HINDU MONISM AND PLURALISM

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As Found in the Upanishads and in the Philosophies Dependent upon Them

BY

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TO MY MOTHER

PREFACE

In his recent book, *The Vedānta and Modern Thought*, Dr. Urquhart dwells at some length upon a certain tendency to extravagance of statement to which writers on Indian thought seem to have been peculiarly liable. Some have been so infected with the idea of the superiority of western philosophy, that they have scarcely been willing to admit that any product of Indian thinking deserved the name of philosophy at all. Others have been so extravagant in their praise of all things Indian that from their works one would suppose that no Indian thinker had ever been in error. Dr. Urquhart might have specified other kinds of bias which are equally destructive in their effects, but which could be amply illustrated from writings on Indian subjects. It is probably too much to hope that the present writer has escaped a fate which appears to be so general, although he has endeavoured to free himself from bias so far as he was conscious of it. But it may be only fair to the reader to state in advance some of the interests which have been in his mind in the making of this study.

The following pages represent one of the principal outcomes of two years of study which it was my privilege to undertake in Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary, New York City, as Dodge Missionary Fellow of the latter institution. During these two years I had the opportunity to follow out in greater detail studies begun some years before while working in a missionary college in north Ceylon. These studies had centred, so to speak, around two foci. In the first place, at the invitation of Dr. J. N. Farquhar, I had undertaken the preparation of a representative series of selections from the

Upanishads.[1] In the performance of this work the conviction was speedily gained that there is to be found in the Upanishads not one normative system of thought, but, on the contrary, a number of different strands of thought, which show some relation to each other, to be sure, but nevertheless have many discordant features. It seemed necessary, therefore, if my selections were to be truly representative, to disentangle these strains from each other so far as might be, and in so doing to appreciate as clearly as possible each one in its own individuality. The further I proceeded with this attempt, the more I felt the need of some study of the later systems which grew out of the Upanishads if I was to make the thought of the Upanishads themselves thoroughly intelligible to myself. And if a system of thought may be regarded as a living organism, it is as reasonable to explain it by what it develops into, as by what it develops out of. In considering Indian philosophy, at least, we do not fully grasp a system of thought until we see the process by which all its inner implications are brought to full expression. This does not mean that we should neglect a careful discrimination of the stages in the development of a system of philosophy. But the later developments may throw real light upon the meaning of the earlier stages.

The second focus of interest in my studies was the problem of the relationship between Hindu and Christian religious development, and, more generally, the relationship between Indian and European thought. As the cultural relationships between India and the West grow closer, it becomes increasingly important that each side should not merely have an historical knowledge of the culture of the other, but should also

[1] This work, under the title *Readings from the Upanishads*, will appear shortly in the Heritage of India series of the Association Press, and will illustrate the present essay, so far as it is concerned with the Upanishads.

be able to understand the significance of that culture for its own. The day has long passed when either side could casually dismiss the thought of the other as unworthy of serious consideration. It has become increasingly clear that many elements of Indian thought have been duplicated with rather curious exactness at various stages in the thought of the West. The relation between some of the cosmological ideas and those of the pre-Socratic thinkers in Greece has long been well-known. There is almost complete identity of literary method between the great classical commentators of India and the somewhat later scholastics of Europe. One of the more recent historians of Indian philosophy finds great similarity between the thought of the Vedānta and that of the English thinker, Bradley. The task of tracing these correspondences, and showing from what similar conditions each arose is one which must be seriously faced. But as this study proceeded, it seemed clear to the present writer that it was better for him to postpone such comparisons for the present. The history of Indian philosophy is still a youthful science, and until much which is at present obscure is explored, it would seem to be the part of prudence to abstain from facile comparisons, especially as such comparison has been a fruitful source of bias in the treatment of the history of Indian philosophy itself. The author feels that such a decision was fortunate, especially in the light of the fact that since his work was practically completed, Dr. Urquhart's *Vedānta and Modern Thought* has carried out this comparison, at least so far as modern European philosophy is concerned, with a far greater ability than he could command.

I cannot conclude this statement without acknowledging the debt of gratitude which I owe to those who have helped me in this work. To Professor Eugene W. Lyman, of Union Theological Seminary, I owe the suggestion of the specific form which this study finally

took, and much painstaking help in its execution. To Professor A. V. Williams Jackson, of Columbia University, I am indebted not only for constant suggestion and criticism throughout my investigation, but for many hours of labour in reading and criticising the final draft in the midst of a sweltering summer. Without his aid this work would have been quite impossible. In addition to these, Professors J. J. Coss of Columbia and R. E. Hume of Union, assisted with their encouragement and advice. It would be invidious to single out from my fellow students and teachers others for special mention, when I am indebted to so many for material or suggestions. But there is one other who has had so great a part in suggesting and directing my work in Indian subjects that I must not leave him unmentioned. It was Dr. J. N. Farquhar, at that time Literary Secretary of the Indian Y.M.C.A., who first gave definite direction to my studies, as he did for so many others in India, and who, so long as he lived, gave most freely of his time in help and criticism. Would that my work might be in any way worthy of the help which he gave to it.

Finally, my thanks are due to the authorities of Union Theological Seminary, who for two years gave me facilities for carrying on this investigation. No one can be more conscious than myself of the imperfections with which I have carried it through. But the task of interpreting the thought of India to the modern world is one which ought to be done, if there is to be any mutual understanding between India and the West, and if this work succeeds in any degree in assisting in the performance of this task, the purpose of the missionary fellowship which I held will be in some measure achieved.

M.H.H.

Kodaikanal,
30 May, 1930.

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Rig.	..	*Rigveda*

The Upanishads are referred to in the following manner:

Ait.	..	*Aitareya Upanishad*
Brih.	..	*Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*
Chānd.	..	*Chāndogya Upanishad*
Īśā	..	*Īśā Upanishad*
Kaṭha	..	*Kaṭha Upanishad*
Kaush.	..	*Kaushītaki Upanishad*
Kena	..	*Kena Upanishad*
Mahān.	..	*Mahānārāyṇa Upanishad*
Maitri	..	*Maitri Upanishad*
Māṇ.	..	*Māṇḍūkya Upanishad*
Muṇḍ.	..	*Muṇḍaka Upanishad*
Praśna	..	*Praśna Upanishad*
Śvet.	..	*Śvetāśvatara Upanishad*
Tait.	..	*Taittirīya Upanishad*

Other abbreviations used which are not immediately obvious are the following:

Aufrecht, *CC.*	..	Th. Aufrecht, *Catalogus Catalogorum*
Bulletin	..	*Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient*
CHI.	..	*Cambridge History of India*
Deussen, *AGP.*	..	Paul Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*
Deussen, *SUV.*	..	Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*
Deussen, *SV.*	..	Deussen, *System of the Vedānta.* English translation by Charles Johnston
Farquhar, *ORLI.*	.	J.N. Farquhar, *Outline of the Religious Literature of India*
ERE.	.	*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*
JAOS.	..	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JRAS.	..	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
Keith, *RPV.*	..	A.B. Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and Upanishads*
SBE.	..	*Sacred Books of the East*
Smith, *EHI.*	.	Vincent Smith, *Early History of India*
V.S.	..	*Vedānta Sūtra*
Winternitz	.	M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der Indischen Litteratur*

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

THE course of Indian philosophical thought may be represented as a long ascent from its scattered and unsystematic beginnings in the Vedas and Upanishads to its climax in the formulation of the philosophical systems. These for the most part received their first definite shape in the centuries immediately following, or possibly in those just preceding, the beginning of the Christian era. These early works, however, were expressed in such an abbreviated form as to lead to endless ambiguity of interpretation; and we shall find the classical expressions of the philosophical systems, not in these first brief works so much as in the productions of the great commentators, whose interpretations remained in some sense authoritative expositions of their contents. These classical commentaries belong to a period which ranges from a few centuries before, to shortly after, A.D. 1000. Up to this point, then, we may think of Indian thought as representing a movement of progress. But after this period of the classical systems we have a change in the course of thought in two ways. First, instead of the creative thinking which we have seen hitherto, philosophical activity is now chiefly directed to further exposition and criticism of the results already obtained. In the second place, the more significant new developments were no longer so much in philosophy as such, as in the closely related realm of religion. Both of these statements are in need of some qualification. In regard to the first, there is room for some doubt as to just the degree in which the classical commentators were actually creative. It is quite possible to believe

that they represent merely the writing down in definite form of an oral tradition which had long been current, and certainly there is much in all of them which is merely commentary, and not in any sense new. But as compared with the succeeding period they do represent much which, for us at least, in our ignorance of the detail of the tradition which had preceded, must appear original. In regard to the second point, it is necessary to remember that in every period Indian philosophy has been very closely connected with religion. All that is meant to be emphasized here is the fact that in the time following this classical period of Indian thought, the really new systems which appeared were in their main emphasis and interest rather religious and sectarian than genuinely philosophical. It is, as we shall see, difficult to draw a clear line of distinction; but it is evident that such a line ought somewhere to be drawn.

If we confine our attention once more to the philosophical sphere, we note that the period of expository and critical, rather than creative, effort has extended in India almost to the present day. Into the causes which produced this cessation of original thought, we are not here concerned to inquire. But it is clear that to the student of Indian thought as a whole the main interest is to be found in the earlier and more progressive period. We turn then to inquire what these classical systems were which were elaborated during that time.

Mādhava, in his well-known, *Compendium of All Systems*,[1] gives a summary of sixteen different systems which were known in his day. These he grades according to his estimate of their philosophical value, giving the lowest place to the *Cārvākas*, or materialists,

[1] *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, translated by Cowell and Gough. It was written in the 14th century A.D. See J. N. Farquhar, *Outline of the Religious Literature of India*, p. 367.

and the highest to the absolute non-dualism of Śaṅkara. Whether we accept Mādhava's valuation or not, it is obvious that the systems which he describes are not all of equal interest and importance. Some of those enumerated are very imperfectly known to us apart from Mādhava's brief summaries. Others, again, such as the grammatical system of Pāṇini, are not philosophies at all in our sense of the term. Others still, such as Buddhism and Jainism, are more commonly reckoned as religions than as philosophies. Without pausing, then, to examine Mādhava's work in detail, we turn to a more usual classification which enumerates six systems as orthodox, i.e. as consistent with the teaching of the Vedas. These are the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, the *Uttara-Mīmāṁsā* or *Vedānta*, the *Sāṅkhya*, the *Yoga*, the *Nyāya*, and the *Vaiśeshika*. But again we find that by no means all of these can claim, at least in the first instance, to be independent systems of philosophy in our sense. The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā is primarily a system of scriptural exegesis; the Yoga is a technique of practical self-discipline for religious purposes; the Nyāya is the Indian logic; the Vaiśeshika is primarily concerned with physics, although, as has happened elsewhere in the world, its atomism is elevated to the dignity of a metaphysic. This leaves us with only the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya to be considered as in their main intent genuine philosophical systems, if we are to consider the orthodox schools alone,[1] and it is only the orthodox systems

[1] cf. Paul Deussen, 'Outlines of Indian Philosophy,' in the *Indian Antiquary*, vol. XXIX (1900), p. 397: 'But the six orthodox schools are not philosophical systems . . . in the strict sense of the term. The *Mīmāṁsā* is only a methodical handbook treating of the various questions arising out of the complicated Vedic ritual. The *Yoga* is a systematic exposition of the method of attaining union with the *Ātman* by means of concentration in oneself. The *Nyāya*, though it treats incidentally of all kinds of philosophical topics, is properly nothing more than a handbook of logic or better of disputation, furnishing a canon for use in controversies. The *Vaiśeshika*, giving a classification of existing things under six categories, is interesting enough, but more from a physical than a philosophical point of view. The only systems of metaphysical importance are the *Sāṅkhyam* and the *Vedānta*.'

which can be considered as belonging to the main line of development of Indian thought. For while nearly every system, including the materialistic Cārvākas, claimed that their system was drawn from the Upanishads, and while it is in a certain sense true that the Upanishads form the point of departure for all forms of Indian thought, still no close connexion can be maintained except in the case of the Vedānta and, in a lesser degree, of the Sāṅkhya. A distinction should however be drawn within the field of the Vedānta itself. It is usual to speak of Śaṅkara's interpretation of the *Vedānta Sūtras* as the Vedānta philosophy *par excellence*. It is not necessary, however, that the term should be so restricted; and Rāmānuja's exposition of the Sūtras represents an independent philosophical attempt, which, while it differs radically from that of Śaṅkara, is in the opinion of some competent critics,[1] truer to their original meaning. Again, Rāmānuja's philosophy, which is technically called modified non-dualism, represents as clearly as does Śaṅkara's a certain strain of thought which is found already in the Upanishads.

We propose, then, in the following essay, to consider the three main tendencies of thought which have their origin in the early stages of Indian reflection upon the nature of the world and reality. These reach their classic expression in the absolute non-dualism of Śaṅkara, the modified non-dualism of Rāmānuja, and the pluralism of the Sāṅkhya system. We shall attempt to trace the origin of these systems, so far as they can be found, in the Upanishads; we shall make an examination of their leading ideas as found in their classic exponents; and finally we shall show what criticisms each passed upon the others. In so doing we shall have come to some degree of understanding

[1] e.g. G. Thibaut, *Vedānta Sūtras*, SBE, vol. XXXIV, pp. c, ci.

of the most significant period in the history of Indian thought.[1]

In this study it will be necessary for us in some degree to restrict the sphere of our inquiry to the main outlines of the metaphysics of the systems which we are to examine. We shall find in them all great masses of material, much of it concerned with psychological and eschatological questions, which was evidently of much importance to the thinkers of that time, but which is only of secondary interest to us. While it is important to remember how large a place this material held in their thinking, the significance of their main results does not depend upon the detail of their work in this direction, but upon their general views. After having shown, then, what their main viewpoint was, we shall not find it necessary to refer to these minutiæ except incidentally.

In another direction the results which we may hope to accomplish will necessarily be limited, although

[1] It may be objected to the delimitation of the field to be covered in this essay as given above, that the determination of what should be included and what excluded is made with some arbitrariness. Thus, Buddhism and Jainism are both in some sense philosophies, and if it be replied that they are primarily ways of salvation, it may be rejoined that all of the philosophies which we have chosen to consider are liable to the same charge. That they are closely connected with the thought of the Upanishads is unquestioned. But if theoretical reasons for their exclusion are insufficient, practical ones are surely more than enough. The study of Buddhism and Jainism requires a different linguistic equipment from that which suffices for the Hindu philosophies; and the study of these religions in consequence has developed into an independent department of research. Somewhat different considerations may be urged in favour of the inclusion of some of the further interpretations of the *Vedānta Sūtras,* since the production of commentaries on this work by no means ceased with those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. V. S. Ghate in his *Etude sur les Brahma-Sūtras et leurs cinq commentaires* studies those mentioned and three others. Th. Aufrecht, *Catalogus Catalogorum*, vol. I, pp. 383 ff., lists no less than 49 commentaries and 42 super-commentaries upon the Sūtras. Of course, the majority of these belong to one or the other of the well-defined schools. Perhaps the greatest claim for inclusion can be urged in favour of Mādhava or Ānandatīrtha, who lived in the thirteenth century, and whose point of view is technically known as *dvaita* or dualism. But an examination of his work makes it clear that he belongs much more definitely to the sectarian religious movement than to philosophy. The same charge can be made, although to a much less degree, against Rāmānuja. We cannot lay claim to perfect consistency, but it is necessary to draw the line somewhere.

in this case unwillingly. An ideal presentation of the philosophy of a given period would depict the philosophical movements in close correlation with the other aspects of the historical life of the time. It would thus be able to explain the movement of thought not merely by the development of the ideas contained in it, but as a product of all the forces of the contemporaneous civilization. Such a programme, while quite feasible in connexion with many periods of European philosophy, can only very imperfectly be carried out in the case of Indian thought. History has been cultivated by Indian writers only in a sporadic fashion. Much of the historical data which we do possess has been gathered from inscriptions, from copper-plate land grants, and similar material; and while this is valuable as fixing a skeleton framework of chronology, it gives us very little of the insight into social development which we require for our present study. Some of the most important documents for the history of Indian philosophy can be dated only with a possible error of several centuries. For some parts of the period covered by our study it is doubtful whether the materials for the understanding of social conditions will ever allow us to make more than a conjectural reconstruction. For the later portions of our period it is probable that the contemporary life will in the future be more fully understood. But it is unfortunate that, while the great classical philosophers, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, belonged to the south, the history of India has for the most part been written from the point of view of the north, with an occasional appendix on what was happening south of the Vindhya mountains. This defect in the treatment of Indian history has at length been noticed even by the historians themselves[1] but it cannot be said that we as yet possess any clear and

[1] See Vincent Smith, *Early History of India*, p. 8.

satisfactory account of the history of south India. Under these circumstances, therefore, the correlation of the history of philosophy with the other historical factors in the life of the Indian people must be very imperfect; and while we shall endeavour to include references to non-philosophical factors in the situation, so far as we are warranted by known facts, we cannot pretend that it is as yet possible to carry through such a programme with any thoroughness. We are obliged to take our facts where we can find them, and it has so far turned out that the literary material which has come down to us from the past in India is far more instructive for the history of philosophy and religion than it is for the history of more practical affairs. This is not to deny that there is much literary material of a non-philosophical nature which remains to be utilized. But much of it still lies hidden away in manuscript where it is inaccessible except to the special investigator.

It may be inquired to whom such a project as this, if successfully carried out, might be expected to prove useful. It can hardly be any longer anticipated that the study of Indian thought is likely to bring about any very striking change in the course of western philosophy. In spite of the enthusiasm of Schopenhauer and Deussen for the Upanishads and the Vedānta, their brilliant advocacy has secured few converts. It has instead been found, as was indeed freely admitted by Deussen, that Indian thought is significant more because of its parallelism with movements in the west than for any radically novel feature. While it is not necessary for us to pronounce upon the absolute value of Indian thought in advance, the fact that some degree of knowledge of it has been present in the west for about a century without its producing any very striking effect upon the course of western thinking tends to make such an effect unlikely in the future.

Such a study as this, then, will be primarily of value to those who are already for some reason specially interested in the life and thought of India. This group of persons is not limited to those whose interest is merely in the past, for to a large extent the philosophical ideas which will here be described have lived on in one form or another to affect the life of the present. But such a presentation of Indian thought should also have a certain value to others who have no special interest in India. For while it is true that Indian philosophy has, at least as yet, made little contribution to the thought of the west, it is not for that reason to be denied a place in the history of philosophy, if that subject is to be conceived as a human and not a provincial affair. In the total history of human thought, the philosophy of India has been by no means an unimportant episode; and through its influence upon the religion of Buddhism, it has had something of the place in the thought of Asia which Greek philosophy, through its influence upon Christianity, has had in the west.[1] In the closer relations into which the nations of the modern world are rapidly being drawn, it is important that the bases of a cultural understanding between east and west should be laid. To this task the historian of philosophy may well contribute. But we do not believe that this is the only interest which Indian thought may have to the student of philosophy. As already hinted, there are to be discovered numerous parallelisms between the thought of India and that of the west. It is probable that in most instances this does not indicate historical borrowing, but rather that when similar problems were set, parallel solutions were arrived at. A knowledge of how the problems of western thought have been dealt

[1] It is noteworthy as illustrating this point that the first complete translation of the canon of one hundred and eight Upanishads into a modern language has been made neither in India nor in the west, but in Japan. It has been carried out by J. Takakusu and others under the auspices of Tokyo University. See the *Modern Review* (Calcutta) November, 1925.

with by others may throw light both upon the nature of the problems themselves and upon the processes involved in their solution. While our study, then, may not help materially the establishment of western systems either of monism or of pluralism, it should be of some value to point out what motives and what mental processes have led people of another culture to arrive at one position or the other.

But Indian thought may be of some importance to those who are not directly concerned with the study either of India or of philosophy. The student of religion finds in India one of the richest sources for his material, and the Indian philosophies, as we have already indicated, are most closely connected with religion. Those also whose interest is in the general history of human culture will find here materials for their study.

We have spoken thus far of those whose interests are philosophic or scientific. Of the popular movements in contemporary western life one of the more noteworthy is the interest in Oriental philosophies or cults. While much of this interest has been very superficial, there has been involved in it to some extent the desire to understand a strange and remote form of thought. When this desire has not been met by the ordinary sources of information, fanciful or extreme ideas have been introduced which are in some cases in need of correction. It is desirable that an exact knowledge of Indian thought should be available, if for no other purpose than to correct the misunderstandings of it which are current.

When we turn again, however, to our more immediate project, criticisms of it may be raised from two opposite points of view. It may be criticized either as unnecessary or as over-ambitious. It appears unnecessary because previous studies covering much the same ground already exist. Although I believe that apart from general histories of Indian philosophy, no other single work has attempted to survey precisely

the same field, yet every part of it has been covered not once but repeatedly by previous writers. In particular, the Upanishads and Śaṅkara are well-worn themes for students of India. But it must be confessed that much of this literature is manifestly second-hand, and the number of those who have taken care to base their exposition of the Vedānta upon Śaṅkara's own text is comparatively small. As compared with Śaṅkara's Vedānta, Rāmānuja and the Sāṅkhya are less known, but they have still each been the subject of considerable scholarly research. When we look critically, however, at the particular works which have attempted the task at first hand, we cannot regard even the ablest of them as beyond the possibility of improvement. The early European writers on Indian philosophy were generally dominated by the interpretation put upon it by the followers of Śaṅkara, and the Upanishads in particular were interpreted almost entirely from that point of view.[1] The beginnings of a more historical standpoint are to be seen in Deussen, who because of his enthusiasm for the study of Indian thought, and because of his extensive acquaintance with the actual texts, deserves great credit as a pioneer in this realm of scholarship. But in spite of Deussen's many excellencies, he suffers from several considerable defects. He has a strong bias in favour of Schopenhauer's philosophy, which frequently gets the better of his historical understanding. The Upanishads are

[1] At the same time, some of these earlier writers possessed an enormous store of erudition concerning things Indian which is all the more remarkable in view of the lack of convenient works of reference. This fact, and the circumstance that many of them lived in India at a time when the old philosophies were still a living part of the best intellectual activity of the time, make their works still of interest to consult. In this connexion may be mentioned two early Indian Christian writers, whose writings, although of course acknowledged propaganda, still give a more vivid sense of the systems which they were endeavouring to refute than is often to be gained from more academic treatises. They are K. M. Banerjea, who wrote *Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy*, and N. N. Goreh who composed in Hindi *A Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems*, which is translated into English by Fitz-Edward Hall.

interpreted by him as approximating to the highest results of European thought, although he admits that they are in need of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* for their completion. He has a peculiar theory of degradation in Indian thought, which makes the absolute idealism of Yājñavalkya the earliest as well as the highest strand of the Upanishads, from which every other later element is derived by a process of decline. We shall have to criticize this theory in detail in later chapters. Here we merely point out that while both his *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, and his *System of the Vedānta* still contain probably the best collection of the material which we possess, apart from the texts themselves, his conception of the connexion of thought has long been subject to serious criticism.

Of the two histories of Indian philosophy by Indian scholars which have appeared in recent years[1] much can be said by way of commendation. They represent the first attempts since Max Müller and Deussen to give a connected survey of the whole field of Indian thought, and in many ways they mark the progress which has been made by scholarship. They also make an advance in giving a much more satisfactory account of the later stages in the history of Indian thought than we have hitherto possessed. In comparing them with each other, Dasgupta shows a closer acquaintance with the Indian sources, while Radhakrishnan, through his extensive acquaintance with modern western philosophy, is able to make his results more readily intelligible to the western reader. But these writers would not claim for themselves that their work represented more than a report of progress in the study of Indian philosophy, and Dasgupta's work is still incomplete. In examining them more particularly, we find that occasionally

[1] S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I (1922); S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vols. I (1923), II (1927).

Dasgupta expresses views in regard to the dates of the documents which he uses that are not likely to commend themselves to western scholars, and his practice of treating each school as a whole, without any very clear distinction between its earlier and later members, although it has certain advantages in the treatment of Indian philosophy, still obscures the process of the development of thought, which may be of greater importance to us than the philosophical results themselves. Radhakrishnan, although he endeavours to be scrupulously fair to each system which he studies, cannot always conceal his preference for the Vedānta, and not infrequently appears in the light of an advocate rather than an expositor of Indian philosophy. His treatment of the Upanishads, however, where such a prejudice is most likely to manifest itself, is much sounder than that of Deussen's. Our conclusion, then, in regard to these two works is that, while we must be very grateful for the contributions they make, their existence does not preclude the necessity for furthur study.

Perhaps the ablest writer on Indian philosophy at the present time is Berriedale Keith, whose little book on the Sāṅkhya system, and now his large work on the religion and philosophy of the Vedas and Upanishads are possibly the best treatments of their respective subjects. We shall have detailed criticisms of his work to make further on. Perhaps the only general criticism which I should care to pass upon his work would be that his careful analytic method in the presentation of facts sometimes gives the reader the impression that he is dealing with a collection of museum specimens which are being carefully labelled for preservation, rather than with a culture that was once at least genuinely alive. However this may be, he has not yet treated the systems of either Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja.

But the project which I have outlined may be

criticized from a precisely opposite point of view. It may be claimed, and with good reason, that such a project cannot be successfully accomplished so long as the necessary preliminary critical work on the sources has not been carried through. Of all the documents which we shall have occasion to employ, the Upanishads are probably the most studied and best known. Yet we can hardly say that even for them we as yet have a satisfactory edition of the text, constructed according to the principles that would be held essential in the editing of a Greek or Latin document. Something has been done in the case of the Upanishads towards analyzing them into their literary sources, but further study along this line might prove significant. When we come to the later texts, however, we are in a realm of very great uncertainty. Strictly speaking, we have no accurate idea of what Śaṅkara wrote. All that we can be definitely sure of is that he could not possibly have written the greater part of what has been attributed to him. Even in the work which is most definitely thought to be his, the commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*, it appears not impossible that interpolations have been added by a later hand.[1] It is clear, then, that before any finally satisfactory presentation of the course of Indian philosophy can be given, a truly immense amount of philological work will be required. We can only admit the truth of this criticism; but it does not appear to us to be a final objection to the usefulness of our plan. For it seems likely that the work of understanding Indian thought will best be promoted if the two operations of historical criticism and philosophical understanding are carried on simultaneously, instead of postponing the latter until the critical process is complete. While our results are of course contingent upon the findings of further

[1] cf. Deussen, *The System of the Vedānta*, p. 28 f. where he gives a list of what in his opinion are the chief interpolations.

critical study, they should, on the other hand, also furnish useful material for the carrying on of that pursuit.

In concluding, we wish to make a few further remarks as to the actual procedure which we shall employ in carrying out our plan. We do not mean to trace the full development of each of the systems which we have to describe, but only to discover its origin in the Upanishads, and to explain its classical statement in its standard text or commentary. In this way we shall avoid some of the difficult critical questions which are connected with the intermediate literature. It will be necessary for us to alter this procedure somewhat in the case of the Sāṅkhya, where the beginnings in the Upanishads are more obscure. But even here we expect to put our chief emphasis upon the beginnings and upon the normal form of the system, rather than upon the intermediate stages. In the development of our plan, then, we shall first give some account of the sources which we shall employ. We shall next speak of some general considerations in regard to Indian thought during our period, which, since they apply more or less equally to all the systems with which we are concerned may readily be discussed once for all. We shall then turn to the three particular systems, treating in each case its origin in the Upanishads and its normal form in its standard text or commentary. Finally, we shall indicate the criticisms which each system passed upon the other, and present our own conclusions.

CHAPTER II

THE SOURCES

1. The Upanishads

THE course of philosophical reflection in India did not begin with the Upanishads. The break with the naturalistic polytheism of the Vedic religion and the beginning of independent speculation is to be found in certain of the hymns of the *Ṛigveda* itself. In the *Atharvaveda* and the *Brāhmaṇas* there are to be found further stages in the progress of thought. But we shall have no occasion in this study, except incidentally and in connexion with particular ideas, to employ sources more ancient than the Upanishads; for the philosophic ideas which the earlier literature contains are for the most part repeated in some form in these later documents,[1] while those ideas which did not find entrance there are of negligible importance in the history of later thought.[2] Further, while, as we shall see, the developed systems claimed in various ways to depend upon the authority of the Vedas, their dependence is in most cases actually upon the Upanishads rather than upon other Vedic writings. This is most readily illustrated in the case of Śaṅkara, where, as Deussen points out,[3] all but one hundred and

[1] e.g. the reaction against the gods of popular religion which is implied in such hymns as *Ṛigveda*, 2. 12 or 10. 151 is paralleled in *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 10; the tendency to unity in *Ṛigveda*, 1. 164. 46, in *Bṛih.* 3. 9. 1–9 and in many other passages; in *Ṛigveda*, 10. 129 it is denied that the world arose from either being or non-being. In *Chānd.* 6. 21–2, *Tait.* 2. 7 the origin of the world from these sources is discussed. For other parallelisms and developments in thought see chap. iv.

[2] Such are the mystical ideas of certain of the hymns of the *Atharvaveda*, e.g. 13. 1–3, 4. 11, 10. 10. These will be found to be discussed by Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. I, i, pp. 212–37.

[3] *The System of the Vedānta*, p. 32.

fifty out of more than two thousand Vedic quotations are from the Upanishads, and this in spite of the small compass of the Upanishads as compared with the huge bulk of other Vedic literature.

While the beginnings of philosophical reflection undoubtedly antedate the Upanishads, we should be seriously misled if we were to understand the Upanishads themselves as primarily philosophical treatises, or as setting forth any unified point of view. This is the way in which the founders of the classical systems endeavoured to understand them, but in this they must be regarded as unsuccessful. Thus Śaṅkara[1] divides the whole of Vedic literature into two sections, the *karma-kaṇḍa*, or section on works, which treats of the Vedic ritual and sacrifices, and includes our Saṁhitās and Brāhmaṇas, and the *jñāna-kaṇḍa*, or section on knowledge, which is limited to the Upanishads. The Vedānta school confined itself to the latter of these sections, leaving the discussion of the section on works, which it regarded as less important, to the school of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. Within the limits of the Upanishads, Śaṅkara endeavoured to find a single consistent view of the nature of *Brahma*, and this he was obliged to do, as we shall see later, because of his teaching in regard to their nature as revelation. A later Vedāntic conception made the Upanishads one member of the so-called Triple Source (*prasthāna-traya*), the other members of which were the *Bhagavadgītā* and Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta Sūtra*.[2] But while they are thus regarded as on an equality with these later treatises, they are in many ways the least philosophical of the three. This view of the Upanishads as primarily a unified philosophical source, has, however, had great influence both

[1] In the introduction to his commentary on the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, The Works of Śaṅkara, Memorial edition, vol. VIII, p. 4.

[2] On the *prasthāna-traya* see Farquhar, *ORLI*, p. 172. cf. also Vedāntasāra, sec. 1, translated by G. A. Jacob, *Manual of Hindu Pantheism*, p. 13.

upon Indian thought and upon earlier European scholarship. In India hundreds of commentaries have been written to prove that this or that system was the one which the Upanishads meant to teach, and in the west most scholars until the time of Deussen interpreted them in accordance with Śaṅkara's view. But this method of interpretation has now been given up by Indian as well as by western scholars,[1] and it becomes our duty to inquire more particularly as to what the Upanishads are as well as into the circumstances of their origin.

A preliminary difficulty in attempting to understand the nature of the Upanishads lies in the fact that although all orthodox schools maintained their dependence upon them, no authoritative canon was ever made. Śaṅkara in his commentary upon the *Vedānta Sūtras* made use of eleven Upanishads, and commentaries under his name are extant for eleven; although the Upanishads included in the two groups are not precisely the same.[2] A few other Upanishads are mentioned by him incidentally.[3] In Rāmānuja the number of Upanishads used is increased to eighteen.[4]

[1] The change from the older point of view is significantly expressed by both Dasgupta and Radhakrishnan. Dasgupta writes (*A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 42): '. . . It is necessary that a modern interpreter of the Upanishads should turn a deaf ear to the absolute claims of these exponents, and look upon the Upanishads not as a systematic treatise but as a depository of diverse currents of thought—the melting pot in which all later philosophic ideas were still in a state of fushion.' Radhakrishnan puts it thus (*Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 141): 'But the problem is, do all of the thoughts of the Upanishads hang together? Could all of them be traced to certain commonly acknowledged principles about the general make-up of the world? We are not so bold as to answer this question in the affirmative. . . . The Upanishads do not contain any philosophic synthesis as such of the type of the system of Aristotle or of Kant or of Śaṅkara.' We should like to add that in our view there are many things besides philosophic ideas in the melting pot.

[2] For his quotations in the commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras* see Deussen, *SV.* p. 37. The Upanishads found in both lists are the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, *Chāndogya*, *Taittirīya*, *Kena*, *Kaṭha*, *Īśā*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Praśna*, and *Svetāśvatara*. The *Kaushītaki* is quoted but not commented upon, and the *Māṇḍūkya* is commented upon, but not quoted.

[3] The *Paiṅgī*, *Agnirahasya*, *Jābāla*, *Nārāyaṇīya* and an unknown *Atharva Upanishad*.

[4] i.e. the eleven quoted by Śaṅkara, with the addition of the *Jābāla*, *Garbha*, *Culika*, *Mahānārāyaṇa*, *Mahā*, *Maitrāyaṇa*, and *Subala*.

In the year 1656, when the Upanishads were translated into Persian at the order of the Mughal prince, Dārā Shikoh, fifty were included,[1] and it was this collection which was ultimately translated into Latin by Anquetil Duperron and thus came to the notice of European scholars at the very beginning of the nineteenth century. But other collections were current in India, in particular, one of fifty-two texts known to the early European scholar, Colebrooke; while in south India a canon of one hundred and eight members was accepted, which is vouched for by one of the late Upanishads, the *Muktikā*. But other claimants to a place in the one hundred and eight were known, so that Weber was able to find no less than 235 titles which had some claim to the term 'Upanishad'.[2] A more carefully winnowed list of 123 members is given by Farquhar.[3] It is at once seen to be very likely that the Upanishads form a literature which has been added to enormously in fairly modern times, an assumption which is confirmed by an examination of the texts themselves. Modern scholars have therefore for the most part restricted their study to the certainly older and more original Upanishads, and some measure of agreement has grown up as to what documents are to be included in this group. Max Müller in his translation for the 'Sacred Books of the East', included twelve, viz. those referred to as quoted by Śaṅkara with the addition of the *Maitrāyaṇa*. Deussen translated no less than sixty, but he makes a clear distinction between fourteen which have more or less claim to a connexion with the Vedic schools, and the later Upanishads where no such connexion can be made. Hume translates Müller's twelve with the

[1] See Farquhar, *ORLI.* p. 287.
[2] For details in regard to Colebrooke's and the *Muktikā's* lists see Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*, pp. 533, 537. The *Muktikā* is translated in Narayanaswami Aiyar, *Thirty Minor Upanishads*, pp. 1–12. The Upanishads of the *Oupnekhat* are all included in Deussen's sixty.
[3] *ORLI.* p. 364.

addition of the *Māṇḍūkya*. Keith in his *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas*[1] includes the *Mahānārāyaṇa*, making his fourteen the same as those selected by Deussen. There seems to be good reason for considering these fourteen as a distinct group[2] and hereafter when we speak of the Upanishads without qualification, it will be these fourteen which will be meant.

But although we have thus marked off a certain class of writings which may be considered together, it remains to be seen what common qualities they possess. We take our first clue from the name of 'Upanishad', which was applied to them from a very early period.[3] The derivation and original meaning of this word have been matters of dispute. Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*[4] in accordance with his philosophic view makes it mean the 'utter extinction of *saṁsāra*' (i.e. the round of repeated birth) 'together with its cause, for those who make that their aim', deriving the word from the root, *sad*, meaning ordinarily 'to sit', but sometimes, and especially in the compound form *avasādana*, 'to cause to sink down', 'to cause ruin or extinction'. He takes the prefixes, *upa-ni*, in the sense of intensification, and thus the whole word means 'utter extinction'. This derivation is repeated in his commentaries on the *Kaṭha*, the *Muṇḍaka*, and the *Taittirīya*.[5] But he gives in the *Muṇḍaka* and the *Taittirīya* commentaries two alternative meanings, either that the doctrine of the Upanishads 'cuts down' (*ni-śataya*) the collection of evils, viz. the embryo state,

[1] p. 499.

[2] i.e. the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, *Chāndogya*, *Taittirīya*, *Aitareya*, *Kaushītaki*, *Kena*, *Kaṭha*, *Īśā*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Praśna*, *Māṇḍūkya*, *Śvetāśvatara*, *Maitri*, and *Mahānārāyaṇa*.

[3] The name is found as belonging to a class of literary works already in *Bṛih.* 4. 5. 11, but it is not certain that it is not, with some of the other literary categories mentioned, an interpolation, since the Mādhyaṁdina recension of the Upanishad omits a number of items which are found in the Kāṇva text.

[4] Memorial Edition, vol. VIII, p. 3.

[5] ibid. vol. IV, p. 129; vol. VIII, p. 9; vol. VI, p. 11.

birth, old age, ill-health, etc., or that it leads to the higher Brahma. In spite of this variety of explanations, western scholars for the most part reject them all, on the grounds that they are philologically inexact, and that they imply conceptions which are themselves developments from the thought of the Upanishads. Instead, the word is held by most to be derived from *sad*, to sit, and *upa-ni*, near; in other words, it is a sitting, or session, for the purpose of communicating instruction, and hence by association of ideas, the sacred knowledge which is thus imparted.[1] The etymology of Oldenberg[2], which associates *upanishad* with *upāsana*, or adoration, has not met with general acceptance. But while the etymology which makes the word mean 'session' is probably correct, it does not do justice to the actual meaning of the word as we find it in the texts themselves. For there the word *upanishad* is used simply in the sense of 'secret', a mystic word or saying. So, for example,[3] it is said: 'The secret (*upanishad*) of him who knows it thus is "Let one not beg". It is as if one who had begged in a village without receiving anything were to sit down nearby saying, "I would not eat anything given from here." Those very ones who formerly refused him summon him saying, "Let us give to you." Such is the characteristic of one who does not beg.'

In other words, in a country where the wandering holy man is believed to possess supernatural powers to punish those who offend him, non-begging is a valuable professional secret. 'One should not beg,' this is his secret, his 'Upanishad'. Again, certain expressions, practically meaningless in themselves, such as *satyasya satyam*[4] or *tajjalān*,[5] were used to sum up important doctrines, and were known as Upanishads.

[1] See M. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, s.v. Upanishad; Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 13; A. Berriedale Keith, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and Upanishads*, p. 489.

[2] *Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Budhismus*, p. 37.

[3] *Kaush.* 2. 1. [4] *Bṛih.* 2. 1. 20. [5] *Chānd.* 4. 14. 1.

The connexion of this meaning of 'secret' with that of 'session' becomes clear when we discover that the teachings contained in these books were not intended for the general public, but were to be confined to a small group. In the first place, all teaching of revealed Scripture was to be confined to the three highest castes according to the provisions of religious law,[1] and doubtless in practice this knowledge was largely confined to Brāhmans. But the Upanishads were still more narrowly circumscribed. We read in several instances in the earlier Upanishads[2] lists of all those who had been possessors of the knowledge of the Upanishads previous to the time of the final fixing of the texts, and likewise in several cases we have severe penalties enjoined upon those who allowed the knowledge to spread beyond a certain narrow circle of relatives or pupils.[3] It is clear, then, that the Upanishads were 'sittings' or 'sessions' for the acquisition of esoteric knowledge, knowledge which was not to be made known to the world at large, and which was at least at first actually confined to very small groups. To be sure, in later times when the custom had been established of taking the Upanishads as dogmatic authorities, new Upanishads were written which were meant to serve as the theological textbooks of particular sects. But even then, certain ones such as the *Garbha*, which deals with embryology, fail to fit into this description.

Thus far we have spoken of the Upanishads as if they were independent literary works, and such doubtless the majority of them have always been in some sense, while nearly all of them came ultimately to be so regarded. But for the oldest of them another factor

[1] *Mānava-dharma-śāstra*, 4. 99, *Gautama-dharma-śāstra*, 12. 4-6. The latter is specially severe: 'If a Sudra intentionally listens to a recitation of the Vedas, his ears shall be filled with molten tin or lac; if he recites Vedic texts his tongue shall be cut out; if he remembers them his body shall be split in twain.'

[2] *Bṛih.* 2. 6, 4. 6, 6. 3, 6–12, 6. 4. 4, 6. 5; *Chānd.* 3. 11. 4, 8. 15. 1, etc.

[3] See *Bṛih.* 6. 6. 12; *Chānd.* 3. 11. 5; *Śvet.* 6. 22, etc.

must now be considered. Whatever may have been the origin of the ideas contained in these oldest Upanishads (a matter which we shall have soon to consider) their transmission to us in their present literary form was due to the inclusion of these ideas in the literature of the Brāhman schools which is known under the general term of Veda. This factor is important for our consideration at this point, because it probably served to determine in some measure what material should be included in these works. As is well known, the Vedic literature was preserved in the first instance not through manuscripts but through the existence of a large number of schools, in each of which some particular portion or recension of the Vedas was committed to memory.[1] These schools, or at least some of them, did not confine themselves to the strictly professional preparation of priests, but gave something in the way of a general education for boys of the three higher castes,[2] an arrangement for which provision was made in the later theory which made studentship one of the regular stages in the life of all male members of those castes.

We have no need here to take into account all that may have been taught in these schools. But the oldest part of that material was the Vedic texts themselves,

[1] On these Vedic schools or *śākhās* see M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Literatur*, vol. I, p. 48; Farquhar, *ORLI.* p. 21.

[2] Interesting glimpses into early stages in this development of an educational curriculum are given in the Upanishads themselves. Thus in *Chānd.* 6. 1. 1–2, Śvetaketu Āruṇeya learns all the four Vedas between the ages of twelve and twenty-four. In *Chānd.* 7. 1. 2, we have a list of the subjects studied by Narada: 'the *Ṛigveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmaveda*, the *Atharvan* as the fourth (and) tradition and ancient lore (*itihāsa-purāṇa*) as the fifth Veda of the Vedas, the ritual for the Manes (*pitryam*), sums (*rāśi*), portents (*daivam*), chronology (*nidhi*), argumentation (*vākovākyam*), worldly wisdom (*ekāyanam*), the science of the gods (*deva-vidyā*), the science of holy knowledge (*brāhma-vidyā*), the science of demons (*bhūta-vidyā*), military science (*kshatra-vidyā*), the science of the stars (*nakshatra-vidyā*), the science of the race of the serpent gods (*sarpa-deva-jana-vidyā*).' In this list no division is drawn between the religious and the secular, or between inspired (*śruti*) and merely traditional material (*smṛiti*). In a much later Upanishad, the *Maitri* (7.10), it is stated that a Brahman should not study non-Vedic subjects.

consisting of two principal parts, the *mantras* or hymns, and the *brāhmaṇas*, or priestly commentaries, which showed how the hymns were to be employed in the sacrificial ritual. Each of the schools had its own recension of the mantra portion which it studied, while the Brāhmaṇa was a separate work in each school. Now as they have come down to us, the Upanishads are, in theory at least, the concluding chapters of the Brāhmaṇas, to which they are attached with varying degrees of closeness. In some cases the transition from Brāhmaṇa to Upanishad is made by means of an intermediate work called an *Āraṇyaka*, or book of meditations for use in the forest. Or, to state the matter more accurately, the Brāhmaṇa in some cases contains an Āraṇyaka, which in turn includes an Upanishad. In one case, that of the *Īśā*, the Upanishad, perhaps because of its metrical form, has been included in the Saṁhitā, or mantra portion of the Veda. The actual connexions of the Upanishads with the Vedic schools may be seen from the table on the following page[1]:

From this table it is evident that in the case of certain of the Upanishads, in particular, the *Aitareya*, *Kaushītaki*, *Chāndogya*, *Taittirīya* and *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, the connexion with the Vedic schools is close and vital, while in others it is either doubtful or non-existent. This fact, as we shall see, has its importance for the determination of dates, but our interest in it here lies in the fact that a close connexion with a Vedic school had some influence upon the determination of the kind of material which was included in the Upanishad. This can be seen most clearly in the *Taittirīya Upanishad*, the first chapter of which is called the Śikshā-Vallī, or 'Chapter Concerning Instruction'. This contains among other material a section on the elements of pronunciation,[2] a subject

[1] This table is dependent for its facts upon Farquhar, *ORLI.* pp. 27, 30, 54, 58 and upon the introductions to the Upanishads in Deussen, *SUV.*
[2] *Tait.* 1. 2.

SCHOOLS	BRĀHMAṆAS	ĀRAṆYAKAS	UPANISHADS
I. Of the Ṛigveda			
1. The Aitareyins	*Aitareya*	*Aitareya*	*Aitareya*[1]
2. The Kaushītakins	*Kaushītaki* (or *Śāṅkhāyana*)	*Kaushītaki*	*Kaushītaki*[2]
II. Of the Sāmaveda			
1. The Tāṇḍins	*Pañcaviṃśa*		
	Shaḍviṃśa		
	Chāndogya		*Chāndogya*[3]
2. The Talavakāras	(*Jaiminīya* or *Talavakāra*)		*Kena*[4]
III. Of the Yajurveda			
1. The Kāṭhakas	(*Kāṭhaka*)[5]		*Kaṭha*
2. (The Kapishṭala-Kaṭhas)[6]			
3. The Maitrāyaṇīyas[7]			*Maitri*
4. The Taittirīyas	*Taittirīya*	*Taittirīya*	*Taittirīya*[8]
			Mahānārāyaṇa
5. (The Śvetāśvataras)[9]			*Śvetāśvatara*
6. The Vājasaneyins	*Śatapatha*	*Brihad*[10]	*Brihadāraṇyaka*[11]
			Īśā

IV. Of the Atharvaveda

The *Muṇḍaka*, *Praśna*, and *Māṇḍūkya*, as well as the later Upanishads are usually assigned to the *Atharvaveda*; but as this Veda was not recognized as on an equality with the others until a later period, there was not the same regular development of schools or of literature in connexion with it.

[1] The Upanishad forms the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions of the second Āraṇyaka of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*.—Deussen, *SUV*. p. 13.

[2] The Upanishad forms ādhyāyas 3–6 of the *Kaushītaki Āraṇyaka*. —Deussen, *SUV*. p. 21.

[3] The Upanishad forms ādhyāyas 3–10 of the *Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa*. —Deussen, *SUV*. p. 64.

[4] The *Jaiminīya-Upanishad-Brāhmaṇa* is described by Winternitz, vol. I, p. 204, as an Āraṇyaka. It contains the *Kena Upanishad* embedded in it.

[5] The *Kāṭhaka Brāhmaṇa* is partially preserved in *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, 3. 10–12, and *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, 1–2. The *Kāṭhakas'* own recension has been lost.—Deussen, *SUV*. p. 213. The *Kaṭha Upanishad*, while it belongs to the school, is an independent work.

which was later to become the material for a special science. The subject is presented in the Upanishad merely by means of catchwords, which were doubtless to be explained at length in the oral instruction of the teacher. This chapter contains also two sections of moral precepts for students,[1] in the first of which the point most emphasized is that the supreme duty is the study and teaching of the Veda—doubtless a matter of great importance at a time when the preservation of all literature depended upon the powers of memory of successive generations of scholars. Another item from this chapter which shows the influence of this school tradition is the prayer for teachers,[2] which requests, among other blessings, that their knowledge may not fail them in teaching, and that they may have plenty of students. The *Chāndogya* not only contains frequent references to the system of education,[3] but its concluding passage is an impressive exhortation on the conduct of life, addressed, as Hume thinks,[4] to the pupil as he departs from his teacher at the end of his studentship. In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* we have near the end of the last book[5] detailed instructions regarding the religious conduct of family life, perhaps

[6] A fragmentary Saṁhitā of the Kapishṭala-Kaṭha school is known, but no other works.

[7] The *Maitri* or *Maitrāyaṇa Upanishad* appears to belong to the Maitrāyaṇīya school, although this school possesses no separate Brāhmaṇa beside its Saṁhitā.—Deussen, *SUV*. p. 312.

[8] The *Taittirīya Upanishad* forms the seventh, eighth and ninth sections of the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, while the *Mahānārāyaṇa Upanishad* forms section ten of the same work.—Deussen, *SUV*. p. 213.

[9] A Śvetāśvatara school is spoken of (Deussen, *SUV*. p. 288) but no literature of their school is known with the exception of the Upanishad itself.

[10] The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 14. 1–3, in the Kāṇva recension is sometimes known as the *Brihad Āraṇyaka* , while 14. 4–9 of the same work is the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*.

[11] The *Iśā Upanishad* is ādhyāya 40 of the Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā of the White Yajurveda.

[1] *Tait*. 1. 9, 11.

[2] *Tait*. 1. 4.

[3] *Chānd*, 2. 23. 1, 4. 4, 4. 19, 5. 3, 6. 1. 1, 7. 1. 1. In 8. 7. 2, even the gods and the demons go to school.

[4] See the section-heading in R. E. Hume, *Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, p. 274.

[5] *Bṛih*. 6. 4.

placed at this point because of the imminent departure of the student to enter upon the householder's duties. Material of a similar nature, although apparently not of a high ethical standard, is found also in the *Kaushītaki*.[1]

The result of these two factors—the making of a collection of 'Secrets' and the provision of matter to meet the needs of students for instruction—has been the gathering together of a remarkable medley of material. We may find in the earlier Upanishads details concerning ritual observances,[2] and their interpretation in mystical terms,[3] semi-magical rites,[4] domestic observances,[5] prayers,[6] mythology,[7] physiology,[8] psychology,[9] cosmology,[10] ethics,[11] dramatic[12] and didactic poetry,[13] dialogues,[14] and even grammar,[15] etymologies[16] and riddles.[17] While there is to be found this bewildering variety, it may still be said that the principal contents of the earlier Upanishads as well as the later ones is of two kinds. We have first mystic interpretations of ceremonies which were already known, but which acquire a greater or different power if the performer possesses the knowledge of their secret significance. These are comparatively unimportant philosophically, but they occupy a considerable portion of the actual texts. The second kind of material is the discussion of subjects of religious philosophy, which at first are often treated in dialogue form, recalling the *Brāhmodyas*, or disputations about Brāhma, which often accompanied the great sacrifices

[1] *Kaush*. 2. 4. 10. [2] e.g. *Chānd*. 4. 17. 4-7. [3] e.g. *Bṛih*. 1. 1.
[4] e.g. *Bṛih*. 6. 3. [5] e.g. *Kaush*. 2. 11. [6] e.g. *Tait*. 1. 4.
[7] Myths on two subjects in particular, viz. creation as e.g. in *Bṛih*. 1. 4, and the contest of the senses for superiority, as e.g. at *Bṛih*. 6. 1. 7–14 are repeated in many different forms.
[8] To be found in such lists as *Tait*. 1. 7. [9] ibid. [10] ibid.
[11] Ethical passages are to be found in *Bṛih*. 3. 5, 5. 2; *Chānd*. 2. 23; *Tait*. 1. 9, 11. [12] e.g. the *Kaṭha*, *passim*.
[13] e.g. the *Īśā*, *Muṇḍaka*, and portions of most of the Upanishads.
[14] The most important sections of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and the *Chānd ogya* are in dialogue form. [15] *Tait*. 1–2.
[16] e.g. *Bṛih*. 1. 2. 1 *et passim*. [17] e.g. *Bṛih*. 1. 4. 9.

in the Brāhmaṇa period[1] but which are later put forth dogmatically. This philosophical discussion and teaching gained complete possession of the later Upanishads, with the result that most of them are fairly well unified treatises; and while they do not agree in giving any single religious philosophy, yet extraneous matter no longer finds ready entrance.

The curious jumbling of material which is characteristic of the earliest Upanishads is probably due in part to the fact that it was as true in India as it has been elsewhere in the world that all kinds of knowledge and culture have grown out of religion, and the differentiation which now seems obvious between science and religion and between the special sciences themselves is one which is at first entirely foreign to the minds of the Upanishadic seers. By the time of the later Upanishads the special disciplines known as the *Vedāṅgas* were already beginning to spring up[2] and their presence helped to relieve the Upanishads of their ungainly bulk. Another factor which helps to account for the apparent confusion of material in the oldest Upanishads is the fact that they are in all probability of very composite authorship, so that we must not expect uniformity of purpose throughout.

Before we proceed to speak of their authorship, however, it will be convenient to add a few remarks on the nature and style of the separate books. It is useful for several reasons to divide the Upanishads into three groups—the early prose Upanishads in which the connexion with the Brāhmaṇas of the various schools is most direct, the verse Upanishads, and the later prose Upanishads. To the first group belong the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, the *Chāndogya*, the *Taittirīya* the *Aitareya*, and the *Kaushītaki*. It is in these,

[1] For the Brāhmodyas see Keith, *RPV*. p, 344 f.: the term is used for the Yājñavalkya dialogues in *Bṛih*. 3. 8. 1. A modern parallel is represented in K. M. Banerjea, *Dialogues*, pp. 205 ff.

[2] The earliest list of the Vedāṅgas is found in *Muṇḍ*. 1. 1. 5.

especially in the first two, that the confusion of material already referred to is most obvious. Parts of these Upanishads closely resemble in style the Brāhmaṇas with which they are connected, and to a limited extent they share their subject matter, so that an exchange of some chapters could be effected without the fact being conspicuous. As a matter of fact, some chapters of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* are also to be found in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*.[1] In point of style these Brāhmaṇa-like sections share the faults of the Brāhmaṇas in general. Of the weary repetitiousness of the Brāhmaṇas, Keith speaks in the following language:[2] 'It is impossible to place the Brāhmaṇas in any respectable position as regards their style. . . . The structure of the sentences is drearily monotonous; parataxis is wearisomely frequent. . . . There is no objection to a chapter consisting . . . of a series of sentences precisely the same in shape and form, and in this, as in many other respects, it is easy to see the genesis in the Brāhmaṇas of the style which disfigures so many of the Pāli texts.' The same language could with propriety be applied to many passages of the Upanishads.

This peculiarity of repeating a long formula for a series of subjects, which is as characteristic of the Upanishads as it is of the Brāhmaṇas, is probably to be explained through the fact that the Upanishads in common with all the Vedic literature were transmitted by oral tradition. In the case of poetry, the metre gave some assistance to the memory, but when the material was prose, it was felt that the constantly repeated formula would fix itself in the student's mind more effectively than straightforward prose. A specially clear case of the adaptation of the style to the needs of memorizing is found in *Kaush*. 4. 2, where at the

[1] *Bṛih*. 1. 1–2 = *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 10. 6. 4–5. Part of *Bṛih*. 3 is found in *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 11. 6. 3.

[2] Keith, *Ṛigveda Brāhmaṇas*, p. 96 f.

beginning of the passage the necessary clue-words are given in a separate table, so that when these together with the formula for the whole were memorized, the entire passage could be mechanically constructed.

But if the early Upanishads in their Brāhmaṇa-like passages sink to low depths in regard to style, they also rise in their dialogues and in some of the verses which they quote to very considerable heights. As compared with the more systematic teaching of the later Upanishads, they put forth their newly gained insights with all the freshness of recent discovery. The conversations of Yājñavalkya[1] and the instruction of Śvetaketu[2] belong not merely to the sources of Indian philosophy, but to the literature of the world. The similarity of form between these passages and Plato's dialogues make a comparison between them natural; and while the Upanishads inevitably suffer, when put in contrast with the complex artistry of the Platonic masterpieces, still there can be little question that the best passages of the Upanishads are much superior to some of the less inspired work of Plato.[3]

The next group, the verse Upanishads, includes the *Kaṭha*, *Īśā*, *Muṇḍaka*, and *Śvetāśvatara*. The *Kena* stands on the margin between this group and the earlier prose Upanishads. Here the teaching is no longer in the formative stage, but is already clearly understood, and the attempt of the author is now to put it into effective literary form. This is done with special success in the *Kaṭha*, where an old legend is

[1] *Bṛih.* 3, 4. [2] *Chānd.* 6.

[3] Farquhar's estimate (*ORLI.* p. 57) is as follows: 'There are many strikingly beautiful and effective passages in these works; here a few sentences whice recall the Psalms, there a brief paragraph which reminds one of Plato. There is a simple sincerity about them, and a childlike naturalness of vision which are very attractive. There are parts of these works which will take a high and permanent place in the world's best literature. But, after all, the books are but compilations; and, beside these lofty prophesyings which reveal the Indian mind at its noblest and greatest, there are many passages as futile and worthless as the poorest twaddle of the Brāhmaṇas. The Brāhman compiler had not yet learnt to separate the wheat from the chaff.'

used as the vehicle for the doctrinal teaching, and in the *Muṇḍaka* in which the doctrines are explained with conspicuous clearness. The *Kena*, likewise, makes use of allegory in the introducing of the knowledge of Brāhma. The *Īśā* puts the characteristic teaching of the Upanishads into brief and intentionally paradoxical form. The *Śvetāśvatara* is less clear than the *Muṇḍaka*, and appears confused in its philosophical teaching, but it introduces material which has proved interesting from a religious point of view.

When we come to the last group, the *Praśna*, the *Māṇḍūkya*, the *Maitri*, and the *Mahānārāyaṇa*, we feel on the whole a decline. The *Praśna* in mixed prose and verse wanders rather indefinitely from point to point, although the main outline is clear. The brief *Māṇḍūkya* is a meditation upon the mystic syllable *Om*, a type of devotional exercise which begins already in the *Chāndogya*, and which is continued and developed in many of the post-classical Upanishads. The *Maitri*, while reproducing much of the older teaching, expounds it with something of the technical vocabulary of later philosophy and shows clear marks of the influence of Buddhist ideas. The *Mahānārāyaṇa* is plainly of derivative character as regards its philosophical teaching, but mixes with this much detail concerning the ritual. All these later prose Upanishads show their dependence upon earlier ones by repeated quotations, suggesting, at least in some cases, that the older books were already authorities when these works were written.

The authorship of the Upanishads is ascribed by the texts themselves to Brāhma,[1] usually in connexion with the so-called *vaṁsas*, or lists of teachers, which are appended to the texts, showing the line by which

[1] *Bṛih.* 2. 6, 4. 6, 6. 5; *Chānd.* 3. 11. 4, 8. 15. In *Muṇḍ.* 1. 1. 1, the personal god, Brahma, is the first of the series. In *Bṛih.* 5. 2, and *Chānd.* 8. 7. 12, Prajāpati is represented as the divine teacher but in the vaṁsas Prajāpati takes only second place.

the tradition had been handed down. It is likely that these lists are later accretions to the texts, as each generation of teachers passed them on to their pupils, leaving their own name at the end of the text as a sort of guarantee of its authenticity. With the practice of putting Brahma at the head of these lists goes the doctrine that the Vedas and with them the Upanishads were breathed out by Brahma before all other created things.[1] But in the body of the texts we find frequent passages where the origin of the doctrines is ascribed to human authors[2] or, in some cases, particular men are represented as gaining their knowledge through supernatural instruction.[3] We do not, however, possess any information in regard to the authorship in the usual sense of the word, and it is in fact evident, as mentioned above, that the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya* at least are of quite heterogeneous authorship. The last third of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* is traditionally known as a *khila*, or appendix, and in this case a survey of its contents quite justifies the tradition. Again, the first and second parts of this Upanishad are relatively independent books, since both contain the same story of Yājñavalkya's conversation with Maitreyī in slightly differing forms. The *Chāndogya* also is obviously composite, for it takes the teaching of Śāṇḍilya at 3. 14 bodily from *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 10. 6. 3, while it shares a number of passages with the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*.

But though we may not speak of authorship in the ordinary sense, we may still inquire whether the sages who are represented as teaching their doctrines in the Upanishads can be thought of as historical persons

[1] *Bṛih.* 1. 2. 5, 4. 5. 11.

[2] Thus in *Bṛih.* 3. 2. 13, 3. 9. 18, Yājñavalkya is represented as teaching the doctrine of transmigration as something previously unknown. *Chānd.* 3. 14, is known as the teaching of Śāṇḍilya.

[3] So in *Chānd.* 4. 5–8, Satyakāma Jābāla is instructed by a bull, fire, a swan and a diver-bird. In *Chānd.* 4. 10. 16, Upakosala is instructed by the sacrificial fires.

and actually the authors of the doctrines accredited to them. It appears that the answer to this question must be largely in the negative. For while it is of course always possible that the person represented may have taught the doctrines ascribed to him, it is impossible for us to be sure in any particular case that the later compilers did not merely use a traditional name as a convenient peg to which to attach the doctrine in question. Thus we find manifest contradictions in the references to individual teachers. Satyakāma Jābāla is a teacher of King Janaka in *Bṛih.* 4. 1. 6, whose teaching is shown by Yājñavalkya to be imperfect. But in *Bṛih.* 6. 3. 11, he is a pupil in the fourth generation below Yājñavalkya, while in *Chānd.* 4. 4. 9, not only is his ordinary teacher a different person from the one mentioned in *Bṛih.* 6. 3. 11, but he is represented as gaining instruction from supernatural sources also. In *Bṛih.* 3. 7, Uddālaka Āruṇi is represented as giving way to Yājñavalkya in disputation, but in *Chānd.* 6 he is the teacher of the highest doctrine of the Upanishad. His son, Śvetaketu, is instructed in regard to transmigration by Pravāhana in *Chānd.* 5. 3. 10, but by Citra Gaṅgyāyani in *Kaush.* 1. 1.[1] In one case, however, it seems not impossible to make out the outlines of an historical personage. The doctrines which are attributed to Yājñavalkya have a marked degree of coherence and originality, so that even Keith, who denies that Yājñavalkya was historical,[2] is obliged to treat his teachings as a fairly consistent whole. Not only do we have sharpness of philosophic insight, but we have marked personal characteristics which it is hard to think were merely invented.[3] Keith objects that Yājñavalkya is also the great ritual teacher of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, but the two roles are not

[1] B. M. Barua, in his *Pre-Buddhistic Philosophy*, attempts to give a biographical history of philosophy for the period of the Vedas and Upanishads, but his work is uncritical and confused. cf. Keith's criticism of this work, *RPV*. p. 523 n.

[2] *RPV*. p. 495. [3] cf. *Bṛih.* 3. 1. 2, 4. 1. 1.

necessarily inconsistent, and we find ascribed to him in the *Śatapatha* remarks which indicate the same independence of spirit.[1]

A more serious question has often been debated as to whether the main thought of the Upanishads is due to the Brahman class, thus carrying on to a higher stage of development the thought of the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas, or whether it is not rather the Kshatriya class to whom the credit should be given, with the consequence that in the Upanishads we should have to recognize the incursion of quite a new set of ideas. The latter point of view is argued by Garbe[2] and, at least at first sight, appears to have considerable warrant in the texts themselves. Thus *Bṛih.* 2. 1, gives an account of how Gārgya Bālāki endeavours to instruct Ajātaśatru, king of Benares, about the true nature of Brahma, only to find his teaching inadequate at every point. The result is that the king eventually takes him as his pupil, although he points out how contrary this is to the usual course of things for a Brahman to come as a pupil to a Kshatriya. Again in *Chānd.* 5. 3–10, the important doctrine of transmigration is taught by a 'fellow of the princely class' after the Brahman, Uddālaka Āruṇi, and his son, Śvetaketu, had been unable to answer his question. It is to be noted, however, that in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, transmigration is first taught by the Brahman, Yājñavalkya.[3] On the basis of the instances given above and other similar ones it has been concluded that the Kshatriyas must have been the authors of these typical Upanishad doctrines. For it would be extremely unlikely that the Brahmans would have invented anything so derogatory to their own dignity as the supposition that they had to go for their know-

[1] The same opinion as to the historicity of Yājñavalkya is held by Dorothea Stephens in her valuable little book, *Studies in Early Indian Thought*.

[2] *Beiträge zur indischen Kulturgeschichte*, pp. 3 ff.

[3] *Bṛih.* 3. 2. 13, 4. 4. 3–4.

ledge to the Kshatriyas, and thus it must be supposed that the Kshatriyas were responsible for the new teachings in an even greater degree than the Brahman accounts reveal. The value of this theory is that it explains the fact that at the end of dullness of the Brāhmaṇa period we have the new thoughts of the Upanishads suddenly bursting forth, without, apparently, any sufficient preparation in the previous literature. It is to be urged, on the other hand, that some of the teachers, and among them some of the greatest, were Brahmans, and that at all events the new doctrines were speedily accepted in Brahman circles, a fact which would seem unlikely if the ideas were of quite alien origin. It seems possible that a compromise may be accepted between the extreme views and that both Kshatriyas and Brahmans had their part in originating the new ideas, even though it is true that their transmission is chiefly through the Brahmans. Caste lines at this time were not as strictly drawn as in a later period,[1] and we have a picture in the early Upanishads of a state of society where kings and learned Brahmans engaged in philosophic discussions on equal terms.[2] There would seem to be nothing impossible in supposing that the thought of the Upanishads grew out of the reactions of thought in this intellectual circle, instead of believing it to be derived exclusively from one party or the other.[3]

In regard to the locality from which the Upanishads arise, we can speak only in general terms. Judging from the references to the names of peoples, which are fairly numerous in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*,[4] less

[1] cf. the story of Satyakāma Jābāla who is accepted as a Brāhman merely because he told the truth in a trying situation. *Chānd.* 4. 4.

[2] cf. *Chānd.* 1. 8; *Bṛih.* 2. 1, 4. 1–4.

[3] cf. Winternitz, vol. III, 616: 'Im übrigen glaube ich (mit Hillebrandt, *Aus Brahmanas und Upaniṣaden.*, S. 10 ff.) dass zwischen den Brahmanen und den anderen gebildeten Klassen ein reger Austausch philosophischer Gedanken bestanden hat, so dass die Philosophie der Upaniṣads weder als brahmanische noch als Kṣatriya-Philosophie aufzufassen haben wird.'

[4] *Bṛih.* 2. 1. 1, 3. 8. 2, 3. 3. 1, 3. 7. 1, 3. 1. 1, 3. 9. 19, 4. 2. 4, 4. 4. 23.

numerous in the *Chāndogya*,[1] and almost entirely absent from the others with the exception of the *Kaushītaki*,[2] the principal intellectual activity took place in the land of the Kurupañcālas in the neighbourhood of the modern Delhi,[3] at Kāśī, or Benares, and in the land of the Videhas.[4] The people called Madras who lived in the Punjab[5] are still important because of their knowledge of the sacrificial ritual, while Gandhāra on the north-western frontier lies quite on the horizon of the geographical knowledge of the time. Many of the teachers of the Upanishads led a wandering life, as did Gārgya Bālāki, who 'dwelt among the Usīnaras,[6] among the Satvans,[7] and the Matsyas,[8] among the Kurus and Pañcālas, among the Kāśīs and the Videhas.'[9] The Vedic home in the Punjab had been left behind, and it may be significant that the teaching of Yājñavalkya, which is in some respects the most original, comes from Videha, which is furthest removed from the seat of the old civilization.

We pass to the question of date. It will be realized that the fixing of the date of the oldest Upanishads is in the very nature of the case impossible, since they are compilations and were only gradually reduced to their permanent form. The absence of any certain chronology for political history prior to the time of the invasions of Alexander the Great (326 B.C.[10]) dooms all attempts to fix the date of the Upanishads to inevitable failure. The most we can do is to fix

[1] *Chānd.* 1. 10, 4. 17. 10, 5. 3. 1, 6. 14. 1.
[2] *Kaush.* 4. 1.
[3] See map in the *Cambridge History of India*, vol. I, opposite p. 514.
[4] Equivalent to the modern Tirhut or North Bihar. See map, ibid.
[5] See map, ibid.
[6] Also belonging to the Middle Country, near the Kurupañcālas.—*CHI.* vol. I, p. 117.
[7] To the south of the Kurupañcālas, ibid.
[8] Also to the south of the Kurupañcālas, ibid.
[9] *Kaush.* 4. 1.
[10] Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, p. xiv. cf. Rhys Davids in *CHI.* vol. I, p. 171.

their position relative to other literature and to make a rough estimate as to their position in the scale of absolute chronology. It may readily be shown that they are subsequent to the Vedas, for the first three Vedas are already mentioned as sacred literature in the older Upanishads,[1] while the *Atharva*, which is at first put in a lower rank,[2] is raised to an equality with the first three Vedas in the later texts.[3] That the Upanishads are as a whole later than the Brāhmaṇas is evident from the absence in the latter of any knowledge of the characteristic ideas of the Upanishads, and in particular from the lack of any knowledge of the doctrine of transmigration. On the other hand it is equally clear that the Upanishads are at least in part older than the Buddhist literature. Not only are the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads presupposed in Buddhism, but the Buddhist texts show a far greater working out of psychological terminology.[4] At the same time, some of the teachings of even the

[1] *Bṛih.* 1. 2. 5, 1. 3. 20–22, 5. 1. 1–3; *Chānd.* 1. 3. 7, 1. 4. 2, 1. 7. 4, 4. 17. 4–6, 6. 7. 2; *Tait.* 1. 5. 2; *Kaush.* 1. 5, 1. 7, 2. 6; *Muṇḍ.* 1. 2. 1, 2. 1. 6; *Praśna*, 2. 6, 5. 3–5; *Maitri*, 6. 5.

[2] *Bṛih.* 2. 4. 10, 4. 1. 2, 4. 5. 11; *Chānd.* 3. 4. 1, 7. 1. 2; *Maitri*, 6. 32-33 follows *Bṛih.* 2. 4. 10.

[3] *Tait.* 2. 3; *Muṇḍ.* 1. 1. 5.

[4] The contrast between the Upanishads and Buddhist literature is well expressed by Estlin Carpenter, *Theism in Mediæval India*, pp. 11, 13: 'The early thinkers whose teachings are reflected, for example, in the *Brāhmaṇa of a Hundred Paths* and the older Upanishads, had busied themselves with the conception of the soul or self of the world. Many penetrating glances flash out in question and answer between laymen and women, on the one hand, and distinguished Brahmans on the other, sometimes one and sometimes the other taking the lead. But the terminology is extraordinarily fluctuating, confused, uncertain, inexact. The same document may contain a bewildering medley of figures and speculations which cannot be reduced into psychological or metaphysical coherence. . . . To pass from these random imaginative combinations to the careful analyses of the Buddhist texts is like the transition from the poetry of the forest, with its sunshine and gloom and its sound of the wind among the trees, to the orderly arrangement of the professor's lecture room. Here is an attempt to express the facts of conscious experience in the fields of sense and thought. . . . The incongruous enumerations of the mental and material, of inward states and outward objects, are replaced by careful classifications. And the conspectus of wrong theories of the Self, which occupies the second chapter of the discourse of 'the Perfect Net', implies a range of speculation far exceeding that of the debates of the Upanishads, and requires a corresponding lapse of time for its extension.'

early Upanishads come near to the Buddhist solution[1] and it is likely that at any rate the latest of the classical Upanishads are post-Buddhistic.[2] The Upanishads are to be placed then for the most part between the age of the Brāhmaṇas and the beginnings of Buddhism. Since the death of Buddha is put, according to our present knowledge, at 483 B.C.[3] it has become customary among European scholars to place the oldest Upanishads in the sixth century B.C.[4]

While it is not possible to fix the absolute date of the Upanishads more precisely, it is possible through a comparison of the parallel passages which they contain to come to some probable opinion as to their age relative to each other. It is clear from a consideration of the general development of doctrine that the groups which we have already distinguished, namely, older prose Upanishads, verse Upanishads, and later prose Upanishads, follow each other in the order named. Within these groups the arrangement has been fixed upon with fair unanimity by such scholars as Deussen,[5] Hume,[6] and Keith.[7] The questions which are still in doubt are not important to our purpose.[8]

[1] e.g. such a passage as *Bṛih.* 3.5.

[2] The *Maitri* shows most clearly the influence of Buddhism.

[3] *CHI.* vol. I, p. 112 n.

[4] Keith, *RPV.* pp. 501, 502: 'The older Upanishads are substantially, at least, older than say 500 B.C. . . . Certainly it is wholly impossible to make out any case for dating the oldest even of the extant Upanishads beyond the sixth century B.C.' So Farquhar, *ORLI.* p. 35; Hume, *Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, p. 6. Radhakrishnan speaks of the accepted dates for the early Upanishads as from 1000 B.C. to 300 B.C. (*Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 142.)

[5] *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 23–25.

[6] *Thirteen Principle Upanishads*, p. xiii.

[7] *RPV.* pp. 498–500

[8] For purposes of convenience I have followed Hume's order which agrees with Deussen's, except that he puts the *Śvetāśvatara* later. Keith disagrees with other scholars in putting the *Aitareya* earlier than the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*. He agrees with Deussen in putting the *Śvetāśvatara* next after the *Īśā*. The *Mahānārāyaṇa* is probably next after the *Muṇḍaka*. Walleser (*Der ältere Vedānta*) believes that the *Māṇḍūkya* was written about the same time as the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*. In any case it may be later than the *Maitri*.

2. Kārikās and Sūtras

It is not our intention to follow the historical development of philosophical literature from the time of the Upanishads until the composition of the classical systems of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Such a survey would have to include not merely the philosophical portions of the epic writings, but also the huge literatures of Buddhism and Jainism, the former of which undoubtedly had a considerable influence upon the later development of philosophy. We confine ourselves to the works which directly underlie the developed systems. These works are of two sorts, the *Kārikās* or Memorial Verses and the *Sūtras* or Clues. Both classes of works had the same object, to minimize as far as possible the difficulty of remembering lengthy treatises at a time when writing was not unknown, but was still regarded as subsidiary to the memory in the preservation of literature. Both kinds of works endeavoured to abbreviate the material to be understood and to put it into a form which could easily be remembered. Both are literary forms used in the treatment of other subjects as well as philosophy.[1] The Kārikās rely upon the device of metrical form for fixing their contents in the memory, while the Sūtras, which are in prose, endeavour to compress the material into the briefest possible compass. The latter achieve a truly remarkable condensation by omitting every unnecessary word, even those required for grammatical structure, a fact which brought upon their composers the sarcastic remark of the grammarian, Patañjali, that 'a Sūtra-writer rejoiced as much over the saving of half a short vowel as over the birth of a son'.[2] The result of this extreme compression was that the Sūtras were nearly

[1] For the use of these forms in dramatic art, grammar, etc., see Winternitz, vol. III, index s.vv. Kārikā and Sūtra.
[2] Quoted by Winternitz, vol. III, p. 230

unintelligible in themselves, and could only be understood with the help of interpretation. This was at first given orally by the teacher, but later it took a fixed form in the commentaries written by various scholars. The Kārikās, which did not aim at such condensation, were felt to be more suitable, on the whole, for the exposition of a particular doctrine or of a single phase of a subject, while the systematic works which aimed to give a complete survey of the whole of a department of learning were put in Sūtra form. Each of the six orthodox philosophic systems was provided with a Sūtra, which is in most cases the oldest work now extant belonging to its school, although most of the philosophic Sūtras contain indications that they were the outcome of a long previous intellectual activity, the literary record of which is now lost. In the Sāṅkhya school the usual situation is reversed, and the so-called *Sāṅkhya-sūtra* is a comparatively modern work, while the place of importance in the early history of the school is to be given to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*.

It remains for us to discuss briefly each of the individual works in our field which fall under these two classes. Among the Kārikās we have two works to be noticed, the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* just mentioned and the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*. The first is the basic text of the Sāṅkhya system, thus taking the place which in other systems is filled by a Sūtra. As contrasted with these Sūtras it is an admirably clear and concise work, although some of its verses are in need of a commentary in order to be completely understood. The work in its present form consists of seventy-two stanzas, but it is practically certain that the last three are a later addition, both because of their subject matter, and from the fact that they were not commented upon by Gauḍapāda, one of the earliest commentators. On the other hand, the original work is stated by Gauḍapāda to have consisted of seventy

stanzas, so that it is thought that one is now missing.[1] The three added verses supply us with some account of the literary tradition of the school, namely, that the system was made known by an unnamed 'highest seer' to Asuri, who in turn transmitted it to Pañcaśikha, and then through a course of seers finally to Īśvarakrishṇa, who is declared to be the author of the Kārikā.[2] It is also said that he incorporated in his work the substance of the 'whole *Shashṭitantra*' with the exception of the illustrative stories and the refutations, and it seems likely that we have reference here to an earlier work which was called the *Shashṭitantra*, although the word is capable of being interpreted as merely 'the science of sixty principles'. Of Īśvarakrishṇa we know nothing beyond what the passage suggests, although there is some reason for believing that he was also called Vindhyavāsa (Vindhya-dweller). As to the date of the work we fortunately have some fairly definite information. It was translated into Chinese by the Buddhist monk, Paramārtha, between A.D. 557 and 569.[3] According to the Chinese tradition, the second stanza of the Kārikā is quoted by the great Buddhist sage, Vasubandhu. Since his date is now placed by most scholars in the early part of the fourth century A.D.[4] the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* must be placed slightly earlier, and hence in the third or the beginning of the fourth Christian century.

Our second Kārikā, the *Māṇḍūkya*, does not have the same place in the Vedānta school as the one just discussed has in the Sāṅkhya, but it is still of special interest for our study, inasmuch as it is the first outspoken exposition of the doctrine of non-dualism, which later became the characteristic of Śaṅkara's

[1] See Keith, *Sāṅkhya System*, pp. 59, 64; S. K. Belvalkar in the *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, pp. 171 ff.

[2] *Kārikā*, 71.

[3] J. Takakusu in *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient*, vol. IV (1904) pp. i. ff.

[4] Smith, *EHI*. pp. 328 ff.

philosophy. Its first chapter is a metrical paraphrase of the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad* in 29 stanzas, while the whole poem runs to 229 stanzas. Its authorship is attributed to Gauḍapāda (probably not identical with the Sāṅkhya commentator of that name) who, according to a fairly credible tradition, was the teacher of Śaṅkara's teacher. If this identification be correct, its date would fall in the eighth century A.D.

In the voluminous Sūtra literature, the *Vedānta Sūtra* alone comes into our view, since the *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-sūtra* is certainly not an early work (it may be as late as the fourteenth century) and did not have the fundamental place in its system which is credited to those of other schools. The *Vedānta Sūtra*, which is also called the *Brahma Sūtra*, since it treats of Brahma, and *Śārīraka Sūtra*, or *Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā-sūtra*, since it deals with the embodied (*śārīraka*) soul, consists of 555 brief and enigmatic Sūtras arranged in four books. They deal in a more or less orderly fashion with the main topics of the theology of the Upanishads: Brahma, the relation of the world to him, the individual soul, the means of obtaining knowledge of Brahma, and the fruits of that knowledge. In the second book there is inserted a long series of criticisms of other schools, in particular of the Sāṅkhya. Throughout, the work is closely dependent upon the Upanishads, on which it relies for authority. These it uses according to a peculiar scheme[1] which suggests the possibility of the existence of earlier exegetical works upon which the Sūtras might be dependent. Tradition, beginning with Śaṅkara, assigns the authorship of the work to Bādarāyaṇa, of whom, however, nothing definite is known. Others call the author Vyāsa, who is accordingly identified with Bādarāyaṇa by some.[2] The name, Bādarāyaṇa, occurs in the Sūtras

[1] Deussen, *SV.* p. 121.

[2] Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 432, gives details. Inasmuch as the name means merely 'Arranger', 'Compiler,' and as the name

themselves, but there seems to be no impossibility in an author choosing to mention himself in the third person.

In regard to the date of the Sūtras far less definite conclusions can be reached than in the two documents just discussed. The style of the Sūtras is so condensed and they have so few points of contact with the world outside as to make the dating of them very difficult. Yet some indications of date do exist. The *Vedānta Sūtra* appears to be closely linked up with that of its sister school, the *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā*, since the former mentions Jaimini, the supposed author of that treatise, while the latter, in turn, mentions Bādarāyaṇa.[1] Further, there are indications that the two Sūtras may have regarded themselves not as exclusive systems, but as co-ordinate members of a single work on Vedic exegesis.[2] At any rate, the dates of these two works appear to be much the same. We can learn something further from the schools of thought which the Sūtras' attempt to refute. The Sūtras themselves mention none of these schools by name, but there can be little question that the schools referred to include the Sāṅkhyas, the Vaiśeshikas, the Buddhists, and the Jains. The commentators partially disagree as to which sects of Buddhists are meant, and they differ widely in regard to the significance of the last part of the section. Śaṅkara understands it as refuting certain Saiva and Vaishnava theistic sects, while Rāmānuja gathers from it a refutation of certain more specific Saiva sects, and an approval of the Vaishnavite Pāñcarātras. It may, I believe, be safely inferred that the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeshika schools, Jainism and Buddhism, were

is applied to the compiler of the Vedas and the *Mahābhārata* as well as to the author of the Sūtras, it seems hardly necessary to think that the name must be limited to a particular person.

[1] Jaimini is mentioned in *V.S.* 1. 2. 28, 1. 2. 31, 1. 3. 31, 1. 4. 18, 3. 2. 40, 3. 4. 2, 3. 4. 18, 3. 4. 40, 4. 3. 12, 4. 4. 5, 4. 4. 11. Bādarāyaṇa is mentioned in *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā-sūtra*, 1. 1. 5, 2. 2. 19, 6. 1. 8, 10. 8. 44, 11. 1. 64.

[2] Deussen, *SV.* p. 24.

in existence before the composition of the Sūtra. It is not impossible that some of the tendencies of Buddhism referred to belong to the Mahāyāna schools, as the commentators believe, but too much weight must not be given to this possibility. The commentators find several references to the *Bhagavadgītā*[1] although the *Bhagavadgītā* mentions the *Brahma Sūtras.*[2] It is possible, however, that this passage in the *Gītā* may be an interpolation,[3] or if not, the word may be interpreted generally, and not in connexion with this particular book. The opinions of several scholars are mentioned in the Sūtras, namely Badari, Auḍulomi, Aśmarathya, Kāśakṛitsna, Kārshājini, and Aitreya. All of these, with the exception of Auḍulomi, are mentioned in the Śrauta and Gṛihya Sūtra literature, while Auḍulomi is known in the *Mahābhāshya* of Patañjali.[4] In spite of this array of data, opinions on the date of the Sūtras vary widely. As regards the *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā* of Jaimini we only know surely that it must be older than its oldest commentator, Śabarasvāmi, who is thought to have flourished in the fifth century A.D.[5] although it is probable that it is considerably older. As mentioned above, there is doubt as to which schools of Buddhism are being refuted in the Sūtras. The general opinion is to consider them as schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which would put the Sūtras at least as late as perhaps the second century A.D. but Dasgupta endeavours to show that the doctrines implied were known at a considerably earlier date. The most likely view would seem to be that they were composed at about the same time as the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, the doctrine of which they were so concerned to refute. Farquhar has an

In *V.S.* 2. 3. 45, 4. 1. 10.
Bhagavadgītā, 13. 4.
So Winternitz, vol. III, p. 429 n.
For references see Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 433.
So Winternitz, vol. III, p. 425.

interesting series of arguments[1] to show that all of the philosophical sūtras together with the *Sāṇkhya Kārikā* were composed during the brilliant era of the Gupta sovereigns, which began in A.D. 320; but this appears to be slightly late for the *Sāṅkhya*, and remains an hypothesis, although an attractive one, for the other works.

3. The Commentators

The outstanding commentator on the *Vedānta Sūtras*, and in fact perhaps the greatest name in all Indian philosophy, is Śaṅkara. Although we have several attempts to relate the story of his life, they resemble the lives of saints found in the Christian Church in being works of edification rather than sober history.[2] They are practically valueless for historical purposes. According to a brief manuscript of doubtful age and authority[3] it is said that Śaṅkara was born in A.D. 788 and was 'united with Śiva' in 820. Since it is certain from other considerations that this is approximately the period in which he must have lived, these dates are generally accepted, although they are not beyond possible question. It is not sure whether the 'uniting with Śiva' refers to his death, or to his attainment of deliverance. If the former, it is difficult to find room in the thirty-two years of his life for even a small part of the literary and other work usually accredited to him. No less than 369 titles are ascribed to him in manuscript sources, of works ranging in length from poems of a few stanzas to commentaries of hundreds of pages.[4] Of these 117 titles are included in the Memorial Edition of his

[1] *ORLI.* p. 123.

[2] The two most important works are the *Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya* of Mādhavācarya, and the *Śaṅkara-vijaya* of Ānandagiri. The traditional accounts are conveniently summarized by V.S. Ghate, *ERE.* vol. II, p. 186.

[3] Brought to notice by E. B. Pathak, *Indian Antiquary*, vol. II (1882) p. 174 f. For discussion and references in regard to Śaṅkara's date, see Winternitz, vol. III, p. 434.

[4] See Aufrecht, *CC.* vol. I, p. 626; vol. II, p. 149; vol. III, p. 130.

works.[1] Even with this limitation, it is clear that much must be the work of his school rather than of his own hand. Besides his literary work, it is quite likely that he travelled widely and engaged in controversy with the leaders of the opposing philosophies of his time. It is also probable that he introduced some form of regular organization among his followers, since there still exist[2] four monasteries which claim to have been founded by him, and which are ruled over by superiors bearing the title of Śaṅkarācārya. The principal monastery is at Śṛingeri in Mysore, of which he is said to have been the first head.[3]

His works include commentaries on the *Vedānta Sūtras*, on the Upanishads, and upon the *Bhagavadgītā* as well as a multitude of independent writings in prose and verse. These works have not yet been subjected to any thorough-going critical anlysis, so that it is still impossible for us to say how far they are actually Śaṅkara's own work. Since the *Śārīraka mīmāṁsa-bhāshyā* on the *Vedānta Sūtra* is the most important, it has usually been assumed that it forms the standard for judging the authenticity of the other works attributed to him. But Deussen believes that he finds even in it evidences of interpolation.[4]

Śaṅkara's method of composition in the commentary on the Sūtras is to indicate what he calls the 'superficial view (*pūrvapaksha*)' which he sets forth often at length with reinforcing arguments. After this has been given, he states the 'established view (*siddhānta*)' which he develops as the true meaning of the Sūtras, and proves to his satisfaction as against the *pūrvapaksha*.[5]

[1] Published at Śrīraṅgam, 1910 onwards. Referred to by V. S. Ghate, *ERE.* vol. II, p. 186.

[2] Or did exist until recent times. See Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India* (1918) p. 432.

[3] See Farquhar, *ORLI.* p. 174 f.

[4] Deussen, *SV.* p. 28.

[5] In the regularity with which he carries out this procedure, which sometimes appears rather artificial in view of the fact that the *pūrvapaksha* in some instances can scarcely have been more than a man of straw, he may be compared with the Western scholastic, Thomas Aquinas.

Śaṅkara does not use the easily flowing language of actual oral discussion, but instead a rather elaborate scientific style, although it is still lucidity itself as compared with that of the Sūtras. It is clear that he did not have behind him an unbroken oral tradition from the fact that he sometimes gives two or even three alternative explanations of the same Sūtra. In fact, in spite of his professed reverence for past authority, one is inclined to wonder whether he did not put into his texts what suited his own philosophical position quite as much as what he found in the texts themselves.

The second great commentator on the *Vedānta Sūtras* is Rāmānuja, whose active life may be placed in the last quarter of the eleventh century and the first half of the twelfth century A.D.[1] The exact dates of his birth and death are still in some dispute.[2] In contrast with many Sanskrit authors, we have a considerable amount of early biographical material from which a fairly distinct view of his life can be gained.[3] In his youth he lived in Conjeeveram in south India, where he studied under a certain Yādavaprakāśa, who was an adherent of Śaṅkara's school of non-dualism. He became dissatisfied with his guru's teaching, however, and eventually left him in order to join the school of Yāmunamuni, who followed the tendency known as modified non-dualism, and who was teaching

[1] So S. Krishnaswamy Aiyengar, *Sri Rāmānujāchārya*, p. 30, reprinted in his *Ancient India*, pp. 192 ff. This is followed by Winternitz, vol. III, p. 439.

[2] The traditional date of his birth is A.D. 1017, but this seems to be too early, since we have good authority for believing that he dedicated an image to Vishnu in 1099, and there is some reason for thinking that he fled from Śrīrangam to Mysore in 1098, and returned again in 1122. The traditional date of his death is 1137, which would make him 120 years old. See Farquhar *ORLI.* p. 245. *JRAS.* (1915) p. 147 f. Rajendralala Mitra, *Notices of Sanskrit*, MSS, vol. V, p. 10 f.

[3] References to this biographical material are given by Farquhar, *ORLI.* pp. 246, 379. A biography purporting to be written by one of Rāmānuja's immediate disciples is the *Yatirājavaibhava* of Āndhrapūrṇa, in Tamil (*Vaḍuganambi*) which is published by S. Krishnaswami Aiyengar in the *Tamil Antiquary*, vol. XXXVIII (1909) pp. 129 ff. It is clear and straightforward and unusually free from the tendency to the miraculous.

at Śrīraṅgam. Yāmunamuni was not the author of this tendency, but merely carried on the tradition which went back at least as far as his grandfather, Nāthamuni, who had been the collector of the Tamil hymns of the Āḻvārs, who were the poetic seers of the Vaishnava faith. He had also been a Sanskrit scholar and a theologian. The school over which Yāmunamuni presided was engaged in both Sanskrit and Tamil studies, and the devotional tendency which we see in those who carried on the influence of this school is due in part at any rate to the influence of the devotional Tamil literature of the day. Rāmānuja was very proficient as a student and eventually became the head of this school. He engaged in literary composition, and numerous works are attributed to him, although in his case as in Śaṅkara's there is a great need for a process of critical sifting. His most important works are the *Śrībhashya* on the Vedānta Sūtras, the *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, and a commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*.[1] He undertook extensive travels for the purpose of spreading his faith and confuting opponents, and is said to have gone as far as Kashmir. Under the reign of Kulatuṅga I the Vaishnava sect suffered persecution, and Rāmānuja was obliged to flee to Mysore, where he found protection with the reigning family. He established a monastery there, and converted many of the people as well as some of the royal family from the Jain faith to Vaishnavism. On the death of Kulatuṅga, he returned to Śrīraṅgam where he died.

In literary method Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāshya* largely resembles Śaṅkara's commentary, although Rāmānuja is far more deeply touched with the devotional side of religion, which is occasionally expressed in beautiful ways.[2] He disagrees with Śaṅkara at many points in

[1] See V. A. Sukhtankar, *The Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja*, pp. 2 ff.
[2] e.g. in his example of the lost son, *SBE*. vol. XLVIII, p. 199.

the interpretation of the *Vedānta Sūtra*, but since the original is so obscure, it is seldom possible to be sure which is right. Thibaut, the English translator of both Bhāshyas, holds that Rāmānuja is on the whole closer to the teachings of the Sūtras than Śankara, while Śankara is nearer to the original teachings of the Upanishads than are the Sūtras.[1] Without attempting to resolve that question for the present, we have reason to believe that Rāmānuja did not feel that he was founding a new school of interpretation. The theistic strain of thought which he represents had been held by a long line of preceding thinkers, among them a certain Bodhāyana, who was the author of a commentary on the Sūtras and had lived even earlier than Śankara. Unfortunately his works have not been preserved.

In the Sānkhya school we have no such outstanding names among the commentators as in the Vedānta. The oldest commentator appears to have been Maṭhara, whose commentary, the *Maṭharavritti*, was translated into Chinese along with the *Kārikā* by Paramārtha between A.D. 567 and 569.[2] Probably a little later, it was commented on again by Gauḍapāda, whose Bhāshya was used by the Arab writer, Alberūnī, in his account of the Sānkhya system. The most important commentary on the *Kārikā* is the *Sānkhyatattvakaumudi*, 'the Moonlight of Sānkhya Truth,' by the famous scholar, Vācaspatimiśra, who probably wrote about A.D. 830. This scholar wrote commentaries on five of the six systems of philosophy, endeavouring in

[1] *Vedānta Sūtras*, *SBE.* vol. XXXIV, p. cxxvi.

[2] The commentary in Chinese is very similar to the later one of Gauḍapāda, and is translated into French by J. Takakusu in *Bulletin*, vol. IV (1904) pp. 978 ff. A document purporting to be the Sanskrit original was discovered by S. K. Belvalkar and published by him (*Maṭhara-Vṛtti*, Annals of Bhandarkar Institute, 1924) under that title. Unfortunately, it appears that the title is wrongly attributed to the document, since it appears that the commentary published by him is later even than Śankara. See further in *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, pp. 171 ff. and Keith, *RPV*. p. 504.

each case to enter sympathetically into the system and to explain it from its own point of view. His commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* has been regarded as one of the most authoritative of Sāṅkhya works, and has been expounded in many supercommentaries.[1]

[1] For references to Sāṅkhya literature, and the connexion with Alberūni, see especially Winternitz, vol. III, pp. 451 ff.

CHAPTER III

THE PRESUPPOSITIONS, PURPOSE AND METHOD OF THE INDIAN THINKERS

A FUNDAMENTAL difference in the development of thought between India and the west has been that the Indian thinkers, or at least those who have been most influential in determining later progress, have never detached themselves from the religious tradition of their people. In Greece, the beginnings of philosophy are associated with a distinct reaction against popular religion, and through much of the history of western thought the great philosophers, while not necessarily denying all place to current religion, have yet certainly been concerned with much which was not due to that source. In India, on the other hand, from the time of the Upanishads to the present day, the primary material of philosophy has been that furnished by the religious tradition, and while the philosophers have naturally understood that tradition in a far different manner from the common people, yet they have not in any decisive way set themselves to criticize it. It is true that in the early Upanishads we find occasional slighting or satirical references to the older ritual, while among the philosophical systems a *Lokāyata* or 'worldly' system is sometimes referred to. But these tendencies were of comparatively little importance in the development of thought. Even the great systems which rejected the authority of the Vedas, in particular Jainism and Buddhism, although they might have but little place for the Vedic gods, yet became religions on their own account. This domination of philosophy by religion by no means implies that there were in India no interests outside of religion. That these

interests existed and had a rich life of their own is becoming increasingly clear from contemporary study.[1] But the investigations of ethics, politics, mathematical and natural science, and medicine, which in the west have furnished much of the material for philosophical reflection, were in India comparatively without influence in that regard; on the other hand, the indebtedness of philosophy to the religious tradition was of great importance, whether it was the older tradition of the Vedas, or whether, as in the case of Rāmānuja, it was in addition the contemporary movement of revival in the Vaishnava sect. It becomes necessary, therefore, for us to define with somewhat greater precision what the relation to the religious tradition was, even though in a brief survey we are not able to touch upon any but its most important features.

We turn first to the question of how the Indian thinkers themselves regarded their relationship to this religious tradition, and in connexion with this problem, it will be convenient, especially with reference to the later systems, to inquire into the more general question of what the sources of knowledge were which they regarded as fundamental to their constructions.

The Upanishads are aware of the existence of the Vedic Saṁhitās[2] and regard them as of great dignity, but for the most part do not profess to base their own teachings upon them. Since later thought, however, after the inclusion of the Upanishads in the Vedic canon, came to look upon the authority of the Veda as one of the primary guarantees of its own accuracy, we shall have to show that this conception does not belong universally to the Upanishads themselves, although it doubtless occurs sufficiently often to make the quotation of proof-texts possible. The most impor-

[1] See W. E. Clark, 'Some Misunderstandings about India,' *JAOS*. vol. XLVI, pp. 193–201.

[2] For references see p. 36 *ante*.

tant of these latter passages is *Bṛih.* 2. 4. 10 where it is said: 'So it is as when a fire is laid with damp fuel, and separate wisps of smoke issue forth from it. So, lo, truly, from this great being there has been breathed forth that which is the Ṛigveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, the [hymns] of the Atharvans and Aṅgirases, tradition (*itihāsa*), ancient lore (*purāṇa*), sciences (*vidyā*), secret teachings (*upanishad*), poetry (*śloka*), sūtras, explanations, and expositions. From it alone these things have been breathed forth.' This passage is interpreted by Śaṅkara[1] as meaning that the 'great Being' is Brahma, and that this process of 'breathing forth' gives authority to the whole of the Vedic literature. Actually, however, the latter inference can scarcely be drawn from this passage, since it has the fault of proving too much. For while the three Vedas with the Hymns of the Atharvans and Aṅgirases (later called the *Atharvaveda*) and the Upanishads were all recognized in later thought as authoritative in the first degree, this dignity was not given to the other members of the series, at least in the same measure. It is also striking that in this list the Upanishads are not placed next to the Vedas, but only after other items which were later not given scriptural authority.

On the other hand, we do have several passages in the Upanishads in which it is explicitly stated that the knowledge which they profess to teach is not to be found in the Vedas. Thus in the story of Śvetaketu Āruṇeya,[2] even after the young man has studied all the Vedas for twelve years, he is still found ignorant of the knowledge 'whereby what has not been heard of becomes heard of, what has not been thought of becomes thought of, what has not been understood becomes understood', in other words the knowledge of the ultimate reality, Ātman, which his father proceeds to impart to him.

[1] Comment on *Vedānta Sūtra*, 1. 1. 3; cf. also his commentary on *Bṛih.* 2. 4. 10, Memorial Edition, vol. VI, p. 308.
[2] *Chānd.* 6. 1 ff.

In a similar story[1] Narada protests to Sanatkumāra that he has covered the entire range of knowledge from the Vedas to snake-charming, and yet is ignorant of the Ātman. 'Now I, sir, am one who knows only the mantras, but I am not a knower of the Ātman; for I have heard from those like you, sir, that the knower of the Ātman crosses over sorrow. Now I, sir, am in sorrow. Do you, sir, make me to cross over to the further shore of sorrow.' Especially in connexion with the teaching of transmigration it is pointed out that the knowledge of this doctrine has never before been known to the Brahman class, although they are the recognized custodians of the Vedic literature.[2] It is clear, therefore, that for an important part of the teaching of the older Upanishads, the authority of the Vedic Saṁhitās is not only not affirmed, but is even expressly denied.

There are also signs in these early documents of a certain reaction against the ritual and ceremony of the older religion. As contrasted with works, knowledge is of pre-eminent power;[3] familiar sacrifices become far more efficacious when performed by one who has also mystic knowledge;[4] contemplation can even take the place of sacrifice;[5] in one passage,[6] the ordinary worship of the gods is definitely rejected as foolish, while in another instance[7] the conduct of the priests at a sacrifice is parodied with stinging satire.

But while this reaction against the older religious faith is found, it is not universal even in the oldest Upanishads. The Vedas are usually mentioned with great respect, and their study is enjoined as perhaps the most important duty[8], while sacrifice, austerity, and almsgiving are all of high value, at least as preparatory

[1] *Chānd.* 7. 1 ff. [2] *Chānd.* 5. 3–10; *Bṛih.* 6. 2.

[3] Thus in *Chānd.* 5. 3, 7 it is said that political rule has belonged to the Kshatriyas because they alone know the doctrine of transmigration. Illustrations of the power of knowledge abound on nearly every page of the early Upanishads. [4] *Chānd.* 4. 17. 9, 1. 10. 11. [5] *Bṛih.* 1. 1–2.

[6] *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 10. [7] *Chānd.* 1. 12. [8] *Bṛih.* 4. 4. 22; *Tait.* 1–9.

steps toward the receiving of the supreme knowledge. Certain verses from the Vedas, such as the famous Gāyatrī, form the subject of meditations, which endeavour to find in them some mystic meaning;[1] and occasionally, though rarely in the early Upanishads, verses from the Vedas are used in support of the new teachings.[2] In the *Kaṭha*, which is one of the oldest of the verse Upanishads, a story from the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* of the Yajurveda[3] is used as a dramatic setting for the new doctrine.

If the question be asked on what basis the early Upanishads did found their teaching, if not upon the authority of the Vedas, the answer must be twofold. In the first place, they founded it upon the personal authority of individual teachers, whether this authority was gained through the force of reasonable arguments, or whether it was maintained by what must seem to us at any rate bare asseveration. Thus in his conversation with his wife Maitreyi, in regard to immortality,[4] Yājñavalkya contends that there can be no consciousness, in the ordinary sense of the term, after death, and he supports this by the argument that consciousness always implies duality, while in the absolute there can be only unity. But the same teacher in his public controversy warns one disputant, Gārgī,[5] not to ask any more questions on pain of having her head split open, and this fate actually overtakes the stubborn Śākalya[6]—whether through the king's orders or through magic power, we are not informed. The importance of personal authority in teaching is also seen in the fact that one of the early forms of the doctrine of transmigration is attributed to Śāṇḍilya,[7] a seer, who, like Yājñavalkya, is also famous for his ritual teaching in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*.

[1] *Bṛih.* 6. 3. 6.
[2] In *Bṛih.* 1. 3. 10 a line from *Ṛigveda*, 4. 26, is used in this way, though probably with some violence to its original meaning.
[3] *Tait. Brāhmaṇa* 3. 11. 8. 1–6. [4] *Bṛih.* 2. 4. 12 ff.
[5] *Bṛih.* 3. 6. [6] *Bṛih.* 3. 9. 26. [7] *Chānd.* 3. 14.

In the second place, authority is often given to the teachings by showing that they have been handed down by a line of teachers from some recognized source, which in certain passages is no other than Brahma or Prajāpati himself. In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* this is done chiefly by the *vaṁsas*, or lines of tradition, which form the concluding passages of the three main sections of the work, but we find the same practice also in the body of the work in connexion with individual doctrines.[1]

In the later Upanishads we find a much more definite effort to adjust the new standpoint to the traditional religious practice, and as the older texts of the Upanishads became fixed, they are more and more used as authorities in teaching. The thought becomes increasingly prevalent that the Vedas and the Upanishads form in some sense one body of religious truth. In some passages[2] the Vedas are made clearly subordinate to the higher teachings of the Upanishads, while in others[3] the Vedas are highly praised, and the sacrifices which they prescribe are recommended as necessary steps in religious progress. Since this teaching can be gained only by oral instruction, as writing was not used at that time for religious works if at all, the necessity for a guru or religious teacher is specially emphasized,[4] but it is added that he must be learned in the Scriptures. Thus the principle of the authority of the teacher which we have seen in the earlier Upanishads is reconciled with the authority of the older literature. The doctrine of the four *āśramas*, or stages of life, although it did not attain its complete formulation during the period of the classical Upanishads, was in process

[1] As at *Bṛih.* 6. 3. 7–12; *Chānd.* 3. 11. 4. It is interesting to note that the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* likewise gives a vaṃsa as authority for its teachings in *Kārikā*, 70.

[2] e.g. *Chānd.* 3. 5. 4; *Kena*, 33; *Muṇḍ.* 1. 1. 5.

[3] e.g. *Muṇḍ.* 1. 2. 1–3, 3. 2. 10.

[4] *Muṇḍ.* 1. 2. 12–13; *Śvet.* 6. 23.

of development,[1] and aided materially in reconciling the partially conflicting claims of Vedic study and sacrificial offerings with the life of asceticism and meditation. The texts of the Upanishads are now called 'Vedānta', or 'the end of the Veda';[2] and the right understanding of their meaning is the chief means for attaining salvation.[3] The furthest point in the development of the doctrine of Scriptural authority, so far as it is found in the classical Upanishads, is reached by the *Maitri*, which repeatedly quotes the older Upanishads in support of its teachings with the formula, 'For thus has it been said.'[4] After a lengthy and bitter attack upon heretics who deceive themselves with devilish doctrines, it sets forth the true source of knowledge in the following words: 'Hence, what is set forth in the Vedas—that is true! Upon what is told in the Vedas—upon that wise men live their life. Therefore a Brahman should not study what is non-Vedic.'[5] From the position of the early Upanishads—that the highest knowledge cannot at all be found in the Vedas—the course of thought has now circled round to the point where it maintains that it is to be found nowhere else: but, of course, with the important modification that the term 'Veda' now includes the Upanishads as its most essential part.

It might be supposed that this doctrine of Vedic authority which we have thus seen developed would have been a fettering impediment to the free course of Indian thought. To some extent this was doubtless true, for it cast upon later thinkers the task of proving by somewhat questionable exegesis that all parts of the Veda, by which the Upanishads are now chiefly meant, were in harmony with their own systems. But it certainly did not have the effect of confining all thought henceforth to one narrow track. Instead, we find a luxuriant growth of widely different systems,

[1] See Deussen in *ERE.* s.v. Asrama. [2] *Śvet.* 6. 22.
[3] *Muṇḍ.* 3. 2. 6. [4] As at *Maitri*, 2. 2. [5] *Maitri*, 7. 10.

each protesting that it alone is the authentic interpretation of the meaning of the Veda. This process was aided in India by two factors. The first was the enormous extent of the Vedic Scriptures, and the great variety of doctrines which may be found genuinely present in them. The second factor was that in the interpretation of the Vedas a set of distinctions was developed which enabled scholars to ignore vast sections of opinion with which they did not choose to agree. This formulation of rules of exegesis was in part the work of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā school, which was primarily concerned with the ritual portions of the Vedas; but the theory was extended to the study of theological doctrine by the members of the school of the Vedānta.

The primary distinction is that between *Śruti*, or revelation, as the word may be paraphrased, and *Smṛiti*, or tradition. This contrast serves to set off the Vedas from other literature which has a certain though lesser degree of authority. The word, 'Śruti', meant originally 'hearing', and indicated the fact that the Vedas were 'heard', not read. It thus corresponds to our word, 'scripture', which in its etymology gives evidence of a culture where writing was the normal method of transmitting religious thought.[1] The term, 'Śruti', included the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas and, as parts of the latter, the Upanishads. The other term, 'Smṛiti', is rather less definite in meaning, but connoted primarily the ancient non-Vedic literature. It was thus applied to the sciences subsidiary to the Veda, to the ritual Sūtras, to the legal literature, and finally to the epics and Purāṇas. These works have a certain weight, but in case of conflict of authority, they must yield in the settlement of the dispute to the Śruti.[2]

[1] For this parallel I am indebted to Winternitz, vol. I, p. 50.

[2] cf. Jaimini, *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā-sūtra*, 1. 3. 3: 'Whenever there is contradiction between the Smṛiti and the Veda, the Smṛiti should be dis-

A second distinction, which is prominent in the works of both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja is the distinction between the *karma-kāṇḍa* or 'works-section' of the Veda and the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* or 'knowledge-section'. The former includes the Saṁhitās and the greater part of the Brāhmaṇas. The latter contains the Upanishads and those passages in the Brāhmaṇas which are composed in more or less the same spirit. The value of this distinction was that it assigned entirely different purposes to the two sections of Śruti. Thus, the purpose of the karma-kāṇḍa was to enjoin actions, the performance of sacrifices, religious ceremonies and the like. Although there may be in this section of the Veda some parts which do not at first sight appear to enjoin actions, it will be found that they are subsidiary to action, since they are concerned with explanations (or *arthavāda*) which serve to make the commands more intelligible. In this section of the Veda, apparent contradictions are of no consequence, since if two different methods of performing the same sacrifice are given, the inference is that the sacrifice may be performed in either way. On the other hand, the purpose of the jñāna-kāṇḍa is not the performance of works, but knowledge, and here contradiction is not allowable. But the portion of the Veda which is relevant to metaphysical truth is now practically limited to the Upanishads, so that the task of reconciling it with the philosopher's system becomes a much more manageable one. The problem of harmonizing the ideas of the Upanishads with what we must regard as the undoubtedly different ones of the earlier parts of the Veda does not arise, since the

regarded. There is a considerable variation in usage in regard to the terms used for expressing these ideas of revelation and tradition. Śruti and smṛiti are the most familiar, but the *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā* used *śabdam* and *aśabdam* (word and non-word) in the same sense, while Bādarāyaṇa with singular perversity (unless Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are both at fault in understanding him) used the expressions *pratyaksham* and *anumānam*, which in other systems mean perception and inference, to indicate śruti and smṛiti respectively.

purpose of these earlier sections is not to give knowledge at all.[1]

A third distinction which is employed in Śaṅkara's system is that between *aparā vidyā* or empirical knowledge and *parā vidyā* or metaphysical knowledge. We postpone a detailed consideration of this distinction until we come to our treatment of Śaṅkara's system as a whole. But whatever its significance may be for his philosophy, it is of interest here in that it provided a way of escape from some of the contradictions of the Upanishads, since passages which disagree with Śaṅkara's ultimate view could be given a subordinate place in the aparā vidyā.

With the exception of this last distinction which was the special possession of Śaṅkara and his followers, the other divisions were the common property of the schools of the time, although they were naturally more emphasized in the schools which were most concerned with the interpretation of the Veda, namely the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta. In one other respect the philosophies with which we are especially concerned were in agreement. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and the Sāṅkhya alike held that there were three *pramāṇas*[2] or criteria of knowledge, namely perception,

[1] The difference in purpose between the *karma-kāṇḍa* and the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* is illustrated by Śaṅkara as follows (comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 2.):

'An action of ordinary life as well as one dependent upon the Veda may either be done or may not be done or may be done otherwise; just as one may travel on horseback or on foot or otherwise or not at all. So, for example, if it is said, "At the Atirātra sacrifice he uses the [stanza] of sixteen parts" and "At the Atirātra sacrifice he does not use the [stanza] of sixteen parts"; or "He offers after sunrise" and "He offers before sunrise", we have here prescriptions and prohibitions, which signify that there are optional procedures, rules and exceptions. But a real object does not allow an option as to whether it is thus or not thus, or as to whether it exists or does not exist. All options are dependent upon the discretion of men: the knowledge of how the thing really is does not depend upon the discretion of men; but it depends only on the thing itself. For to think about a post, "It is a post, or it is a man, or it is something else", is not true knowledge. There, "It is a man or it is something else" is false knowledge. "It is a post" is true knowledge, because it is determined by the thing itself.'

[2] The word *pramāṇa* means literally a measure or a standard, and thus a standard for testing the validity of knowledge. The Greek κανών has nearly the same significance.

inference, and Scriptural authority, although they disagreed as to the relative importance to be given to each. These three pramāṇas were accepted also by all the other orthodox schools, although in some of them as well as in later forms of the Vedānta, the number is increased.[1] Of the three philosophies with which we are specially concerned, only that of Rāmānuja contains in its standard text any systematic discussion of the pramāṇas, which are elsewhere assumed to be already well-known. Perception, or *pratyaksham* (also referred to as *dṛishṭam*, 'what is seen') is what is 'before the eyes' i.e. all that is manifest to the senses. Inference, or *anumānam*, is a 'measuring one thing after another', i.e. using something which is already known by pratyaksham in order to determine something else which is not so known. It was chiefly by sub-dividing this pramāṇa that the later Vedānta increased its number of pramāṇas to as many as six. Scriptural authority is referred to under the terms, *śabdam* (word), *āgama* (traditional doctrine) and *āptavacanam* (authoritative communication). We shall consider the exact meaning of these terms a little more closely in our attempt to show what measure of importance each of our philosophies gave to the individual pramāṇas.

In Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtras* there is no mention of pratyaksham and anumānam in the connotations which have here been attached to them. In fact, curiously enough, his total disregard for these pramāṇas is indicated by the fact that he uses these terms to mean something entirely different, namely śruti and smṛiti. But although the pramāṇas are thus

[1] In Śaṅkara's commentary it is difficult to be sure that he limited the pramāṇas to the three mentioned above, since he ordinarily refers to them as *pratyakshādi*, 'perception, etc.': and naturally later commentators with their tendency to expand and subdivide, find in the 'etc.' all the developed theory of the later Vedānta. But so far as I am aware, only the three pramāṇas mentioned are actually used by Śaṅkara.

formally dispensed with, in practice at least, the second, namely inference, is continually used.[1]

Śaṅkara again formally denies that the ordinary means of proof are able to give any knowledge of the highest reality, although they may be sufficient for the lower world of empirical knowledge. The only final source for the knowledge of Brahma is Scripture, when this is properly understood. 'For the comprehension of Brahma is effected by considering the meaning of the texts and standing fast in it; it is not effected either by inference or by the other pramāṇas.'[2] If the Sūtras on which he is commenting appear to argue, they are but referring back to passages in the Upanishads. But it is evident that the force of reason is producing its effect upon Śaṅkara, since he has to contend with opponents who are making a free use of it, and to a certain extent he yields. In his refutation of philosophies which do not acknowledge the authority of the Vedas, he makes free use of argument, and he does the same even against the Sāṅkhya position, although not until after he has shown that their interpretation of the sacred texts is faulty. Even the investigation of Brahma, although it is based upon the Vedānta texts, is also to be carried on with the help of any arguments which do not contradict them.[3] 'While, however, the Vedānta passages primarily declare the cause of the origin, etc., of the world, inference also, being an instrument of right knowledge, in so far as it does not contradict the Vedānta texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the meaning ascertained.'[4] This position is then duly confirmed by the authority of the Vedānta texts. 'Scripture itself, more-

[1] It is possible that we have here a hint that Bādarāyaṇa was combating the Sāṅkhya system even in his terminology, since the *Kārikā* (v. 4) expressly gives these two pramāṇas along with āptavacanam, and Bādarāyaṇa in considerable sections of the Sūtras is primarily engaged in refuting the Sāṅkhyas. In Sūtra 2. 1. 11, he appears to express definitely the baselessness of mere reasoning.

[2] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 2.

[3] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1.

[4] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1, 2.

over, allows argumentation: for the passages, *Bṛih.* 2. 4. 5, and *Chānd.* 6. 14. 2, declare that human understanding assists Scripture.'

The reason that Brahma cannot be known through perception and inference is clear. Brahma is not an object of sense perception, and inference deals only with things which are first known through the senses.[1] But, beside the mere authority of Scripture another source of knowledge is sometimes recognized, which is called *sākshātkāra* or *anubhava*, both of which terms may be translated as intuition. After one has pursued the study of the nature of Brahma, his knowledge ceases to be based on mere authority, and becomes an immediate experience. But this experience would not be possible were it not for the guidance given by the text of Scripture.[2]

In making use of this principle, that Scriptural authority is the only final standard, Śaṅkara is capable of pushing it to an extreme position in holding that judgments concerning Brahma, which would ordinarily be regarded as contradictory to each other are yet both true if affirmed by Scripture. In his comment upon Sūtra, 2. 1. 27, he is forced to hold

[1] This is discussed in answering the following objection which has been raised against studying the Vedānta texts: 'But it might be said, as Brahma is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other means of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a discussion of the Vedānta texts is purposeless.' The rejoinder is then made: 'This we deny; for as Brahma is not an object of the senses, it has no connexion with these other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahma. If Brahma were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is connected with Brahma as its effect; but as the effect only (i.e. the world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception) whether it is connected with Brahma or something else.'—Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 2.

[2] 'Scriptural texts, etc., are not, in the inquiry into Brahma, the only means of knowledge, as they are in the inquiry into active duty, but scriptural texts on the one hand, and intuition, etc., on the other hand are to be had recourse to according to the occasion; because intuition is the final result of the inquiry into Brahma.' (Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 2.) 'Nor again can Brahma, although it is of the nature of an accomplished thing, be the object of perception and the other means of knowledge; for the fact of everything having its self in Brahma cannot be grasped without the aid of the scriptural passage, "That art thou.".'—Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 4.

at the same time (*a*) that Brahma does not wholly enter into the phenomenal world, and yet (*b*) that he is without parts. He is chiefly concerned to show that he does not deny the second of these propositions: 'But at the same time there is no violation of the word of Scripture that Brahma is without parts; for we admit that it is without parts just because it is revealed, Brahma is based upon the word of Scripture, and is known to be true through the word of Scripture. It is not known to be true through the senses, etc. And the word of Scripture acknowledges even both things of Brahma, that it is not completely present (in its effects) and that it is without parts. Even in regard to ordinary things, gems, charms, herbs, and the like, because of differences of place and time and circumstance, many contradictory effects are found. Even these cannot be understood by mere reason without instruction, nor [can we know] how many its powers are, nor what [circumstances] favour them, nor what are their appropriate objects, nor what their uses. How much more impossible to examine the form of the unthinkable nature of Brahma without the word of Scripture! So say the teachers of the Purāṇa: "Let one not harness with reasoning those things which are unthinkable! And what is beyond material substances, that is the mark of the unthinkable." Therefore the knowledge of the real nature of super-sensuous things is based upon the word of Scripture only'.

The opponent then objects that 'even the holy texts cannot make us understand what is contradictory'. But Śaṅkara rejoins in substance that what would be false in the *aparā vidyā* may yet be true in the *parā vidyā*.

While Śaṅkara thus leans heavily upon the Scripture in cases of necessity such as the one just noted, yet his usual practice is to introduce reasoning into his comment perhaps even more than the principles which we have discussed would seem to allow, and the

resulting system, while of course closely linked with the Upanishads, is by no means a mere résumé of their thought.

In Rāmānuja the tendency in favour of reason in religion has gone perhaps a little farther, although he also maintains that Scripture alone is a trustworthy source for supreme knowledge. In distinction from Śaṅkara he gives a careful description and analysis of the ordinary pramāṇas. This account is found in the form of a counter-objection to an objection which has been raised in the discussion of Sūtra 1. 1. 3, but since he does not return to the matter again in his own positive statement, we infer that it represents Rāmānuja's own point of view. The Sūtra, which is in Sanskrit *Sāstra-yonitvād-iti* may be interpreted to mean either that Brahma is the source of Scripture, or that Scripture is the source of [the knowledge of] Brahma. Rāmānuja takes it in the latter sense, and immediately has to meet the objection that Brahma can be known also from the other pramāṇas. In reply to this he says:

'But what are those other sources of knowledge (i.e. other than Scripture)? It cannot, in the first place, be perception. Perception is twofold, being based either on the sense-organs or on an extraordinary concentration of [the] mind (*yoga*). Of perception of the former kind there are again two sub-species, according as perception takes place either through the outer sense-organs or the internal organ (*manas*). Now the outer sense-organs produce knowledge of their respective objects, in so far as the latter are in actual contact with the organs, but are quite unable to give rise to the knowledge of the special object constituted by a supreme Self that is capable of being conscious of and creating the whole aggregate of things. Nor can internal perception give rise to such knowledge; for only purely internal things, such as pleasure and pain, fall within its cognizance, and it is

incapable of relating itself to external objects apart from the outer sense-organs. Nor, again [is it] perception based on Yoga; for although such perception—which springs from intense imagination—implies a vivid presentation of things, it is, after all, nothing more than a reproduction of objects perceived previously, and does not therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge; for it has no means of applying itself to objects other than those perceived previously. And if, after all, it does so, it is [not a means of knowledge but] a source of error. Nor [is it] inference, either of the kind that proceeds on the observation of special cases, or of the kind which rests on generalizations. Not inference of the former kind, because such inference is not known to relate to anything lying beyond the reach of the senses. Nor inference of the latter kind, because we do not observe any characteristic feature that is invariably accompanied by the presence of a Supreme Self capable of being conscious of, and constructing, the universe of things.'[1]

In another passage,[2] perception is divided in a different way into non-determinate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*), the latter being applied to objects in so far as they manifest differences, while the former is used in so far as they are free from difference. But apparently this distinction is used merely for the purpose of combating Śaṅkara's view of non-dualism by showing that even where an object is in some measure destitute of difference it is not altogether so.

In making good the position discussed above, that Brahma can be known only through Scripture and not through perception or inference, the most important objection which Rāmānuja had to meet was from those who held that Brahma could be known from

[1] *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, pp. 161–2.
[2] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 41.

arguments similar to those known in the west as the causal argument and the argument from design. But he succeeds in proving at least to his own satisfaction that their arguments are invalid, and he sums up the debate as follows: 'Thus the inference of a creative Lord which claims to be in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning which itself is in agreement with observation, and we hence conclude that Scripture is the only source of knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the Lord of all and constitutes the highest Brahma.'[1]

Another objection is that while it may be true that the other pramāṇas do not give knowledge, it may also turn out that the Scripture also is faulty in this regard. Here the chief argument which he endeavours to answer is the Mīmāṁsā view, that the purpose of the Scripture is not to give knowledge but to prescribe actions. He points out that Scripture would not succeed in its purpose of enabling men to gain salvation if its teaching were not true:

'The assertion again that a statement referring to some accomplished thing gratifies men merely by imparting a knowledge of the thing, without being a means of knowledge with regard to its real existence—so that it would be comparable to the tales we tell to children and sick people—can in no way be upheld. When it is ascertained that a thing has no real existence, the mere knowledge or idea of the thing does not gratify. The pleasure which stories give to children and sick people is due to the fact that they erroneously believe them to be true; if they were to find out that the matter present to their thought is untrue, their pleasure would come to an end that very moment. And thus in the case of the texts of the

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 3, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 173. But cf. Sūtra 2. 2. 1, where Śaṅkara gives a full version of the argument from design. Rāmānuja briefly indicates it, but does not give it much prominence. *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 484.

Upanishads also. If we thought that these texts do not mean to intimate the real existence of Brahma, the mere idea of Brahma to which they give rise would not satisfy us in any way.' [1]

As against Śaṅkara he contends at length that in case of conflict between perception and Scripture, Scripture is not stronger.[2] As he puts the matter in another place, even though the Scripture should speak of something to be done with 'fire and water', we could not accept it. Yet it is to be noted that he explains the difficult Sūtra, 2. 1. 27, in essentially the same way as Śaṅkara[3].

The Sāṅkhya system, again, although far earlier than Rāmānuja, gives careful attention to the pramāṇas. This was indeed natural since it abandoned reliance upon the Vedas as the principal means to religious truth, and thus was obliged to show that the other pramāṇas could be regarded as giving positive knowledge. In the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* itself the Veda appears to be given a quite subordinate place in regard to knowledge, although later interpreters laboured to bring its verses into nearer accord with Vedāntic orthodoxy. The second *Kārikā* boldly says: 'The revealed [means of precluding pain] are like the visible (i.e. inefficient) for they are connected with impurity, destruction and excess.' The visible or ordinary means of preventing pain are medicine, etc., and in the previous stanza they have been proved insufficient. Pain cannot be absolutely and permanently removed by such means. But the Veda, to which men have usually turned, is equally insufficient. The *Kārikā* proceeds to offer a more excellent way: 'A contrary method is better, and this consists in a discriminative knowledge of the manifested (forms of matter), the unmanifested (*prakṛiti* or primeval matter) and the knowing (Soul).'

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 4, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, pp. 199–200.
[2] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, pp. 73 ff.
[3] See above, p. 62 f.

In other words, the way to salvation is neither common sense nor the Vedas, but the study of the three primary principles of the Sāṅkhya philosophy.

Just how far this turning away from the Veda was originally meant to go is not clear. The reasons given for the insufficiency of the revealed means are explained by even the earliest commentators as referring to the sacrificial system, and it is not certain whether the Upanishads are to be included in the Veda which is thus rejected, or whether they are thought of as the source of the Sāṅkhya principles. When we come down to *Vācaspatimiśra*, we find it definitely interpreted in the latter sense. 'Though the text uses the general term *anuśravika* (revealed), yet it ought here to be taken as applying to the Vedic chapter on duties (the *karma-kāṇḍa*); since discriminative knowledge also is obtained from the Veda, as says the Śruti: "The Self, truly, should be known" (cf. *Bṛih.* 1.4.5, 4.5.6), i.e. it should be discriminated from matter; "It does not return again" (*Chānd.* 8. 15. 1'). He says later: 'The upshot of the whole then is this: the knowledge of the distinction of the soul from Nature arises from a discriminative knowledge—consisting in meditation and contemplation, uninterruptedly and patiently practised or carried on for a long time—of the Manifested, which must have been first heard of from Śrutis and Purāṇas, and then established by philosophic reasoning.'

Beginning with the fourth *Kārikā* we have a considerable section of the poem (six stanzas in all) devoted to a consideration of the means of knowledge, and their use in establishing the Sāṅkhya system. As they are fairly clear in themselves, we quote the more important of them as the best exposition of the position of this philosophy on the subject. We shall then add a few comments on the way in which the stanzas have been understood by the commentators.

Kārikā 4. 'Perception, inference, and fit testimony

are the threefold [kinds of] accepted proof, because in them every mode of proof is fully contained. The complete determination of perfect knowledge (*siddhi*) of what is to be determined is by proof.

Kārikā 5. 'Perception is the application [of the senses] to special objects of sense. Three kinds of inference are declared; it (an inference or logical conclusion) is preceded by a *liṅga* (mark or sign = major premise) and a *liṅgi* (the subject in which it inheres = minor premise). Fit testimony is fit revelation (*śruti*).

Kārikā 6. 'The knowledge of formal or generic existence is by perception; of things beyond the senses by inference; that which cannot be determined by this [method] and cannot be perceived must be determined by fitting means.'

The author of the *Kārikā* then proceeds to point out eight conditions which may prevent an object from being perceived by the senses, even though it is well known that it exists. In a similar manner, Nature, the fundamental principal of the Sāṅkhya, cannot be perceived on account of its subtlety, but it can be known through inference.

The commentators interpret the verses in greater or less detail. Perception, as the text itself declares, is limited to perception through the ordinary senses. The three kinds of inference which are mentioned are said to be (*a*) *pūrvavat*, (*b*) *śeshavat*, and (*c*) *samānyatas*. The exact meaning of these terms in Indian logic is not altogether clear, and the last is particularly uncertain,[1] but there is little question that in the earliest commentators, pūrvavat meant inference from a cause to an effect, śeshavat, inference from an effect to a cause, and samānyatas some kind of non-causal inference.[2]

[1] See Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, pp. 88 ff.

[2] The examples given in what may be the oldest commentary on the *Kārikā*, that which was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha, are instructive. I quote from the French translation of Takakusu, *Bulletin*, vol. IV, p. 985. 'Par example, les hommes voient des nuages noirs et infèrent qu'il

In the earlier commentaries samānyatas appears to be merely inference from analogy, but Vācaspatimiśra explains it as 'inference from the perception of species or class'.[1] The third pramāṇa, *Āptavacanam*, would seem to have been of no great importance in the original system, and one may surmise that it was introduced in order that some recognition might appear to be given to the existence of what was at that time by far the greatest body of traditional learning. At any rate the examples given by the early commentaries seem to indicate that what this tradition had to teach was not regarded as of great importance. Thus the commentary translated by Paramārtha says:

'Si une chose ne peut être connue par les preuves de la perception ou de la comparaison nous nous référons à une autorité sacrée, et la preuve sera faite. Ainsi des régions comme le Ciel ou l'Uttarakuru ne peuvent être connues ni par perception ni par inférence. Nous ne pouvons les connaître qu'en nous référant à une autorité sacrée.' This is very much as if we should say that if we wish to know the true nature of centaurs or unicorns, we must turn not to perception or inference but to a classical dictionary. At the same time, the tradition may very well be true: 'L'Agama (tradition) est l'autorité sacrée; un saint personnage est libré de toute erreur, et, étant libré de toute erreur, il ne dit jamais un mensonge, par le raison de l'absence de cause.'[2]

No careful distinction is made by this early commentator between śruti and smṛiti, since in explaining the meaning of āptavacanam, he illustrates it by

va pleuvoir (*pūrvavat*); ou bien, voyant l'eau d'un fleuve récemment troublée, ils savent que la pluie est tombée en amont du fleuve (*śeshavat*); ou bien ils voient fleurir les manguiers à Pataliputra et en infèrent que dans le Kosala aussi ils sont en fleurs (*samānyatas*).'

[1] In regard to this distinction and also another which Vācaspatimiśra introduces from his study of the Nyāya system, namely that between *vita* and *avita* inferences, see Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, pp. 89–90.

[2] Takakusu, op. cit. p. 984.

saying: 'Par example, les quatre Védas énoncés par le Dieu Brahma et le Dharmasastra du roi Manu.'

Vācaspatimiśra is much more concerned to square the Sāṅkhya system with Vedic knowledge. For him the value of śruti is self-evident. 'It is true, since all faults and doubts with regard to it are set aside by the fact of its proceeding from the Veda which is superhuman. Thus also the knowledge obtained from Smṛitis, Purāṇas, etc., which are founded on the Veda, becomes true. To the primeval Kapila, in the beginning of the *Kalpa*, we may attribute the reminiscence of the Śrutis studied in his previous birth, as we recollect after a night's sleep the occurrences of the previous day.' Even though the teaching may come from Kapila, its ultimate source must be śruti. But not all supposed revelations are authoritative. 'By saying true revelation, all pretended revelations, such as those of Śākya,[1] Bhikshu,[2] etc., have been set aside. The invalidity of these systems is due to their making unreasonable assertions, to want of sufficient basis, to their making statements contradictory to proofs, and lastly to their being accepted only by Mlecchas or other mean people.'

Finally, it may be remarked that Vācaspatimiśra is constrained to accept another source of knowledge in exceptional cases beyond those already discussed. This is the insight of seers, which is, however, of no avail to any except themselves. 'The above,' he says, referring to the pramāṇas enumerated in *Kārikā* 4, 'is an exposition of what is popularly known as proof; and a philosophic system is expounded for the people, since thereto is its province confined. The knowledge of the great sages, though a reality, is yet of no use as to popular knowledge, and as such is not treated of here.'[3]

[1] Buddha. [2] Mahāvīra.

[3] A similar distinction had earlier been made in the Nyāya school from which Vācaspatimiśra doubtless derived it. See Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 53.

We now turn to another fundamental presupposition of Indian philosophy, the view of life and destiny which is expressed by the doctrines of karma and transmigration. These doctrines were accepted throughout our period practically without criticism, and with almost no attempt to establish their validity. This fact is the more remarkable because of the practical certainty that the doctrines in question were quite unknown in Indian religion until about the time of the earliest Upanishads. Evidence for this is found in the facts already noted, that those who had mastered the whole of the Vedic literature with all its attendant sciences were yet ignorant of these doctrines, although they became of primary importance in the period immediately following. Occasional passages in the Upanishads appear to make use of Vedic quotations to support the doctrine, but further examination makes it clear that either transmigration is not actually taught by the Upanishad passages in question,[1] or that if it is taught, the Vedic text has been subjected to misinterpretation.[2] Whether these new concepts were taken over from aboriginal peoples, or whether they represent a gradual development from Brāhmanic conceptions, such as that of 'repeated death', is a question of little importance for our inquiry. At all events, in such a passage as *Bṛih.* 3. 2, we appear to be near the origin of the doctrine so far as the literary tradition is concerned. In this passage the doctrine stated is simply that a man becomes good by good action and bad by bad action, and that this law determines his fate when he departs from this life. The doctrine is referred to as a profound mystery, which can only be discussed in a private conference, and which must not be revealed to the public. A similar thought,

[1] *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 10, referring to *Ṛigveda*, 4. 26. 1; *Ait.* 2. 4, referring to *Ṛigveda*, 4. 7. 1.

[2] *Bṛih.* 6. 2. 2, referring to *Ṛigveda*, 10. 88. 15.

although in a setting which immediately connects it with the Ātman doctrine, is that of the famous teaching of Śāṇḍilya in *Chānd.* 3. 14. 'Then, indeed, a person is composed of purpose. According as one's purpose is in this world, so does a person become on departing hence. One should resolve upon a purpose.' In other passages in the teaching of Yājñavalkya[1] the doctrine is illustrated with analogies drawn from nature and art, and is brought into connexion with his psychological analysis of the process of death, but without any further detail in regard to reincarnation in this world.

This detail is first supplied in a document known to the Vedānta philosophy as 'the Doctrine of the Five Fires', although that title belongs properly only to the first part of it. It appears first in a late portion of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, which according to tradition was added as an appendix to the original text, and again, in what is probably a derivative form, in the *Chāndogya.*[2] A third version of the doctrine in the *Kaushītaki* is dependent upon these earlier statements, and attempts to reconcile their discrepancies, while adding certain new features of its own.[3] Since these three passages form the classic statements for later philosophy, we will endeavour to outline their teaching, although the confusion in matters of detail is such that it is impossible to gain from them any single consistent picture.

The passage which, in the main, is common to the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya*, falls clearly into two parts, one of which may be designated as the doctrine of the five fires in the narrower sense, and the other as the doctrine of the two ways.[4] Since these two sections diverge somewhat in point of view we

[1] *Bṛih.* 4. 4. 3-4, 5b. [2] *Bṛih.* 6. 2; *Chānd.* 5. 3–10. [3] *Kaush.* 1.

[4] The doctrine of the five fires in the narrower sense is found in *Bṛih.* 6. 2. 9–14, and *Chānd.* 5. 4–9; the doctrine of the two ways in *Bṛih.* 6. 2. 15-16, and *Chānd.* 5. 10. For the literary analysis see Deussen, *SUV.* p. 137 f.; Keith, *RPV.* p. 575.

propose to discuss first the doctrine of the five fires as it appears in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* and secondly the doctrine of the two ways as it is found in both these sources.

The doctrine of the five fires endeavours to explain the origin of a human being as the result of five sacrifices. First, in yonder world, the gods offer faith (*śraddhā*) as a sacrifice, and from this offering King Soma[1] arises. Soma is offered in turn and rain is produced. From this comes food, then seed, and finally man. After man has lived his life and dies, he in turn is offered in the flame of the funeral pyre. In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* version of this passage nothing explicit is said about transmigration into another human body in this section, the process stopping with the 'man having the colour of light' who rises from the pyre. The passage leads on easily, however, into the doctrine of the two ways which does definitely teach transmigration, and it is not improbable that the earlier passage also is to be understood in that light. At any rate, the teaching of transmigration is definitely attached to it in the *Chāndogya*, which after tracing the course through the five fires as above adds that the funeral pyre is also the fire from which man comes. We are to understand then from this doctrine as it stands in the *Chāndogya* that at death man goes through the series of changes mentioned and that he returns from the fires to a new life. Nothing is said here about any separation of men into classes, or of any residence whether temporary or permanent in another world.

These changes are introduced in the second passage, the doctrine of the two ways. We discuss this again primarily as it appears in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, but noting so far as necessary the variations in the *Chāndogya*. This doctrine diverges at several

[1] *Soma* is an intoxicating drink used for ritual purposes in the Vedas.

points from the doctrine of the five fires, although there are points of contact between them. The doctrine is based upon a verse from the *Ṛigveda*[1] which speaks of two ways, the way of the Manes and the way of the gods. In its original context these two ways are probably merely day and night.[2] But in the Upanishad they are interpreted as ways which the soul may follow at death; the way of the gods conducts those who know the doctrine of the five fires (which has just been expounded) ultimately to the world of Brahma from which there is no return; while the way of the Manes brings back to rebirth those who have merely performed the Vedic duties of sacrifice, charity, and austerity. The way of the gods takes a man through a series of intermediate stations before he reaches his final goal. As given in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* they are flame, the day, the bright half of the month (i.e. the part in which the moon is waxing), the bright half of the year (i.e. the part in which the sun is moving northwards), the world of the gods, the sun, the lightning fire, and finally the world of Brahma. The temporal terms employed are probably to be understood spatially, although, in the *Mahābhārata*, Bhīshma, after he has been given his death-blow, is obliged to remain in a kind of suspended animation in order that he may finally die in the part of the year which belongs to the way of the gods. The *Chāndogya* list is the same as that just given, except for the fact that it substitutes the year for the world of the gods, and inserts the moon just before the lightning fire, possibly in deference to the earlier belief that the moon was the abode of the dead.

The stations on the way of the Manes are in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, smoke, night, the dark half of the month (i.e. the part in which the moon is waning), the dark half of the year (i.e. the part in which the sun is

[1] *Ṛigveda*, 10. 88. 15.
[2] So Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 318.

moving southwards), the world of the Manes, and then the moon which is mystically identified with King Soma. Here the souls become food for the gods, thus in some mysterious way accounting for the waxing and waning of the moon. They then pass into space, then successively into air, rain, earth, food, and seed, and thus eventually are reborn. The *Chāndogya* places space also before the entry into the moon, and adds that the souls remain in the moon so long as they have a residue of good works. The return journey in the *Chāndogya* is a little more complicated. The souls pass into space, wind, smoke, mist, cloud, rain, plants (rice and barley, herbs and trees, sesame plants and beans are mentioned), seed, and thence to rebirth. Amid much which is bizarre in these conceptions, it is possible to make out that the two ways are the ways open respectively to those possessing the mystic knowledge given by the Upanishads, and to those who merely practice the Vedic virtues.

We would expect a third way for those who would fail to come up to the standards of either mystic knowledge or Vedic dutifulness. This, however, we fail to find. Instead, a third way is designated in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* for those who are ignorant of the doctrine of the two ways. These are condemned to be reborn, not as men, but as 'crawling and flying insects, and whatever there is here that bites'. This omission of a way for those who are sinful is made good in the *Chāndogya*, although only at the cost of introducing further confusion into the conception. Although we are told that the way of the Manes is followed by those who reverence a belief in the Vedic virtues, yet they appear at the end of their journey to be divided into two classes, those of good conduct, who are given rebirth into one of the higher castes, and those of evil conduct, who are degraded to the condition of an animal or an outcaste. The third way of the *Bṛihad-āraṇyaka* is kept, but without its original significance,

for short-lived creatures such as flies and worms, who, it appears, are quite excluded from the possibility of ever rising to a higher state. It is also to be noted that the *Chāndogya* provides for a double retribution, at least for good works, since the soul's residence in the moon seems to be a kind of heaven, where it can remain until its good works are exhausted.

The *Kaushītaki* presents what is in many ways a much more intelligible account. At death, the soul passes to the moon where its knowledge of certain formulas which it is supposed to have learned is tested. If it passes this test, it goes on in the way of the gods. If it fails, it returns to earth through rain, and there is reborn 'either as a worm, or as a moth, or as a fish, or as a bird, or as a lion, or as a wild boar, or as a snake, or as a tiger, or as a person, or as some other in this or that condition. . . . according to his deeds, according to his knowledge'.[1]

All of these conflicting ideas, together with some of the earlier eschatological ideas of the Vedic period, are carried over into the philosophies with little further development, and while much attention is given to detail in the *Vedānta Sūtras*, it is hardly necessary for us to follow Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja in their attempts to expound the Vedāntic teaching. It may be remarked that the account which was most influential was that of the *Chāndogya*, in many ways the most confused and perplexing of the three. But the essential point in the development of the systems lies in the general conception of a universe in which there is repeated return to rebirth in forms determined by the deeds of each life, a process which continues until eventually the knowledge is achieved which in some way sets the soul free from the necessity of further reincarnation.

One point in which greater clearness seems to have been gained by the philosophies is in the

[1] *Kaush.* 1.

conception of just what it is that transmigrates. In the Upanishads this is by no means evident. In the early passage, *Bṛih.* 3. 2, two suggestions are made. The first is the idea that the one eternal element in man's nature is the name, a doctrine of obscure meaning in the original, but apparently lying back of the later Buddhist notion that the element which is reborn is name and form, i.e. individuality.[1] The second question which is also, of course, paralleled in Buddhism is that while the parts of the body are scattered to their respective sources, what remains over to cause a new existence is karma. In another passage in the teaching of Yājñavalkya, the transmigrating entity is much more developed. The Ātman, as it departs from the body, takes with it the bodily senses, intelligence, its knowledge and works, and its knowledge of former things (*pūrvaprajñā*). One more element is added to these in the later philosophy to form what is known as the subtle body (*liṅga śarīra* or *sūkshma śarīra*). These elements are combined in a kind of spatial counterpart of the physical body, distinguished from it by being invisible, and forming the entity which passes from birth to birth, carrying with it the seeds of karma which are realized in each new existence.[2] The thought that the actions of a man remain in this subtle body like seeds which spring up to life in the new existence is a favourite one with Śaṅkara, and is well used by him to reinforce what doubtless has been one of the great motives for accepting the whole transmigration theory, the fact that it provides what is at least at first sight an excellent solution for the problem of evil.[3]

[1] See Keith, *RPV.* pp. 578–9. For Buddhism see the *Milindapañha*, 46. 5, translated by Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 234.

[2] See *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, 39, 40, 44, 45, 62, for texts dealing with transmigration and the subtle body. In the *Vedānta Sūtra*, Sūtras 4. 2–4, deal with transmigration and release, while 4. 2. 8–11 deal specially with the subtle body.

[3] We quote the following section from Śaṅkara's comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 34, which admirably exhibits his use of the doctrine for furnishing an

A further condition which should be kept in mind as affecting to some extent the development of Indian thought is the institution of caste. It is clear that in the Vedas and Upanishads this institution had not developed into the rigid and complicated system which is characteristic of later Indian society. The only distinctions generally made are divisions into natural social groups, namely, the priestly class, the ruling or fighting class, the farmer and merchant class, and the labourers. The last were apparently at first recruited from the conquered aborigines. The primacy of the Brahmans over the Kshatriyas is by no means evident in such a passage as *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 11, and it is evident that there was considerable give and take in intellectual discussions between them, although the Brahmans are endeavouring to maintain the supremacy. It is also clear that the number of those who

explanation of evil: 'The Lord is not to be received (it is argued) as the cause of the world. Why? Because of his implication (in that case) with unfairness and lack of mercy. Some, such as the gods, etc., he makes to enjoy extreme pleasure; some, such as the animals, etc., to suffer extreme pain; others, such as men, etc., to suffer a middle fate. So, because passion and cruelty would have to be ascribed to a Lord who brought forth so unfair a creation, just as to a common person, there would follow a contradiction of the character of the Lord as perfectly pure, etc., that is, of qualities which are ascertained from the Śruti and Śmṛiti. Moreover, lack of mercy and extreme cruelty, which are things despised even by low people, would be implied in him because of his infliction of pain and his [final] destruction of all creatures. Therefore because of his unfairness and lack of mercy it cannot be received that the Lord is cause of the world.

'We reply: Unfairness and lack of mercy are not implied in the Lord. For why? Because of his "having regard", because if the Lord alone without "regard" had made an unfair creation there would be these two charges—unfairness and lack of mercy. But he did not create it without "regard"; for the Lord "having regard" brought forth an (apparently) unfair creation. But to what did he have "regard"? We say that he had regard to righteousness and unrighteousness. Hence this (apparently) unfair creation has regard to the righteousness and unrighteousness of the creatures created, and this is not a fault to be charged against the Lord. Moreover the Lord must be looked upon like Parjanya (the god of rain); for just as Parjanya is the cause alike of the production of rice, barley, etc., but the differences of the species of rice, barley, etc., are caused by the unlike potentialities lying hidden in each different seed, so the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, etc., but the differences of gods, men, etc., are caused by the unlike karma lying hidden in each different seed. Hence the Lord, because of his "having regard" cannot be charged with unfairness and lack of mercy.'

were allowed to share the highest knowledge was not in all cases so closely confined to the three highest castes as was later the rule. Satyakāma is allowed to study as a Brahman, although his paternity is unknown. His teacher is willing to assume that he is a Brahman merely from the fact that he gave a truthful answer to the embarrassing question concerning his origin. Raikva teaches his mystic doctrine to Janaśruti after fitting presents had been given, although before he had openly called him a Śūdra.[1]

These breaches in the proprieties of a later time are explained away by Śaṅkara, following Bādarāyaṇa, but in the most obviously sophistical fashion. He also discusses for his own part at considerable length two questions, namely, whether the Śūdras should be excluded from the study of the Vedānta, and whether the gods (who it must be remembered are also in need of salvation) may be admitted to the mystic knowledge.[2] The answer to both questions is in the affirmative. The Śūdras are excluded because they cannot be invested with the sacred thread, a sacrament which admits the youth of the three higher castes to the study of the Veda. The gods, on the other hand, are admitted, since although they have not been invested with the sacred thread, they are not in need of it because the Veda is self-revealed to them. It might appear as if the Vedānta were illogical in excluding the Śūdra, since he is also a human being and has a soul to be saved. But it is to be remembered that he owes his position to the results of previous karma, and while he may not be able to gain deliverance in this birth, fitting conduct may give him that privilege in his next, or at all events some future reincarnation.

Much the same position is taken by Rāmānuja in his commentary on the Sūtras. He holds strictly that the Śūdras cannot be admitted to that relation-

[1] *Chānd.* 4. 4, 44. 12. [2] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 3, 32–39.

ship with Brahma which constitutes salvation, since they are not allowed to study the Veda, which is a necessary condition. In fact, in one way he is even stricter than Śaṅkara, for he argues that if Śaṅkara's position were logically followed out, it would be necessary to admit the equality of the Śūdra with the higher castes, and he appears to regard it as an advantage that this deduction cannot be drawn from his system. At the same time, there is another side of Rāmānuja's thought which stands apparently in direct opposition to that which has been already stated. In south India from early times there has been a tendency for religious leadership to spring from members of the lower castes. One of the earliest and most famous literary works in the Tamil language, the *Kurral*, was written by a priest or soothsayer of the Pariahs, if we may trust the common tradition.[1] In the line of spiritual descent in which Rāmānuja more immediately stands, the twelve Āḻvārs are said to have included in their number some who were outcastes, and they did not hesitate to teach outcastes.[2] In the accounts of Rāmānuja's life which have come down to us, we find him teaching the Śūdras and outcastes the doctrines of *Vishnu-bhakti* or loving trust in Vishnu, and he is said to have admitted outcastes for one day in the year into the temple which he founded at Melkote. The same contradiction remains among the spiritual descendants of Rāmānuja to the present day. The special sect to which he belonged, the Śrī-Vaishnavas, are still very strict in the enforcement of caste, while a fifteenth century follower of his, Rāmānanda, was one of the early leaders of reform movements which endeavoured to minimize the power of caste or remove it completely.[3] It is possible, as Farquhar suggests, that Rāmānuja's severity in enforcing caste regulations was in order to remove from his sect the suspicion

[1] G. U. Pope, *The Kurral*. [2] Farquhar, *ORLI.* p. 187.
[3] Farquhar, *ORLI.* pp. 247, 323 ff.

of heterodoxy which had clung to it from early times.[1]

I have not been able to discover in early Sāṅkhya sources any definite references to the position of the system in regard to the Śūdras or outcastes, although there is reason for believing that it was more liberal than the Vedānta. From the bias which it has against the Vedas, as compared with the Vedāntist system, we should expect that it would not give the supreme place to the Brahman caste who were the custodians of the sacred literature. The Sāṅkhya system is in several respects allied to Buddhism and Jainism, systems which made no caste distinctions. Perhaps the most important piece of evidence which can be obtained from the early literature is that *Kārikā* 53 of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, in giving the divisions of sentient beings, places the gods in eight groups, while the human race is put entirely in one. Considering the love for tracing distinctions which the Sāṅkhya exhibits, it is remarkable that it should pass over the obvious one of caste, unless it wished to show that it did not consider this distinction important. In the later Sāṅkhya works Śūdras are definitely admitted to the study of the system, and in this the commentator on the *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-sūtra*, Vijñāna-bhikshu, appeals to the authority of the *Mahābhārata*,[2] where it is stated that the results of Yoga are open to women and Śūdras as well as to men and the twice-born.[3]

[1] Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, pp. 616, 708, maintains that Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja take a much more liberal view of caste than the one which I have been able to find in them as presented above. The references which he gives are either not to the writings of the thinkers in question, or when taken from the commentaries on the Sūtras, fail in my opinion to establish his point. In particular, I am unable to find anything in Śaṅkara's comment on *V.S.* 3. 4. 38, which would justify his assertion that 'Śaṅkara holds that any man of any caste can attain the highest knowledge'. The passage deals with those outside the āśramas, not with those outside the higher castes.

[2] *Mahābhārata*, 14. 19. 61.

[3] On the position of the Sāṅkhya in regard to caste see Garbe, *Die Sāṅkhya Philosophie*, pp. 138–40; Keith, *The Sāṁkhya System*, p. 100; Farquhar, *ORLI*. p. 131.

The division of Indian society into castes affected the development of philosophy in two ways. In the first place, the pre-eminence of the Brahman caste in intellectual matters meant that the course of Hindu philosophic development was kept largely under their control,[1] and was for the most part based upon their religious tradition. They were the class in the community which beyond all others had the leisure necessary for prolonged occupation with intellectual affairs. While *brahmacarya* or Vedic study was open to all the members of the twice-born castes, it is unlikely that many would have fully availed themselves of its privileges who were not expecting to make professional use of their knowledge in later life. Such books as the *Pañcatantra* show us that the education given to princes was in many cases at least of a much more practical sort. Brahman supremacy meant then that philosophical knowledge was an aristocratic and exclusive possession, and was limited by the Brahman caste chiefly to the religious tradition.

In the second place, the separation which existed between the Brahmans and the other classes meant that the knowledge which grew out of the conduct of ordinary handicrafts reached the Brahmans in only a very small degree. As has previously been pointed out, there was in India a considerable knowledge of the sciences, medicine, mathematics, etc., but it made no important contribution to philosophy because of this social stratification. Even the consideration of ethics and politics which in the west have had an important place in philosophical development, is for the most part lacking in Indian thought, largely doubtless because the structure of caste appeared to make such a consideration unnecessary.[2]

The motive of the philosophies which we are to study is throughout practical. It is not the dis-

[1] It was of course otherwise in Buddhism and Jainism.
[2] Keith, *RPV.* p. 600.

interested love of truth but the desire to end some of earth's sorrows or to secure some of its acknowledged joys which leads the thinker to undertake his task. In the early Upanishads, knowledge is power in a crassly material sense, and it is desired because it can give to its fortunate possessor some of the ordinary natural goods of life. Whoever knows this or that mystery will obtain pleasure, or food, or control over a hateful rival, or gold, or whatever else it may be. Of course, other-worldly boons are by no means excluded when they come to be thought important, and the correct knowledge will also give a man power to escape the second death, or, with Naciketas in the *Kaṭha*, he may learn how to kindle the fire which leads to the possession of heaven. In all this there is a magical note, so that the knowledge operates not through its meaning, or through any action which it may suggest, but purely through its own mysterious power. Knowledge is a terrible thing, and its possessor, like Yājñavalkya, may use it against his opponent who is not equally equipped, to make his head burst open.

On the other hand, as the thought of the Upanishads becomes more developed, the idea becomes increasingly clear that the primary use of the knowledge for which the thinkers strive is to secure salvation or release. A full discussion of release, as we find it in the Upanishads, can be intelligible only after their metaphysical principles are understood, and hence must be postponed for later consideration. It may be pointed out here, however, that in contrast with later Indian thought, the doctrine of release grew neither out of transmigration nor out of any thorough-going pessimism. The doctrine of release appears independently of, and perhaps previous to, the doctrine of transmigration; while pessimism, in the form which became characteristic of Buddhism, is scarcely to be found in the Upanishads, except in the late *Maitri*.

The desire for release was, however, closely associated with both these elements in the later philosophies. In the Sāṅkhya, which in this respect stands closest to the Buddhist point of view, all existence is an evil, and the purpose of philosophy is to discover some means of escaping from it. The first verse of the *Kārikās* declares: 'From the injurious effects of the threefold kinds of pain [arises] a desire to know the means of removing it.' The three kinds of pain are explained by the commentators as (*a*) that which arises from some inner source, such as bodily or mental ills, (*b*) that which arises from natural external causes, and (*c*) that which comes from supernatural causes, such as demon-possession, or from the influence of the planets. Such remedies for these ills as medicine or earthly pleasures have no permanent effect, and they can only be finally eliminated by the study of the Sāṅkhya philosophy.

Knowledge is for Śaṅkara a means of securing a more positive blessing, although it is closely linked in his mind with escape from the evil round of transmigration, and since in his view the source of all evil is false knowledge (a conception which we shall have to examine more carefully later) it is natural that he should believe that the way of release is through true knowledge. His point of view is sufficiently expressed by the words with which he introduces his comment on the first of the *Vedānta Sūtras*: 'With a view to freeing one's self from that wrong notion which is the cause of all evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self, the study of the *Vedānta Sūtras* is begun."[1]

In Rāmānuja knowledge does not have the place of exclusive importance in regard to salvation which it assumes in Śaṅkara, since it is replaced by *bhakti* or loving trust. Yet in his thought as well, it does

[1] Introduction to *Comment on V.S.*, *SBE.* vol. XXXIV, p. 9.

have an essential place, and wrong notions in regard to ultimate reality may prevent the achievement of the emancipation which is the goal of his thought. But whereas in Śaṅkara's system knowledge is salvation, with Rāmānuja it is but one step, although a necessary one, on the way.

In the method of Indian thought, as might be expected, there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between the period of the Upanishads and that of the philosophies. In the Upanishads we have a creative period when new ideas were surging in the minds of men, and when the impulse to expression was too great to allow time for considering whether or not the new doctrines were harmonious with one another, or whether they could be placed in any regular system. Naturally, we have then both brilliant intuitions into truth as well as much else which is of little value. At the same time, the Upanishads formed a rich quarry for later workers, and there is little in the later philosophical development which does not show traces of its origin from the Upanishads.

For the later philosophy, however, the problem was no longer that of origination but of construction. The elements of thought which were found in the older tradition had to be fitted together, harmonized, ordered in a system. The philosophies in the period in which they become known from literary documents show ample signs of having been conceived in the atmosphere of competing schools. Contested doctrines could not be supported on the mere authority of the teacher but required proof if they were to stand. If the authority of the Veda was seriously to be maintained it was necessary to make the endeavour to bring its teachings into some kind of unity. Or if it were to be given up as a determinative principle, it was necessary to find some other standard to put in its place. We have then a period of intense intellectual activity, which, if it produced little fundamentally new,

was yet valuable in that it explored thoroughly the meaning of the movements of the past, and contributed new emphases and new rationalizations of previous beliefs.

This intellectual activity has its closest western parallel so far as method is concerned, in the slightly later movement of scholasticism. In both we have the attempts of groups of men whose main interest was in religion and who tried to understand their religious tradition and to reduce it to a rationally coherent system. In both we have the same atmosphere of controversy, where the effort is not to discover new truth so much as to defend positions against possible assailants. Even in literary form the resemblance is striking. The Sūtras have their parallel in the medieval books of Sentences, such as those of Peter Lombard. The commentary is the form of exposition which is most common both in east and west. If we examine the structure of such a commentary as the *Śrībhāshya* of Rāmānuja, we find that it is not dissimilar to that used by Thomas Aquinas in his *Summae*. In both, after a preliminary statement of the proposition to be defended, the views of opponents are represented, which is finally followed by the establishment of the commentator's own position.

In a recent book,[1] Otto compares Śaṅkara with the German mystic, Meister Eckhart, and succeeds in showing great similarities as far as the substance of their thought is concerned. In form, however, both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are much more closely allied with the great systematizers of the Middle Ages. Like them, they were able to reduce to inclusive syntheses the knowledge which appeared to be of value to men of their time and class. They owe their reputation and influence in later ages to the fact that their followers have felt that if only they

[1] *West-Ostliche Mystik.*

thoroughly understood the works of these great masters, they would find that the problems which the world presents were already completely solved. It might be necessary to expound once more the master's teachings or to defend them against new attacks of opponents; but it was hard to believe that these great systems would ever be in need of reconstruction. It is, then, not strange that after the age of the great systems, the only further development of Indian philosophy upon new lines has been to make the attempt to bring all systems into one single synthesis; an attempt which, in spite of some measure of apparent success due to the many common elements of Indian thought, could in the end only produce confusion of what had already been rightly distinguished.

CHAPTER IV

BRAHMA AND ĀTMAN IN THE UPANISHADS

WE have seen that to many questions which can be asked in regard to the teaching of the Upanishads no single answer can be given. If inquiry were to be made whether the Upanishads are theistic or pantheistic, or whether they teach a realistic or an idealistic system, one could at best reply with what one believed to be the prevailing view. Any simple answer would have to pass over evidence which definitely tends toward an opposite viewpoint. It is unlikely that the attempts made by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja as well as by early western scholars, to bend all the teachings of the Upanishads to fit this or that theory of their meaning, will ever be repeated. It may then be inquired whether it is not possible to show that one view in the Upanishads is fundamental, and that from it all the others are derived by a process either of development or degradation. Or, if it should prove impossible to make any one view fundamental to the detriment of others, does not our material give us sufficient data for the construction of a theory of the historical development of their thought, so that we may be enabled to explain each successive stage as the outworking of the ideas contained in the one before it? It must be admitted that if it should prove possible to work out such a theory, and to demonstrate it convincingly, it would be of considerable value in aiding us to interpret the doctrines of the Upanishads themselves. There is much in these documents which must necessarily remain ambiguous except in the light of some general theory of historical development. If we

assume, for instance, that the fully developed doctrine of the Ātman, as found in the teaching of Yājñavalkya, was known to the authors of the cosmogonic myths in *Bṛih.* 1.4, we shall believe that they were endeavouring to popularize the higher teaching by making use of familiar material, and we shall read into these myths much more meaning than they will have, if we think that they are merely stepping-stones on the way to the higher teaching. Some idea of the chronological sequence of our materials can be gained, as was pointed out above,[1] by the methods of literary criticism.

At any rate, the relative order of the Upanishads, apart from a few exceptions, can be regarded as fairly certain. Is our knowledge sufficiently extensive to enable us to use it for a convincing theory of the development of ideas?

Attempts have been made to provide such a theory by two of the foremost interpreters of Indian thought. Deussen, in his *Philosophy of the Upanishads*,[2] holds that there is one normal view in the Upanishads, from which all differing views represent a decline. This view is expressed in the teaching of Yājñavalkya in the oldest of the Upanishads, the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, and thus stands at the very beginning of the intellectual movement which the Upanishads represent. This view is an uncompromising idealism, and is the strain of thought afterwards defended and systematized by Śaṅkara. In Deussen's words, this view states that 'the Ātman is the sole reality; with the knowledge of it all is known; there is no plurality and no change. Nature, which presents the appearance of plurality and change, is mere illusion (*māyā*)'. While there is much in the earlier parts of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya* which does not accord with this view, he holds that it is placed there with a pedagogic purpose, so that the learner may be gradually prepared for the

[1] p. 37. [2] pp. 237 ff. *et passim.*

doctrines of the Ātman.[1] Finally, Deussen believes that Yājñavalkya's view is an essential element, perhaps the most essential element, of any ultimately true philosophy.

But this high idealistic view, so this theory continues, could not be permanently maintained, owing to the natural tendency of the human mind to think of even ultimate principles in empirical terms. We have, then, a series of steps of degeneration, as men gradually lost sight of the original view in their attempts to make it more intelligible. The first step, which is caused by the difficulty of holding the universe entirely unreal, is to pantheism, and Deussen admits that this view occupies the largest place in the Upanishads, and not the original idealism. This view holds that 'the universe is real, and yet the Ātman is the sole reality; for the Ātman is the entire universe'. Yet this pantheism is distinct from European pantheism since pantheism in Europe grew out of the theism of the Middle Ages, while this pantheism grew out of an original idealism. But it was impossible, again, for thought to rest content in the pantheistic view. The relation between the universe and the Ātman was in need of further interpretation, and this was accomplished in terms of the causal relationship. Our next step, then, is to cosmogonism, which in the Upanishads makes use of older cosmogonic material, while maintaining that the Ātman, after creating the world, entered into it. A further step is theism, in which a distinction is drawn for the first time between the supreme and the individual soul. But with the drawing of this distinction, the existence of God is called into question. For if souls are ultimate and eternal realities, the only function left for God is to be the creator of the material world, and this becomes unnecessary, if it is assumed that matter also

[1] *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 121.

is eternal. We are left then with the atheism of the Sāṅkhya system, which assumes only two types of ultimate reality, matter (*pradhāna*) and souls (*purusha*). The Sāṅkhya philosophy is just beginning to reach expression in the latest of the classical Upanishads, but the development goes one stage further in later philosophy, when the Yoga, while accepting the fundamental principles of the Sāṅkhya system, adds to it the belief in a personal God. This is perhaps due to the pressure of popular opinion, since the system properly speaking has no place for this belief. This last development Deussen calls deism. We have thus a series of changes, idealism, pantheism, cosmogonism, theism, atheism, and deism, each of which follows by logical development from the one before it when the mind endeavours to understand metaphysical truth in empirical terms.

Although it is admitted even by Keith that this theory is a brilliant and attractive one,[1] it nevertheless presents certain difficulties. Perhaps the chief of these is that it puts at the very beginning of the development the highest and most abstruse theory, while the relatively imperfect views are considered to be subsequent to it. Granting for the moment that Yājñavalkya's views do represent the norm of the Upanishads, it is indeed strange that we should have no trace of the steps by which this highest insight was attained. Deussen is able to explain this difficulty by means of his theory that the philosophy of the Upanishads was originally worked out by the Kshatriya caste, and was taken over and given its present literary form by the Brahmans after its development was practically complete. But this theory of the exclusive Kshatriya origin of the Upanishadic philosophy, as we have seen,[2] is now discredited, and further research has shown that the thought of the Upanishads presents

[1] *RPV*, p. 510. [2] pp. 33–4.

far more continuity with that of the Brāhmaṇas than was earlier supposed.[1] Further, the notion that the Upanishads do have a normal form of thought is one which is suggested by the study of the later systems of philosophy rather than by the Upanishads themselves. One can hardly say that there is any hint, in the many passages which express a pantheistic view, that they are a falling away from an original idealism.

In place of Deussen's theory, then, Keith, who is the most recent systematic expounder of the philosophy of the Upanishads, offers another solution.[2] The original source of the thought of the Upanishads is the cosmogonism which comes down unbroken from the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas. Creation implies not the making of something from outside, but the unfolding of something already implicit. Thus the identity of the world with the Ātman follows as a natural consequence. But along with this strain of thought, the ultimate effect of which is rather to diminish the personal aspect of the deity, is another which has just the opposite effect. The worship of the great gods of popular religion had never ceased to be a force, and in the *Kaṭha* and still more definitely in the *Śvetāśvatara* is a determining element in Upanishadic thought. This force makes its appearance later than cosmogonism, yet is not a result of it, but rather of this popular religion which had never ceased to exist. A third factor which is of importance in the Upanishads, but by no means of such dominant interest as Deussen thought, is the philosophy of Yājñavalkya. This is a necessary presupposition for the historical understanding of both the Sāṅkhya philosophy and Buddhism; but it 'cannot, save by paradox, be deemed the earliest view or the dominating view expressed in the Upanishads'.[3] To put the

[1] This is specially emphasized by Edgerton, 'Sources of the Filosofy of the Upanishads', *JAOS*. vol. XXXVI, pp. 197–204.
[2] *RPV*. pp. 510 ff. [3] *RPV*. p. 512.

whole matter in another way, we have two lines of development, both tracing their antecedents to the Brāhmaṇas. We have on the one hand, the conception of Brahma as the holy power which controls things expanded into an idea which includes the whole of the universe. On the other, we have a study of the psychic element, which is known under the names of *Prāṇa* (Breath), or *Prajñā* (Intelligence), but which is most satisfactorily termed the Ātman. A decisive advance is made when, after unsatisfactory attempts to explain the nature of Brahma, it is identified with the Ātman. But this position leaves us with unsolved difficulties, which lead us on the one hand, to the position of Yājñavalkya, which treats the world of appearances as illusory, and on the other to that of the *Kaṭha*, which takes it as real. The position of the *Kaṭha*, however, leads to further antinomies, which end in the system of the Sāṅkhya, which makes the absolute unreal, and in Buddhism, which asserts the unreality of both the absolute and the individual.

In attempting to criticize the two theories which have been outlined above, it may in the first place be pointed out that any such reconstruction of the process of the development of thought in the Upanishads must inevitably remain to a certain extent hypothetical in nature. The facts are too few and the interpretation of them too ambiguous for us to be sure that we have attained complete certainty in any theory which we may adopt. It is quite conceivable that if the facts in a given situation are sufficiently few, not merely two but an indefinite number of hypotheses may all explain them equally well. Further, we must remember that in the present case certain of our data in regard to the relative age of our documents are ultimately gained through the acceptance of some theory of the development of thought. We are thus in danger of reasoning in a circle. It is doubtless also true that the circle is

not complete, and that when we have once established a preliminary theory on the basis of unquestioned facts, we can legitimately use it for discovering further relations of data. But it is easy to forget how large a measure of hypothesis may have entered into the establishment of what we regard as fact. Again, we must remember that thought was proceeding in several different centres in north India, so that we need not assume that a highly developed theory which grew up in one district is necessarily later or dependent upon a more primitive view which comes from a more backward group. Still again, we have no reason for assuming that we have preserved to us all the relevant materials from this movement of thought. For all these reasons, then, we must regard with some suspicion such a beautifully logical theory as that of Deussen's, brilliant and instructive as it no doubt is. It is at any rate singular that it should be possible to construct such a theory in the obscure field of Upanishadic philosophy, while in many other fields where the facts are far more numerous, it has proved impossible to attain any such logical sequence.

With these general considerations in mind, we come to a study of the particular elements of the two theories. Here we note that in spite of an appearance of wide divergence, there is actually a considerable degree of agreement between them. This will become clearer if we consider first not the chronological beginning of the movement, where the difficulties in our way are relatively greater, but the conclusion of Deussen's series. That the Yoga system adds its *Īśvara* in a quite external way to the twenty-five principles of the Sāṅkhya system is clear,[1] although the point is not settled whether this was due to the demands of popular pressure,[2] or whether the

[1] Keith, *The Sāṁkhya System*, p. 56.

[2] So Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 371: 'We cannot help saying that the Yoga philosophy introduced the conception of God just to be in fashion and catch the mind of the public.'

attenuated condition of the belief in God in the Yoga is due on the one hand to the survival of the theism of the Upanishads, and on the other to its association with the atheism of the Sāṅkhya.[1] Again, the proposition that the Sāṅkhya is not original, but presupposes the Ātman philosophy in some form, is accepted by Keith, although he appears to vary between the view that it is dependent upon the idealism of Yājñavalkya, and the alternative opinion that it is derived from the theism of the *Kaṭha*.[2] Our real perplexities concern only the earlier members of the series—idealism, pantheism, cosmogonism, and theism —and here the divergencies between Deussen and Keith are greater. That the idealism of Yājñavalkya is really more ancient than the cosmogonism which fills much of the older Upanishads is a position which is very difficult to maintain, except in the light either of a theory of the Kshatriya origin of the Upanishads or of a preconceived philosophy. Deussen's proposition that the earlier portions of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* are designed as a pedagogic preparation can scarcely be regarded as of serious weight, in the light of the pedagogic deficiencies of the Upanishads in most matters. It is, of course, not impossible that a late compiler may have put his materials together in the order which he thought most effective. But it is difficult to believe that the early sections of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* or the *Chāndogya* were deliberately composed in order to provide an easy introduction to the idealistic doctrine of Yājñavalkya. We shall be much more likely to interpret them correctly if we take them as endeavouring to express something which their composers thought worth saying for its own sake. We shall be inclined, then, to reverse Deussen's order for the first three items of his series, and to believe that from an original cosmogon-

[1] So Keith, *The Sāṁkhya System*, p. 56. [2] *RPV.* pp. 512-13.

ism, which carried on the tendencies which are known to us from the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas, we have developed a pantheism which is ultimately refined into the idealism of Yājñavalkya. The only remaining question is as to the place of theism in our series. In this again we are inclined to agree with Keith in believing that it represents not something newly developed in the Upanishads, but the survival of the older tendency of the Vedic period. On the other hand, we do not believe that Keith has sufficiently emphasized the fact that, so far as our methods of literary criticism can give any certain result, Yājña-valkya's doctrine certainly appears earlier in the Upanishads than does theism, and we are inclined to believe that the form in which theism does appear is to some extent determined by the fact that not only a general pantheism but the explicit teaching of Yāj-ñavalkya had gone before. The fact that Yājñavalkya had the most penetrating philosophical mind of any of the individual thinkers of the Upanishads might dispose us on general principles to put him near the end of the development. But the fact appears to be that, while he does not belong at the very beginning, as Deussen supposed, he does come fairly early in the development.

We have certain further criticisms of Keith's theory to make. According to his account, the development of thought in the Upanishads comes in the end from two sources, from an interest in cosmogony and from theism. Now this again appears to be rather an over-simplification. Undoubtedly cosmogony did have a large place in the origin of this movement, but it appears only as one element along with others. Along with it we note the interest in giving fanciful interpretations to the sacrifice, in finding everything in the world to be like something else, an interest in the fate of man after death, and an interest in physiology and psychology, all of which

had some contribution to make to the developed theories, although they have no special connexion with cosmogony. Again, Keith appears to give too exclusive an importance to the conceptions of Brahma and Ātman as ways of conceiving supreme reality, and to the discovery of their identity. Undoubtedly, once more, these matters are important, but it is also clear, if we turn for our material not merely to the passages which later became famous, but to the less familiar passages which still have a place in our texts, that the conceptions which finally prevailed were originally only a few out of a considerable number of ideas, each of which is advanced with the same absoluteness as the others. The identification of Brahma and Ātman is a most important step in thought, but it is by no means as prominent in the pages of the Upanishads themselves, as it has become in later accounts of their philosophy. If we are endeavouring to come to an historical view of the development of the Upanishads, even the neglected strands of thought should have a place, even though they were soon to be abandoned in favour of more popular conceptions.

The foregoing criticism of the theories of Keith and Deussen will have made evident the procedure which we ourselves must follow in our treatment of the Upanishads. We shall endeavour in the remainder of the present chapter, first, to analyse the interests and attitudes which led to the development of the characteristic ideas of the earlier Upanishads, second, to trace the various ideas by which they endeavoured to conceive supreme reality, and third, to trace the actual development of thought through the construction of the system of Yājñavalkya. Later chapters will be devoted to the theistic elements in the Upanishads, and to the origins of the Sāṅkhya.

In endeavouring to discover what were the interests that were most active during the period of the Upani-

shads in leading men to work out the beginnings of philosophical theories, an easy clue is given us by the form in which these discussions were frequently held. Very often an anecdote begins with a question which is put forward for consideration, and to which answers are given by those who feel that they possess the requisite knowledge.[1] Sometimes these questions are mere catch questions, as when Yājñavalkya is asked what was said by a woman possessed by a spirit on an occasion when he himself had not been present. But usually the questions are seriously meant, and the answer tries to meet what is felt as a genuine intellectual difficulty. Apart from the catch questions just referred to, the questions asked in the Upanishads may be divided into four main groups. We have first of all questions as to the ultimate basis of things, the cause of the world, or to put the matter in another form, the principle by which knowledge of all things can be gained. A second group of questions deals with what happens to man at and after death, what rewards sacrificial works may have at that time, the course of transmigration, the attainment of immortality. Still a third group deals with questions of physiology and mental states. Fourth and last, we have a group of questions which are very closely connected with our first group, and which concern themselves with the nature of ultimate reality. There are, however, sections of the Upanishads, especially of the earlier ones, which are not covered by this survey of questions and answers. A

[1] Such questions and answers are to be found introducing the following sections: *Bṛih.* 2. 1, 3. 1–9, 4. 2–4, 3. 4–5, 6. 2; *Chānd.* 1. 8–9, 2. 24, 5. 3 ff., 5. 11 ff., 6. 1. 3 ff., 7. 1. 3 ff., 8. 7. 3 ff.; *Tait.* 3. 1; *Ait.* 5. 1; *Kaush.* 1; *Kena* 1; *Kaṭha*, 1. 20 ff.; *Muṇḍ.* 1. 4; *Praśna*, 1–6; *Śvet.* 1; *Maitri*, 1. It is to be noted that this literary device became in the later Upanishads almost standardized, so that one of them is called the *Praśna* or 'Question' Upanishad. One of the post-classical Upanishads, the *Nirālamba*, has the method worked out into the form of a catechism of Vedānta philosophy. In contrast to this, the earlier parts of the oldest Upanishads make only infrequent use of it.

study of these sections adds to our list one further main interest or attitude. This is an interest which may be expressed as the desire to read all things in terms of something else. We shall now endeavour to explain a little more fully how each of these interests works itself out in the Upanishads.

We begin with the spirit of identification, a habit of mind which extends far behind the Upanishads into the Brāhmaṇas and the Vedas. In the earliest Upanishads one continually comes upon the recurrent formula *ya evam veda*, 'whoever knows it thus'. If one only knows that the horse-sacrifice or the chant, or whatever it may be, is really identical with something quite different, his knowledge will be given some kind of reward. Thus in *Chānd.* 1. 6–7 we have a long series of identifications of the *Ṛig-* and *Sāmavedas*. The *Ṛigveda* is earth, atmosphere, heaven, the lunar mansions, or, in the personal realm, speech, seeing, hearing, etc. The *Sāmaveda* is fire, wind, breath, soul, mind, and many other things. At the close of the section the person who knows the Vedas thus, is promised the worlds and all desires. Now this delight in identifications is no new discovery of the Upanishads. Thus, to take but a single conception in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, the year is identified successively with the fire-altar, the worlds, Prajāpati, Agni, Vaiśvānara, space, the strength of all beings, the sun and death.[1] As Deussen says of the Brāhmaṇas as a whole,[2] 'In den Brāhmaṇa's gelegentlich alles Mögliche mit allem Möglichen gleichgesetzt.' Very possibly this interest was a natural outgrowth of a pre-occupation with the rather dry and tedious minutiæ of the sacrificial ritual, and the natural desire of professional priests to find their recreation in what seem to us rather absurd word-plays upon the details

[1] *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 8. 2. 1. 17, 8. 2. 2. 8, 8. 4. 1. 18, 20, 10. 2. 4. 3, 10. 4. 3. 1.

[2] *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. I, i, p. 174.

of their vocation. At any rate we find marks of this same activity in the *Ṛigveda* in the so-called riddle hymns,[1] and it is in one of these that we find the famous verse which proves the forerunner of much philosophical development:[2]

> They call him Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Agni and he is heavenly nobly-winged Garutman.
> To what is One, sages give many a title: they call it Agni, Yama, Mātariśvan.

In the Upanishads, then, we shall not be surprised to find that Brahma is identified with a variety of things, nor shall we regard too seriously, in its first appearances, the famous identification of Brahma with Ātman, epoch-making as that proved to be for the later history of Indian thought. In the later Upanishads this zeal for identification passes away, but the philosophical results which had been attained by it remain.

The second interest which we have to note has its roots again far back in the Vedic literature. The desire to explain the way in which the world has come into being is a common element in early religious beliefs, and it had left its mark in the Creation and Purusha Hymns of the *Ṛigveda*.[3] In the Brāhmaṇas also there are attempts of a similar kind to explain the beginning of the world, although they hardly come up to the level already attained by the *Ṛigveda*.[4] In the Upanishads, as in the earlier literature, creation is conceived according to two principal analogies, that of sacrifice, and that of procreation. The idea of sacrifice as a means to account for creation goes back to the Purusha Hymn just referred to, where the primeval person, Purusha, is represented as being dismembered by the gods. From each of his members some part of the world is made. In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*,[5]

[1] See Winternitz, vol. I, p. 101.
[2] *Ṛigveda*, 1. 164. 46.
[3] *Ṛigveda*, 10. 90, 129.
[4] *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 6. 1. 1, 11. 1. 6; *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, 1. 23.
[5] 1. 1–2. In a similar way, *Atharvaveda*, 9. 7, describes a cosmic ox.

the horse-sacrifice is taken as the point of departure, and the parts of the world are made to correspond with the members of his body, point for point. The dawn is the head of the sacrificial horse; the sun is his eye; the wind, his breath; and so on, through the entire list of his members. But the human analogy is far more frequently employed, and lists of the corresponding elements of man and the universe are extremely common in the early Upanishads as they had been in the Brāhmaṇas.[1] Frequently in such lists the cosmogonic origin of the idea is lost sight of, or, where it is kept, the alternative idea of procreation is also introduced.[2] Often, after a series of statements has been made concerning the cosmic realities or macrocosm (*adhidaivatam*), a similar series is made concerning the bodily functions or microcosm (*adhyātmam*).[3] In *Bṛih.* 3. 2. 13, a further use of this concept is made to determine the places to which the parts of the body will go at death, following out thus the suggestion made already in the Cremation Hymn of the *Ṛigveda*.[4] In this way the sacrificial analogy of creation had already at the beginning of the period of the Upanishads been worked out to results which were sufficiently different from its original conception.

The second analogy used is that of procreation, and this idea underlies the greater number of the explicit accounts of the origin of the world given in the older Upanishads. This analogy again goes back to the Creation Hymn of *Ṛigveda*, 10. 129. A simple form of this conception, which occurs in the Brāhmaṇas and also in *Chānd.* 3. 19, is that which makes the development of the world proceed from a cosmic egg. There was in the beginning just non-being.

[1] Such lists are found, e.g. at *Bṛih.* 1. 2. 12–16; *Chānd.* 39. 18.
[2] As e.g. at *Ait.* 1.
[3] As in *Bṛih.* 3. 7. 3 ff.; *Chānd.* 1. 6–7; *Kaush.* 4. 2.
[4] *Ṛigveda*, 10. 16. 3.

But although it was non-being, yet it existed. It developed into an egg. After a year's incubation, the egg-shell broke into two halves, one of silver and one of gold. The silver shell is the earth, the golden one the sky. The parts of the egg are identified with the parts of the world in the same spirit which we have seen in other associations. Its outer membrane is the mountains; the inner membrane, clouds and mist. The veins are the rivers. The fluid is the ocean. It turns out that what is born from the egg is the sun, which in this passage is identified with Brahma, and is recommended as an object of worship.

Often, the conception of reproduction is joined with that of sacrifice. For example in *Ait.* 1 we have a bizarre combination of ideas. We begin with the Ātman, or Self, which was once the only existing being. He first creates the worlds, although we are not informed by what means. These are four in number, the water (*ambhas*) which is above the heaven, the light-rays or atmosphere, death or the earth, and the waters (*āp*) which are underneath the earth.[1] The next problem of the creator is the fashioning of eight world guardians. To accomplish this, he brings forth from the waters a person or Purusha. Here we have a connexion with the Purusha Hymn mentioned above. But instead of proceeding by a process of dismemberment or sacrifice, the Creator broods over this person as a hen over an egg. In the Purusha which is thus brooded over, a mouth, nostrils, eyes, ears, skin, a heart, a navel, and a generative organ gradually become distinct. From these bodily members come in turn speech, breath, sight, hearing, hair, mind, the digestive breath (*apāna*), and seed. From these functions proceed their cosmic counterparts, *agni* or fire, *vāyu* or wind, *āditya* or the sun, the quarters of heaven, plants and trees, the moon, death, and water.

[1] For the division of waters above the heaven, and those beneath, cf. in Semitic cosmogony *Genesis*, I. 7, 7. 11.

This last series provides the world-guardians who are required. These cosmic powers, however, have the misfortune to fall into a sea, where strangely enough they are troubled with thirst and hunger. They ask their Creator for a fixed abode where their hunger may be satisfied. After a bull and a horse have been found inadequate as abodes for them, they are offered the body of a person, into which they enter, each taking possession of the part with which he had originally corresponded. Eventually food is produced for them, and the Ātman himself enters into man through a suture of the skull as the one thing necessary for man's completion.

A similar confusion of theories accounts for the story found in *Bṛih.* 1.2, where the ideas of creation through splitting and procreation from death as a demiurge is combined with the analogy of the horse-sacrifice.

In *Bṛih.* 1.4.1–6, we have the analogy of procreation worked out in perhaps its clearest form, although we have here also marks of developing ideas which lead on into further conceptions. The original being is called Ātman or Self, because when he looks round he sees nothing else but himself. He is also called 'I' and the Purusha. This latter term is explained here by means of a perverse etymology which appears irrelevant to the context. When the Ātman realizes his loneliness he has two feelings, one of fear and the other of a desire for companionship. He dispels his fear with the reflexion that he has nothing else to be afraid of, while his second desire is satisfied by his dividing himself into two parts, which are then named husband and wife.[1] From their union the race of human beings is produced. A series of transformations of the original human pair into animal forms takes place, and from each transformation a new

[1] For a parallel in Greek philosophy cf. Plato's myth of the androgynous man in *Symposium*, 189 C.

species of animals is born. The animals and men thus produced are Brahma's begetting or creation. He then creates the gods, Agni and Soma, which between them are said to include the universe. They are described as Brahma's super-creation, because they are higher in rank than himself.

Further cosmogonic analogies which are slightly used are those of weaving, and of fire and smoke. In *Ṛigveda*, 10. 130, the figure of weaving as a process of world-creation is used, and it is possible that this image lies behind the questions of Gārgī in *Bṛih.* 3. 6. 8, where she inquires concerning the successive grounds upon which the reality of the world is woven and interwoven, until she is brought to the world of Brahma as the ultimate ground of the universe. In *Bṛih.* 2. 4. 10, the evolution of the Vedas, and in fact of all known literature, is traced from Brahma. This literature is represented as being an important part of his creative activity in other accounts, but here it is explained as being 'breathed forth' from Brahma, in the same manner as wisps of smoke issue forth from a fire built with damp fuel.

Of the third main interest of the Upanishads, the problem of what happens after death, we have already had occasion to speak;[1] and it is unnecessary to repeat our former remarks. It may be of interest, however, to illustrate the different forms which this interest took. In the earliest passages, before the period of explicit questioning, we have various identifications of the sort already mentioned recommended to us with the promise that 'whoever knows it thus overcomes repeated death'.[2] Again, we find the interest—which comes down from one of the Cremation Hymns in the *Ṛigveda*[3]—in tracing the destiny of each of the parts of the body at its dissolution.[4] Another question which receives

[1] pp. 72 ff. [2] *Bṛih.* 1.2.7, 3.2.10.
[3] *Ṛigveda*, 10.16.3; cf. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 10.3.3.8.
[4] *Bṛih.* 3.2.13.

some attention is in regard to the value of sacrifices in connexion with life after death.[1] In the *Kaṭha*, the second of the boons asked by Naciketas is the knowledge of the heavenly fire which gives entrance to the heavenly world.[2] In connexion with the doctrine of transmigration we have questions put to test the knowledge of men concerning it.[3] When the doctrine had become fully assimilated, we have men inquiring not only in regard to the lower way which leads to heaven, as in the *Kaṭha* passage just cited, but also in regard to the means of securing the higher boon of release.[4] The word immortality was used for both ways, and the distinction between these two meanings does not at first seem clear. At any rate, in the passage of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* where Maitreyī asks her husband, Yājñavalkya, about immortality, one feels that the answer which he gives involves the higher notion, while her question had in all probability been based upon the lower.[5]

Closely connected with the interest in life after death was that in human physiology and psychology. It is not our intention here to give a detailed description of the views of the Upanishads on these subjects, which have been sufficiently investigated elsewhere.[6] These views are in part primitive in nature, and in part incompletely intelligible to us, but their frequent appearance in the Upanishads leaves no doubt of their interest and importance to the thinkers of that time. We are told over and over again of the veins (or rather ducts) called *hitā* which lead upward from the heart, and which are finer than a hair divided a thousand times. They are connected in some rather obscure way with

[1] *Bṛih.* 3. 1. 8, 3. 1. 2.
[2] *Kaṭha*, 1. 13. The efficacy of this fire had been previously taught in *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, 3. 11. See Deussen, *SUV.* p. 262.
[3] *Bṛih.* 6. 2. 2 ; *Chānd.* 5. 3. 2–3.
[4] *Kaṭha*, 1. 20 ff.
[5] *Bṛih.* 2. 4, 4. 5.
[6] See especially G. W. Brown, *The Human Body in the Upanishads* which deals with the subject in considerable detail. See also A. H. Ewing, *The Hindu Conception of the Functions of Breath.*

the states of waking and sleeping, and through one of them the soul departs from the body to immortality.[1] The idea of the correspondence between the different organs of the body and the parts of the universe supplies elaborate lists of cosmic parallels, as mentioned above. The bodily members are several times represented as having distinct individualities of their own, so that they carry on conversations in the style of the Latin fable of the *Belly and the Members*, and engage in contests with each other to determine which is superior. The prize goes to the breath, which is found to be the function most necessary for the preservation of life.[2] Among many other ideas which might be mentioned as typical of the interests and viewpoint of the composers of the early Upanishads we select the curious notion[3] that the reflexions seen in the pupils of the eyes are divinities, Indra and Virāj, which thus become visible. They appear to be intimately connected in some way with the human soul, a notion which has frequent parallels among peoples on low levels of culture.[4]

The last of the interests which we discovered in the Upanishads is the interest in the nature of reality. As this will concern us through the remainder of this chapter as we attempt to show what answers were given to this question, we shall first merely try to point out some of the ways in which the question itself arose. A clear instance of the character of this interest, although it belongs to one of the higher levels of thought, is to be found in the instruction given to Śvetaketu by his father.[5] This young man

[1] *Bṛih.* 2. 1. 19, 4. 2. 2–3, 4. 3. 20, 4. 4. 6–9; *Chānd.* 8. 6. 1-3, 6; *Tait.* 1. 6. 1; *Kaush.* 4. 19; *Muṇḍ.* 2. 2. 6; *Praśna*, 3. 6–7; *Maitri*, 6. 21, 30, 7. 11. See G. C. O. Haas, 'Recurrent and Parallel Passages in the Principal Upanishads, *JAOS.* vol. XLII, pp. 4, 6.

[2] Accounts of the contests of the members are found in *Bṛih.* 1. 3, 1. 5. 21–23, 6. 1. 7–13; *Chānd.* 5. 1; *Kaush.* 2. 14.

[3] *Bṛih.* 4. 2. 2; *Chānd.* 4. 15. 1; *Maitri* 7. 11. (1).

[4] See E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, p. 389.

[5] *Chānd.* 6. 1 ff.

had returned from his years of Vedic study feeling proud and conceited because of the learning which he had received. His father, in order to test his knowledge and destroy his conceit, asks him a puzzling question:

'" Śvetaketu, my dear, since now you are conceited, think yourself learned, and are proud, did you also ask for that teaching whereby what has not been heard of becomes heard of, what has not been thought of becomes thought of, what has not been understood becomes understood?"

" How, pray, sir, is that teaching?"

" Just as, my dear, by one piece of clay everything made of clay may be known—the modification is merely a verbal distinction, a name; the reality is just 'clay'.

" Just as, my dear, by one copper ornament everything made of copper may be known—the modification is merely a verbal distinction, a name; the reality is just 'copper'.

" Just as, my dear, by one nail-scissors everything made of iron may be known—the modification is merely a verbal distinction, a name; the reality is just 'iron' —so, my dear, is that teaching."'[1]

We shall have presently to learn what in the father's opinion this underlying reality of the world may be. We note here the high estimate which is put upon this knowledge is that through it the mastery of all other knowledge is given. We note also the effect of this knowledge in unifying the world. This desire for unity in regard to the world of the gods had been manifested already in the *Ṛigveda*, in such passages as *Ṛigveda*, 1. 164. 46, which has been previously quoted.[2] The same desire for unity is now extended to the entire world.

Another form in which the attempt to find an ulti-

[1] *Chānd.* 6. 1. 3–6. Hume's translation.

[2] cf. Yājñavalkya's answer to the question, 'How many gods are there?' in *Bṛih.* 3. 9.

mate reality arises is connected with the not infrequent attempts to find that to which all lesser realities go back, or upon which they are based. Thus in *Chānd.* 1. 8, three men discuss the question in regard to that reality to which the Sāman chant ultimately goes back. They trace it through sound, breath, food, water, to the yonder world. Here one of them is inclined to stop. Another passes beyond that to this world. The third finds this also unsatisfactory, and they finally conclude that the ultimate basis is neither yonder world nor this world, but space, which alone is greater than them both. Similar series, sometimes suggesting cosmogonic ideas, are found elsewhere.

We now undertake to inquire more definitely what the concepts were under which reality was conceived. The most important of these for the further history of thought are undoubtedly Brahma and Ātman; but it is important to realize at the outset that these were not the only conceptions employed, and that they owed their ultimate superiority rather to a process of the survival of the fittest than to any uncontested monopoly of the field. It is true that Deussen believed that other ideas, such as breath and space, were introduced by the composers of the Upanishads merely as a pedagogical preparation of the mind of the student for the final conceptions, and that they were meant to be taken as a kind of symbolic representation of the final reality. This is the point of view of the later Vedānta, but there is very little to indicate such a conception in the texts of the Upanishads themselves, and such an idea implies a pedagogical subtlety in these early documents which would be surprising if true. Rather we must believe that when the three inquirers mentioned in *Chānd.* 1. 8, concluded that space was the ultimate, they meant by it only space, and had no inkling of a higher conception.

When we have once rid ourselves of the prepossession that Brahma and Ātman are the sole

metaphysical concepts of the Upanishads, we find ourselves rather embarrassed with the multitude of conceptions which are to be discovered. Some of these are explicitly stated to be the ultimately real in the same terms which are used elsewhere when that place is given to Brahma or Ātman. In other cases we find them identified with Brahma or placed in a series evolving from it in such a manner as to suggest that an earlier view which regarded them as independent is being brought into harmony with the Brahma doctrine. It would appear probable that these various conceptions were held contemporaneously by different thinkers or groups of thinkers, although it is also likely that some sprang up earlier than others. But for the purpose of our exposition we shall place them in groups according to their character, instead of trying to fix upon any chronological order.

One group of conceptions is physical in character. Thus *Bṛih.* 5. 5, unblushingly proclaims: 'In the beginning this world was just Water. That Water emitted the Real—Brahma [being] the Real—Brahma, Prajāpati; Prajāpati, the gods.' This is quite wrong from the later point of view. But it is noteworthy that this fifth section of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, which is one of the sections traditionally described as an appendix, contains several other views of this sort which seem to have been regarded as not harmonious with the general teaching of the book, and yet were too important to be discarded. Elsewhere in several of the cosmogonies water is given a very prominent place, although it is not put at the beginning. In *Bṛih.* 3. 6 it is said that all this world is woven and interwoven on water, although the account then proceeds to give a series of further stages which lie behind water.

Another common conception of the reality lying behind things is that it is Wind, or Air. This is

indicated in *Bṛih.* 3. 3, where the spirit of Sudhanvan speaking through a demon-possessed woman declares: 'Wind alone is separateness. Wind is collectedness. Whoever knows it thus overcomes repeated death.' The reference to repeated death indicates that this thought belongs to an early stage in the development of the Upanishads. In *Bṛih.* 3. 7, Yājñavalkya is asked in regard to the thread by which this world and the other world and all things are tied together. His reply is that it is wind which does this, and illustrates his answer with the parallel conception of the work of the vital breath or air in the human body, which holds the members of the body together lest they should become unstrung. The idea is further carried out in *Chānd.* 4. 3. 1, where wind is represented as a kind of final depository, or, as the text says, a snatcher-unto-itself of fire, the sun, the moon, and water: 'The Wind verily is a snatcher-unto-itself. Verily when a fire blows out, it just goes to the Wind. When the sun sets, it just goes to the Wind. When the moon sets, it just goes to the Wind. When water dries, goes up, it just goes to the Wind. For the Wind, truly, snatches all here to itself.'

A closely related conception is that of the Ether or the Void (*kha*). This appears only as associated with Brahma, but it is not unlikely that it was once an independent conception. Thus we find in *Bṛih.* 5. 1, '"Brahma is the void, the ancient void, the wind-filled void." Thus, verily, was the sun of Kauravyāyanī wont to say.' The conception is also referred to in *Chānd.* 4. 10. 5.

Slightly more abstract is the conception of Space. We have already seen that for the inquirers in *Chānd.* 1. 8 this represented the end of the search. In *Bṛih.* 3. 8, Gārgī asks Yājñavalkya concerning 'that which is above the sky, which is below the earth, which is between these two, the sky and the earth, which men call past, present, and future—on what is it woven, and

interwoven?' Yājñavalkya's first answer is space. When the question is put again in identical terms, he answers that it is the Imperishable, by which Brahma appears to be meant, but the relation of this conception to space is left indefinite. Perhaps a similar conception is to be surmised in *Chānd.* 4. 6. 4, where among a series of other conceptions of Brahma, the Endless is mentioned, which includes as parts the earth, the atmosphere, the sky, and the ocean.[1]

One would expect that Time would have a place among these conceptions of reality, since already in the *Atharvaveda*[2] time had been celebrated as a divinity. But in spite of much mysticism about the year and its parts, we do not find such a position given to time in the early Upanishads.[3] Later in the *Śvetāśvatara*[4] we find time mentioned as a first cause according to the opinions of some, while in the *Maitri* some little attention is given[5] to an exposition of it as one of the forms of Brahma.

Rather less definite and clear cut are the conceptions of Light and Heat. For example, we find in *Chānd.* 3. 13. 7–8, 'Now, the light which shines above this sky, on the backs of all, on the backs of everything, in the highest worlds than which there are no higher, that, indeed, is that light which is here within a person. There is this [way of] seeing it—when one perceives by touch the heat which is in this body. There is this [way of] hearing it—when one stops one's ears and hears what is like a humming, what is like a din, what is like [the sound] of a blazing fire. One should worship that as a thing which can be seen and heard. He becomes a person good to see and much heard of who knows it thus, who knows it thus!' Similar references to the fire within one, which incidentally has the func-

[1] cf. also *Chānd.* 8. 14. 1. [2] *Atharvaveda*, 19. 53, 54.

[3] Unless the reference in *Brih.* 3. 8, to 'what people call past, present and future' involves such a conception.

[4] *Śvet.* 1. 2. [5] *Maitri*, 6. 14–16.

tion of cooking and digesting one's food, are found in *Bṛih.* 3. 9, and *Maitri*, 2. 6. We have perhaps a hint of another related conception where it is said in *Bṛih.* 5. 7, that Brahma is Lightning.[1]

Still another conception which perhaps can be most readily disposed of here is that of Food. This is mentioned in *Bṛih.* 5. 12, although it is immediately set aside in favour of the more usual concept of *prāṇa* or breath. '"Brahma is food" thus some say. This is not so. Verily food comes putrid without life (*prāṇa*)'.[2] The real exponent of the conception of food, however, is the *Taittirīya Upanishad.* Although it recognizes higher manifestations of Brahma, it dwells much upon food, and emphasizes the idea that breath, water, and earth are all forms of food.[3] At the close of this Upanishad, the seer fairly bursts into dithyrambs in his praise of food:

> Oh, wonderful! Oh, wonderful! Oh, wonderful!
> I am food! I am food! I am food!
> I am a food-eater! I am a food-eater! I am a food-eater!
>
> . . . .
>
> I, who am food, eat the eater of food!
> I have overcome the whole world![4]

A certain parallelism can be detected between the physical conceptions developed thus far and those traditionally ascribed to the Ionian physicists in the beginnings of Greek philosophy. No such likeness, however, can be found in the second group of conceptions which arise out of the preoccupation of the Indians with the religious ritual. In the opening section of the *Chāndogya* we find a claim made for the supreme position of the *Udgītha*, or Loud Chant of the Sacrifice: 'The essence of things here is the earth. The essence of the earth is water. The essence of water is plants. The essence of plants is a person. The essence of a

[1] cf. also *Kena*, 29. [2] cf. *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 6. [3] *Tait.* 3. 7–9.
[4] *Tait.* 3. 10. Hume's translation.

person is speech. The essence of speech is the Ṛig (Hymn). The essence of the Ṛig is the Sāman (Chant). The essence of the Sāman is the Udgītha. This is the quintessence of the essences, the highest, the supreme, the eighth—namely the Udgītha.'[1] It is to be noted in this passage that the first members are physical things, and that some of them at least were elsewhere claimed to be the ultimate reality. But the priests of the *Sāmaveda*, to which this Upanishad belonged, felt that their Udgītha surpassed in value all these other conceptions, and hence must be given the highest dignity.

Closely related to the Udgītha is the sacred syllable, 'Om'. Originally this was merely an expression of solemn affirmation, but it came to be used at the beginning and conclusion of certain parts of the ritual in somewhat the same way as the Christian 'Amen'. The *Chāndogya* has much to say in regard to it, but perhaps the classical expression so far as the principal Upanishads are concerned, is to be found in the fairly late *Māṇḍūkya*: 'Om!—This syllable is this whole world. Its further explanation is: The past, the present, the future—everything is just the word Om. And whatever else that transcends threefold time—that, too, is just the word Om.'[2] Perhaps an early reference to it may be found in *Bṛih.* 3. 8. 8, where Yājñavalkya finds the ultimate reality which underlies the universe to be the *akshara*. This is usually translated as the imperishable, but the word means equally a syllable, and so perhaps the syllable *par excellence*, the word 'Om'. The meditation on this syllable remained a standard part of the Yoga technique.

We may mention here certain conceptions the chief function of which was to provide a demiurge in the cosmogonic myths. The chief of these was Prajāpati, the Lord of Creatures, who is scarcely a god to

[1] *Chānd.* 1. 1. 2–3. Hume's translation.
[2] *Māṇ.* Equally outspoken is *Tait.* 1. 8.

whom popular worship was given, but who is conceived in the period of the Brāhmaṇas and the early Upanishads as a creator, and is thought of in rather anthropomorphic terms. He is also a teacher of morals and philosophy.[1] In *Bṛih.* 1. 2, Death is the demiurge, while speech also sometimes seems to share in cosmogonic functions, although it is usually one of the functions of the human body.

The most important term for reality in the Upanishads is Brahma, and while it absorbed much of the content of the physical conceptions already described, it appears to have been in origin a ritual idea. Although philologists have devoted much attention to the elucidation of its etymology, it cannot be said that their labours have added very greatly to our understanding of its meaning. The most probable etymology derives it from the root *bṛih*, 'to be great,' as is already stated by Śaṅkara,[2] and it is thus related to the common adjective, *bṛihat*, 'great'. Much more insight into its actual meaning is to be gained from a study of its actual usage in the earlier literature. In the *Ṛigveda* the ordinary meaning is clearly that of prayer or hymn,[3] and it is evident that it is the spoken word of the ritual rather than the pious feeling which animates it. In the *Atharvaveda*, with the general change in religious conceptions, the emphasis is rather upon the

[1] *Bṛih.* 5. 2; *Chānd.* 8. 7–12.

[2] *Brahma-sūtra-bhāshya*, 1. 1. 1, '*bṛiñhater dhātor*'. I do not understand why Deussen translates this by 'ausreissen', since this meaning belongs to *bṛih.* 1, *bṛihati*, *vṛihati*, but not to *bṛih.* 2, *bṛiñhati*. (See Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* s.vv.) Keith also (*RPV*. p. 445,) gives it as the opinion of the Vedānta school that *brahma* is derived from *vṛih*, to twist, to tear away. In Śaṅkara's comment on *Chānd.* 3. 14. 1 (if it be his) we find '*vriddhatamatvāt brahma*'. This derivation is the one chosen by Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 55. Further data on the etymology of Brahma may be found in Griswold, *Brahman* in 'Cornell Studies in Philosophy,' No. 2, pp. 19 ff., where the connexion with the Avestan *baresman* is emphasized, and in Keith, *RPV*. pp. 445, 644 and index s.v.

[3] For references see Griswold, *Brahman*, pp. 1 ff. where the usage in the Vedic literature is summarized with great clearness. Much valuable material for the history of the conceptions of Brahma and Ātman is collected by Deussen, *AGP.* vol. I, i, pp. 289–336, but his use of it is in part vitiated by his peculiar theory as to the meanings of these terms.

holy word as a magic formula, a charm or spell. In the Brāhmaṇas we have the word applied to the older sacred literature, and Brahma is said to be the triple science, i.e. the three older Vedas. Beside the neuter, Brahma, we have the masculine Brahmā, who is in the first place the man skilled in prayer, the seer or sage, who is able to construct or utilize the sacred texts. In the later usage, Brahmā is a personal god, while its earlier meaning passes over to the Brahman, the member of the priestly class. Another meaning which develops during the period of the Brāhmaṇas is that of Brahma (n.) as the power which resides in the prayer or spell. During this period the most exalted ideas were held of the efficacy of ritual operations in bringing about changes in the world. It is natural that the conception of their holy power should have been thought of as the central power of the universe. Closely connected with this idea of Brahma as power is that of the divinities Bṛihaspati and Brāhmaṇaspati (the Lord of Prayer or Brahma), which appear in the late *Ṛigveda*, in the Brāhmaṇas, and in the early Upanishads. A parallel to the conception of Brahma as supernatural power may be found, as Keith remarks, in the conceptions of *mana* and *orenda* which have been investigated by students of primitive religions.[2]

By the time of the Upanishads, the early conception of Brahma as sacred hymn or prayer has for the most part been blunted by the admixture of other conceptions, and the term becomes a somewhat colourless expression for ultimate reality, although in special connexions[3] its earlier meanings are still present. Often it appears as a somewhat mysterious thing, into the nature of which it is necessary to inquire. In *Kena*, 14 ff. Brahma is represented as a wondrous, powerful being which even the Vedic

[1] *RPV*. p. 446.
[2] See R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, chap. iv.
[3] As e.g. at *Tait*. 1. 8.

gods are unable to understand until its nature is revealed to them by Umā, the beautiful daughter of the Himalayas. In frequent passages Brahma is explained as being identical with one or another of the other ideas which we have examined. One special force of the word in the Upanishads, which also has its precursors in the Brāhmaṇas,[1] is its use to denote the Brahman class, or the abstract quality which constitutes men members of it. Thus in *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 11 ff. we find Brahma and Kshatra used to indicate the underlying nature of the Brahman and Kshatriya castes, as well as the castes themselves. Now we are told that the Kshatra of the Kshatriya caste is law (*dharma*), and that its power is so great that even the weak man can by it control the strong. Similarly, we may infer that Brahma is the corresponding power of the Brahman caste.

Another group of conceptions consists of different elements or functions of the human body. Apparently each of the special functions at some time had its advocates, and we are told that speech, or sight, or hearing, or the mind is Brahma.[2] By far the most important of them, however, is the *Prāṇa* or vital breath, which in an often repeated story is shown to be superior to the other powers. Prāṇa is discussed in the Upanishads with much detail, and next after Brahma and Ātman is the most important conception of reality in the older Upanishads.

Another term which may be included here is Purusha, or person. We have already taken account of the thought expressed in the Purusha Hymn[3] that the universe is created from the dismemberment of the primeval person. The idea lingers on in the Upanishads, although the Purusha only occasionally

[1] For a discussion of these see Hume, *Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, p. 98, n. 2.

[2] As e.g. in *Bṛih.* 4. 1. cf. the line from Xenophanes (Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Fragment 24) which Diels translates 'Die Gottheit ist ganz Auge, ganz Geist, ganz Ohr'.

[3] *Ṛigveda*, 10. 90.

takes the place of supreme importance in the earlier texts. Thus in *Bṛih.* 5. 6 (which is a simpler form of the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā of *Chānd.* 3. 14) we have instead of the Brahma and Ātman of the fuller version merely Purusha. More often, as in *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 1, Purusha is brought in as an alternative description of the Ātman or Brahma; 'In the beginning this world was Ātman alone in the form of Purusha.' That the Purusha is not an insignificant addition here is indicated by the special etymology which is given for it. In the *Kaṭha*, however, we get a series of evolution which we will later have to discuss more fully, in which Purusha is the highest term, and in the later Upanishads we find frequent use of this expression for the highest reality, although of course not to the exclusion of the more usual concepts.

The most important term in this group is Ātman, and the adoption of this concept as an expression of the highest reality is most significant for the further development of thought. Its etymology again is disputed. As likely a view as any appears to be that which connects it with the Greek ἀτμός and the German *Atem*. At all events, Vedic passages are quotable where it clearly has the meaning of wind or breath.[1] If this be its original meaning, it corresponds well with the attention given in the Upanishads to Prāṇa, the vital breath, and to the wind, as cosmic principles. The commonest use of the word, however, both in the Vedās and later, is as a reflexive pronoun. The reflexive use of the word made it appear suitable as a first principle in such a passage as the following:[2] 'In the beginning this world was Ātman alone in the form of Purusha. Looking around, he saw nothing else than himself' i.e. nothing else than Ātman. A natural development of this conception is that which makes the Ātman refer to the trunk of the body as

[1] *Ṛigveda*, 7. 87. 2, 1. 34. 7, 10. 22. 13, 10. 188. 4. [2] *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 1.

distinct from the limbs. We shall later have to pay some attention to the development of thought in connexion with the Ātman, but we will add here only that it, too, like Brahma, had already become in some connexions a mere general term for ultimate reality, and is not infrequently treated as a bare synonym for Brahma.

We pass next to a final group of conceptions, those which are mere abstract ideas. We notice in passing the term which is frequently used to denote the mere totality of this world which is in need of explanation, *idam sarvam*, literally, 'everything here'. Abstract terms which are sometimes used to denote that which lies at the beginning of the world process are *sat*, 'being,' and *asat*, 'non-being'—which of these really is first is argued in *Chānd.* 6. 2, 1–2. 'In the beginning, my dear, this world was just Being (*sat*), one only, without a second. To be sure, some people say: "In the beginning this world was just Non-being (*asat*), one only without a second; from that Non-being Being was produced." "But verily, my dear, whence could this be?" said he. "How from Non-being could Being be produced? On the contrary, my dear, in the beginning this world was just Being, one only, without a second."'[1] Connected with *sat* is an often repeated word-play[2] on the words *sat* and *tyam* (the yonder) which together are said to make up *satyam*, the real or the true. In some of the later Upanishads, as e.g. *Kaṭha*. 4. 3ff. the word *tad*, 'that,' is used for the ultimate reality, perhaps in imitation of the expression *tat tvam asi*, 'thou art that,' of *Chānd.* 6. 8. 6, etc., where, however, the word 'tad' does not appear to have primarily that significance.[3]

After this long and perhaps tedious summary of the principal conceptions of the Upanishads, it may be

[1] Hume's translation. [2] As in *Bṛih*. 2. 3.

[3] On the translation of this passage see Edgerton, 'Sources of the Filosofy of the Upanishads,' *JAOS*. vol. XXXVI (1916) p. 200, n. 5.

well to point out that these ideas bear witness to attempts to find at least three different sorts of things, namely, *the underlying substance* of the universe, *its highest power* and, at least in some of the ritual conceptions, *the thing of highest value.* These different functions of the ultimate reality are not kept distinct, and any particular idea such as we have examined may involve more than one of them. We shall find that this confusion has an important effect upon the later development of thought.

It is clear that when these multitudinous conceptions of ultimate reality had been developed, they could not all be given undisputed possession of the field. If one was right, then others must be wrong, or, at all events, they must be so correlated as to stand in some unified system. First Brahma, which, perhaps because of the vagueness of the conception, seemed especially appropriate as a mere general designation of ultimate reality, could be identified with one after the other of the remaining conceptions, which are henceforth allowed to have a partial but only a partial degree of truth. Or, second, the conceptions could be placed one after the other in a kind of evolutionary series. It is only occasionally, as in the *Chāndogya* passage cited above, that an imperfect conception is openly and explicitly rejected.

Examples of the first two methods are frequent. Thus in *Bṛih.* 4. 1, a considerable number of views of Brahma are mentioned as the opinions of various teachers. They are all allowed to have some degree of value, but still they represent only a part of the truth. To trust to one or the other of them would mean having only a one-legged Brahma, as Yājñavalkya picturesquely says. In *Chānd.* 4. 5–8, we have a discussion of Brahma as consisting of sixteen parts, arranged in groups of four each, thus taking account of a number of the different conceptions which were current. We must remember, however, that once the

making of lists of this sort was begun, it was very easy to swell the number of members, and many of the terms which were thus introduced probably had no existence as independent metaphysical ideas. In *Ait.* 5. 3, we have perhaps the earliest gathering together of the physical principles into the group of the five gross elements, earth, wind, space, water and light.

The second method was by placing the different conceptions in a series in which each member depended upon the one preceding or succeeding it. Perhaps the most extended list of this sort is that given in *Chānd.* 7, where we have an ascending series of name, speech, mind, conception, thought, meditation, understanding, strength, food, water, heat, space, memory, hope and life. This series is in itself sufficiently inconsequential to suggest that it has grown up by a process of accretion from something originally much simpler. But the matter is made worse when, after an apparent pause, another series begins with truth, to go on to understanding, thought, faith, growing forth, activity, pleasure, and the Plenum (*bhūman*), which appears to be in some way identified with egoity (*ahaṅkāra*) and the Ātman. In the final section of the passage is another list of conceptions, partly the same as those previously given and partly different, which are said to owe their origin to the Ātman. A much briefer and perhaps more logical series of evolution may be found in *Tait.* 2. 1, 'From this Ātman, verily, space arose; from space, wind; from wind, fire; from fire, water; from water, the earth; from the earth, herbs; from herbs, food; from food, seed, from seed, the person.' Here, from Ātman to earth we appear to have the conceptions arranged in an increasing degree of concreteness. From that point we seem to have a causal series such as could be arrived at from observation.

So far we have endeavoured to survey with some

generality the development of metaphysical ideas in the early Upanishads. One particular line of thought, however—that which identified Brahma with Ātman—became of such importance that it demands special treatment. This identification had already been made, at least to the extent of recognizing the Ātman as the world soul, in one of the Skambha hymns of the *Atharvaveda*,[1] but the hymn is too obscure for us to gain from it much more than this fact. Such references, again, as can be found in the Brāhmaṇas to Ātman in a cosmic sense are too uncertain or obscure to be of much significance. In the Upanishads, we refer first to the usage of the word as the first term in cosmogonies such as those of *Ait.* 1. 1, and *Bṛih.* 1. 4, which have been referred to above, and which surely must belong to an old stage of Upanishadic thought. The conception appears to be that just as the individual has a self, so there would be a self of the world, but there is no indication that the two were thought to be identical. We have here, however, doubtless the working of the principle of mystic correspondence between the microcosm and the macrocosm, which, as we have seen, is much older than the Upanishads. As a variant of this conception which puts the Ātman at the beginning of the cosmogony, we may mention *Bṛih.* 1. 2, where Death, or Hunger, apparently as a mythological representation of Non-being, is the demiurge. His first thought is the desire to possess an Ātman, which he seems hitherto to have lacked.

In many early passages we find Ātman used as a general term for a world principle in much the same way as we have seen in the case of Brahma. We find inquiries into its nature similar to those which we have observed in regard to the other term. Thus, in *Chānd.* 5. 11 ff. we find the investigation made by five

[1] *Atharvaveda*, 10. 8. 44

householders into the nature of the universal Ātman, which here has practically the same significance as Brahma. A series of identifications is made of the same sort as we have met with before, namely, with heaven, the sun, wind, space, water, and earth, in none of which do we detect any influence of the special meaning of Ātman. In fact, we must remember that apart from this general use, the word Ātman was being used in ways which are only indirectly connected with the personal notion for which it came to stand. Thus in *Kaush.* 4. 4 ff. we hear of the Ātman of food, of truth, of sound, of brilliance, of speech, fire and light, of lightning and brightness. In *Chānd.* 2. 2. 3 ff. by a curious conception, the vowels are spoken of as the Ātmans of Indra, the spirants as the Ātmans of Prajāpati, and the other consonants as the Ātmans of Mṛityu.

Instructive as showing the transition from the cosmogonic use of Ātman to its more effective employment as a key to the understanding of the world through the individual self is *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 7: 'This one (i.e. the Ātman) entered in here; [into the human body] as far as the ends of the finger-nails, just as a razor would be placed in a razor case or the all-sustaining fire in its receptacle. Men do not see him, for [in his activities] he is incomplete. Breathing, his name is breath; speaking, voice; seeing, sight; hearing, the ear; thinking, the mind. These are only the names of his activities. Whoever worships him as one or another of these, he does not know. For this one is incomplete as one or another of these. Let one worship him as the Ātman (i.e. the Self); for here all these [activities] become one. This very thing is to be traced out in this universe which is here (i.e. in us) the Self. For by it one knows this universe, just as one might find [something lost] by a footprint, thus: "He obtains glory and renown who knows it thus."' This passage in several ways stands at the beginning

of further development.[1] We have an effective criticism of views which would take any partial function of the Self, even the breath, as the ultimately real. We have the conception of the Ātman as the centre or point of union of the functions, which, as we shall immediately see, was a fruitful line of thought. The knowledge of the Ātman is seen to be the key of all knowledge. On the other hand, in other respects, we are distinctly on more primitive ground. The Ātman enters into the body as a life-giving principle, somewhat as in the Biblical cosmogony[2] the breath of life is breathed into the nostrils of man, after his body has been already formed. The human Ātman is a footprint by which the Ātman of the universe may be traced out, but we do not have here the more developed doctrine that the universal Ātman is present whole and undivided in the individual soul.

The passage which we have just discussed is of special interest because it appears to show us the process by which the earlier cosmogonic thought passed over into the developed Ātman doctrine. We turn next to a passage which is doubtless early, since it is given also in a simpler form in *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 10. 6. 3,[3] where perhaps for the first time, the individual Self is identified with the universal Ātman. This famous teaching of Śāṇḍilya in the form which it has in the *Chāndogya*[4] runs as follows:

[1] It has not, I believe, been previously pointed out that a part of the famous conversation between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī (*Bṛih.* 2. 4. 5) is dependent upon this passage. The long series of observations which follow the formula: 'Lo, truly, not for the love of a husband is a husband dear, but for the love of the Ātman is the husband dear,' merely amplifies *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 8: 'This very thing is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than all else': while the end of *Bṛih.* 2. 4. 5, 'Lo, truly the Ātman must be seen, must be heard, must be thought upon, must be meditated upon attentively', similarly amplifies *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 7: 'This very thing is to be traced out in this universe which is here the Self.' This correspondence in the second passage is obscured by translating the gerund, *padanīyam*, as a noun, as has often been done.

[2] *Genesis*, 2. 7. [3] Also in *Bṛih.* 5. 6. [4] *Chānd.* 3. 14. 1 ff.

'Truly, all this world is Brahma. As *tajjalān*[1] should one worship it, with calm mind.

'Then, indeed, a person is composed of purpose. According as one's purpose is in this world, so does a person become on departing hence. One should form for himself a purpose.

'Composed of mind, having breath as its body, having light as its form, having truth as its resolve, having space as its Self, containing all actions, containing all desires, containing all odours, containing all tastes, pervading all this world, not speaking, indifferent—

'This Ātman of mine in the space within the heart is smaller than a grain of rice, or than a grain of barley, or than a mustard seed, or than a grain of millet, or than the kernel of a grain of millet. This Ātman of mine in the space within the heart is greater than the earth, greater than the atmosphere, greater than the heaven, greater than these worlds.

'Containing all actions, containing all desires, containing all odours, containing all tastes, pervading all this world, not speaking, indifferent—this is my Ātman in the space within the heart. This is Brahma. Into this shall I enter on departing hence. Whoever would be certain of this would have no more doubt.

'Thus said Śāṇḍilya, Śāṇḍilya.'

This passage contains in brief form some of the most distinctive teachings of the Upanishads. Life after death is determined by one's purpose[2] in this life.

[1] This word, unintelligible in itself, is explained by Śaṅkara and his school as meaning 'that (*tad*) from which the world is produced (*ja*), into which it will be dissolved (*la*), and in which it breathes (*an*): Mādhava in his commentary takes it as meaning 'moving (*an*) on the water (*jala*)'. I do not attempt to explain further a phrase which probably was meant to be a mystery to the uninitiated. But it seems possible that the mystic phrase is to be limited to *jalān*, while the *tad* is merely the 'it' which we have supplied in the translation.

[2] Such seems the more probable interpretation of the vague word, *kratu*, in this passage: cf. Keith, *RPV*. p. 484. At the same time its earlier meaning of knowledge, or insight, is not inappropriate to the general spirit of the Upanishads, and it is possible that this sense also may be intended in this passage as a secondary suggestion.

The Ātman which is within the heart is the same as the Ātman to which cosmic attributes can be applied. The Ātman has the same contradictory features which were later to be so much emphasized. The Ātman forms the final goal of the soul of the sage at death, and this fact appears to afford him religious satisfaction. But although this passage gives us an early and fairly comprehensive summary of the Ātman doctrine, it does not give us very much insight into what it meant to its upholders or into the manner in which they became convinced of its truth. This may be more readily learned from the instruction given to Śvetaketu in *Chāndogya* 6. We have already referred to portions of this passage in other connexions. What we are concerned with here is the teaching, that the individual soul is one with the universal reality, or, as it is expressed in the classic phrase of the Upanishad, 'That thou art'. This is taught in a series of parables, each of which has the same truth for its conclusion.

'As the bees, my dear, prepare honey by collecting the essences of different trees and reducing the essence to a unity, as they are not able to discriminate, "I am the essence of this tree, I am the essence of that tree"—even so, indeed, my dear, all creatures here, though they reach Being, know not "We have reached Being". Whatever they are in this world, whether tiger, or lion, or wolf, or boar, or worm, or fly, or gnat, or mosquito, that they become. That which is the finest essence—this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Ātman. That art thou, Śvetaketu.'[1]

In a similar way, as the rivers, when they have flowed into the ocean do not know that they are this river or that, but are one, so the individuality of creatures is lost when they are merged in Being,

[1] *Chānd.* 6. 9. Hume's translation.

from which they have come forth. The nature of this Ātman is further illustrated from the life of a great tree. So long as the Ātman is in it, the tree lives, even though one branch or another may be wounded. But if the Ātman leaves a branch of the tree, that branch dies, or if it leaves the whole tree, then the whole tree perishes. It is the same Ātman which is in us. Again, Śvetaketu is asked to bring a banyan berry and to cut it open. Within are fine seeds, and one of these he divides again. What is within is invisible, and yet from this invisible source grows the mighty banyan tree. The life which is present in the banyan seed is the same as the Ātman in us. A still further lesson is gained from dissolving a lump of salt in water. The next day the lump of salt has completely disappeared, but every part of the water is pervaded by a salty taste. In like manner, the Ātman pervades the universe. The next section deals rather with the question of salvation than with the nature of the Ātman, while the one following gives information as to the process of dissolution at death. The last section is of some interest for the metaphysical question. It refers to the custom of trying a person suspected of theft by the ordeal of touching a heated axe. If his hand is burned, he is declared guilty. 'But if he is not the doer of the deed, thereupon he makes himself true. Speaking truth, he covers himself with truth. He seizes hold of the heated axe, and is not burned. Then he is released. As in this case he would not be burned [because of the truth], so this whole world has that [truth] as its soul. That is Reality. That is Ātman. That art thou, Śvetaketu.'[1]

Since this passage became one of the most famous statements of the Ātman doctrine, it will be well for us to examine its exact teaching somewhat closely. We notice first what appears to be a discrepancy between

[1] *Chānd.* 6. 16. Hume's translation.

the kind of reality promised and that which the parables seem to furnish. It will be recalled that Śvetaketu's father promised to give his son the teaching by which the unknown becomes known, i.e. the knowledge of the all-inclusive substance of which all particular objects are merely modifications. But while the illustrations of the honey and the rivers may point in this direction, the later parables indicate rather something which pervades all things, which is immanent in them, than that which merely is all things. In the illustrations drawn from the vegetable kingdom, the Ātman appears to be the life which is present in the tree rather than the tree itself. The same conclusion is to be drawn from the salt dissolved in water. As the repeated formula at the end of each section puts it, the Ātman is rather the finest essence of the world than the world itself. If it is said that the Ātman is truth or reality (*satyam*), we must understand that term from the final illustration, where it is said that the innocent man is saved from the burning axe because he has covered himself with the truth. We began our search endeavouring to find the all inclusive substance, but what we have found is rather the elusive power which pervades all things and gives them significance. The ambiguity which we have discovered here has an important effect in the systems of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

If we ask further as to what light these illustrations have to throw on the nature of the Ātman, we are struck by the fact that although the conclusion of each is 'That thou art', we have not an explanation of reality in terms of human personality but rather an inclusion of human personality in a reality which is conceived largely in non-personal terms. In the first two illustrations the particular point which is made is that all individuality, all separateness, disappears, while in the next two, the Ātman is the mere principle of life and not anything conscious or intelligent.

In the illustration of salt we have a purely physical principle, while the 'truth' which protects the innocent man in the ordeal reminds us of the conception of Brahma as magic power which we have seen in the earlier literature. Other thinkers were to conceive the Ātman in far more personal terms.

To the thought of this and similar passages in the Upanishads the name of pantheism has often been applied. This term with its rather vague connotations in Western philosophy is not a very happy one to use for the study of the Upanishads, but if it is to be employed, it is well to see what meaning it can have there. The derivation of the word suggests that it may have either one of two meanings—either that all is God, or that God is all, i.e. either that all individual objects are in some sense divine, or, on the other hand, that God alone is completely real, while everything else is in some degree appearance or illusion. Ignoring the question as to whether the Ātman can properly be described as God, it will be seen that neither of these interpretations of pantheism exactly fits the conceptions which we have discovered. If we had only the introductory passage, in which the reality is sought which stands in the same relation to the objects of the world as does clay to the vessels made from it, we might justly call the doctrine pantheism in the first of the senses which we have distinguished. But, as we have tried to point out, this is not exactly the reality which is discovered. The illustrations which are used point rather to a reality which is in all things than to a reality which is all. Nor can the second of our meanings of pantheism be made to fit the facts more successfully. The Ātman is undoubtedly possessed of the greatest significance, and hence may be called reality in a kind of honorific sense, but we have no hint of any doctrine that ordinary things are mere appearance or illusion. If, then, we are to call the doctrine of this passage

pantheism, it must be in the rather loose and general sense that there is in all things a reality, a pervading essence, if we wish, which is the most significant thing about them, and which binds them all together.

Thus far we have traced the thought of the Upanishads to the point where we have seen the Self of the individual identified with the ultimately real. Already in the early thought of *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 7, we found the individual Self used as a clue to the understanding of the ultimate reality. But if the universe is to be read in terms of the Self, what, first of all, is this Self which we thus take as a principle of explanation? This was by no means a simple problem for the thinkers of the Upanishads, and we can pardon their perplexity, when we note the difficulties which even modern metaphysicians have had with the same question.[1]

The lowest view of the Self was that which identified it with the body. Although a number of passages can be cited in the Upanishads where the word Ātman probably has this sense,[2] the doctrine that the Ātman as a metaphysical principle is the body is mentioned only to be superseded or condemned. Thus in the interesting analysis of the meanings of the Self given in *Chānd.* 8. 7 ff. under the guise of teaching given by Prajāpati to the god, Indra, and the devil, Virocana, we have an unsparing condemnation of this doctrine. Indra and Virocana come for instruction as to the nature of that Ātman 'which is free from evil, ageless, deathless, sorrowless, hungerless, thirstless, whose desire is the Real, whose conception is the Real'. After their serving a novitiate of thirty-two years, Prajāpati vouchsafes to them the instruction. He tells them to put on their best clothes and look into a pan of water. The reflection which they see there

[1] cf. e.g. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 75–102.

[2] See Hume, *Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, Sanskrit index, s.v. Atman for references.

will be the Self for which they are seeking. They do so and are highly pleased with the result, and start to go away. Indra, however, is struck with a doubt as to whether this is indeed the highest trust for which he has been seeking, and returns to gain further and higher conceptions of the Ātman. But Virocana remains convinced that the body is the highest Ātman, and returns to the devils, proclaiming this 'Upanishad': 'Oneself (Ātman) is to be made happy here on earth. Oneself is to be waited upon. He who makes his own self (Ātman) happy here on earth, who waits upon himself—he obtains both worlds, both this world and the yonder.' But Prajāpati's judgment upon this doctrine is: 'Whoever shall have such an Upanishad, be they gods or be they devils, they shall perish.'

The *Taittirīya Upanishad*[1] conceives of the Ātman as consisting of a series of layers, or sheaths. The outermost is the body, that which consists of the essence of food (*anna-rasa-maya*, or *anna-maya*). The next layer is the Ātman which consists of breath or life (*prāṇamaya*). Beneath that we find the Ātman which consists of mind (*manomaya*). Still further within is the higher power of understanding (*vijñanamaya*), while at the very centre of all is the Ātman which stands above all these powers, and which is described as composed of bliss (*ānandamaya*).[2] A less elaborate arrangement distinguishes merely the bodily Ātman (*śārīra-ātman*) and the Ātman of intelligence (*prajnā-ātman*).[3]

The idea that the Ātman stands at the centre of the psychic powers and forms a point of union between them, which we noticed earlier in *Bṛih*. 1. 4. 7, occurs frequently. When one goes to sleep all the mental

[1] *Tait*. 2. 1–5.

[2] For an attempt to reinterpret this doctrine in the light of modern knowledge see the final chapter of Radhakrishnan's *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*.

[3] See the *Taittirīya* passage just referred to and *Kaush*. 4. 20.

powers enter into the Ātman. When one awakes, 'as from a blazing fire sparks would disperse in all directions, even so from this Self the vital breaths disperse to their respective stations; from the vital breaths, the sense-powers (*deva*); from the sense-powers the worlds.'[1] More intelligibly, in *Chānd.* 7. 5. 2. the Ātman is identified with thought (*citta*) which is the uniting-point of things, so that thought gives order and connexion to matters which were otherwise unrelated.[2]

The boldest and most penetrating use of the principle of the Self as a means to philosophical understanding is that found in the teachings which are ascribed in our text to the sage, Yâjñavalkya. Whether, indeed, he was really their author, or whether they were merely attributed to him, in order to gain the support of a famous name, is not an especially important question. Not all the teachings which have come down under his name can be reconciled with each other. But certain characteristic ideas are repeated in the passages ascribed to him, which indicate the work of an original and subtle mind.

We begin our exposition of this thought with a passage which in its earlier part merely sums up the doctrines which we have already expounded from other sources. In *Bṛih.* 3. 4, Yājñavalkya is asked by a certain Ushasta to expound the Brahma which is visible and not imperceptible, the Ātman which is in all things. He replies that it is the Ātman of the questioner, *your* soul which is in all things. Ushasta follows with the further question which we have already traced out: Which Ātman is it which is in all things? Yājñavalkya replies that it is the Self which acts in each of the vital powers. But still Ushasta is not satisfied. He complains that Yājñavalkya has explained the Self only by pointing to it, as one might say to a child, 'This is a horse, this is a

[1] *Kaush.* 3. 3; cf. *Bṛih.* 2. 1. 10. [2] cf. *Bṛih.* 2. 4. 11,

cow.' He has not yet told just *what* the Self is. Yājñavalkya replies that in this sense the Self is unknowable. 'You could not see the seer of seeing, you could not hear the hearer of hearing, you could not think the thinker of thinking, you could not understand the understander of understanding.' In other words, the Ātman is the subject in action and especially in cognition. It is the 'I' in consciousness which sees, hears, knows. Its function is to see other things, but if it endeavours to look at itself, it inevitably eludes its own gaze. If it thinks that it sees something which it calls the Self, it can be sure that it is mistaken, for the thing seen would be object and not subject.

It follows as a consequence of this, that, if the Self is to be described at all, it must be in negative terms, and hence we have long lists, as in *Bṛih.* 3. 8. 8, of negative adjectives applied to it. It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long, without measure, without inside, without outside, to mention but a few terms of the long series, which, as the difference in readings shows, was capable of indefinite expansion. The whole matter could be summed up in the compact phrase which apparently was already current as a mystic doctrine or Upanishad, 'Not thus, not thus (*neti, neti*).' Or, if one is to describe the real in positive terms, all descriptive expressions are equally applicable. 'This Self, truly, is Brahma, composed of intelligence, wind, breath, seeing, hearing, earth, water, wind, space, of light and non-light, of desire, and non-desire, of anger and non-anger, of righteousness and unrighteousness, of all things. This is [the meaning of] that [saying]: "Made of this, made of that."'[1] Whatever could find a place in the wide range of experience must also have some recognition in reality.

In spite of Yājñavalkya's insistence upon the unknowable character of the Ātman, certain positive

[1] *Bṛih.* 4. 4. 5.

convictions in regard to it are yet clear. In the first place, there is no question but that this reality exists. In the second place, its positive character is that of intelligence or knowing. The lump of salt illustration which we found in the *Chāndogya* is here given a slightly different force: 'It is as is a lump of salt, without inside, without outside, entirely a mass of knowledge.'[1] In order to understand the third attribute assigned to it, that of bliss, we need to pause for a little to examine the religious bearings of this doctrine, which we have thus far rather neglected. When Ushasta in the passage noted above received his answer, that the Ātman was unknowable, apparently some dissatisfaction was still felt, for in the succeeding section another questioner repeats precisely the same question, and receives the answer that the Ātman can be known only through a life of asceticism free from desire. One must become disgusted with learning, and desire to live as a child.[2] The passage is by no means clear, but the main import of Yājñavalkya's teaching appears to be this: Our ordinary consciousness involves duality between subject and object. If we are ever in any sense to know the subject, it must be when this duality is broken down. Now this takes place, according to the psychology of the Upanishads, ordinarily only in two states, namely, those of deep sleep and death. But the teaching of Yājñavalkya gives glimpses into a third kind of experience, that of a mystic state, where also the duality of ordinary consciousness is broken down. Here these hints are closely combined with descriptions of deep sleep[3] and death,[4] but in later Upanishads this mystic state is more clearly defined. Now the purpose of the ascetic life which is urged appears to be to promote the appearance of these mystic experiences, which are described as experiences of extreme

[1] *Bṛih.* 4. 5. 13. [2] *Bṛih.* 3. 6. [3] As in *Bṛih.* 4. 3. 21, 23 ff. [4] *Bṛih.* 2. 4. 13, 14.

bliss. Sometimes, as in *Bṛih.* 4. 3. 21, this bliss is described in terms of sex: 'For just as one, when he is in the embrace of a beloved wife, knows not anything without or within, just so this person in the embrace of the intelligent Ātman, knows not anything without or within;' a simile which has been employed by mystics in other lands as well. But no special stress is laid upon it and the bliss is described in other terms also.[1] It is probably this mystical experience which furnishes the ground for the description of the Ātman as bliss, which is found not only here but elsewhere in the early Upanishads.

We saw in connexion with the discussion of *Chānd.* 6. 9 ff., that, while great significance was given to the Ātman as real in a pre-eminent sense, this had not yet resulted in a doctrine of illusion. It is not possible to speak so definitely of the teaching of Yājñavalkya. The increasingly great valuation which was put upon the Ātman led to a corresponding depreciation of other things, and several of the sections which contain this teaching end with the refrain, 'Aught else than this (i.e. the Ātman) is wretched.' The critical passage, however, is in the instruction in regard to immortality which Yājñavalkya gives to his wife, Maitreyī. He has just remarked that after death there is no consciousness in the ordinary sense. This disturbs Maitreyī, who had apparently looked forward to gaining a personal immortality. So Yājñavalkya explains: 'Where there is duality, as it were (*iva*), there one sees another: there one smells another, etc. Where, however, everything has become just one's own self, then whereby and whom would one see? Whereby and whom would one smell? etc.'[2] The point is, that while after death the Ātman continues to exist, because it is imperishable, it can no longer be conscious in the ordinary sense, since such consciousness

[1] As e.g. at *Bṛih.* 4. 3. 33. [2] *Bṛih.* 2. 4. 14.

involves duality. Now the question is whether this implies that ordinary consciousness is illusory. The word *iva* (as it were) gives a suggestion that this may be Yājñavalkya's meaning. But we can only say that it is a suggestion, not that it is a definitely stated theory. The working-out of a doctrine of illusion is the work of later thought.

Yājñavalkya's doctrine tends then to an idealism where the knowing subject is the one reality, or where at all events it far outweighs in value everything else. While, strictly speaking, not knowable in the sense of being capable of description, yet there is no question that the subject exists, and that its essential nature is intelligence. Though knowledge of it is impossible, mystic union with it is possible through ascetic discipline, and this constitutes man's highest bliss. This is the goal of religious effort, and, while the doctrine of transmigration is found in Yājñavalkya's teaching, it can hardly be said that the Ātman doctrine has yet come into effective co-ordination with it. Although there may be discerned a tinge of pessimism in his thought as compared with the earlier feeling, it is still quite untrue to say that release is sought because of the hopeless prospect of repeated rebirth upon earth. It is rather that the mystic experience of the Ātman far surpasses all earthly pleasures, than that these pleasures themselves are unalluring. And while Yājñavalkya counsels asceticism, we must remember that he professes himself as one fond of acquiring cows, and that he had two wives. While there are in his teaching suggestions of Buddhist thought, deep pessimism in regard to earthly life belongs to a later age. In regard to morality, it will be seen that the unknowableness of the Ātman prevented the attachment to it of moral attributes, and the man who rises above duality rises also above the thought of good and evil. Nevertheless, he does not use this doctrine as an occasion for immorality, as we find it used in some

other places, notably in the *Kaushītaki*, and the picture which he gives of the sage is not an unattractive one:[1] 'Therefore one who knows it thus, when he has become tranquil, restrained, indifferent, patient, concentrated, sees the Ātman in the Self, sees all as the Ātman. Evil does not overcome him, he passes beyond all evil. Evil does not afflict him, he consumes all evil. He becomes free from evil, free from passion, free from doubt, a [true] Brahman. This is the Brahma-world, Your Majesty.'

[1] *Bṛih.* 4. 4. 23.

CHAPTER V

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NON-DUALISM IN ŚAṄKARA

IN proceeding immediately from the philosophy of Yājñavalkya to that of Śaṅkara, we pass over more than a thousand years of eventful history in the course of Indian thought. In so doing we inevitably miss much which might be interesting and suggestive for our study. But there is nevertheless a certain fitness in following our treatment of Yājñavalkya's teaching with an exposition of the system which takes his view as the essential doctrine of the Upanishads. The philosophy of Śaṅkara, in our opinion, may best be conceived as a systematic working-out of the convictions of Yājñavalkya with such developments as were necessary to meet the needs of the new day.

Before we enter, however, on the details of Śaṅkara's non-dualism,[1] it will be well for us to remind ourselves of the changed situation, and of a few of the factors which were influential in determining Śaṅkara's thought. We first notice the fact that many of the leaders in philosophical discussion are now connected with the south instead of the north of India. Thus besides Śaṅkara, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, a contemporary expositor of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, Rāmānuja, who lived a little more than two centuries later, Mādhava, the upholder of dualism, and Sāyana, the Vedic expositor, were all connected with the south. In

[1] I have preferred to keep non-dualism rather than monism as a descriptive term for Śaṅkara's system, both because it literally translates the Sanskrit term, *advaita*, and because it more faithfully reflects the negative nature of Śaṅkara's thought. At least from a certain point of view in Śaṅkara, the ultimate reality resists any positive attribute which may be given to it. It is thus truer to say that Brahma is not two than to say positively that it is one.

religion, too, the south was pre-eminent. The Tamil Śaiva saints and the Vaishnava Āḷvārs, some of the greatest of whom were probably nearly contemporary with Śaṅkara, made that age as famous for its religious poetry as it was for its philosophical systems. In the north on the contrary, although it had some share in the philosophical development[1] there were symptoms of a religious decline.[2] This may perhaps be explained as a result of the foreign invasions which troubled north India, viz. that of the Huns in the fifth and sixth centuries, and of the Muhammadans in the tenth and eleventh.[3] Śaṅkara himself was born in the village of Kaladi in North Travancore, and although he travelled over the whole of India, he must have spent a considerable part of his time in the south, since the most important monastic establishment among those which he is said to have founded is that of Śṛingerī in Mysore.

In the centuries intervening between the time of the Upanishads and that of Śaṅkara, Aryan culture had been introduced into the south and naturalized there, so that in many respects it superseded the older Dravidian culture. Of the condition of this Dravidian civilization before the Aryan influx we know extremely little except by dubious conjecture, although it is fairly clear that it was radically different from the culture of the Aryans. At any rate, the missionaries of Aryan civilization did their work thoroughly, and, as sometimes has happened elsewhere, the converted population became even more conservative in their adherence to some elements of the new culture than were the people of the north among whom it had arisen. The knowledge of Sanskrit became widespread. The Dravidian languages, although they originally possessed a grammatical structure widely

[1] Vācaspatimiśra, the expositor of the Sāṅkhya, was a native of Tirhut.
[2] As e.g. in the growth of the Śākta systems in Bengal.
[3] On these invasions and their effects, see Smith, *EHI.* pp. 407–11.

different from Sanskrit, or, in fact, from any Indo-European speech, were recast in Sanskrit moulds, and received large additions from the Sanskrit vocabulary. The three principal religions of the north, Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism were introduced and widely accepted, although large elements of what was probably the original Animism remained.[1]

This leads us to the mention of what was doubtless the most important development for the progress of thought during the millenium and more which we have passed over. This is the rise and partial decline of the religions of Buddhism and Jainism. Into the discussion of these religions in themselves we cannot enter here. We wish merely to discuss two points at which Buddhism and, to a lesser degree, Jainism may possibly have had some influence upon the development of Śaṅkara's thought. The first question which we wish to consider is to what extent Śaṅkara can be considered as a propagandist against Buddhism and Jainism for the re-establishment of the Hindu faith. It is a noteworthy fact that while these two religions flourished in south India during the early centuries of the Christian era, the period of Śaṅkara finds them rapidly decreasing in vigour, and by the twelfth century Buddhism becomes extinct in the south, as it now is in practically the whole of India.[2] The causes of the decline of Buddhism have been the subject of much discussion. According to the Buddhist

[1] On the earlier part of this movement see Farquhar, *ORLI.* p. 36.

[2] cf. R. W. Fraser, 'Dravidians (South India)' in *ERE.* vol. V, p. 22. 'An account of South India, seemingly authentic, . . . is given by Hiuen Tsiang, a Chinese pilgrim, who travelled all over India to trace the footsteps of the Buddha and to learn the condition of the Buddhist faith. It is recorded that this visit took place in A.D. 640 . . . The Chinese pilgrim describes Kāñchi (now Conjeeveram) as a city, five miles around, containing many Jains, 10,000 Buddhist monks, and 80 Brahman temples.' But even at that time Buddhism was already decaying. 'He says that the country possessed many ruins of old monasteries, but that only the walls were preserved. There were many hundred Deva (Hindu) temples and a multitude of heretics, mostly Jains.' For a discussion of the period at which the extinction of Buddhism took place, see Smith, *EHI.* p. 433.

tradition, the followers of that faith in India were exterminated by bitter persecution on the part of the Hindus. Modern investigation has shown that, while persecution did exist in certain specific instances, the general decline of Buddhism was due principally to other causes.[1] Among these, doubtless, a considerable place should be given to the propaganda carried on by the adherents of Hinduism, working perhaps in exceptional cases by means of persecution or political control, but more usually through the peaceful efforts of Hindu teachers. But here again a question rises. The Buddhist tradition names two men as the arch-enemies of their faith, namely, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the expositor of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā system, and Śaṅkara, whose thought we are here to expound. It freely accuses them of inciting rulers to acts of violence against members of their religion.[2] The facts of the case are again obscure. That both did actually in their literary works give refutations of what they considered the erroneous opinions of the Buddhists is unquestioned, and according to Winternitz, Kumārila was particularly severe.[3] The legendary lives of Śaṅkara regard him as an incarnation of the god Śiva sent specially for the purpose of putting an end to the Buddhists.[4] There is reason to believe that propaganda against the Buddhists and Jains was characteristic not merely of these two leaders but of the age, since Tamil sources record that the Śaiva saint, Māṇikkavāsagar, who is thought to have been nearly contemporary with Śaṅkara, was likewise engaged in making journeys in south India and Ceylon for the purpose of refuting Buddhists and Jains.[5]

[1] cf. Smith, *EHI.* p. 203, n. 1.

[2] See Farquhar, *ORLI.* pp. 169, 175; A. A. Macdonell, 'Indian Buddhism,' in *ERE.* vol. VII, p. 211.

[3] *Geschichte der Indischen Litteratur*, vol. III, p. 426. Winternitz there gives a brief summary of Kumārila's statements.

[4] See Ghate, 'Sankaracharya,' in *ERE.* vol. XI, pp. 185 ff.

[5] See G. U. Pope, *Tiruvāçagam*, p. lxvii, n. ix, and Fraser, 'Dravidians (South India)' in *ERE.* vol. V, p. 22.

While it appears not too much to infer from this evidence that during this period Hinduism was frequently upheld against Buddhism in learned controversy, and that Śaṅkara took a share in this work, yet the impression made upon one by the *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāshya* is not primarily that of a mere controversialist and propagandist; and even in those sections which are given over to the criticism of other schools, it is the Sāṅkhyas rather than the Buddhists or Jains who are given the greatest amount of attention. Śaṅkara extends his refutation of Buddhism to three of its schools, which were evidently of some importance in his day. He treats the Sarvāstivādins or realists, and the Vijñānavādins or idealists in some detail, while he dismisses the Śūnyavādins or nihilists, who maintain that absolutely nothing exists, with the rather contemptuous remarks that their opinion 'is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and therefore requires no special refutation.'[1] His final opinion of Buddha is that 'Buddha by propounding the three mutually contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself made it clear either that he was a man given to making incoherent assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by which they would become thoroughly confused.'[2] But we need not take this cavilling too seriously, and apart from these isolated expressions, we have little more than the dispassionate statement of a philosophical criticism. At the same time it must be remembered that Śaṅkara's purpose in making these criticisms is not the pure pursuit of truth, but to warn men not to trust Buddhism and Jainism as means of gaining final release. The answer, then, which we give to this first question in regard to the connexion between Śaṅkara

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 32. [2] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 33.

and Buddhism is that, while he did criticize the systems of Buddhism and Jainism, and while it is probable that he spent some part of his active life in propaganda against them, this activity was not the primary purpose of his thought and is of comparatively less importance than his criticism of some other

s.

The second question which we have to raise in regard to the connexion of Śaṅkara with Buddhism is whether his own system of thought was not a development of Buddhism, which he thus covertly introduced into Hinduism. This view has sometimes been maintained by modern scholars who were interested in showing that not only did the Upanishads not uniformly teach Śaṅkara's non-dualism, but that that system, especially in its insistence upon the doctrine of illusion, was entirely foreign to them.[1] The charge that his system is merely 'crypto-Buddhism' is an old one and apparently was made soon after his time. A line is often quoted from the *Padma Purāṇa* which runs: *Māyāvādam asacchāstram pracchannam bauddham eva ca.* 'The Maya doctrine is an untrue science and just concealed Buddhism.'[2]

Another passage from the same source declares that the māyā theory is not supported by the Veda.[3] Similar charges were made by Yamunācārya, who was the guru of Rāmānuja's guru.[4] Again, on the side of the Buddhists, we find that they were aware of the similarity between their teachings and those of the

[1] So Gangānātha Jhā. See Keith, *JRAS.* 1916, pp. 379 ff. Walleser, *Der ältere Vedanta*, pp. 22 ff.

[2] This is found in chap. xli of the *Padma Purāṇa.* An Oxford manuscript of this work has a slightly different text. Aufrecht, *Catalogus Codicum Sanskriticorum*, p. 14, De La Vallée Poussin, art. 'Vedānta and Buddhism' in *JRAS.* 1910, pp. 129 ff. This line is quoted by the 16th century commentator on the Sāṅkhya, Vijñānabhikshu, in maintaining that the māyā theory is a false interpretation of the *Vedānta Sutras.* See *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāshya*, 1. 22.

[3] Quoted in Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 471: *Vedārthavan mahāsāstram māyāvādam avaidikam.*

[4] For details see Poussin, op. cit.

Vedanta.[1] The theory is, then, a natural one that Śaṅkara, in spite of his criticisms of the Śūnyavāda Vijñānavāda schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, was yet influenced by them more deeply than he was willing to admit. The Śūnyavāda teaching that all is non-existent suggests the theory of māyā. The Vijñānavāda doctrine that all that is real is thought, corresponds with Śaṅkara's own doctrine of the nature of Brahma.

We must now inquire how far this theory may be justified. In the first place, there is a fair measure of agreement among scholars that the actual similarity between Śaṅkara's metaphysics and the Buddhist doctrine, especially that of the Vijñānavāda school, is considerable.[2] The further problem remains of whether there was any historical connexion, and if so, whether the influence was exercised by Buddhism or by the Vedānta or by some other source upon both. In the absence of clear chronological knowledge of the development of thought in the two schools, these questions are not easily answered. One point, however, does appear clear, namely, that the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, which according to tradition was written by the guru of Śaṅkara's guru,[3] shows evident traces of contact

[1] For details see Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 261.

[2] Thus, Keith writes (*JRAS*, 1916, p. 379): 'The similarity between the Vijñānavāda and the Vedānta is patent and undeniable.' Barnett says (*JRAS*. 1910, p. 1364): 'There can be no doubt, especially after Dr. Walleser's studies, that the later representatives of this school (viz. the Vedānta) were strongly influenced by the absolute negativism of Buddhism, while preserving the positive side of their tradition, the belief in the reality of the transcendental subject.' De La Vallée Poussin's opinion (*JRAS*, 1910, p. 132) is: 'The Vijñānavāda at least in some of its ontological principles is very like Vedāntism in disguise, or, to be more exact, it is likely to be understood in a Vedāntic sense.'

[3] We cannot help feeling that the tradition is rendered plausible by the way in which Śaṅkara refers to the *Kārikā* in the *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāshya*. Thus in the comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 9 he says in introducing a quotation from the *Kārikā*: 'With reference to this point *teachers knowing the true tradition of the Vedānta* have made the following declaration.' This phrase would seem to indicate someone not too remote from Śaṅkara's personal knowledge. cf. also comment on *V.S.* 1. 4. 14. On the other hand, Walleser, *Der ältere Vedānta*, gives grounds for putting the *Kārikā* before A.D. 600.

with Buddhist thought, and the evidence now appears to be decisive that in this work at least the influence was from the Buddhist side.[1] The analogy of the illusory figure of fire formed by waving a firebrand, which forms one of the most striking features of the *Kārikā*, is known from earlier Buddhist sources.[2] There are similarities of phrase too pointed to be accidental. Poussin sums up his conclusions which are based upon a detailed study of a number of parallel passages, as follows: 'One cannot read the *Gauḍapādakārikās* without being struck by the Buddhist character of the leading ideas and of the wording itself. The author seems to have used Buddhist works or sayings and to have adjusted them to his Vedāntic design; nay more, he finds pleasure in *double entendre*. As Gauḍapāda is the spiritual grandfather of Śaṅkara, this fact is not insignificant.'[3]

On the other hand, there appears to be no good reason to believe that Śaṅkara's thought is to be explained primarily as a development from Buddhist philosophy.[4] We have found the doctrine of illusion to be a natural development from Yājñavalkya's thought, although it is not yet definitely stated by him; and while his thought is but one of the many strains of the Upanishads, the passages ascribed to him are among those most frequently cited by Śaṅkara as proof texts.[5] One may indeed go further, and assert

[1] Detailed comparisons are made by De La Vallée Poussin in the article above referred to.

[2] It is found in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, which was translated into Chinese in A.D. 443 (see Winternitz, vol. II, p. 243). It is there applied to teach the nothingness of things. Cloth is said not to be real, because the perceiving of it depends upon the perceiving of its parts, as is also true in the case of the firebrand circle. Since the latter is illusory, all things which are similarly composed of parts are illusory. The figure of the firebrand circle is also found in *Maitri* 6. 24, but it is clear that this Upanishad was in some degree influenced by Buddhism.

[3] loc. cit. p. 134.

[4] As appears to be held by Walleser and Gangānātha Jhā. See Keith, *JRAS.* 1916, p. 379 and Farquhar, *ORLI.* p. 172.

[5] cf. e.g. *Brih.* 3. 3. 8, 4. 4. 22, 4. 5. 15, and the passages in Śaṅkara referred to for these verses in the index of quotations found at the end of Thibaut's translation. (*SBE.* vol. XXXVIII, pp. 421 ff.)

that the Upanishads themselves in *Śvet.* 4. 9–10 had definitely taught the doctrine of māyā in so many words. The exact meaning of this passage in its original context may be disputed. But even granting that it may be interpreted as illusion in Śaṅkara's sense, and that it may have been so understood in the Vedānta school, it is yet difficult to see that it had any special influence upon Śaṅkara's own thought, since he refers to it only twice in the course of his entire commentary[1] and there only in connexion with a discussion of certain points in the Sāṅkhya system. But in the teaching of Yājñavalkya there appears to be ample foundation for the development of the doctrine of illusion, without supposing that it was an innovation which was brought into their interpretation through the influence of Buddhism. It must also be remembered that Buddhist thought also developed, broadly speaking, on the foundations which were already laid in the Upanishads, so that we may think of the extreme tendencies of Buddhism to nihilism and idealism as a parallel movement to what took place in the Vedānta school.[2] Our conclusion then is that, while there are traces of contact between Buddhist and Vedāntist thought, and while the presence of certain Buddhist doctrines may have tended to emphasize the importance given to the theory of illusion, in the main this doctrine as well as the remainder of Śaṅkara's teaching represents a legitimate development of a strain of

[1] In the comment on *V.S.* 1. 4. 3 and 1. 4. 9.

[2] This is well expressed by Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II. p. 472: 'There is no doubt that Śaṅkara develops his whole system from the Upaniṣads and the *Vedānta Sūtra* without reference to Buddhism. A persistent misreading of India's religious history is responsible for the prevalent view that Buddha's view is an alien one opposed to the Vedas. In our discussion of Buddhism we have repeatedly urged that Buddha developed certain views of the Upaniṣads. The inclusion of Buddha among the avatars of Viṣṇu means that he appeared for the establishment of the Vedic dharma, and not for the undermining of it. There are no doubt similarities between the views of Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta, and this is not surprising in view of the fact that both these systems had for their background the Upaniṣads.'

thought already present in the Upanishads, although definitely expressed—and even there not without a certain ambiguity—only in one of the later documents of this literature.

We have already mentioned the *Vedānta Sūtras* and Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* as the most important productions of the Vedānta school before Śaṅkara's time. We shall try to sum up briefly their philosophical significance.

Through its compression the *Vedānta Sūtra* is so obscure that very little can be made of it apart from the commentaries, which unfortunately disagree frequently in just the most important points. Yet some tentative conclusions in regard to its teaching may be reached.[1] The purpose of the Sūtra is by no means to give an independent philosophical construction, but to give a systematic account of the teaching of the Upanishads, to explain the meaning of doubtful passages, to bring apparently contradictory statements into harmony with each other, and to defend their teachings from attack. It thus attempted to perform the same service for the Upanishads as the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā had undertaken for the *karma-kāṇḍa* of the Veda. As to what the systematic teaching was which could thus be extracted from the Upanishads, each commentator has naturally held his own opinion. But the weight of scholarly opinion at the present day is in favour of holding that the original teaching of the Sūtras was inclined rather to pantheism in the sense in which we have explained it in connection with *Chānd.* 6. 8. 5 ff. or even to theism, than to the absolutist teaching of Yājñavalkya as developed by Śaṅkara.[2] At the very outset we note

[1] A clear survey of the teachings of the Sūtra, so far as they can be disengaged from the conflicting commentaries, is given in Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, pp. 430–44.

[2] This is maintained in great detail by Thibaut, who uses the greater part of the lengthy introduction to his translation (*SBE.* vol. XXXIV, pp. ix–cxviii) in comparing the interpretations given to the Sūtras by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. De La Vallée Poussin (*JRAS.* 1910, p. 129) says: 'There is no

that the old name of the Sūtra, the *Śārīraka-Mīmāṁsā*[1] i.e. the inquiry in regard to the embodied soul, would appear to countenance the belief that embodiment is an actual fact and not an illusion. Again in the Sūtra's fundamental definition of Brahma,[2] it is described, not, as would seem natural from Yājñavalkya's or Śaṅkara's point of view, as the one reality, or as absolute subject, but according to the definition of *Tait.* 3. 1 as that 'whence there is the origin, etc., of this,' i.e. that from which this universe is produced, in which it subsists, and into which it will be resolved. In *V.S.* 1. 2. 1–8 the Sūtras appear to speak of the supreme and individual souls as different, although of course Śaṅkara is able to give an explanation of this fashion of speaking.[3] The Sūtras at 1. 4. 20–22 give three different theories of the relation of the supreme and the individual soul, those of the teachers, Āśmarathya. Auḍulomi, and Kāśakṛitsna, whose views we shall later examine. Śaṅkara takes the opinion of the last named to represent the conclusion of the Sūtras, but this is by no means conclusive, and even so, Rāmānuja interprets it in a radically different sense. In *V.S.* 2. 3 a considerable section is given over to a

to support the opinion of Rāmānuja, Dr. Thibaut and many others, that Śaṅkara's doctrine of illusion is a biassed rendering of the old Vedānta, Bādarāyaṇic as well as Aupanishadic.' Dasgupta (*A History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 421) believes that the Sūtras are even dualistic: 'I am myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the *Brahma-Sūtras* were probably more faithful to the Sūtras than the interpretations of Śaṅkara. . . . It seems that Bādarāyaṇa, the writer of the *Brahma-Sūtras*, was probably more a theist than an absolutist, like his commentator, Sankara.' Radhakrishnan (*Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 442) maintains that the Sūtras waver between the two opinions: '(Bādarāyaṇa) accepts the two views of Brahman as the indeterminate intelligence . . . and determinate personal Lord. . . . From the nature of the Sūtra, it is not possible to set forth the way in which these two accounts are reconciled in the mind of the author. . . . The Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa reflects the indecision and vagueness characteristic of the Upanishads, whose teachings it attempts to set forth, and harbours within it many seeds of doubt and discussion.' (ibid. p. 422:) 'The Sūtra is one of those rare books where each, in accordance with his merits, finds his rewards.'

[1] It is so referred to by Śaṅkara in the introduction to his comment, and also in the comment on Sūtra, 1. 3. 19.

[2] *V.S.* 1. 1. 2.

[3] See Thibaut in *SBE.* vol. XXXIV, p. xxxiv.

discussion of the theories of creation found in the Upanishads, and the attempt is made to bring them into harmony. This would hardly seem worthy of the attention which is given to it, if it were entirely an illusion. Finally, the latter part of the Sūtra is very largely taken up with matters which according to Śaṅkara's interpretation belong to the lower knowledge. It is difficult to believe that the composer of the Sūtras thought that these subjects which engaged so much of his interest were anything less than the final truth. It must be admitted, however, that such results are to a considerable extent subject to question, and that no conclusions can be completely proved.

In regard to the main teaching of Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* there can be no such question, even though its connexions with Buddhism, as we have seen, may be to a certain extent the subject of debate. It is a brilliant poetical presentation of a theory of illusion, maintaining that the world as usually conceived cannot possibly be real. In the first chapter, the author gives a poetical paraphrase of the *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad*, with its recommendation of meditation upon the syllable Om, and its distinction of the mental states of waking consciousness, dreaming, deep sleep, and mystic trance. In the second chapter he enters upon his own theory of illusion. It is agreed that the world of dreams is unreal. What guarantee have we that the waking state gives us more of reality? The wise, he answers, regard the wakeful as well as the dreaming condition as one.[1] The appearance of duality is illusion, jugglery, which the Ātman produces: 'The Ātman as a God imagines himself, through himself, through the power of his Māyā. He alone recognizes the objects so sent forth—such is the fixed position of the Vedānta.'[2] Some of the favourite illustrations of the latter Vedānta are introduced. The rope which is mistaken for a snake[3]

[1] *Kārikā*, 2. 5. [2] ibid. 2. 12. [3] ibid. 2. 17.

the mirage which seems to reveal the city of the Gandharvas,[1] the firebrand which appears as a circle of fire,[2] the juggler's trick which makes an illusory mango tree grow from an illusory seed,[3] furnish the symbols under which this apparent world is to be conceived. In reality, however, 'There is no dissolution, no creation, none in bondage, no pupilage, none desirous of liberation, none liberated—this is the absolute truth.'[4] If we persist in requiring some illustration which may make clear the relation of the one Ātman and the individual soul, it may best be conceived by the relation of the space within a jar to space in general. If the jar is broken, the limited space is merged with universal space, from which it has never, except in appearance, been separated.[5] This theory of illusion is upheld with quotations from the Upanishads, of which there are nearly as many from the Yājñavalkya passages of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* as from all the rest of the Upanishads together. It is also maintained by philosophical arguments which suggest a comparison with Parmenides or even certain modern western idealists. Becoming can be explained neither from being nor from non-being, and must therefore be regarded as illusory. That which truly is cannot come into being. To speak of that which is not as coming to be, is like speaking of the son of a barren woman, who can exist neither in reality nor in illusion.[6] The relation of causality is shown to have like contradictory results, if one is to think seriously.[7] 'The whole of duality of whatever form, is simply a phenomenon of the mind; for it is never experienced when the mind is naught.'[8]

The way of escape from the world of duality is through the cultivation of mystic trance,[9] which must be distinguished from sleep, since in sleep the mind is

[1] ibid. 2. 31.
[2] ibid. 4. 47–50.
[3] ibid. 4. 89.
[4] ibid. 2. 32.
[5] ibid. 3. 3–4.
[6] ibid. 3. 17–18.
[7] ibid. 4. 11 ff.
[8] ibid. 3. 31.
[9] *Samādhi*, 3. 34.

simply overpowered, while in trance it becomes entirely the 'light of knowledge'. Nor is this yoga merely that of the ordinary yogin. It is so difficult that it requires perseverance 'equal to that of one emptying the ocean, drop by drop, with the tip of a straw of *kuśa* grass'. Yet when acquired it gives supreme satisfaction, and release from all sorrow and desire. It is easy to recognize in all this many motives similar to those of Buddhism. On the other hand, the connexion of this conception with the thought of Yājñavalkya, both in its contents and in its historic dependence, seems perfectly clear. At any rate, there can be no question of its near relationship to the philosophy of Śaṅkara.

If we come now to Śaṅkara himself, we are at last in a position to understand something of the significance of his work. He lived, as we have said, in a time of revival of Hinduism in south India when it had to a considerable extent already gained the upper hand over its ancient rivals, Buddhism and Jainism. We do not gain from Śaṅkara's refutations of either system the same impression of urgency or of critical importance which we gather from his consideration of the Sāṅkhya. He discusses them in a somewhat more academic spirit than the active controversialist is usually able to maintain. But the decline of these other religions did not leave Hinduism without its problems. There had been sufficient experience of the futility of mere disputation, even from the conflicts of the discordant Buddhist sects themselves, to convince men of the need of a return to authority.[1] With the reaction to Hinduism, this meant a return to the acknowledged authority of the Upanishads. But the mere appeal to Scripture gave no clear guidance. The teaching of the Upanishads as summed up in the *Vedānta Sūtras* was questioned by other schools,

[1] cf. comment on *V.S.* 2.1.11, 2.2.33.

which had an equal claim to participation in the Hindu faith. Further, the Sūtras themselves gave rise to most perplexing problems, if one wished to make from them a philosophy which would answer to the requirements for consistency, which had grown up during the centuries of disputation. Not long before Śaṅkara's time, if we accept the traditional dating of the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, a brilliant presentation had been made of a point of view, which while very possibly influenced by Buddhism, is undeniably akin to the thought of Yājñavalkya in the Upanishads. This view was developed by Gauḍapāda on grounds partly of Scripture and partly of reason. Now Śaṅkara, taking this point of view with a certain amount of modification, found in it an admirable means for bringing the statements of the Upanishads and of the *Vedānta Sūtras* into harmony, thus forming a sound dogmatic basis for the new Hinduism, which could be successfully defended from attack either from other interpretations of Hinduism or from heretics. The chief of the systems which he finds it necessary to oppose is the Sāṅkhya, and the fundamental error which he detects in this is its denial of one of the cardinal tenets of all schools of the Vedānta, namely that the nature of Brahma is intelligence. Against the view that the primary principle might be either unintelligent or only partly intelligent, absolute non-dualism appeared to Śaṅkara the safest defence.

As compared with the earlier statements of the Vedānta School which we have surveyed, Śaṅkara is in some ways at least distinctly a moderate in his views. The Sūtras had maintained the sole place of Scriptural authority as against reason.[1] While Śaṅkara, as we have seen, formally maintains the same position, in so far as he believes that the highest metaphysical knowledge is to be gained from Scripture alone, yet he does feel

[1] *Sūtras* 2.1.11, 1.3.28. cf. Deussen, *SV*. p. 90.

the desire to make use of reason so far as possible, and actually finds a considerable place for it in his work. Again, the theory of illusion in the *Kārikās* is considerably toned down by Śaṅkara and brought into a certain working harmony with the demands of ordinary life. Once more, we see the inclusive spirit in which he worked in his attitude toward the ordinary elements of the Hindu faith. He grants a large place to the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school of thought, with its insistence upon religious duties and reward, only demanding that it should not crowd out the Vedānta with its conviction that Scripture contained not merely commands but knowledge.[1] Again, he finds a place even for the defence of the popular gods of the Hindu faith and, according to tradition at least, he was the composer of a considerable number of popular hymns to these deities.

Śaṅkara's commentary upon the *Vedānta Sūtras* is not, in its main outlines at least, an especially obscure or difficult work. He has something of the skill of a great teacher in letting us know from time to time what he is attempting to prove and why he wishes to prove it, while again at the ends of sections, or at the beginnings of new ones, he gives convenient summaries of what he has accomplished. We shall therefore attempt to give a brief summary of the main contents of his interpretation of the Sūtras in the order of thought as he presents it.

He begins with what he regards as the self-evident proposition that object and subject in experience, or, as he more concretely puts it, the 'Thou' and the 'I' are absolutely different and in no respect capable of being identified. No more can the qualities of the one be found in the other. Yet it is an innate tendency in man to transfer the qualities of the one to the other, and to say 'I am this or that' or 'Such and such a

[1] See his full discussion under *V.S.* 1. 1. 4.

thing is mine'. Such a transference of qualities from one object to another, as e.g. of the qualities of silver to mother-of-pearl, or of double appearance to the moon, when one is suffering from a disease of the eye, is easily recognized as erroneous, so long as the things in question are ordinary objects. But, although here one of the terms is the Self, which by definition is not an object, the mistaken transfer still takes place. That this is not without parallel is shown by the fact that men transfer to the ether, which is not an object of sense perception, the attribute of dark blue colour. This natural although erroneous transference is given the technical name of *avidyā* or false knowledge, while the correct ascertainment of the nature of the Self as free from this transference is *vidyā* or knowledge. All ordinary thought and life, the things known by the canons of logical thought and the precepts of Vedic religion, as well as matters of common experience, all fall under the category of *avidyā* when they are subjected to Śaṅkara's analysis. From this *avidyā* arise the transmigratory state and all the evils of this world. Therefore man's prime need is for the means of destroying this false knowledge and with it all the evils which it brings in its train. For that purpose it is necessary for one to enter upon the study of Brahma which is identical with the Self considered as the ultimate reality. 'The complete comprehension of Brahma is the highest end of man, since it destroys the root of all evil such as false knowledge, the seed of the entire process of transmigration.'[1]

In the first four Sūtras the fundamental questions arising in regard to this enterprise are discussed. In the first Sūtra the necessary antecedent conditions for embarking upon this study are stated. In the second, Brahma is defined, as we have seen, in the terms of

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1.

Tait. 3. 1. In the third, the relation of the study of Brahma to the Veda is treated, while in the fourth the claims of this pursuit in comparison with those of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā are adjusted. The first question then raised as to the nature of Brahma is whether the ultimate reality is to be considered intelligent, or whether, with the Sāṅkhyas, we are to think of a principle which is either unintelligent or which merely has intelligence as one of its elements. On the basis of Scriptural authority the former alternative is decided upon, and this in Śaṅkara's mind is the chief result to be obtained in the whole study. He then raises the question[1] as to what purpose is to be served by continuing the treatise further. His answer is as follows: 'Brahma is understood in two forms; either as qualified by the limiting conditions due to the different modifications of name and form; or, opposite to this, as free from all limiting conditions. . . . So, the following part of the treatise is entered upon in order to show that although Brahma is one, it is considered both as connected with the limiting conditions referred to and as free from limiting conditions, according as it forms an object of devotion or an object of knowledge.' There follows, then, in the remainder of the first book, a detailed consideration of a number of doubtful passages from the Upanishads in order to determine whether they refer to Brahma or to some other being. The passages chosen for discussion are 28 in number, of which the largest number, twelve, are chosen from the *Chāndogya*. These appear to form the outline of the discussion, since they are introduced in the order in which they stand in the *Chāndogya*, while passages from the other Upanishads are brought in as the connexion of thought suggests.[2] The last section of the first book is taken up with all the passages in the Upanishads upon which the Sāṅkhyas had based

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 11.
[2] On this matter of arrangement see Deussen, *SV.* p. 121.

their system, and it is shown that they are capable of a Vedāntic meaning.

The first two sections of the second book deal with the relations of the Vedānta to other philosophies, the first section taking up the objections which they might raise against the Vedānta, while the second gives the Vedāntic criticisms of the other schools, viz. of the Sāṅkhya, which is always the one considered most important, the Vaiśeshikas, two schools of Buddhists, the Jains, and two theistic Hindu sects. In this section the arguments are not from Scripture, since that would be unavailing against those who did not acknowledge the authority of the Hindu Scriptures, but from reason.

With the main tenets of the Vedānta thus developed and defended, the remainder of the book goes into more detailed matters. The rest of the second book endeavours to bring order into the confused statements of the Upanishads in regard to cosmology and psychology. The third book undertakes a similar task for the doctrine of transmigration, while the fourth enters into further questions of eschatology.

We have thus become in some degree acquainted with the main outlines of Śaṅkara's work, although it must of course be realized that he frequently introduces the discussion of important subjects incidentally in the midst of other questions. We are now in a position to examine more carefully his fundamental metaphysical doctrines. We shall first discuss the point which is pivotal to his system, the doctrine of *avidyā*; then we shall note his doctrine of Brahma, its essential nature, its relation to individual souls and the world. Finally, we shall try to place these metaphysical ideas once more in the religious setting in which they stood in Śaṅkara's mind.

We have already seen that in our philosopher's thought, all ordinary knowledge, whether religious or secular, belongs to the domain of *avidyā*, or false knowledge. This false knowledge is essentially caused by an

erroneous transference (*adhyāsa*) of the properties of the not-Self to the Self. That all our ordinary thought is infected with this error is shown by means of two arguments.[1] First, the presupposition of all thought which makes use of the canons of perception and inference is that the Self has as its attributes the body, the senses, and the particular personality. It presupposes the particular personality, since the canons of thought cannot operate unless there is an individual knowing person. It presupposes the senses, since the person cannot know without the employment of the senses; for Śaṅkara is of opinion that all ordinary knowledge arises ultimately from the senses. But the senses cannot function *in abstracto*, since they are in need of a material body for their operation. Hence we are forced to the conclusion that, unless one consents to the erroneous assumption that the body and the senses are one's own, that they qualify the 'I', it is impossible that ordinary knowledge should arise. Since it is admitted that we do have such knowledge, it must be agreed that it is only false knowledge, *avidyā*.

The second argument starts with the admitted premise, that animals are unable to distinguish between the metaphysical Self and not-Self. It is then shown that the ordinary thinking of both men and animals is the same, since it is directed to the securing of objects desired and to the averting of those which are disliked or feared. 'A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching her with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and therefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also—who possess a higher intelligence—run away when they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently approach

[1] Introduction to the comment on the *V.S.*

persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to the means and objects of knowledge."[1] The conclusion is, therefore, that men also fail in ordinary knowledge to distinguish between the Self and the not-Self, and that their knowledge is therefore only imperfect.

If we turn to the distinctions of Scriptural knowledge, arguments can be found which lead to a similar conclusion. For there too we find such texts as 'A Brāhman is to sacrifice,' as if the Self were subject to limitations of caste, etc., involving the same erroneous transference. Thus we see that the whole of ordinary life involves this mistaken identification of the Self with something else. We transfer to it things quite external when we say that it goes well or ill with one's Self, when it goes well or ill with a member of his family. Or we may attribute to it qualities of the body, as when we say, 'I am stout or lean'. Or again, it may be a quality of one of the sense organs which is transferred, as if one should think, 'I am deaf or blind'. Finally one may take the qualities of the internal organs (that is the *manas*, which in Indian psychology has both cognitional and volitional functions) as if they were qualities of the Self, and consider oneself subject to desire, intention, doubt and determination. The true Self is to be found in none of these things.

The subject of *adhyāsa* had apparently been discussed before the time of Śaṅkara, since he mentions no less than three formal definitions of it along with the popular understanding of it, all of which he partially replaces with his own statement of its meaning. The word is not used in the Upanishads, and this fact may have led Śaṅkara to substitute for it the term, *aviayā*, which is fairly often found there, although hardly in the technical sense which Śaṅkara gives to

[1] Introduction to the comment on the *V.S.*

it. In the Upanishads it means in many passages scarcely more than ignorance of the specific knowledge which is for the moment regarded as important.[1] In Yājñavalkya's description of the dreaming state, in *Bṛih.* 4. 3. 20, we have it applied as an explanation of the occurrence of frightful dreams. We have seen how Gauḍapāda made the dreaming state and the waking state equally unreal, although he did not use the word himself. It therefore appeared to Śaṅkara as eminently suitable for describing a view of experience similar to that of Gauḍapāda's, while he kept in close touch with the terminology of the Upanishads.[2] At the same time we must make some distinction between Śaṅkara's view and that of Gauḍapāda. Gauḍapāda had emphasized the idea that all experience is illusion. With Śaṅkara, however. although all ordinary experience is false knowledge, it is yet natural and for certain purposes useful.[3] Waking experience is to be clearly distinguished from that of dreams, since in dreams the conditions of place, time, causality, and non-contradiction are not fulfilled.[4] As against the Vijñānavāda Buddhist, who maintains that the mind is conscious only of its own ideas, and not of any external thing, he maintains that

[1] cf. *Chānd.* 1. 1. 10.

[2] His distinction between *aparā* and *parā vidyā* is likewise based upon *Muṇḍ.* 1. 1. 4 but in the *Muṇḍaka* they are merely two kinds of knowledge to be known, although they are of varying worth. The *Muṇḍaka* does not support the view that the lower knowledge is illusion.

[3] The relation between *vidyā* and *avidyā* is clearly pointed out in the comment of *V.S.* 1. 2. 6. 'With regard to this [unreal limitation of the one Self] the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically assumed, as long as we have not learned—from the passage, 'That art thou'—that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final release, and the like.' When *vidyā* begins *avidyā* ceases, so that there can never be any contradiction between the two, since they do not exist in the same person at the same time. 'Therefore the man who has once comprehended Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions.' (Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 4.)

[4] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 29; comment on *V.S.* 3. 2. 1–4.

objects are objective in the sense that they do not depend upon any particular consciousness. The idea of a thing is different from the thing itself, and one is conscious of the thing by means of the idea.[1] Our ordinary life, then, furnishes us with a lower degree of reality, not with absolute error.

This contrast between *avidyā* and *vidyā* underlies the whole of Śaṅkara's thought. We have already seen his distinction between the lower and the higher Brahma which follows as its primary consequence. Upon it also rests his theory of the relation between the supreme (*paramātman*) and the individual soul (*jīvātman*). In the relation between Brahma and the world it appears in the notion of māyā. Before we proceed to follow it out in these directions, however, let us attempt to see once more what the significance of the doctrine is in his thought. Interpreters of Śaṅkara are divided into two schools on this point. To some, it appears that he has made a great philosophic discovery, or at least that he has put this discovery into definite form, namely, that he has made clear the metaphysical distinction between the world of appearance and that of reality, and thus has accomplished for Indian thought what Kant, or more recently Bradley, has done for European. Such is the estimate of Deussen and especially of Radhakrishnan. On the other hand, some are of the opinion that his significance is not that of an original thinker, but rather that of a systematizer, a scholastic, although not necessarily in a derogatory sense, and for this point of view his distinction between the higher and the lower Brahma is merely a means of bringing order into the thought of the Upanishads.[2]

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 28.

[2] Radhakrishnan interprets Śaṅkara largely in terms of Bradley's philosophy. 'Among Western thinkers Bradley comes nearest to Śaṅkara, though there are fundamental differences between the two.' (*Indian Philosophy*, p. 524.) He devotes several pages to a comparison of Śaṅkara with Kant, Bergson and Bradley (pp. 52–06).

Winternitz holds a widely contrasted view (vol. III, p. 432): 'Ich halte

In attempting to judge this question, we must first notice that, in European thought, one tendency which has led men to distinguish sharply between a phenomenal world and reality has been the pressure of mathematical and physical science. Both Kant's and Bradley's systems may be considered, at least from one point of view, as attempts to find a world which may be the abiding place of values beyond the reach of the world which is known as the domain of mathematical or mechanical law. Now this problem had none of the importance in the development of Śaṅkara's thought which it has had in modern times in the West. While mathematics was studied in India in fairly early times, the mathematical-physical conception of the world has entered India in any effective way only since its contact with Western education. It is impossible, then, to think of Śaṅkara's distinction as an attempt to meet precisely the same problems as these Western thinkers. With this necessary caveat, however, we do feel that Śaṅkara's distinction between the lower and the higher knowledge is entitled to be called a metaphysical one, and represents a genuine attempt to understand reality. It is an attempt, further, which has its parallels in the West, in ancient as well as modern times. As contrasted with Gauḍapāda, whose view is the bolder and more striking, Śaṅkara represents a more considered and critical doctrine. But granting that this is a truly philosophical and not merely a theological distinction, it must also, we be-

Śaṅkara mehr für einen Theologen als für einen Philosophen, und die Unterscheidung zwischen zweierlei Wahrheiten für theologische Spitzfindigkeit und nicht für philosophische Weisheit.'

Farquhar (*ORLI.* pp. 173, 174) says: 'He never questioned the truth of the Vedānta, i.e. those writings which were then recognized as revelation of the first grade, śruti. Yet within these theological limits Śaṅkara displays consummate philosophical capacity; he is the Thomas Aquinas of Hinduism'.

Deussen, however, believes that the spirit of Saṅkara is essentially different from that of European scholasticism. See *Die Sūtra's des Vedānta*, Vorrede, p. x l.

lieve, be agreed that the principal use which Śaṅkara makes of it in the comment on the *Vedānta Sūtras* is to find in it a principle for the interpretation of Scripture. We have already seen how through various other distinctions he was able practically to emancipate himself from the binding force of the greater part of the Vedas. The doctrine of the higher and the lower Brahma gave him the opportunity to bring the texts of the Upanishads into harmony with the one view which he considered to be true.[1]

In coming to Śaṅkara's doctrine of the ultimately real, we recall that, for Śaṅkara as for the more developed thought of the Upanishads, Brahma and Ātman are convertible terms.[2] We first inquire what reason he had for believing that this reality existed. This inquiry into the existence of Brahma was not an unnecessary one in Śaṅkara's day, since it had already been denied by more than one school of thinkers. In Śaṅkara's introduction to the comment on the Sūtras the question is already raised. If the 'I' is always subject and never the object of knowledge, how can we ever have any knowledge even that it exists? Śaṅkara's reply is that in a certain sense it is an object, namely of the idea of the 'I', although it is not an object in the same sense as other objects. But more seriously his answer is, on the one hand, that it is an immediate intuitive presentation,[3] and that it is a necessary pre-supposition. If it is denied, it is implied in the denial. 'It cannot be denied, for of that very person who might deny it, it is the Self.'[4]

[1] cf. Thibaut, *SBE.* vol. XXXIV, pp. cxxii, cxxiii: 'It has been said before that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the Upanishads to a system consistent and free from contradictions is an intrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we are quite ready to admit that Śaṅkara's system is probably the best which can be devised. While unable to allow that the Upanishads recognize a lower and a higher knowledge of Brahman, in fact the distinction of a lower and higher Brahman, we yet acknowledge that the adoption of that distinction furnishes the interpreter with an instrument of extraordinary power for reducing to an orderly whole the heterogeneous material presented by the old theosophic treatises.'

[2] 'This Atman is Brahma.' Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1.

[3] Comment on *V.S.* Introduction. [4] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 4.

At the very beginning of the Sūtras, where it is declared that their object is the knowledge of Brahma, the following dilemma is put: 'Is Brahma known or not known? If it is known, we need not enter on an inquiry concerning it; if it is not known, we cannot enter on such an inquiry.' Śaṅkara replies that Brahma is known. 'Brahma, which is all-knowing and endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence and freedom, exists. For if we consider the derivation of the word "Brahma" from the root *bṛih*, "to be great," we at once understand that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahma.' (The argument which appears to be implied here is that if its existence be granted, it must have these qualities from the etymology of the word.) 'Moreover the existence of Brahma is known on the ground of its being the Self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of his Self, and never thinks "I am not". If the existence of the Self were not known, every one would think "I am not". And this Self is Brahma.' In reply to the other horn of the dilemma, that there is therefore no room for an inquiry, he answers that there are many erroneous views in regard to this Self. The materialists, e.g. think that the body is the Self, others that it is the senses, others again the internal organ (*manas*). Still other misleading views are held by other schools. Only the opinion of the Vedāntists, that the ultimate reality is the true Self of the individual soul suffices for the gaining of release. In order to prove that this is the correct view it is necessary to make the investigation into the nature of Brahma.[1]

The attribute of Brahma which is most insisted upon by Śaṅkara is that of intelligence, and his chief criticism of the Sāṅkhya is that its ultimate world-source, the *pradhāna*, is either lacking in this element

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1.

or has it only as one of its constituent members. As against this, Śaṅkara uses the illustration of Yājñavalkya, that, like a lump of salt which is salty taste through and through, so Brahma is in every part intelligence. His chief proof of this apart from Scripture is the argument which has so often served the same purpose in the West, the argument from design. In Śaṅkara's form the argument runs as follows: 'On this point (in answer to the Sāṅkhyas) we say: "If we make examination only by means of taking parallel examples, it is nowhere found in the world that an unintelligent thing, without the guidance of something intelligent, of its own accord produces results capable of serving the purpose of a particular man. For in the world houses, palaces, couches, seats, pleasure gardens, etc., are found to be made by cunning workmen either for the furnishing of pleasure or for the removing of pain, according to circumstances. In the same way this whole world as external, composed of the elements, earth, etc., is fitted for the enjoyment of the fruit of different kinds of karma; and as animated, consisting of bodies, etc., of different species, it possesses a definite arrangement of organs which are the places for the experiencing of the fruits of many actions. When this world cannot even be conceived mentally by the most cunning and excellent workmen, how could an unintelligent pradhāna fashion it? For this does not happen in the case of clods and stones. In the case of clay and similar substances when they are employed by potters a fashioning takes place. In a similar way it would be implied that the pradhāna is under the direction of an intelligent being."'[1]

Among the more formal proofs of Brahma's existence, we also find a causal argument: 'With regard to ether and air, the possibility of an origin has been shown; but in the case of Brahma there is no

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 1.

such possibility. Nor from the fact that from effects other effects arise can it be inferred that Brahma is an effect; for if we did not admit a fundamental causal substance an infinite regress would follow; and that fundamental causal substance which is generally admitted, just that is our Brahma."[1] But it must be acknowledged that Śaṅkara does not appear to put primary reliance upon these proofs, and he seems to introduce them more for controversial purposes than because they are essential to his positive argument. At the same time it is noteworthy that although these arguments were doubtless not original with Śaṅkara, he never subjects them to a searching scrutiny in the manner of Kant or Rāmānuja.

We have already noted his distinction between two forms of Brahma, a higher form (*para* or *nirguṇa brahman*) which is without attributes, and a lower form (*apara* or *saguṇa brahman*, or *Īśvara*), which is conceived with attributes for the purposes of devout meditation. The primary use of the distinction, as we have maintained, is that it serves as a means of harmonizing passages of Scripture. Thus, in the comment on *V.S.* 3. 2. 11, in introducing a discussion of this subject, he says: 'The Scriptural passages which refer to Brahman are of double character; some indicate that Brahman which is affected by difference, so e.g. "He to whom belong all works, all desires, sweet odours and tastes" (*Chānd.* 3. 14. 2); others, that it is without difference, so e.g. "It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long" etc. (*Bṛih.* 3. 8. 8).' His explanation is that although Brahma, as it is in itself, can be but one, it may yet be viewed in such a way that it appears to possess attributes which do not genuinely belong to it, just as a piece of crystal, although really transparent, appears red when a red hibiscus flower is placed near it, or as

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 3. 9.

light, although really formless, appears to possess form when falling upon objects which have form. 'Hence there is no reason why certain texts should not teach, with a view to meditative worship, that Brahma has that and that form. We thus escape the conclusion that those Vedic passages which ascribe form to Brahma are devoid of sense; a conclusion altogether unacceptable since all parts of the Veda are equally authoritative, and hence must all be assumed to have a meaning."[1]

The nature of Brahma in itself is pure intelligence. Or, if we search for further determinations, we are brought back to Yājñavalkya's 'Not thus, not thus.' In illustrating this, Śaṅkara uses a story, which although he says it is found in Śruti, cannot be discovered in any of our existing Upanishads. 'Of a similar purport is that Scriptural passage which related how Bāhva, being questioned about Brahma by Vāshkali, explained it to him by silence. "He said to him, 'Learn Brahma, O friend,' and became silent. Then, on a second and third question, he replied, 'I am teaching you indeed, but you do not understand. Silent is that Self.'"'[2]

It cannot be said that Śaṅkara's teaching in regard to the lower Brahma reaches any such degree of coherence as we have seen in his doctrine of the higher Brahma; and as much of his thought may be found equally well in the Upanishads, we do not undertake to reproduce it here. We also remark that there are frequent passages where no clear distinction appears to be drawn between the higher and the lower Brahma,[3] which confirms us in the opinion that although it has a metaphysical basis, its chief function in Śaṅkara's system is as an aid to interpretation.

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 3. 2. 15. [2] Comment on *V.S.* 3. 2. 17.

[3] This is brought out by Deussen, *SV.* pp. 100, 101. Radhakrishnan (*Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 554) complains that there does not seem to be much point in Deussen's observation, but the point is, I think, sufficiently obvious.

We now turn to Śaṅkara's view of the relation between the supreme and the individual soul. The central position which he holds is that the true Self in every man is the one ultimately real being. The difference between individuals is only apparent, it belongs to the realm of avidyā. Yet there is an apparent difference, and the relationship is in need of explanation. This matter is most fully gone into in connexion with *Sūtras*, 1. 4. 20–22, where various theories, which were current in the time of the composer of the Sūtras, are expounded. These theories, to give them their later names, are the *bhedābheda* view, the *satyabheda* or dvaita view, and the advaita. According to the first, the individual self is partly different from, partly identical with, the highest self. According to the second, the individual soul is absolutely different from the highest self, but becomes united with it through release. According to the third, which is Śaṅkara's view, the individual self is always the same as the highest self, but through avidyā believes itself different from it, until the illusion is dissipated.[1]

[1] Neither the Sūtra nor Śaṅkara's commentary gives a very clear statement of the first two of these views. The following descriptions are from the *Bhāmatī*, one of the standard commentaries on Śaṅkara's *Bhāshya*. This is the work of Vācaspatimiśra, who lived slightly later than Śaṅkara (c. 850), and whose treatment of philosophical views, other than his own, is in most cases unusually objective. His statement of the *bhedābheda* is as follows: 'As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire; and, on the other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from each other; so the individual souls also—which are effects of Brahman—are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence, nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be distinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with Brahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and somehow non-different.' (*SBE.* vol. XXXIV, p. 177 n.)

His statement of the advaita view is as follows: 'The individual soul is absolutely different from the highest Self; it is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of in the Upanishad as non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus transfers a future

Salvation for Śaṅkara is purely a matter of knowledge. It is only on the theory that the distinction between the individual and the highest soul is unreal, that salvation through knowledge alone is possible. Just as a man who sees a rope in the dusk and thinks it to be a snake is relieved of his fear as soon as he perceives its true nature, so man is relieved of the evil of transmigration as soon as the true nature of the Self is perceived. But the rope was always really a rope, and in the same way the Self was really always the same. Its nature cannot be altered by our erroneous views of it.

If we are to illustrate the relation between the individual and the supreme Self by means of an analogy, the favourite one with Śaṅkara is that of the relation of the space within a jar to space in general. This analogy is borrowed from Gauḍapāda, but is used repeatedly by Śaṅkara. 'The truth is that there is no transmigrating soul other than the Lord. Yet his connexion with limiting conditions consisting of bodies, etc., is assumed, just as is the case with the connexion of the ether with limiting conditions such as jars, water-vessels, mountain caves, etc. And from this such words

state of non-difference to that time when difference actually exists. Compare the statement of the Pañcarātrikas: "Up to the moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference."' (*SBE.* vol. XXXIV, p. 278 n.)

Śaṅkara's own view which is called advaita may best be gathered from the following statements: 'That the view of Kāśakṛitsna (i.e. according to Śaṅkara's interpretation the advaita view) is Scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is so all the adherents of the Vedānta must admit that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, viz. the body and so on, which are the product of name and form as presented by Nescience. . . . As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for its object the oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist (as some do) on a plurality of selves and to maintain that the individual soul is different from the highest Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. . . . Those who insist on the distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of the Vedānta-texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which is the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be something effected, and therefore non-eternal.'—Comment on *V.S.* 1. 4. 22.

and conceptions as " the space of a jar " and " the space of a water-pot " are developed and practically used in the world, although they are not distinct from [universal] space. Resulting from this is the false notion that there is a distinction of spaces, such as the space of a jar, etc. In the same way also we find here the false view that there is a distinction between the Lord and the transmigrating soul, which results from failure to discriminate in regard to the connexion [of the Lord] with the limiting conditions which consist of bodies, etc."[1]

But although there is really but one Self, yet when we descend to the plane of avidyā, there are many souls. To hold that there is but one transmigrating soul would lead to the absurd conclusion that, with the emancipation of that one soul, there would never be further need of emancipation, and mundane existence would have completely ceased. This is manifestly not the case.[2] It is therefore to be concluded that avidyā manifests itself in many centres.

We come finally to the relation between Brahma and the world. We saw at the beginning of our account of Śaṅkara's commentary that he separates sharply the Self from the not-Self. From the highest point of view only the former of these really is. The relation of Brahma to the world then can only be a matter of avidyā. We have already pointed out that the fundamental definition of Brahma as the cause of the world which is given by the Sūtra is not very easily compatible with this conception of the world, but it is accepted by Śaṅkara and is ultimately explained by him in terms of his doctrine of illusion. Thus he says in commenting on *V.S.* 1. 1. 2 : 'The full sense of the Sūtra therefore is : That omniscient, omnipotent cause, from which proceed the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of this world — which

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 5. [2] Comment on *V.S.* 3. 2. 21.

world is differentiated by names and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and causes, and the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived by the mind—that cause, we say, is Brahman.' But in summing up the results of the first book, his statement is: 'It has been shown in the first ādhyāya that the omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once originated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical illusion."[1]

But while the material world is for the highest point of view unreal, yet Śaṅkara is no mere subjectivist, for as we have seen, he criticizes sharply the Vijñānavāda theory of knowledge. A clear distinction is to be drawn between the incoherent experience of dramas and the coherent experience of waking consciousness.

Śaṅkara confesses that he is not very much interested in the details of the material world, and, if the Upanishads appear to make contradictory statements concerning it, that is not very important, since physical science is not the subject which they are concerned to teach. Thus in the comment on *V.S.* 1.4.14, in answering the objection that the Upanishads contain conflicting statements in regard to creation, and therefore are untrustworthy authorities for that subject, he says: 'In the first place, it cannot be said that the conflict of statements concerning the world affects the statements concerning the cause, i.e. Brahma, in which all the Vedānta-texts are seen to agree; and, in the second place, the teacher will reconcile later on those conflicting passages also

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 1.

which refer to the world. And to consider the matter more thoroughly, a conflict of statements regarding the world would not matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are not at all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor are we told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends upon those matters in any way; nor have we the right to assume such a thing.'

Although Śaṅkara, following Bādarāyaṇa, devotes the whole of a section in the second book[1] to an attempt to reconcile the various cosmological views of the Upanishads, to discover what was the order of evolution of the elements from Brahma, or in what order the corresponding involution of the world at the end of the world-age will take place, we do not mean to spend time upon these matters, except to call attention to one or two points. Brahma is both the material and the efficient cause of the world, and, although this is contradictory to all ordinary experience, it must be accepted, since it is clearly implied, as we have already shown, in such Upanishad passages as *Chānd.* 6. 1 ff.[2] Śaṅkara in common with other schools of the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya holds the doctrine that the cause must be identical with the effect, although this doctrine has somewhat different meanings under the various interpretations.[3] In some passages Brahma is explained as the source of motion in the world in an argument which suggests Aristotle's unmoved mover. Thus in the comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 2 he says, 'We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists, when the latter is present, and does not exist, when the latter is absent. . . . The motive power of intelligence is therefore incontrovertible. But—an objection will be raised—your

[1] *V.S.* 2. 3. [2] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 4. 23–27.
[3] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 14–20.

Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising moving power; for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which is pure intelligence.—A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and other objects of the sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and other organs of sense. So the Lord also, who is all-present, the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful, may, although himself unmoving, move the universe. If it be finally objected that [in the Vedānta doctrine] there is no room for a moving power, as, in consequence of the oneness (non-duality) of Brahma, no motion can take place, we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Māyā, which consists of name and form presented by Nescience."[1]

The question may be asked why Brahma should ceaselessly provide the illusion of the world. Śaṅkara answers that we cannot think that it is due to any purpose on his part, since there are in him no unsatisfied desires. Rather we are to consider that it is for him mere sport, just as princes or great men who have no unfulfilled desires, yet frequent places of amusement. Nor must we think that the creation of the world, although it far surpasses human capacity, is a matter of any difficulty for him.[2] The conception of creation also leads to moral difficulties, since there appears to be inequality and cruelty in the created world. But this is answered by pointing out that everything happens according to the law of Karma.[3] There is a suggestion that the significance of the material world lies in the fact that it provides a theatre for the working out of rewards and punishments.[4]

Before we take leave of Śaṅkara, we shall

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 2.
[2] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 32, 33.
[3] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 34.
[4] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 1.

endeavour once more to show the significance of his thought, as we have expounded it, in relation to the religious life of his time. The mainspring of his thought is religious, and his purpose in his metaphysical analysis and commentative activity is not the love of truth for its own sake, but the conviction that true views are necessary to serve a religious aim. If he criticizes the adherents of other schools, it is because their false doctrines make impossible the attainment of release. But he finds a good word to say about most of the schools which he criticizes, so long as they are within the Hindu faith. He has little fault to find with the popular religion of polytheism. The many gods are real beings, although like men they are in need of the saving knowledge of the Ātman.[1] The objection, that the gods are known from the Veda to be eternal, causes a difficulty, since if they are already immortal, there would appear to be no need of further knowledge. This is met by a curious theory of species, resembling in some ways the Platonic doctrine of ideas. The name Indra or Agni is not to be thought of as meaning one particular individual who is immortal. It is rather the name of an office, like that of the general of an army, which may be held by different persons from time to time, although the office itself is eternal. At the end of each world-period the individuals may disappear, but the office reappears in the next world-evolution.[2] Not only is a place thus given to popular

[1] There is in *V.S.* 1. 3. 26 a curious discussion as to whether the gods, like the Śūdras, must be excluded from the knowledge of the Atman on the ground that they have not undergone the ceremony of initiation which admits students to the learning of the Vedas. It is decided that the gods are as much in need of the knowledge of the Ātman as are men, and that initiation is unnecessary in their case.

[2] cf. comment on *V.S.* 1. 3. 39: 'As therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in all *kalpas* and as the Lords are able to continue their previous forms of existence, there manifest themselves, in each new creation, individuals bearing the same names and forms as the individuals in the preceding creations, and, owing to the equality of names and forms, the admitted periodical renovations of the world in the form of general *pralayas* and general creations do not conflict with the authoritativeness of the word of the Veda.'

religion in general, but many of the particular beliefs dear to the heart of the common people are expressly supported. People formerly talked with the gods face to face.[1] Dreams are prophetic.[2] Gems, spells, and herbs have magic power.[3]

The separation of the lower and the higher knowledge gave to the former a distinct place as an educative agency in preparing for the supreme intuition. This last, as we have seen, is fundamentally a matter of knowledge. Yet it is no ordinary knowledge, and it presupposes also a certain settled type of character. It is necessary, even before the study of the Vedānta-texts is begun, that one should have prepared oneself to meet the necessary antecedent conditions: 'We maintain that the antecedent conditions are the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit [of one's actions] both here and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint and the other means (i.e. discontinuance of ordinary religious ceremonies, patience in suffering, attention and concentration of the mind, and faith), and the desire of final release.'[4] In other words, the pursuit of the saving knowledge requires a monastic discipline of life, and it is no accident that an ascetic order in India should claim Śaṅkara as its spiritual father. In order to gain the knowledge which brings release, it is necessary that the Vedānta texts should be

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 3. 33: 'What is not accessible to our perception may have been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times. Smṛiti also declares that Vyāsa and others conversed with the gods face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would thereby deny the [incontestable] variety of the world. He might as well maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by which the Scriptural injunction of the *rājasūya* sacrifice would be stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of duty of the different castes and āśramas were as generally unsettled as they are now.'

[2] Comment on *V.S.* 3. 2. 4.

[3] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 27.

[4] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1.

studied, for 'the true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of holy texts.'[1] But with all the help which can be given from without, the supreme intuition can never be communicated but must be discovered by oneself, alone. Although the Vedic passages appear to command the knowledge of the highest Brahma, when they speak of it as something to be seen, to be heard, they aim not at enjoining the knowledge of the truth, but merely at directing our attention toward it. 'Even when a person is face to face with some object of knowledge, knowledge may either arise or not; all that another person wishing to inform him about the object can do is to point it out to him; knowledge will thereupon spring up in his mind of itself, according to the object of knowledge, and according to the means of knowledge employed.'[2] But when the truth of the identity of the Self has been achieved, the false appearance of the world disappears, and even in this life the sage may enjoy freedom from transmigration. 'The person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even while still alive. And the same is declared in the Śruti passages concerning him who knows Brahma: "And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that disembodied immortal spirit is Brahma only, is only light. . . ." Therefore the man who has once comprehended Brahma to be the Self does not belong to this transmigratory world.'[3]

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 11. [2] Comment on *V.S.* 3. 2. 21.
[3] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 4.

CHAPTER VI

GOD, THE SOUL, AND THE WORLD IN THE UPANISHADS

THE absolutist philosophy which we saw growing up in the teachings of Yājñavalkya, and which we have examined in its more developed form in the teachings of Śaṅkara, was, as we found, by no means the only philosophical position which is present in the Upanishads. Even in the famous passage of the *Chāndogya* which culminates with the assertion, 'That thou art,' we discovered an expression not of an absoluteness which denies reality to the world or to the individual soul, but a statement which might be interpreted to mean either that Brahma is the one substance of which all things are forms, or that it is the force which is immanent in all things. When once the sole reality of the Self has been asserted, the relation between the absolute and the individual soul and the world no longer exists as a problem in the metaphysical sphere, although it may still have a meaning in practical life. But in the Upanishads, which, at least in the majority of passages and perhaps everywhere, failed to make Śaṅkara's distinction between the two kinds of knowledge, there remained a genuine problem as to the relations between the supreme reality on the one hand, and the selves of individual men and the material world on the other.

Before we enter upon the detailed survey of these problems, it may be well for us to see how great the influence is in the later Upanishads of the point of view represented by Yājñavalkya. For even in the Upanishads which are most generally recognized as theistic, the presence of elements due to more pan-

theistic or absolutist ideas is unquestioned. This influence may be seen in at least three main directions. The first is in the emphasis upon the negative or unknowable character of the absolute; the second is in considering the absolute to be the subject in consciousness; the third is the development of a technique by which the awareness of unity with the Ātman might be attained. In the first two of these tendencies, Yājñavalkya's teaching is merely carried on largely unchanged, although it may sometimes appear in an altered light through its connexion with new and sometimes contradictory ideas. The third tendency shows considerable growth and expansion, and we shall delay our treatment of it, in order to bring it into closer connexion with our survey of the theistic elements in the later Upanishads.

The most conspicuous of these tendencies is that which emphasizes the negative or unknowable nature of Brahma. Already in the *Taittirīya* we find the verse:

Wherefrom words turn back,
Together with the mind, not having attained—
The bliss of Brahma he who knows,
Fears not at any time at all.[1]

No great significance, however, need be attached to this verse, beyond the importance which it gives to the element of feeling, since experiences of feeling are notoriously difficult to describe.

A much more pronounced negativism is found in the *Kena*, which may be said to consist almost exclusively of the assertion in various forms of the doctrine that Brahma is inexpressible except in negative terms. The seer can scarcely make mention of Brahma without bursting forth into paradox:

It is conceived of by him by whom It is not conceived of.
He by whom It is conceived of, knows It not.
It is not understood by those who understand It.
It is understood by those who understand It not.[2]

[1] *Tait.* 2. 4. Hume's translation.
[2] *Kena*, 11. Hume's translation modified.

The gods are in no better case than men when they try to tell what it is. With the exception of Umā, the daughter of the Himālayas, they are none of them able to explain it. In order to give some conception of its inexpressible power this teaching is given in regard to it: '(It is) that in the lightning which flashes forth, which makes one blink, and say "Ah!"'[1] It is an unutterable and overpowering experience. We note further, and this is important for showing that this side of the teaching of the Upanishad is derivative and not original, that the author of the first half of the *Kena* does not claim that his teaching is his own:

Other, indeed, is It than the known,
And moreover above the unknown.
—Thus have we heard of the ancients
Who to us have explained it.[2]

In the *Kaṭha*, the negative doctrine is found, although only in a few passages, and it is difficult to reconcile with some of the other teachings of the Upanishad. The doctrine receives here no specially original form of expression, and the conclusion lies at hand that it was merely accepted by the author from older sources without its becoming a very vital element of his thought.[3] In the *Īśā*, the paradoxical side of the teaching comes to perhaps its highest point:

Unmoving, the One is swifter than the mind.
The sense-powers reached not It, speeding on before.
Past others running, This goes standing. . . .
It moves. It moves not.
It is far, and It is near.
It is within all this,
And It is outside of all this.[4]

Such references are to be found, though not so commonly in the *Muṇḍaka*[5] and even in the *Śvetāśva-*

[1] *Kena*, 29. Hume's translation.
[2] *Kena*, 3. Hume's translation.
[3] *Kaṭha*, 2.14, 3.15, 6.12.13; cf. 5.2.
[4] *Īśā*, 4, 5. Hume's translation.
[5] *Muṇḍ.* 1.2.6, 2.2.1, 3.2.7, 8.

tara,[1] although in the latter it is immediately joined with a distinctively theistic doctrine. In the *Māṇḍūkya* this negative tendency is pushed to scholastic absurdity in enumerating no less than seventeen negative attributes which belong to the mystic experience and hence to the Ātman itself.[2]

Of the second tendency in Yājñavalkya's thought, that which holds that the subject in consciousness is Brahma, there is not nearly so much evidence, and it is clear that it is the *Chāndogya* conviction that the inner self of man is of the same substance as the Self of the world, or that Brahma is somehow present in the human Self, which is the predominant current. In some passages, as we shall see, even more distinctively theistic notions hold sway. Yet there are passages, especially in the *Kaṭha*, which appear reminiscent of Yājñavalkya. Thus we find:

> That by which [one discerns] form, taste, smell,
> Sound, and mutual touches—
> It is with That indeed that one discerns.
> What is there left over here!
> This, verily, is that.
>
> By recognizing as the great pervading Soul (*Ātman*)
> That whereby one perceives both
> The sleeping and the waking state,
> The wise man sorrows not.
>
> He who knows this experience
> As the living Soul (*Ātman*) near at hand,
> Lord of what has been and of what is to be—
> He does not shrink away from Him.'[3]

The following lines from the *Īśā* suggest the same strain:

> In whom all beings
> Have become just the Self of the discerner—
> Then what delusion, what sorrow is there,
> Of him who perceives the unity?[4]

[1] *Śvet.* 3. 20; cf. 4. 2–4, 19. [2] *Māṇ.* 7.
[3] *Kaṭha* 4. 3–5. Hume's translation. A somewhat similar thought is found at 5. 8. [4] *Īśā*, 7. Hume's translation.

It is perhaps worth noting also that the metrical passages which form a later addition to Yājñavalkya's prose teachings in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, and which express the tendencies which we have been discussing in a somewhat extreme form, have many verbal parallels among the verse Upanishads.

The aspect of Yājñavalkya's teaching which puts the emphasis upon the Ātman as subject can scarcely be discovered, however, in the *Muṇḍaka* or *Śvetāśvatara.* The latter does indeed find in one passage that the root of *saṁsāra* consists in thinking that oneself and the Actuator are different,[1] but the terms employed are not those used by Yājñavalkya, and the leading conceptions of the Upanishad are new. Although a single passage does mention the doctrine of māyā in clear terms,[2] yet it has no dominating place in the Upanishad, and we need not see in it more than a distant connexion with Yājñavalkya.

I have laid so much stress on the fairly clear traces of the influence of Yājñavalkya upon the later Upanishads, because it seems to me evident that, while we have in them certain theistic elements which have come down from the older religious faith, these elements were modified by contact with the influence of Yājñavalkya, and further that certain elements in the new theism must be traced almost entirely to the outworking of that influence. Before we undertake to describe this new theistic faith, in which, ultimately, we come to see God, the individual soul, and the world, as three distinct although related entities, we must first take account of the elements in the older situation from which it sprang.

The Vedic religion was a naturalistic polytheism in which the powers of nature had been conceived in sufficiently personal terms that men could make offerings to them, express their wishes to them through

[1] *Śvet.* 1. 6. [2] ibid. 4. 10.

prayer, and expect their aid in the ordinary affairs of life. Although the early Upanishads show a certain reaction against this religious faith,[1] there is every reason to believe that it continued to be the religion of the masses, and after the first reaction of the Upanishads was over, it secured its place again as part of the ordinary view in Upanishadic circles. Something of the ebb and flow of current religious feeling may be judged from the frequency of prayers to the Vedic gods in the Upanishads. In the older part of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* (§§ 1–4) it is noteworthy that not a single prayer occurs except the famous one at 1. 3. 28:

> From the unreal lead me to the real,
> From darkness lead me to light,
> From death lead me to immortality;

and this moreover appears to be only a quotation from some older text and contains no clear reference to the deity to whom it is to be addressed. The remaining sections of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* (5–6) do contain a few passages which might perhaps be called prayers, but which are more truly described as charms to be used in magical or semi-magical ceremonies.[2] The *Chāndogya* likewise contains only a few mystical explanations of prayers in 2. 24 and a prayer near the end of the Upanishad[3] which requests that the student may not go 'to toothless and hoary and drivelling [old age]'. But here again no deity is distinctly addressed. When we come to the *Taittirīya* Upanishad, however, not only does the first section open and close with a prayer to various Vedic gods for success in study, but the Upanishad contains also a long prayer to Indra, asking for the success of the teacher in his work as well as for other blessings.[4] The *Kaushītaki* mentions a prayer to be offered three times a day to the sun-god

[1] See chap. iii, p. 53. [2] See *Bṛih.* 6. 3, 4. [3] *Chānd.* 8. 14.
[4] *Tait.* 1. 1, 1. 12, 1. 4.

by which one may secure the removal of one's sins.[1] A prayer to Agni for prosperity and the aversion of sin is to be found at the conclusion of the *Īśā*.[2] The *Śvetāśvatara* is filled with prayers taken largely from the older ritual.

Even in the Upanishads which minimize the Vedic faith, the existence of the old gods is not denied. We find only that their power is so diminished that it becomes idle to worship them in the hope of gaining the new blessings of knowledge. The gods, equally with men, are in need of instruction. The terrible storm god, Indra, is represented as meekly spending one hundred and one years in studentship, in order to gain the knowledge of the Ātman. Yet while some gods were decreasing in power, others were coming into greater prominence. Rudra, who had held only a very subordinate place in the Ṛigveda, became in the Brāhmaṇas a very important god, and it is not surprising that in the *Śvetāśvatara* he is accorded the place of the Supreme Being.[3]

While the developed philosophical views of the early Upanishads often said that Ātman was the substance of all things, or even that there was nothing real except the Ātman, yet as we have seen there was also room for the view that the Ātman was in all things, and that it pervaded them in the manner in which the soul may be conceived to pervade the body. In the cruder cosmogonic speculation we often have the theory that the world was produced by a process of procreation or evolution from the creator, so that while it shared his substance, it was still in its evolved condition perfectly real.[4] Another variant of this view[5] considers that after the creation of the human body by the Ātman, he entered into it and gave it life.

[1] *Kaush*. 2. 7. [2] *Īśā*, 18.
[3] See Keith, *RPV*. p. 511 and J. M. Nallasvami, 'The Śvetāśvatara Upanishat', printed in his *Studies in Saiva Siddhanta*, pp. 109–45.
[4] For references see chapter iv, p. 102 f. [5] *Bṛih*. 1. 4. 7.

remaining concealed within. Even in the teachings of Yājñavalkya we find several passages which are more easily reconcilable with a view of immanency in which the human soul and the supreme spirit are in some sense separate, than with the doctrine of absolute identity which we have expounded. Thus in *Bṛih.* 3. 7 we have the doctrine of the inner guide or controller (*antaryāmin*), which seems to express unmistakably an immanent rather than an absolutist view. Again in *Bṛih.* 4. 3 we have the beautiful passage describing the Ātman as the ultimate light of man, which appears to imply a contrast between the light and that which is lighted. It would not seem improbable that the idea of this passage suggested a conception of the Ātman which is expressed in a favourite verse of the later Upanishads:

> The sun shines not there, nor the moon and stars,
> These lightnings shine not, much less this [earthly] fire!
> After Him, as He shines, doth everything shine,
> This whole world is illumined with His light.[1]

Still again, in the famous dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī, which in some respects represents the furthest development of the absolutist doctrine, we find him also maintaining a position which can be interpreted to mean that all earthly loves, whether for husband, wife, or son, for wealth or for honour, are taken up and justified by the love of the Ātman.[2] Whether this be the correct interpretation of this rather ambiguous verse or not, its emphasis certainly appears to lie upon the side of love rather than upon that of knowledge as a means of apprehending the Ātman, and in this way suggests the later theistic doctrine of *bhakti*.

So strong is the impression which this theistic view makes upon some interpreters, modern as well

[1] Hume's translation. This verse is found in *Kaṭha*, 5. 15, *Muṇḍ*. 2. 2. 10 and *Śvet*. 6. 14. [2] *Bṛih*. 2. 4. 5.

as ancient, that they are moved to consider the whole of the Upanishads as teaching this doctrine, and they endeavour to interpret all passages in this sense.[1] But this again appears to be an unnecessary restriction upon the Upanishads; and if it is argued that we thus are obliged to attribute inconsistent views of the Ātman even to a single teacher or passage, we can only reply that the Upanishads elsewhere do not show sufficient logical consistency that we can expect to find it here.

Theistic views are most clearly expressed in two of the verse Upanishads, the *Kaṭha* and especially the *Śvetāśvatara;* and while similar suggestions can be found elsewhere also, these two Upanishads deal most definitely with the problems which a theistic view presents. Our further consideration of this subject will, then, be limited to these two sources.

The older of the two documents is the *Kaṭha.* This uses as its basis an old story from the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*[2] telling of the visit of Naciketas to the abode of Yama, the god of death. Naciketas is the youthful son of Vājaśravasa who was making a sacrifice in which he had vowed to offer up all his possessions. Actually, however, all that he gave proved to be a few worthless old cows. The boy, troubled by his father's apparent lack of sincerity, asks him whether he will not include him also in the offering as part of his possessions. The father replies to his repeated questioning angrily, and says that he gives him as an offering to Death. Naciketas then goes to Yama's abode, but finds him absent. When Yama returns from a three days' absence, he finds Naciketas waiting for him, and is panic-stricken with the thought that he has left a guest and a Brahman without entertainment for three days.

[1] cf. Sukhtankar, *The Teachings of the Vedānta according to Rāmānuja*, pp. 11 ff. and Nicol Macnicol, *Indian Theism*, p. 50.
[2] *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, 3. 11. 8. 1–6. Translated by Deussen, *Sechzig Upanisad's des Veda*, p. 262 f.

In the endeavour to atone for his discourtesy, he offers Naciketas three boons, which he may choose at will. Those selected by Naciketas are, first, that his father may be reconciled to him, second, that he may be taught the sacrificial fire which leads to heaven, and third, that he may be taught the secret of immortality. At least, we so interpret the third question in the light of the answer given, although the question itself seems to ask merely whether or not a man lives again after death. This is an inquiry which seems rather inappropriate in the light of the fact that he has just received instruction as to the means for entrance into heaven. Yama grants all three requests, although he consents to the third only after much persuasion, and the remainder of the Upanishad is occupied with a discussion of the means by which man may obtain the blissful knowledge of the Ātman and thus obtain release from the round of transmigration. The story of Naciketas' visit and the three boons fills the first section of the Upanishad. The second section deals with the way of release, while the third gives what appears to be an attempt at a theory of the relation between the Ātman and the world as well as a method for the conduct of meditation. It is not improbable that the original Upanishad closed with the end of this third section, since we have here a formal conclusion.[1] Further reasons for thinking that the later sections of the *Kaṭha* are additions are to be found in the fact that a considerable passage is substantially repeated (3. 10-13 = 6. 7-11), and that the thought of the latter part appears to cover much

[1] So Macdonell, *Sanskrit Literature*, p. 232. It is of interest to note that this conclusion directs that the Upanishad may be recited in a company of Brahmans or at a funeral ceremony. It further promises that such an action will assist in gaining immortality for the reciter. This is in strong contrast with the rule in most of the Upanishads that their contents are to be divulged to none except a son or a specially qualified pupil. The *Kaṭha's* example is in line with the later theistic movements in Hinduism which tended to be more democratic. cf. Nicol Macnicol, *Indian Theism*, p. 101.

the same ground as that traversed before.[1] However that may be, the teachings of the two parts of the work do not very greatly differ.

It is by no means easy to discover the exact position of the Upanishad as to the place or character of the Ātman. It is first introduced as that which is apart from all things, and it is described in the negative fashion which we have found characteristic of the Upanishads of the period.[2] It is then described in what appear to be a series of word-plays based upon the teachings of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*. The word or footprint (*pada*)[3] which leads to Brahma is the sacred word Om. Brahma is declared to be 'that syllable' or 'that imperishable', according to the way we read the ambiguous word, *akshara*.[4] Taking the word in the latter sense, the Upanishad continues to give an exposition of the soul as the true imperishable, in a passage which has become famous in the West through Emerson's paraphrase.[5] This Ātman is then again declared to be smaller than the small and greater than the great in language which suggests that of *Chānd.* 3. 14. 3.

It is fairly clear that thus far we have primarily an attempt to bring together into a single whole elements which we have previously seen separately. Brahma is the syllable Om, the Ātman, the footprint of the universe lying hidden in oneself. But now new features are added. In one's devotional meditation one is to

[1] cf. Deussen, *SUV*. p. 264. [2] *Kaṭha*, 2. 14.

[3] The word, *pada*, has both these meanings, although the latter is the primary one. That this passage is intended to suggest the sense of footprint would seem clear, if it be granted that *Bṛih*. 1. 4. 7, 4. 4. 23 (*padavid*) were familiar to the author. The mystic relations of *akshara* and *pada* are also much emphasized in *Bṛih*. 5. 14.

[4] A similar ambiguous usage of *akshara* is found in *Bṛih*. 3. 8. 8.

[5] *Kaṭha* 2. 19. In Hume's translation the passage runs:

If the slayer think to slay,
If the slain thinks himself slain,
Both these understood not.
This one slays not, nor is slain.

It has been suggested with some plausibility that this verse is an interpolation in the *Kaṭha* from *Bhagavadgītā*, 2. 19.

consider that the Ātman is god (*deva*).[1] This word is used a second time in describing him a few verses further on,[2] and in a third passage he is given characteristics of election and grace which belong much more naturally to a personal god than to the Ātman considered as the subject in experience.[3] In other words, if we may again interpret the course of thought, the author infuses elements from the popular religious piety into the system of meditation which had already grown up with those who, like Yājñavalkya, were endeavouring by means of states of mystic trance to secure a state of consciousness free from diversity. While this was first introduced tentatively, it gradually influenced the theological interpretation of the experience, so that by the time of the *Svetāśvatara* it makes necessary a fairly thorough reconstruction of the Brahma-Ātman theology.

But, to continue with the place of the Ātman in the *Kaṭha*, it is fairly clear that it is something which is in all things, rather than that which is all things. The Ātman is 'set in the heart of a creature here';[4] he is 'bodiless among bodies', the 'all-pervading';[5] 'He is hidden in all things';[6] he is 'the stable among the unstable',[7] 'the constant among the inconstant';[8] he is the inner soul of things, the one controller.[9] But the doctrine of immanence does not have the field entirely to itself. Especially in the second half of the Upanishad, we have stanzas which suggest more clearly the view of the identity of all things with the Ātman, or indeed that of the sole reality of the Ātman. Thus in 4. 3 and following, we have the formula which is repeated as the refrain of the stanzas, 'This, truly, is that'. This suggests the *Chāndogya* formula, 'That thou art,' and was perhaps meant to imitate it,[10] and is used to affirm the identity between

[1] *Kaṭha*, 2. 12.
[2] ibid. 2. 21.
[3] ibid. 2. 20, 23.
[4] ibid. 2. 20.
[5] ibid. 2. 22.
[6] ibid. 3. 12.
[7] ibid. 4. 2.
[8] ibid. 5. 13.
[9] ibid. 5. 12.
[10] So Deussen, *SUV*. p. 265.

various aspects of the world and the Ātman. In the first place, the experiencing Self is so identified; then the cosmogonic figure who is represented as born from austerity, or from the waters; then the two gods, Aditi and Agni, are all declared to be identical with it. Various other identifications follow, but the sense of some of them is by no means clear. In one verse the sole reality of the Ātman is apparently affirmed:

> By the mind is this [realization] to be attained;—
> There is no difference here at all!
> He goes from death to death
> Who seems to see a difference here.[1]

This would seem to make the existence of separate souls, or anything separate from the Ātman, impossible. But an illustration which follows appears to represent rather the *Chāndogya* analogy of the rivers which at one time are separate, but which ultimately lose their individuality in the sea:

> As water rained upon rough ground
> Runs to waste among the hills,
> So he who sees qualities separately
> Runs to waste after them.
>
> As pure water poured forth into pure
> Becomes the very same,
> So becomes the soul, O Gautama,
> Of the seer who has understanding.[2]

Apparently the difficulties which arise from the problem of evil for a theory which identifies all things with the one reality were beginning to be dimly appreciated, since we have in one passage a series of three illustrations which seems to have been intended to meet the dilemma that the One must either not be all or else it must be partly evil. Just as fire assumes the form of whatever it burns, and yet is different from it, or as the air assumes the form of whatever it enters, and yet keeps its own independence:

[1] *Kaṭha*, 2-11. This verse is also to be found among those added Yājñavalkya's teachings in *Bṛih*. 4. 4. 19. [2] ibid. 4. 14, 15.

So the one Inner Soul of all things
Is corresponding in form to every form, and yet is outside.[1]

As the sun, the eye of the whole world,
Is not sullied by the external faults of the eyes,[2]
So the one Inner Soul of all things
Is not sullied by the evil in the world, being external to it.[3]

In other words the Ātman while immanent in all things, is in some degree transcendent, at least to the extent of being free from the imperfections of the world.

While the passages which we have already quoted deal with the relations between the Ātman and the world in a general way, we must now give more particular attention to the difficult passage which forms the third section of this Upanishad, and which is of particular importance, since it eventually provided the basic idea of the evolution of the world from a primary substance for the Sāṅkhya system. In the Upanishad itself, however, we have no reason to suspect dualistic views. The chapter begins with what appears to be a reference to the supreme and the individual soul, each of which is said to be present both in the human heart and in the highest heaven, and which are known as light and shade.[4] After an irrelevant reference to the Naciketas fire, a parable is given of the Ātman as riding in a chariot. The Ātman is the passenger, the body is the chariot, the intellect (*buddhi*) is the driver, the mind (*manas*) the reins, the senses (*indriya*) the horses, the objects of sense the paths over which the horses go. The immediate point of the illustration is a moral one. If the horses are unruly, the passenger will not reach his destination, but will go on to ceaseless transmigration. If, however, they are well controlled,

[1] ibid. 5. 9, 10. Hume's translation. For the figure of fire cf. *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 7, *viśvambhara vā viśvambharakule*. The passage relating to air and its container has a close resemblance to Gauḍapāda's and Śaṅkara's favourite illustration of the space in the jar.
[2] For the translation, see Pelly, *Kaṭha Upanishad*, p. 48 n.
[3] ibid. 5. 11.
[4] 3. 1; cf. 6. 5d.

he will reach his goal and will not be born again. Thus far we have nothing more than a natural illustration worked out in terms of Indian psychology.[1] But immediately following the enforcement of the moral, we have a longer series of terms which appears to take us out of individual psychology into something of more cosmic significance:

> Higher than the senses are the objects of sense.
> Higher than the objects of sense is the mind;
> And higher than the mind is the intellect (*buddhi*).
> Higher than the intellect is the Great Self (*Ātman*).
>
> Higher than the Great is the Unmanifest (*avyakta*).
> Higher than the Unmanifest is the Person.
> Higher than the Person there is nothing at all.
> That is the goal. That is the highest course.[2]

The latter part of this passage most naturally suggests such attempts as those of Yājñavalkya in *Bṛih.* 3.6 or 3.8 to put a number of principles of world explanation in a series in which each term is dependent upon the one following. A closer parallel, in that it involves psychological terms, is that given in *Chānd.* 7, although that series sprawls along in most unphilosophic length. The actual use to which the series is put in the *Kaṭha* is that it prescribes an order of meditation by which one may eventually reach the supreme Self, the thought being that by meditation one may 'suppress' each of the lower members of the series in the one above it, until the highest goal is reached. As to the reasons which led the author to fix upon the precise items which he puts into his list, it is somewhat futile to speculate, particularly as he shows no special consistency in regard to the individual details. Thus when he gives directions in regard to 'suppression' in verse 13, he mentions speech (perhaps as standing for all the senses), mind, the

[1] cf. Plato's *Phaedrus*, pp. 246 ff. The source of the illustration in the *Kaṭha* is probably *Bṛih.* 4. 3. 35.

[2] *Kaṭha*, 3. 10, 11. Hume's translation.

understanding Self (*jñāna Ātman*), the great Self, and finally the tranquil Self (*śānta Ātman*), while in the parallel passage in 6. 6 the order is senses, mind, true being (*sattva*), the great Self, the Unmanifest, the Person. There is sufficient similarity between these lists that we feel sure they are intended to be substantially the same, and yet it is impossible to reconcile details. Much more important is the general idea that meditation, like the entry of the soul into the absolute at death, is a process of 'becoming one'; [1] and as a matter of fact the closest parallel in the older Upanishads to the actual terms of this series is that given in *Chānd.* 6. 8. 6, where it is said that 'when a person here is deceasing, his voice (with which we may include the other senses) goes into his mind; his mind, into his breath (*prāṇa*); his breath, into heat (with which we may include the other elements of the *Chāndogya*, water and heat, and compare with the avyaktam of the *Kaṭha*); the heat, into the highest divinity.' Thus, according as the individual has evolved from the absolute, in the same way it may return to it again at death or in the trance of meditation.[2]

It seems desirable to point out before we leave the *Kaṭha* some aspects of the religious life which accompanied the development in thought with which we have been engaged. One of the consequences of the extreme unknowability of the Ātman was the growth of the belief in the necessity of a teacher or spiritual guide. We are told that the Ātman is unattainable by reasoning, but that he may easily be found if proclaimed by another. Not only is a teacher necessary, but he

[1] *Bṛih.* 4. 4. 2.

[2] The placing of the objects of sense between the senses and the mind in *Kaṭha*, 3. 10 appears unfortunate, and it is to be noticed that the objects of sense are dropped from the lists in 3. 18 and 6. 7. While, as Deussen and Keith point out, the great Self was undoubtedly in the later Upanishads identified with Hiraṇyagarbha, it appears to me most probable that this term as well as the epithet of unborn (*aja*) which is used in the *Śvetāśvatara* owes its origin to the great unborn Self of *Bṛih.* 4. 4. 22.

must be one possessed of the highest powers. Those who are able to give this knowledge are few.[1] The best teacher will be a god, and it is Yama who is the instructor of Naciketas. Thus we have the unknowability of the Ātman made to give sanction to what had already been a custom in connexion with Vedic study; and the relation between student and teacher is given something of the sacredness which it has since had in Indian life.

Another effect of the anti-intellectualism which is caused by despair of knowing the Ātman through processes of reason, is to give more weight to moral factors in the achievement of the aim of immortality. At the beginning of Yama's instruction,[2] he gives a harangue on the distinction between the better and the pleasanter, which reminds one of similar insistence upon the two ways in early Christian literature. It turns out that the distinction is identified with that between knowledge and ignorance, but the better is said to involve the turning aside from the desire for the pleasures of the world and from avarice. Again in 2. 24 it is solemnly affirmed that the Ātman cannot be gained by the one who has not ceased from bad conduct. The tendency of the early Upanishads had been to minimize the moral life, although we need not believe that they actually taught immorality, except in possibly a few exceptional cases. Here we find moral conditions an indispensable requisite for progress in the upward path.

Much less importance is given, however, to what might be called a positive moral life, than to the pursuit of the religious exercises which are now called Yoga. We have already seen in the teaching of Yājñavalkya the importance given to this means of inducing the mystic states where the distinction of subject and object is at last removed from conscious-

[1] *Kāṭha*, 2. 7–9. [2] ibid. 2. 1–6.

ness, and we have had occasion to refer incidentally to the subject already in this chapter. We merely add here that the attention given to this subject in the *Kaṭha* is greatly increased beyond what we find in the earlier Upanishads. Not only are details given of the process by which one must endeavour to reach union with the Absolute, but the joy of the final attainment is dwelt upon:

> The wise who perceive Him as standing in oneself,
> They and no others have eternal peace!
>
> 'This is it'—thus they recognize
> The highest, indescribable happiness.[1]

It doubtless was the experience of the author of the *Kaṭha*, as it has been the experience of mystics elsewhere, that the highest states of feeling do not come and go at one's own bidding. The Yoga meditation sometimes brought the desired joy, and sometimes even though patiently pursued gave no results. Perhaps in this way we may understand the doctrine of election which is first clearly stated in this Upanishad:

> The Soul is not to be obtained by instruction,
> Nor by intellect, nor by much learning.
> He is to be obtained only by the one whom He chooses;
> To such a one that Soul reveals his own person.[2]

Closely connected with this thought is that of grace. It is not quite certain that this Upanishad teaches this doctrine, since the phrase which means 'the grace of the Creator' (*dhātuḥ prasāda*) can by a slight change also be interpreted as 'the tranquillity of the senses' (*dhātu-prasāda*). But whatever may have been the original sense of the passage,[3] it was very early understood in the theistic sense, and forms the oldest text of the famous Vaishṇava doctrine.

[1] ibid. 5.13, 14. Hume's translation. [2] ibid. 2. 23. Hume's translation.
[3] One wonders whether the ambiguity may not even have been intentional on the part of the writer, in the light of *pada* and *akshara* discussed above.

One further hint which is important for later thought is contained in the line:

> 'One who is without the active will (*a-kratu*) beholds Him and becomes freed from sorrow.'[1]

This forms the basis for the doctrine of the *Bhagavadgītā* that actions performed disinterestedly entail no karma.

The *Śvetāśvatara* is important as containing the fullest expression of the theistic point of view to be found in the Upanishads, although the closely related text of the *Bhagavadgītā* has much the same general standpoint. In fact, we are perhaps entitled to claim a certain parallelism of purpose for the *Gītā* and the *Śvetāśvatara*, and to maintain that the former attempted the same task for the Vaishṇavas which the latter did for the worshippers of Rudra.

The *Śvetāśvatara* opens with a long list of principles which had been suggested by others as the supreme principle of the world, all of which the author puts aside in favour of the 'self-power' (*ātmaśakti*) of God, which rules over all the other principles. This is further indicated by the complex riddle of the Brahma-wheel, which reminds one of the similar riddles propounded in the Vedas. After this introduction, the central position of the Upanishad is laid down. In the supreme Brahma there is a triad which in plain terms is composed of God, the individual soul, and the world. God is present in the individual soul, and indeed in all things, and must be abstracted from them through the exercise of meditation. The second section first speaks in praise of the sacrificial ritual, making use of many Vedic quotations. This freedom of quotation is in fact one of the marked features of the Upanishad. The praise of the sacrifice is immediately followed by a detailed exposition of the methods and results of Yoga. The next section

[1] ibid. 2. 20. Hume's translation.

identifies the absolute with Rudra and Purusha. The following chapter returns to the basic thought of the Upanishad, the threefold relation of the absolute, and suggests a theory of the relation of God and the world. This chapter is also noteworthy for its ascription to the supreme being of the epithet Śiva, which in the *Ṛigveda* had been specially characteristic of Rudra. The next section continues with a description of the supreme being and the individual soul, while the last gives a summary of the principal teachings of the whole Upanishad. The *Śvetāśvatara* is conspicuous for the place which it gives to Rudra or Śiva, although the growth of the influence of this god can be seen also in the Brāhmaṇas. Certain passages suggest relationship, although not necessarily close, with Buddhism.[1]

In attempting to explain in greater detail the main doctrines of the *Śvetāśvatara*, we first note that it maintains with a variety of illustration that the Ātman is immanent in the world and in man. It is the self-power of God which is hidden in his own qualities.[2] It lies concealed, as fire lies latent in wood, until brought forth by the fire-drill.[3] It is in all things as oil in sesame seeds, as butter in cream, as water in river-beds.[4] It is the Soul which pervades all things.[5] It is the Person of the measure of a thumb ever seated in the heart of creatures.[6] It is the one controller, the constant among the inconstant, the One among many, as in the *Kaṭha*.[7] Yet, at least in quotations from the Vedas, it is identified with all things, with the Vedic gods, with man, woman and child, with the birds.[8] The highest knowledge still consists, according to one passage at least, in knowing that the Self and the actuator are one.[9]

[1] cf. the *brahma-cakra* of 1. 4 ff. with the *dhamma-cakka* of Buddhism (Keith, *RPV*. p. 550). The first half of 5. 11 and 5. 18d also have parallels in Buddhist phraseology.
[2] *Śvet.* 1. 3. [3] ibid. 1. 13. [4] ibid. 1. 14.
[5] ibid. 1. 16. [6] ibid. 3. 13. [7] ibid. 6. 12–13.
[8] ibid. 4. 2–4; but note the phrase 'Thou dost abide with immanence'.
[9] ibid. 1. 6.

But in the one Brahma there is a triad, the Lord (*īsā*), the soul (*ātman*) and nature (*prakṛiti*). Nature and the soul are associated with each other as the perishable and the imperishable, the unmanifest and the manifest, while the supreme and the individual soul are similarly coupled as the knowing and the unknowing, the omnipotent and the impotent.[1] They are called the two Unborn Ones (*aja*)[2] and this epithet is applied also to the third member of the triad, nature, even though in the next verse primary matter (*pradhāna*) is declared to be perishable in contrast with the soul. The epithet of aja is used in connexion with these entities in a famous verse which appears to be designedly a play on words, and which has the additional difficulty that it has long formed a bone of contention between the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya schools. The word 'aja' means not merely unborn, but also a goat, and hence in the masculine and feminine forms can be translated as he-goat and she-goat. The verse is as follows:

> With the one ajā (unborn female, i.e. prakṛiti, or she-goat) red, white and black,
> Who produces many creatures like herself,
> There lies the one aja (unborn male, he-goat) taking his delight.
> Another aja leaves her who has been enjoyed.[3]

When this verse is taken in connexion with 1. 9 it seems natural to interpret the two he-goats as the supreme and the individual soul, although it is not entirely easy to determine with which each one is to be identified. The two following verses employ a stanza from the *Ṛigveda* to make substantially the same application.[4] Finally, in the summary of the

[1] ibid. 1. 7–9; cf. *Kaṭha*, 3. 1.
[2] Perhaps after *Bṛih.* 4. 4. 22. cf. also *Kaṭha*, 5. 1.
[3] *Śvet.* 4. 5. Hume's translation modified.
[4] According to the Sāṅkhya interpretation, the two he-goats of verse 5 are individual souls, one of whom is still joined with prakṛiti and hence in need of emancipation, while the other emancipated soul has abandoned her. The most natural interpretation of the verse from the point of view of the

that māyā is identical with prakṛiti (nature). This figure seems to have been the most important one in the mind of the writer, since he refers in another place to 'cessation from every illusion' as the final result of meditation upon God.[1]

This was not his only method of representing the relation between God and the world. In 4. 10 he speaks of

> God who covers himself
> Like a spider, with threads
> Produced from Primary Matter, according to his own nature,

using a figure which was also employed by the *Muṇḍaka*.[2] In still another place he appears to recur to the idea of an evolutionary series which we have seen in the *Kaṭha*, although the numbers used in his riddling style admit of no certain interpretation:

> He creates this world. . . .
> Having entered into union with principle (*tattva*) after principle,
> With one, with two, with three, or with eight.[3]

The distinctively religious conceptions of the *Śvetāśvatara* are developed considerably beyond the stage reached in the *Kaṭha*. As already mentioned, the supreme reality is frequently called Rudra and given the epithet of Śiva, but other terms which at least later were given a distinct religious significance in Śaiva sects are freely used. He is god (*deva*), lord (*īś*, *īśā*, *īśāna*, *prabhū*), the great lord (*maheśvara*). Once he is given the epithet which in the Veda is most often assigned to Indra, that of bountiful (*maghavan*). As already noted, the amount of quotation from the

[1] *Śvet.* 1. 10.
[2] *Muṇḍ.* 1. 2. 7.
[3] *Śvet.* 6. 3. The sole principle is interpreted by Hume, in accordance with the Sāṇkhya, as Purusha, the two as the Unmanifest and the Manifest, the three as the three Sāṇkhya guṇas, and the eight as the five cosmic elements together with mind, intellect, and self-consciousness. cf. *Kaṭha*, 3. 10.

other Vedas in this Upanishad is remarkable, at least nineteen stanzas being so quoted, in addition to the verses which are shared with other Upanishads.

The technique of the Yoga shows development over what we found in the *Kaṭha*, although it does not yet go to the extravagant lengths of a later time. The use of the syllable 'Om' is still important. Attention is given to posture, and the control of the breath is an important means for bringing on the mystic state. Certain conditions which suggest abnormal states are described.[1]

The soul is said to be bound by its enjoyment, but to be set free by knowledge.[2] Although knowledge is thus still important, there is some uncertainty as to just what the knowledge is which gives emancipation. According to 1. 6 it is the knowledge that the soul and the Actuator (God) are one. According to 1. 7. 12 it appears that it is the knowledge of the threefold nature of Brahma which is the highest knowledge. In a verse several times repeated,[3] it is simply by knowing God that one is released from all fetters.

The fruits of Yoga are frequently and sometimes brilliantly described. Thus we find in 4. 18:

> When there is no darkness, then there is no day or night,
> Nor being, nor non-being, only the Kindly One (Śiva) alone.[4]

And in 6. 20:

> When men shall roll up space
> As it were a piece of leather,
> Then will there be an end of evil
> Apart from knowing God![5]

As contrasted with the *Kaṭha*, practically no stress is put upon moral conditions of emancipation, nor are moral qualities specially stated to belong to the

[1] ibid. 2. 8–15. [2] ibid. 1. 8. [3] ibid. 2. 15, 4. 16, 5. 13, 6. 13.
[4] ibid. Hume's translation. [5] Hume's translation.

supreme being, although he is in one passage described as 'the bringer of right, the remover of evil'.[1] On the other hand, divine grace is much more definitely stated.[2] The worshipper is bidden to have loving devotion (*bhakti*) toward God.[3] Although little is said about the position of the teacher, yet this is to be very high, since he is to be honoured as highly as God,[4] a doctrine which was taken quite literally in later sects, both Śaiva and Vaishṇava.

In summing up the development of this chapter, we must regard it primarily as indicating the transformation of the popular religion through the influence of the immanentism and pantheism of the *Chāndogya* on the one hand and of the absolutism of Yājñavalkya on the other. There is little reason to believe that they were thought of as distinct tendencies, and the analysis which we have made in the light of the philosophical development that came from them is one which would not have suggested itself to the thinkers of this period themselves. We believe that we can see clear traces of both tendencies, however, and that much of the later development is to be explained through their influence. On the other hand, we do not regard the thought of the theistic Upanishads with Deussen, as a mere degradation from the higher level of the earlier doctrine. The theistic elements in them did not newly spring up in answer to the problems of thought set by the older doctrines. On the contrary it was primarily the survival of the older polytheistic faith, which had been tending on its own lines toward monotheism. The great success of the Upanishad doctrines indicates that they must have appealed to many who were deeply affected by the Vedic religious life. But the old polytheism does not remain in the new situation unchanged. In place of the many gods we have piety concentrated upon the Absolute, which

[1] ibid. 6. 6. [2] ibid. 3. 20, 6. 21. [3] ibid. 6. 23. [4] ibid. 6. 23.

is identified with a single one of the gods of the Vedic pantheon. In the *Śvetāśvatara*, this god is Rudra-Śiva. In the *Kaṭha*, although no distinct sectarian tendency is present, the mention of Vishnu in 3. 9 is perhaps not without significance in view of the literary connexions between this Upanishad and the *Bhagavadgītā*. Worship becomes intenser and more emotional than the Vedic ritual of sacrifice had been, and greater importance is given to the personal search for salvation instead of the group activities of the older religious life. Finally, in the emphasis placed upon the guru or religious teacher, we have the way paved for the divine-human guru of the *Bhagavadgītā*, the doctrine of incarnation in the Vaishṇava religion, and the practical apotheosis of the human teacher in some of the Śaiva sects.[1]

[1] cf. the treatment of Śaṅkara in his legendary lives, and Manikkavasagar's regard for his guru. See Pope, *Tiruvāçagam*, pp. xxi, xliv *et passim*.

CHAPTER VII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MODIFIED NON-DUALISM IN RĀMĀNUJA

As the philosophy of Śaṅkara may be regarded as fundamentally an extension and systematization of the thought implicit in the teachings of Yājñavalkya, so the system of Rāmānuja may be considered as having a similar relation to the theism of the *Śvetāśvatara* Upanishad. From one point of view, the origin of his thought may also be traced to that side of Yājñavalkya's teaching which inclined to an immanent view of Brahma, and which is expressed in the famous passage which declares him to be the inner guide or controller. But the form in which Rāmānuja conceived this immanent relationship is determined by the form which it took in the *Śvetāśvatara* with its division of reality into three parts, the supreme God, the individual soul, and matter. This dependence of Rāmānuja upon the *Śvetāśvatara* Upanishad in particular is evidenced not only by his general use of the concepts whose origin we have traced in our last chapter, but by the special position which he gives to this Upanishad in the quotation of proof texts. Among the texts which he uses for proof of his fundamental position, he gives first place to a group of eighteen texts,[1] of which twelve are from the *Śvetāśvatara*, one from another Upanishad, and five from the *Bhagavadgītā*. Since only the texts from the Upanishads have the full force of śruti, it will be seen that the importance given to the *Śvetāśvatara* is overwhelming. It is true that he later brings in other Upanishad passages, but he

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, pp. 138–40.

interprets them on the principle that 'all schools (of the Upanishads) convey the same doctrine',[1] and hence they merely serve to confirm or amplify the fundamental view which he has laid down on the basis of the *Śvetāśvatara.*

But as in Śaṅkara other influences determined, at least to some extent, the particular emphasis and form which he would give to the old doctrine, so in Rāmānuja we must note the influence which popular religious movements had upon him in making him fix upon the theistic elements in the Upanishads as the fundamental part of their teaching. We have already had occasion to mention the Āḷvārs, whose religious hymns in the Tamil language were the chief popular expression of the Vaishṇava faith in south India in the centuries preceding Rāmānuja. Because of their use of a vernacular language they were an effective means of making the bhakti of their sect a truly popular movement. The influence of the hymns was extended by making their use a regular part of the ordinary temple worship. Not long before the time of Rāmānuja these poems had been collected together by a certain Nāthamuni into the *Nālāyira Prabandham* (*The Book of Four Thousand Hymns*) and the regular study of this collection was part of the curriculum of the school over which Rāmānuja presided at Śrīraṇgam.[2]

Unfortunately, this literature is still untranslated,[3] and as it is written in a style which has now become archaic, it is no longer easily intelligible even to those to whom Tamil is their mother tongue. These hymns have also been somewhat overshadowed by the greater brilliance of the contemporary Tamil poets of the

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 3. 3. 53, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 676; cf. comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 80.
[2] Farquhar, *ORLI.* p. 240 f.
[3] A beginning has now been made in J. S. M. Hooper's *Hymns of the Āḷvārs.*

Śaiva sect. However, some of the Sanskrit compositions of the members of the school at Śrīraṅgam have been edited, and a few verses from the *Stotraratna* (*Gem of Hymns*) by Yāmunācarya, the spiritual grandfather of Rāmānuja, have been translated. Since it seems desirable that something of the piety from which Rāmānuja's theology springs should be appreciated, I add a few of these verses from Barnett's translation:[1]

Oh, fie on me, foul shameless wanton brute
Craving the rank of servantship to Thee,
Which lieth far, O God! beyond the chief
Of saintliest souls, Brahma or Mahadeo![2]

The vessel of a thousand sins, and plunged
Deep in the heart of Life's outrageous sea,
I seek in Thee the refuge of despair;
In mercy only, Hari,[3] make me Thine.

Forlornly stray I through the storm of Life;
Soul-wilderment blots blind the heavens' face,
Griefs manifold pour unassuaging rain—
Turn but Thine eye, Lord Achyuta,[3] on me.

Hear first my prayer—'tis no glozing lie,
But all most holy truth. Shouldst Thou refrain
Thy mercy from me, elsewhere wilt Thou find
No vessel needier of redeeming grace.

But for Thee I am masterless; save me
There's none to earn Thy mercy. Since our fate
Weaveth this bond between us, Master mine,
Oh, guard it well, and cast me not away.

Whoever and whatever be the Self
That weareth quality of this and that
In bodied form of Me, myself to-day
I dedicate before Thy lotus-feet.

Lord Mādhava, whatever Mine may be,
Whatever I, is all and wholly Thine.
What offering can I bring, whose wakened soul
Seeth all Being bond to Thee for aye?

[1] Barnett, *The Heart of India*, pp. 42–3.
[2] i.e. Brahma and Śiva, the other two members of the Hindu trinity, here subordinated to Vishṇu.
[3] Alternative names of Vishṇu or his incarnations.

The poet's exaggerated feeling of sinfulness and his sole dependence upon Vishṇu for help are typical of this Vaishṇava piety as well as of the contemporary movement in Śaivism. But we note also the thought of the relation between God and the world indicated in the concluding stanzas. This had been characteristic of the *Śvetāśvatara* and was to be further developed by Rāmānuja. This thought of the immanence of God in the world, is, however, for this school no bare statement of theory, but a living religious faith. Rāmānuja is the chief theologian of this school of religious experience.

In mentioning the popular religious influence which determined Rāmānuja's thought we should not fail to notice the Purāṇas. In Śaṅkara, the term Smṛiti is confined to the *Vedānta Sūtra* itself, the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems, the *Mahābhārata*, and the laws of Manu. But in Rāmānuja's commentary, perhaps the most conspicuous smṛiti after the *Bhagavadgītā* is the Purāṇic literature. The Purāṇas are of uncertain date although there is reason to believe that some of them contain old material. The one most used by Rāmānuja is the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*. This is theistic in its main point of view, and while it tells the stories of the youth of Kṛishna, it is less highly erotic than the later versions of these tales. It was a very important Scripture in the Vaishṇava sect, and one can see from Rāmānuja's use of it that he regarded its statements as of very considerable importance.

In writing his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*, Rāmānuja differs from Śaṅkara in that he shows his frequent dependence upon previous traditional interpretations. At the very outset he says that what he has in mind is not a new work, but a re-writing of the lengthy commentary of Bodhāyana, which had come down to him through abridgements.[1] He refers in the

[1] Introduction to the comment on the *Vedānta Sūtras*, *SBE*. vol. XVLIII, p. 3.

course of his work to a number of previous expositors of the Sūtras—Taṅka, Dramida, Guhadeva, Kapardin and Bharuci, as well as to Bodhāyana.[1] At least one of these is said to have been referred to by Śaṅkara, and this if true would add to the probability that Rāmānuja was more in accord with the traditional meaning of the Sūtras than was Śaṅkara. As a matter of fact, it would seem possible within the limits of the *Śrībhāshya* itself to distinguish to some extent between Rāmānuja's own thought and the material which he carried on from tradition. As distinguished from Śaṅkara's commentary, where the writer's philosophical views are fairly evenly distributed through the comment on the whole treatise, Rāmānuja's comment on *Sūtras* 1. 1. 1–4 contains a lengthy exposition of his own view and the chief objections to it, which practically makes up a treatise on the Viśishtādvaita in itself,[2] while the comment on individual Sūtras thereafter is ordinarily fairly brief. Further, there seems to be a certain difference in point of view between this introductory statement and the later comment. Thus in the comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 3 the argument from design is adversely criticised,[3] while in the comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 1 it is used very much as by Śaṅkara, although it is given a much less prominent place. It seems not unlikely, then, that much of the commentary does actually represent approximately the same comment as had been handed down by earlier commentators, while the lengthy introduction, as well as the comment on some particular Sūtras, was Rāmānuja's original thought. Of course, the whole was doubtless subjected to his own revision.

[1] Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 668.
[2] It occupies two hundred pages in Thibaut's translation.
[3] In the description of Rāmānuja's system given by the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* it is said that in Rāmānuja's view the argument that 'the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an effect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin'!—Cowell and Gough, *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, p. 85.

Rāmānuja's system, then, may be regarded as a product of the theism of the *Śvetāśvatara* Upanishad, used as a key for the interpreting of the other Upanishads, together with the piety which had been traditionally handed down in Vaishṇava circles. One more element is important for the development of the metaphysical side of Rāmānuja, viz. the presence of the advaita interpretation of the Sūtras. Rāmanuja is aware of the existence of other opponents of his faith, the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, the Sāṅkhya, and all the other heresies which Śaṅkara likewise had been obliged to combat. But one feels that his treatment of them is rather perfunctory, and made necessary by the text which he was interpreting rather than because of the present need. But with the advaita of Śaṅkara it is quite different, and, both in season and out of season, he is unceasing in his attack upon what he evidently felt to be his most deadly enemy. It seems likely that this criticism made necessary the clearer definition of his own position in regard to the relation of God and the world, since we find in him an attempt to solve this problem which goes beyond the position reached by previous theistic thinkers.

We shall perhaps gain our best insight into the spirit of Rāmānuja's system if we begin, as we did in the case of Śaṅkara, with his distinction between knowledge and ignorance (*vidyā* and *avidyā*), since Rāmānuja understands by these terms something radically different from Śaṅkara. The difference in point of view can perhaps best be explained in Rāmānuja's own terms as contained in his refutation of the opinion that the *karma-kāṇḍa* of the Veda is unnecessary to the attainment of release.

'To this argumentation we make the following reply. We admit that release consists only in the cessation of Nescience, and that this cessation results entirely from the knowledge of Brahma. But a distinction has here to be made regarding the nature

of this knowledge which the Vedānta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of putting an end to Nescience. Is it merely the knowledge of the sense of sentences which originates from the sentences? Or is it knowledge in the form of meditation which has the knowledge just referred to as its antecedent? It cannot be knowledge of the former kind; for . . . we do not observe that the cessation of Nescience is effected by such knowledge merely.' The advaitin is then represented as urging that he does not mean mere knowledge of words and sentences, but such knowledge as is capable of dispelling 'the imagination of plurality', and this is regarded as a process similar to that of curing a disease of the eye which makes a person see two moons, even though he knows that there is only one. This reasoning Rāmānuja controverts, and he concludes: 'Hence we conclude that the knowledge which the Vedānta-texts aim at inculcating is a knowledge other than the mere knowledge of the sense of sentences, and [is to be] denoted by *dhyāna*, *upāsana* (both these words mean meditation) and similar terms.'[1]

Vidyā or knowledge, then, is defined in terms of meditation, and this is described as 'steady remembrance, i.e. a continuity of steady remembrance, uninterrupted like the flow of oil'. 'Such remembrance is of the same character as seeing (intuition),' and 'this character of seeing consists in its possessing the character of immediate presentation (*pratyakshatā*).' But, as the text of the *Kaṭha* says,[2] the attainment of true knowledge does not depend upon the initiative of the individual alone. 'Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained; to him the Self reveals its beings.' As Rāmānuja interprets this text, it 'says at first that mere hearing, reflection, and meditation do not suffice to gain the Self, and then [the verse] declares,

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, pp. 11 ff.
[2] 2. 23.

"Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained." Now a "chosen" one means a most beloved person; the relation being that he by whom that Self is held most dear is most dear to the Self. That the Lord himself endeavours that this most beloved person would gain the Self, he himself declares in the following words: "To those who are constantly devoted and worship with love I give that knowledge by which they reach me" (*Bhagavadgītā*, 10. 10) and "To him who has knowledge I am dear above all things, and he is dear to me" (ibid. 7. 17). Hence he who possesses remembrance, marked by the character of immediate presentation (*sākshātkāra*) and which itself is dear above all things, since the object remembered is such; he, we say, is chosen by the highest Self, and by him the highest Self is gained. Steady remembrance of this kind is designated by the word "bhakti" (devotion); for this term has the same meaning as upāsana (meditation).'

Hence, although Rāmānuja keeps the term vidyā or knowledge, the content which he puts into it has very largely the character of a personal relationship. Although he does not fall into the emotional excesses of the bhakti movement, it is clear that the fundamental principle of his system is determined by this religious devotion rather than by mere knowledge.

This state of devotional meditation can be cultivated by certain definite practices and methods. The first of these is the giving of attention to the Vedic injunctions of works and ceremonies, so that Rāmānuja instead of advising the man who is seeking final release to discard them, as Śaṅkara had done, retains them as beneficial aids to the attainment of piety. Beside these, a list of other practices is handed down by the tradition of the Vaishṇava sect. These are abstention (*viveka*), i.e. the keeping of the body pure by taking care to eat only clean food (food which comes from a ritually clean source and which is

untouched by persons of unclean caste); freedom from attachment to desires (*vimoka*), repetition (*abhyāsa*), perhaps, of special passages of Scripture, or the repeated thinking of elevating thoughts; works (*kriyā*), i.e. the Vedic good works of sacrifice, gifts, penance and fasting; the virtues (*kalyāṇāni*), which are understood to be truthfulness, honesty, kindness, liberality, gentleness, absence of covetousness, keeping oneself free from the sin of lowness of spirit or want of cheerfulness (*anavasāda*, cf. the medieval sin of *accidie*); finally, the avoidance of the opposite sin of too great boisterousness or self-satisfaction (*anuddharsha*).[1] Thus the attainment of vidyā is by no means wholly or even largely an intellectual affair. Far more emphasis is put upon moral means and upon elements derived from religious tradition than was the case in Śaṅkara.

On the other hand, avidyā or ignorance has no special metaphysical significance. In special references in the texts of the Upanishads the meaning of avidyā is found to be that which is other than knowledge, namely, sacrificial works.[2] But it may also indicate the non-existence of knowledge, i.e. mere ignorance, or it may be used for that which is contradictory to knowledge, viz. error.[3] In any case it is a mere negative conception which would be impossible if men were not already familiar with knowledge. Even in the case of error, men's judgments are not entirely false. They are to be explained in their own way as a kind of knowledge of the real. If they are inadequate they may be corrected by a further empirical knowledge, without a wholesale turning away from the world of experience to a transcendental realm. While the advaitin maintains that the whole world is illusion on the basis of only a few illustrations, these cases can

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, pp. 17, 18.
[2] ibid. p. 18. [3] ibid. p. 110.

readily be explained as due to disturbances in the apparatus of sense perception. Rāmānuja takes up these illustrations individually, and gives an explanation for each one on the basis of current theories of sense perception,[1] which although they appear to us as crude, are real attempts at scientific understanding. Thus the case of a white shell appearing yellow to a person suffering from jaundice is explained by the theory that in such a person the visual rays which, as in early western theories of vision, proceed from the eye to the object and not *vice versa*, are contaminated by their admixture with minute particles of bile, and thus give the object which they strike a yellow appearance. In the mirage the appearance of water is not wholly an error; for particles of water always exist in connexion with light and earth, and these particles which are ordinarily invisible, are seen under special circumstances. The appearance of the moon as double to a person of defective vision is due to pressure upon the eyeball which causes the visual rays to go forth in a double instead of a single line. There is no need to point out the inadequacies of these explanations from the point of view of modern science. The important point gained by Rāmānuja is that he believes them capable of rational explanation in accordance with fuller knowledge, and does not take them as types for condemning all empirical acquaintance wth the universe.

Rāmānuja himself goes even further in this theory, that all cognition is in some sense true, even though he does not apply it equally throughout his system. At the conclusion of the explanations of cases of erroneous perception which we have summarized above, he goes on to say:

'We have thus proved that all cognition is true.

[1] Similar theories of perception had already been advanced in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school by the commentator, Prabhākara.—Keith, *The Karma-Mīmāṁsā*, p. 19.

The shortcomings of other views as to the nature of cognition have been set forth at length by other philosophers, and we therefore do not enter on that topic. What need is there, in fact, of lengthy proofs? Those who acknowledge the validity of the different means of knowledge, perception, and so on, and—what is vouched for by sacred tradition—the existence of a highest Brahma, free from all shadow of imperfection, of measureless excellence, comprising within itself numberless auspicious qualities, all-knowing, immediately realizing all its purposes—what should they not be able to prove? That holy, highest Brahma—while producing the entire world as an object of fruition for the individual souls, in agreement with their respective good and ill deserts—creates certain things of such a nature as to become common objects of consciousness, either pleasant or unpleasant, to all souls together, while certain other things are created in such a way as to be perceived only by particular persons, and to persist for a limited time only. And it is this distinction—viz. of things that are objects of general consciousness, and of things that are not so—which makes the difference between what is called "things sublating" and "things sublated".—Everything is explained hereby.'[1]

This theory that all knowledge is equally of the real, and that by truth in the ordinary sense is meant merely social reference, is not after all so different from Śaṅkara's doctrine that all knowledge is false knowledge, for both when carried out strictly would tend to remove the significance of empirical error. As a matter of fact, however, Rāmānuja confines his theory to the explanation of errors of sense perception, and when it comes, say, to the question of the truth or falsity of the advaita philosophy, we hear nothing of the possibility that it might be a special

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1.1.1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 124.

revelation 'to be perceived only by particular persons'. The advaita is for Rāmānuja nothing but unqualified error.

The ultimate reality of the world is Brahma, and this reality is defined in accordance with *Sūtra*, 1. 1. 2 as the basis of the origination, subsistence, and re-absorption of the world. Etymologically the word itself is explained as in Śaṅkara as meaning greatness, or power of growth. But the explicit sense which Rāmānuja most frequently assigns to Brahma is that he is the highest person (*purushottama*), who possesses all desirable qualities in their highest degree.

By describing Brahma as a person, Rāmānuja makes explicit a conception of ultimate reality which had been left indefinite in the Upanishads, and which had been practically excluded by Śaṅkara. In the Upanishads it is difficult to say whether the ultimate reality is conceived personally or not. This indecision is probably due to the fact that the nature of personality itself had not yet been clearly thought out so that the term was scarcely recognized as a definite category of thought. Thus, the terms employed for the ultimate reality are sometimes masculine, sometimes neuter. Often the Ātman or Brahma is spoken of as desiring, determining, acting, but it is as frequently mentioned as a substance, an essence, a power. Even in the 'That thou art' of the *Chāndogya*, the thought is rather to interpret Śvetaketu's personality in terms of the subtle essence, than to explain the subtle essence in terms of personality. In Yājñavalkya we have a much more serious grappling with the problem of personality as a category for the explanation of the world, but, as we have seen, the Self emerges from his searching analysis as a thing ultimately unknowable, and the conception becomes strange and remote from any ordinary view of personality. In Śaṅkara, again, there is little place for the personal in the ultimate reality, even though that be said to consist of pure

intelligence.[1] Personal conceptions of God have their place in Śaṅkara's lower Brahma, but they belong to the realm of avidyā and not to true knowledge. In the later Upanishads, the employment of the term Purusha had come back into favour, and the drift was distinctly to personal conceptions, but nowhere in the Upanishads does the personal idea of God become the exclusive one.

In Rāmānuja the thought of personality is much more seriously and thoroughly worked out. By a person he understands one who has the power to realize his wishes and purposes. In this he finds support in the description of the Ātman in *Chānd.* 8.7.1, where along with a number of negative attributes, the Ātman is described also as *satyakāma* and *satyasamkalpa*. These words are capable of various interpretations,[2] but Rāmānuja's understanding of them as meaning one whose desires come true and whose intentions come true is not impossible.[3] Brahma alone possesses unconditioned Selfhood, since he alone has complete power to realize his wishes and intentions. Men possess this power in only a limited degree, and hence are only incompletely personal.

In the absolutism of Yājñavalkya it is considered impossible to assign definite attributes to Brahma, and hence descriptions of him must be in negative terms. Rāmānuja denies that Brahma is unknowable, and insists that he can be known. The negative descriptions which abound in the Upanishads mean merely to deny to Brahma evil attributes, while they assign to him every auspicious quality. Rāmānuja's formal definition

[1] cf. Radhakrishnan's statement: 'It is because Śaṅkara finds the essence of personality in its distinction from other existences that he contends that the Ātman which has no other existences independent of it is not a person.'—*Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 484.

[2] cf. Hume, *Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, p. 268: 'whose desire is the Real, whose conception is the Real.'

[3] See Rāmānuja's comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 2, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 156; ibid. 1. 2. 2, p. 262; ibid. 1. 3. 13, p. 314. See also Sukhtankar, *Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja*, p. 21.

of Brahma at the beginning of his comment then runs as follows: 'The word "Brahman" denotes the highest person, who is essentially free from all imperfections and possesses numberless classes of auspicious qualities of unsurpassable excellence.'[1] This definition is somewhat further amplified in his comment on the definition given by the second Sūtra: 'Brahma is that highest Person who is the ruler of all; whose nature is antagonistic to all evil; whose purposes come true; who possesses infinite auspicious qualities, such as knowledge, blessedness, and so on; who is omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful; from whom the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world proceed.'

Not only does Rāmānuja lay no great weight upon the proofs of the existence of Brahma from other sources than Scripture, but he definitely criticizes them as inconclusive. The argument that all effects require a cause fails to show that they demand any single cause, or such a cause as is revealed to us in Scripture.

'There is no proof to show that the earth, oceans, etc., although things produced, were created at one time by one creator. Nor can it be pleaded in favour of such a conclusion that all these things have one uniform character of being effects, and thus are analogous to one single jar; for we observe that various effects are distinguished by difference of time, of production, and difference of producers. Nor again may you maintain the oneness of the creator on the ground that individual souls are incapable of the creation of this wonderful universe, and that if an additional principle be assumed to account for the world—which manifestly is a product—it would be illegitimate to assume more than one such principle. For we observe that individual beings acquire more

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE*, vol. XLVIII, p. 4.

and more extraordinary powers in consequence of an increase of religious merit; and as we may assume that through an eventual supreme degree of merit they may in the end qualify themselves for producing quite extraordinary effects, we have no right to assume a highest soul of infinite merit, different from all individual souls. Nor also can it be proved that all things are destroyed and produced all at once; for no such thing is observed to take place, while it is, on the other hand, observed that things are produced and destroyed in succession; and if we infer that all things are produced and destroyed because they are effects, there is no reason why this production and destruction should not take place in a way agreeing with ordinary experience.'[1] Rāmānuja does not mean to deny that God is the cause of the world, but only that arguments to prove this are inconclusive apart from Scripture.

God is the Self, or, as we may here translate the word Ātman, the Soul of the world and of all individual souls. These form his body and in this sense the whole world may be said to be Ātman and Ātman alone. But this one reality is not pure unity without difference as with Śaṅkara, but a complex whole inclusive of infinite diversity of parts and relationships. The material world and the world of souls are thus in one sense separated from, and in another sense united with, Brahma. Thus Rāmānuja says in summing up the teachings of the Upanishads according to his opinion: 'Some texts declare a distinction of nature between non-intelligent matter, intelligent beings, and Brahma, in so far as matter is the object of enjoyment, the souls the enjoying subjects, and Brahma the ruling principle.'[2] Other passages

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 3, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 170.

[2] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 108. It is well pointed out by Sukhtankar (*Teachings of Vedāntā according to Rāmānuja*, p. 20. n. 1) that the word *bhoktṛi* (enjoyer) is properly the soul which experiences the result of its former acts, and hence may be more properly translated as 'sufferer' than 'enjoyer'.

emphasize the connexion of these three realities with one another: 'non-intelligent matter and intelligent beings—holding the relative positions of objects of enjoyment and enjoying subjects, and appearing in multifarious forms—other scriptural texts declare to be permanently connected with the highest Person in so far as they constitute his body, and thus are controlled by him; the highest Person thus constituting their Self.'[1]

Brahma exists in two states, the so-called causal state (*karaṇa-avasthā*) and the effected state (*kārya-avasthā*). In common with all other schools of Indian thought, Rāmānuja believed in successive creations and dissolutions of the world.[2] At the beginning of each age Brahma evolves himself into the threefold form which we have discussed. This is his effected state. At the end of the age he retracts into himself the world which he has produced, until it exists only potentially in him. This is the causal state, and from it the next world evolution proceeds. In the causal state, body and souls do exist, although in a subtle (potential) condition, and in this way the Vedāntic doctrine of the identity of cause and effect is maintained.[3] The texts which insist upon the unity of Brahma and the world can thus readily be explained. 'The body of this Brahma is sometimes constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state, when—just owing to that subtle state—they are incapable of being [conceived and] designated as apart from Brahma whose body they form: Brahma is then in his so-called causal condition. At other times the body of Brahma is constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings in their gross, manifest state, owing to which they admit of being thought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms:

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 140.
[2] cf. the similar idea in Stoic philosophy.
[3] *Sūtras*, 2. 1. 15–20.

Brahma then is in its "effected" state. The effect, i.e. the world, is thus seen to be non-different from the cause, i.e. the highest Brahma."[1] This theory, that in the effected state we have merely modifications of the causal substance, which remains identical with its effect, and that we have neither creation of anything new out of nothing nor a merely illusory evolution, is called the *Satkāryavāda* or 'real effect theory', and is based upon the teaching of *Chānd.* 6. 1. 4.[2]

We turn next to a consideration of individual souls and the material world. Individual souls of all degrees of rank and merit exist. 'There are individual souls of numberless kinds—gods, Asuras, Gandharvas, Siddhas, Vidyādharas, Kinnaras, Kimpurushas, Yakshas, Rākshasas, Pisācas,[3] men, beasts, birds, creeping animals, trees, bushes, creepers, grasses and so on distinguished as male, female, or sexless, and having different sources of nourishment and support and different objects of enjoyment."[4] These different kinds of souls are in other passages placed in four main groups—gods, men, animals, and non-moving things, such as plants, and it is said that in themselves apart from the kind of bodies which they occupy, they are not to be distinguished into these classes.[5] Beside these souls which are subject to transmigration, there are also the souls which have achieved liberation, but which do not lose their separated existence. There is also a suggestion in Rāmānuja's comment of a third class of souls called *nitya* (eternal), which have never been subject to transmigration, but which are, however, limited in power in comparison with the

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 15, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 460 f. cf. also comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, pp. 141, 145.

[2] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 15, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 456.

[3] The preceding groups beginning with Asuras are all various ranks of spirits or demons.

[4] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 4, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 106.

[5] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 3. 25, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 328.

supreme Lord. This side of the world of souls is not further developed by Rāmānuja.[1]

In regard to matter, Rāmānuja has comparatively little to say by way of detailed description in his comment on the Sūtras. He defines it as 'a non-intelligent principle, the causal substance of the entire material universe, and constituting the means for the experience of pleasure and pain, and for the final release of all intelligent souls which are connected with it from eternity'.[2]

Both souls and matter are real and not illusory, and in some degree independent, although not completely independent, of Brahma. The problem of the relation between these realities, then, becomes one of the critical questions of Rāmānuja's philosophy. His fundamental answer is that both matter and souls are modes (*prakāra*) of Brahma, by which he means that Brahma is the one fundamental substance of which all individual things, although possessing some degree of substantiality in their own right, are attributes; or, according to another analogy which Rāmānuja thinks of as having the same meaning, souls and matter are the body of Brahma, of which Brahma himself is the soul.

In order to see what this relationship means in Rāmānuja's thought, we will turn for a moment to recall the chief theories which his conception opposes. They are, first, the advaita view which regards Brahma as alone existing, and the apparent world of plurality as fictitious; second, the dualistic (dvaita) view which regards the soul and Brahma as entirely distinct; and, third, the *bhedābheda* view, which, at least in Rāmānuja's

[1] The comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 35. *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 529 is so understood by Rāmānuja's commentators. cf. Sukhtankar, *Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja*, p. 41 and note; and Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 695.

[2] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 4. 10, *SBE*, vol. XLVIII, p. 370. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 696 gives a more detailed account of matter, but he bases his account on other works than the comment on the Sūtras.

opinion, means that Brahma is merely the sum of all existing things, and thus is identical (*abheda*) with them in one sense, while it is different (*bheda*) from them in that they may be thought of apart from it. We shall examine Rāmānuja's criticism of the first view in a separate chapter. The second view, dualism, is found by him to be completely inconsistent with the Vedānta texts; while the third view which identifies Brahma with the mere totality of the world involves its upholder in either the giving up of the supreme goodness of Brahma or else in a hopeless problem of evil. According to Rāmānuja's definition, as we have seen, Brahma is free from all evil qualities and in possession of all auspicious ones, while the individual soul is manifestly affected with evil. To maintain that the two are related in this sense involves, then, from Rāmānuja's point of view, clear contradiction of his fundamental concepts.[1]

Rāmānuja's own view has, however, considerable similarity with the bhedābheda view, and in his comment on *Sūtra*, 2. 3. 42 he definitely says that the soul is a part of Brahma.[2] But this must be so understood as not to involve the attribution of any evil to Brahma; and this problem forces Rāmānuja to a more subtle point of view. Two kinds of texts, he says,[3] may be found in the Upanishads: those which express the difference between the world and Brahma, and those which maintain their identity. Both views represent a side of the truth. They are different because the soul 'is created by Brahma, is ruled by it, constitutes its body, is subordinate to it, abides in it, is preserved by it, is absorbed by it, stands to it in the

[1] Some account of the bhedābheda school from its own early sources may be found in the notice of the commentator, Bhāskara, in Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II. p. 670. He lived about A.D. 900

For Rāmānuja's position see comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, pp. 134–5.

[2] *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 580.

[3] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 3. 42, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 359.

relation of a meditating devotee, and through its grace attains the different ends of man, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and final release'.[1] In other words, the facts of religious experience as current in Rāmānuja's circle demanded a conception of the supreme reality such that its separateness from the worshipper would be in some sense real, not as a matter of customary knowledge only, but from the point of view of metaphysical truth. On the other hand, Rāmānuja feels that the relation of identity must also be maintained. How this may be and yet not conflict with the separateness we shall learn from another quotation:

'Those who take their stand on the doctrine, proclaimed by all the Upanishads, that the entire world forms the body of Brahma, may accept in their fullness all the texts teaching the identity of the world with Brahma. For as genus and quality, so substances (*dravya*) also may occupy the position of determining attributes (*viśeshaṇa*), in so far as they constitute the body of something else.'[2] This may be illustrated in an imperfect way by the relation between a staff (*daṇḍa*) or ear-rings (*kuṇḍala*) and the person who carries the staff (*daṇḍin*) or wears the ear-rings (*kuṇḍalin*). Although the staff or the ear-rings are substances in themselves, yet they also serve as determining attributes to the person who possesses them. But this analogy is only an imperfect one. The staff and the ear-rings are not dependent for their existence upon their owner, since they remain in existence even after his death, while the existence of individual souls and the world is dependent upon that of Brahma. In this respect the analogy of body and soul is better, since the body cannot exist without the soul. While it is true that in the terms of *Sūtra* 2. 3. 42 the individual soul is a part of Brahma, it is not a part in the sense of being a 'piece' (*khaṇḍa*), cut out, as it were, from

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 3. 42, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 561.
[2] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, pp. 135 ff.

Brahma, nor is it a part of him in the sense in which an extended body would have parts. For in this sense Brahma is without parts.[1] Rather the relationship is to be understood 'as in the case of light', as the Sūtra says: 'The individual soul is a part of the highest Self; as the light issuing from a luminous thing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body; or as the generic characteristics of a cow or a horse, and the white or black colour of things so coloured, are attributes, and hence parts of the things in which these attributes inhere; or as the body is a part of an embodied thing. For by a part we understand that which constitutes one "place" (*deśa*, also = portion) of some thing, and hence a distinguishing attribute (*viśeshaṇa*) is a part of the thing distinguished by that attribute. Hence those analyzing a thing of that kind discriminate between the distinguishing element or part of it, and the distinguished element or part. Now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, yet we observe them to differ in essential character. Hence there is no contradiction between the individual and the highest Self—the former of which is a viśeshaṇa of the latter—standing to each other in the relation of part and whole, and their being at the same time of essentially different nature.'[2] Thus Rāmānuja makes provision, at least to his own satisfaction, for the reconciliation of the two views of identity and diversity between Brahma and the individual soul. Brahma is not merely the sum of the souls and the world. Nor is the identity between himself and the soul to be construed in such a way as to make impossible the presence of qualities in the individual which would be opposite to the qualities of Brahma. There must be room for an

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 3. 42, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 560.
[2] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 3. 45, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 563.

infinitely perfect Brahma, and at the same time for a finite and imperfect world.

We have seen in the quotation just given that Rāmānuja regards the relation of substance and attribute as equivalent to that between soul and body. Just what he means by the latter relationship will be clearer from the careful definition which he gives of the body. After having considered a number of other conceptions of it, he says: 'Any substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the body of that soul. . . . In this sense, then, all sentient and non-sentient beings together constitute the body of the supreme Person, for they are completely controlled and supported by him for his own ends, and are absolutely subordinate to him.'[1] The relation of body and soul is further expounded in another passage:[2] 'The relation of bodies to the Self is strictly analogous to that of class characteristics and qualities to the substances in which they inhere; for it is the Self only which is their substrate and their final cause, and they are modes of the Self. That the Self only is their substrate, appears from the fact that when the Self separates itself from the body, the latter perishes; that the Self alone is their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to the end that the fruits of the actions of the Self may be enjoyed; and that they are modes of the Self, appears from the fact that they are mere attributes of the Self manifesting itself as god, man, or the like.'

In discussing the relation of Brahma to the material world, two alternatives are dismissed as unsatisfactory. The first makes the material world merely Brahma in another form, as a snake and its coils are the same reality, but in the one case the reality is thought of as a whole, in the other as con-

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 9, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 424.
[2] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 137.

sisting of parts. This alternative is rejected for the same reason as the similar theory of the relation of Brahma and souls, viz. that it gives no adequate solution of the problem of evil. The second alternative is that Brahma may be the generic quality, and the material world the concrete exemplification of it, as light is the generic quality which is exemplified in luminous bodies, or as 'horseness' (*aśvatva*) inheres in individual horses. But this is contrary to all Scriptural authority, since Scripture always contemplates Brahma as a concrete entity. There remains the alternative that the material world also, like individual souls, is a mode or attribute of Brahma. For in this way alone can Brahma be kept free from the evil of the world.

While both individual souls and matter form the body of Brahma, they do not do so in precisely the same way, since the souls are immediately dependent upon him, while at least a part of the material world is dependent directly upon individual souls. But in another sense, matter is even more closely dependent than souls, since souls do have a certain freedom, while matter, which is unconscious, has no power of its own. Every change which takes place in the material world, therefore, takes place due to the controlling influence of Brahma.[1]

Although the world is thus the body of Brahma in the sense of being controlled by him, there is another sense in which Brahma is said to have a form of his own, quite free from the imperfections of the world. Thus in the comment on *Sūtra*, 1. 1. 21 we have this thought expressed, and linked up with the Vaishṇava doctrine of incarnation: 'The highest Brahma, whose nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil and essentially composed of infinite knowledge and bliss—whereby it differs from all other souls—possesses

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 4, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 489. cf. also comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 3, ibid. p. 486 f.

an infinite number of qualities of unimaginable excellence, and, analogously, a divine form suitable to its nature and intentions, i.e. adorned with infinite, supremely excellent and wonderful qualities—splendour, beauty, fragrance, tenderness, loveliness, youthfulness, and so on. And in order to gratify his devotees he individualizes that form so as to render it suitable to their apprehension—he who is a boundless ocean as it were of compassion, kindness and lordly power, whom no shadow of evil may touch—he who is the highest Self, the highest Brahma, the supreme soul, Nārāyaṇa!"[1]

While Brahma is embodied, this does not mean that he is in any way subject to evil, even though this is the result of embodiment in the case of individual souls. Thus in the comment on *Sūtra* 1. 2. 8 the objection is raised that if Brahma is said to be embodied, it follows that he is subject to pleasure and pain, since this springs from connexion with bodies. To this Rāmānuja replies: 'What is the cause of experiences, pleasurable or painful, is not the mere dwelling within a body, but rather the subjection to the influence of good and evil deeds; and such subjection is impossible in the case of the highest Self to which all evil is foreign.'[2] Brahma does not act as an individual soul acts. For the latter acquires karma through its action, while Brahma acts in sport, and hence his actions have no effect upon him. His activity is directed to the creation, sustentation, and dissolution of the world, which, although it forms his body, is yet causally connected with him. The process by which he creates the world is known as modification or *pariṇāma*. This is described in the comment on *Sūtra* 1. 4. 27:

'The modification taught in our system is not such as to introduce imperfections into the highest Brahma,

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 21, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 240.
[2] Commenf on *V.S.* 1. 1. 21, *SBE*, vol. XLVIII, p. 265.

on the contrary it confers on it limitless glory. For our teaching as to Brahma's modification is as follows: Brahma—essentially antagonistic to all evil, of uniform goodness, differing in nature from all beings other than itself, all-knowing, endowed with the power of immediately realizing all its purposes, in eternal possession of all its wishes, supremely blessed—has for its body the entire universe, with all its sentient and non-sentient beings—the universe being for it a plaything as it were—and constitutes the Self of the universe. Now when this world which forms Brahma's body has been gradually reabsorbed into its immediate cause, so that in the end there remains only the highly subtle elementary matter which Scripture calls darkness; and when this so-called darkness itself by assuming a form so extremely subtle that it hardly deserves to be called something separate from Brahma, of which it constitutes the body, has become one with Brahma; then Brahma invested with this ultra-subtle body forms the resolve: "May I again possess a world-body constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings, distinguished by names and forms, just as in the previous aeon," and modifies (*pariṇāmayati*) itself by gradually evolving the world-body in the inverse order in which reabsorption had taken place.'[1]

We do not propose to enter into the tedious details of world creation, or into the psychology of souls, nor into the process of transmigration and release. In much of this Rāmānuja merely reproduces the teaching of the Upanishads, although in some matters he is influenced in his interpretation by the Sāṅkhya system. In one important matter in connexion with release he differs from Śaṅkara. For Śaṅkara, emancipation consists merely in true knowledge of the soul's identity with Ātman, so that on the attainment

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 4. 27, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 405.

of this knowledge, all sense of individuality ceases. This is not Rāmānuja's belief. For him the soul continues to exist as a separate entity after its liberation. It is now free from the hampering conditions which result from its connexion with matter, the result of karma. To maintain that with release the sense of the 'I' is lost, Rāmānuja thinks, is equivalent to annihilation. 'To maintain that the consciousness of the "I" does not persist in the state of final release is again altogether inappropriate. It in fact amounts to the doctrine—only expressed in somewhat different words—that final release is the annihilation of the Self.' What persons wish who seek release is release from the hampering conditions of earthly life. If, on the other hand, one were to realize that the effect of seeking release would be the loss of personal existence, 'he surely would turn away as soon as somebody began to tell him about "release". And the result of this would be that, in the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole scriptural teaching as to final release would lose its authoritative character. Nor must you maintain against this that even in the state of release there persists pure consciousness; for this by no means improves your case. No sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the idea that after he himself has perished there will remain some entity termed "pure light"!'[1]

Release does not mean the identification of the soul with Brahma, but rather a loving communion with him. This relationship, and the subordinate place of knowledge in release are illustrated by the following parable: 'Take the case of a young prince, who, intent on some boyish play, leaves his father's palace, and losing his way does not return. The king thinks his son is lost; the boy himself is received by some good Brāhman who brings him up and teaches

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, pp. 69–70.

him without knowing who the boy's father is. When the boy has reached his sixteenth year and is accomplished in every way, some fully trustworthy person tells him, " Your father is the ruler of all these lands, famous for the possession of all noble qualities, wisdom, generosity, kindness, courage, valour, and so on, and he stays in his capital, longing to see you, his lost child". Hearing that his father is alive and a man so high and noble, the boy's heart is filled with supreme joy; and the king also, understanding that his son is alive, in good health, handsome and well instructed, considers himself to have attained all a man can wish for. He then takes steps to recover his son, and finally the two are reunited."[1]

The same thought of heaven as an eternal state of communion is expressed in Rāmānuja's comment on the final Sūtra: 'As, moreover, the released soul has freed himself from the bondage of karma, has its powers of knowledge fully developed, and has all its being in the supremely blissful intuition of the highest Brahma, it evidently cannot desire anything else nor enter on any other form of activity, and the idea of returning into the Saṁsāra therefore is entirely excluded. Nor need we fear that the Supreme Lord when once having taken to himself the Devotee whom he greatly loves will turn him back into Saṁsāra. For he himself has said, " To the wise man I am very dear, and dear he is to me ".'[2]

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 4, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 199. Similar stories of a lost son are to be found in Indian literature in the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*. chap. iv (*SBE.* vol. XXI, pp. 99–106); and in the work of Surēśvara, a pupil of Śaṅkara: see Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 596 n. The idea that release is a process by which a lost man finds his way home is found already in *Chānd.* 6. 14.

[2] Comment on *V.S.* 4. 4. 22, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 771. The final quotation is from *Bhagavadgītā*, 7. 17.

CHAPTER VIII

ORIGINS OF THE SĀṄKHYA PHILOSOPHY IN THE UPANISHADS

In the systems which we have thus far studied, reality is conceived as fundamentally one, whether that unity is thought of as existing without internal differences, as with Śaṅkara, or as including in itself an infinite diversity, as with Rāmānuja. The Sāṅkhya system, into the investigation of which we now enter, maintains on the other hand, that reality includes existences of at least two distinct kinds, namely, matter or prakṛiti, and an indefinite number of souls or purushas, and that the knowledge which is necessary for release consists precisely in the absolute distinction of these two kinds of reality.

In tracing in the Upanishads the origins of this system, which is the chief metaphysical rival of the Vedānta in Indian philosophy, we find that our problem is radically different from that which we have met hitherto. We were able to point to passages or to entire sections in the Upanishads where the views of absolutism or theism were clearly taught, so that the claim of the later systems to found their teachings upon the Upanishads was entirely justified so far as these particular passages were concerned, false as may have been the further generalization that these represented the universal teachings of these documents. On the other hand, we are unable to point to any passage in the Upanishads, which can be definitely used as a basis of the Sāṅkhya philosophy as a whole. Occasional passages may indeed be found, as we shall later point out, which are dualistic in their tone, and particular details of the Sāṅkhya system are definitely

taught in the Upanishads. But the particular combination of ideas which forms the classical Sāṅkhya system is distinctly not to be found in the Upanishads. Not only is it not taught there, but there seems to be no very good reason for believing that the system as such was even known to any of the Upanishads with the exception of the *Maitri*.[1] The word, Sāṅkhya, is indeed to be found in the *Śvetāśvatara*[2] but there is reason to think that the word does not in that passage refer to the system.[3]

While it cannot be said that any Upanishad teaches the Sāṅkhya system, we still find in the Upanishads a great part of the materials from which the Sāṅkhya system was constructed. As Keith puts it: 'There is, in detail, in the Sāṅkhya little that cannot be found in the Upanishads in some place or other.'[4] Arguments have been adduced to show that

[1] For a fuller consideration of this question, see p. 237, and compare Keith, *Sāṁkhya System*, p. 14: 'The view that the *Śvetāśvatara* does not contain any reference to an atheistic Sāṅkhya but merely unites ideas which afterwards are developed in that system, is confirmed by the very different appearance of things in the *Maitrāyaṇi Upanishad*, which does contain very clear evidence of a developed Sāṅkhya belief.'

[2] *Śvet*. 6. 13. For a discussion of the meaning of the word there see p. 231.

[3] On the relation of the Sāṅkhya System to the Upanishads in general, see Keith, *Sāṁkhya System*, p. 7: 'It is impossible to find in the Upanishads any real basis for the Sāṅkhya system. The Upanishads are essentially devoted to the discovery of an absolute, and, diverse as are the forms which the absolute may take, they do not abandon the search, nor do they allow that no such absolute exists. There are, however, elements here and there which mark the growth of ideas which later were thrown into systematic form in the Sāṅkhya, but it is impossible to see in these fragmentary hints any indication that the Sāṅkhya philosophy was then in process of formation. It is, of course, possible, as a matter of abstract argument, to insist that elements in the Upanishads which suggest the later Sāṅkhya views are really borrowings by the Upanishads of doctrines already extant in a Sāṅkhya system, but, in the absence of the slightest evidence for the existence of such a system in the Vedic literature, it is methodologically unsound to take this hypothesis as possessing any value, in face of the natural conclusion that we have in the Upanishads scattered hints which were later amalgamated into one system. Just like the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, or the Vedānta of Bādarāyaṇa, the Sāṅkhya is a system built on the Upanishads; from both of these it differs in that it goes radically and essentially beyond the teaching of the Upanishads.'

[4] Keith, *Sāṁkhya System*, p. 51. cf. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 250: 'When we pass to the Upanishads, we find in their varied

the Sāṅkhya is derived from other than Brahmanic or Upanishadic sources, and to these we shall give further attention in our next chapter. Here after one or two necessary preliminary matters have been dealt with, we shall confine ourselves to inquiring into those elements of the Sāṅkhya system which can be found in the Upanishads.

The exact force of the word, sāṅkhya, as applied to the system is somewhat uncertain. The term is derived from *saṅkhyā*, which means either number, or summing up, enumeration. The word, sāṅkhya, is then most naturally explained as a system which is concerned with number or enumeration. But the word is sometimes used in the sense of reasoning, and some of the earlier accounts of the Sāṅkhya system take this as its primary force, interpreting the Sāṅkhya as first of all a 'rationalistic' system, as contrasted with the authoritarian Vedānta.[1] While this receives a certain support from the lower value which the *Kārikā* gives to Scriptural authority as compared with perception and inference,[2] it is scarcely borne out by the predominant usage of the word. An examination of the system makes it clear in what sense the Sāṅkhya may be considered a system of enumeration, for one of its most characteristic features is the frequency with which lists are given, which are indicated by certain numbers. In calling the system the Sāṅkhya, then, we may understand that this enu-

teachings, the leading conceptions of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. The authors of the Upanishads did not all think alike. Some of them threw out suggestions capable of being worked into the Sāṅkhya system, though they did not themselves reach it. When the Sāṅkhya claims to be a system based on the Upanishads, there is some justification for it, though the main tendency of the Upanishads is radically opposed to its dualism. The realistic tendencies of the Upanishads receive emphasis in the Sāṅkhya conception of the universe.'

[1] So Davies, *Hindu Philosophy*, pp. v, 9. Note the title of Garbe's book, *Die Samkhya-philosophie, eine Darstellung des Indischen Rationalismus.*

[2] cf. chap. iii, pp. 67–71.

merative character of the system was meant to be emphasized.[1]

We may gain some light for the understanding of the term from what is probably the oldest occurrence of the word in Sanskrit literature, viz. in *Śvetāśvatara* 6. 13. The verse runs:

> Him who is the constant among the inconstant, the intelligent among intelligences,
> The One among many, who grants desires,
> That Cause, attainable by *sāṅkhya-yoga*—
> By knowing God, one is released from all fetters.[2]

In later times, the word *sāṅkhya-yoga* was understood as a copulative compound, and in the *Bhagavad-gītā*[3] as well as elsewhere in the *Mahābhārata* the

[1] This is the view of Oldenberg, *Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge der Buddhismus*, p. 298: 'Sāṅkhya bedeutet das von der Zahl Beherrschte, nach der Zahl Bestimmte. . . . Man tragt Sorge, die Kategorien mit denen man arbeiten, in festen Reihen aufzuzählen, bestimmt zu wissen, aus wie vielen Gliedern, nicht mehr und nicht weniger, jede Reihe besteht.'

Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, s.v. Sāṅkhya, defines it as the 'name of one of the three great divisions of Hindu philosophy, so called either from "discriminating" in general, or, more probably, from "reckoning up" or "enumerating" twenty-five Tattvas or true entities.'

Winternitz, vol. III, p. 448, n. 2 defines it in the same sense: 'Sāṅkhya (von *Sāṃkhyā*, "Zahl") bedeutet "Aufzählungsphilosophie" weil Aufzählungen (Einteilungen, Klassifikationen, wie die 3 Guṇas, die 25 Prinzipien, usw.) für dieses System besonders charakteristisch sind' and quotes Garbe as supporting this opinion. He also adds that Jacobi who previously held that it meant merely reflection or deliberation now holds that it means 'Aufzählungsphilosophie' in dem Sinne der 'Bestimmung des Begriffsumfanges durch Aufzählung des in ihm Enthaltenen'.

Keith also appears to have modified his position somewhat. In his *Sāṅkhya System* (1918) p. 33, in referring to a passage from the *Mahābhārata* (12. 300) he said: 'This passage is of importance also in showing the original force of the terms Sāṅkhya and Yoga: the first must refer not merely to the enumeration of principles but to reflective reasoning.' But in his *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and the Upanishads* (1925) he agrees with Oldenberg to whom he refers in holding that the name, Sāṅkhya, means 'examination,' 'calculation,' or 'description by enumeration of constituents,' but adds that by this is not meant a mere counting, but rather a careful examination of the elements of the process of development from the absolute.

Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 249, retains the older view that the system was so named from the fact that it arrives at its conclusions by means of theoretical investigation and rejects the derivation of the term from saṅkhyā meaning 'number'. At the same time he adds references to the *Mahābhārata* (12. 11393, 11409, 11410) where Sāṅkhya is associated with *parisaṅkhyāna* or exhaustive enumeration.

[2] Hume's translation modified. [3] *Gītā*, 2. 39, 3. 8, 5. 4, 5, etc.

Sāṅkhya and the Yoga are spoken of as two ways of gaining release, although it is emphasized that there is no essential contradiction between them. That by the *sāṅkhya* no definite system is meant in the *Śvetāśvatara* is clear from the parallel in 1. 3 where instead of *sāṅkhya-yoga* we have *dhyāna-yoga*, and certainly the *Śvetāśvatara's* theology is not such as to lend countenance to an atheistic system, such as we find the classical Sāṅkhya to be. But in interpreting the word *sāṅkhya-yoga* it would seem not impossible that we have originally not a copulative but a descriptive compound, and that we should translate not 'discrimination and abstraction', but 'enumerative yoga', i.e. a system of meditation in which successive ideas are meditated upon. Such a view is favoured not only by the fact that *sāṅkhya* is an adjectival form, but by the close connexion of the *Śvetāśvatara* with the *Kaṭha*, where, in 3. 10–13, precisely such a kind of Yoga is recommended. This connexion with the *Kaṭha* holds true not merely in general for the whole Upanishad, but specially for this particular verse, since the first two lines are quoted from *Kaṭha*, 5. 13, while the expression *sāṅkhya-yoga-adhigamya* bears a striking relation to *adhyātma-yoga-adhigama* of *Kaṭha*, 2. 12. The latter is certainly a descriptive compound.[1] It is also most probable that the evolutionary series found in *Kaṭha*, 3. 10. 11 and 6. 7–8 forms the historical starting point of the principles of the Sāṅkhya.[2] It would seem, then, by no means improbable that in its original sense the Sāṅkhya was a method of meditation in which increasing degrees of abstraction were gained by reflecting successively upon a series of steps leading up to a supreme first principle, and that as an aid to this a definite number

[1] cf. also the similarly formed expressions, *karma-yoga* and *bhakti-yoga*. Karma-yoga is the yoga which consists in works, not works and yoga. Similarly, *bhakti-yoga* is the yoga which consists in bhakti.

[2] cf. Keith, *RPV.* p. 535.

of steps was fixed upon, so that the person practising meditation might not lose account of any of the stages through which he should pass. With this enumerative conception of meditation agrees the emphasis put in the *Śvetāśvatara* upon enumerations, as in 1. 4, 5 and in 6. 3.

Whether we are justified in considering the *Sāṅkhya-yoga* of the *Śvetāśvatara* as merely a special kind of yoga, or whether we must think of Sāṅkhya and Yoga as two processes which together lead to the goal, the connexion between the two systems remained very close both in the epic philosophy and in later history. They did however, become in some degree separate systems, and we are here concerned only to trace the origins of the former. As we have said, we do not find that the Upanishads at any point definitely teach the Sāṅkhya system. But in a considerable number of cases we do find doctrines taught which were later taken up and included in the Sāṅkhya. We shall consider these premonitions of the developed philosophy under the following heads: (*a*) its dualism; (*b*) its doctrine of evolution; (*c*) its doctrine of the guṇas; and (*d*) its psychological and physical ideas.

As we have previously noticed, the main doctrine of the Upanishads is monistic and not dualistic. Yet occasionally we come upon the presence of ideas or expressions which are capable of interpretation in a dualistic sense. In fact, it is possible to trace the origins of such ideas even further back in Vedic antiquity. Purusha, as we have seen, was known to the *Ṛigveda*, and the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* gives us a hint of prakṛiti.[1] Macdonell finds in the Creation Hymn of the *Ṛigveda*[2] 'the starting point of the natural philosophy which developed into the Sāṅkhya system',[3] and while this view of the hymn is denied by

[1] cf. Keith, *RPV*. p. 483. [2] 10. 129. [3] *Vedic Reader*, p. 207.

Radhakrishnan,[1] the latter finds the equivalents of the Sāṅkhya purusha and prakṛiti in other Vedic hymns, notably in 10. 82. 5–6. Without delaying over the rather uncertain suggestions which these references afford, we turn to the passages in the Upanishads which contemplate dualism as furnishing at least a partial account of the world. Perhaps the oldest of these is contained in *Bṛih.* 1. 4. 6, where the creation of the gods, Agni (identical with fire) and Soma (here identified with seed), is discussed. Soma is further identified with food, and Agni with the eater of food.[2] The declaration is then made: 'Truly, this universe is the same as food and the eater of food.' It is certain that no great stress can be put upon this passage in its original context as teaching a dualistic view, since it is intended to represent only a certain stage of creation, and the one being, whether Ātman or Brahma, is clearly put at the beginning of the process. But the passage appears to have had its influence in later texts, and we seem to have an echo of it in the grotesque statement of the seer of the *Taittirīya*,[3] that man is both food and the eater of food. Perhaps further influence is to be seen in the statement of the *Kaṭha*[4] where the soul is called the 'eater' or 'enjoyer' (*bhoktṛi*),[5] and in the *Śvetāśvatara* where the individual soul and matter are repeatedly contrasted as the 'enjoyer' and the 'enjoyed' (*bhoktṛi* and *bhogya* or *bhogārtha*).[6] In all these passages the monistic trend of thought is clear, and the dualism is suggested only to be set aside. But by the time of the *Maitri* it is evident that the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* text had been given a distinctly

[1] *Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 102. One might also object that to call the Sāṅkhya system a system of 'natural philosophy' is liable to give a somewhat misleading impression. The Sāṅkhya's 'nature' is very different from that known to modern science.

[2] cf. the idea of the gastric fire, Agni Vaiśvānara, in *Bṛih.* 5. 9. 1.

[3] See p. 113 and *Tait.* 3. 10 (6). [4] *Kaṭha*, 3. 4.

[5] This term for the individual soul became standard in later Vedāntic usage. [6] *Śvet.* 1. 9. 12.

Sāṅkhyan interpretation ; and this Upanishad at 6. 10 gives a lengthy explanation of it in Sāṅkhyan terms, identifying food with prakṛiti, and the eater of food with purusha, while at the same time in the succeeding sections he maintains that food is but a form of Brahma.[1]

Whether we are to trace the fact to this same early passage or not, one of the striking features of Yājñavalkya's thought is his drastic sundering of subject and object in consciousness. It is true that in a higher state of consciousness, Yājñavalkya believes this duality to be overcome, but he thinks it is fundamental to our ordinary conscious life. 'For where there is, as it were, duality, there one sees the other; there one smells the other; there one hears the other; there one speaks to the other ; there one thinks of the other; there one understands the other.'[2] This duality of subject and object remains the fundamental feature of the Sāṅkhya system, with this modification, that while in Yājñavalkya the knowing subject is but one, and alone has complete reality, the Sāṅkhya contemplates an indefinite number of knowing subjects, and regards the object as having equal reality with the subject. The purusha, however, keeps the same attribute of being a mere inactive spectator, which the Ātman has in Yājñavalkya, and every active part of the empirical person is considered to be a development of prakṛiti. In the same manner, both are incapable of any positive description.[3]

We must regard this similarity between the view of Yājñavalkya and the Sāṅkhya as of primary importance for the understanding of the Sāṅkhya system, since the early date of the Yājñavalkya passages as compared with any trace in the Upanishads

[1] cf. Keith, *Sāṁkhya System*, p. 8. [2] *Bṛih.* 4. 5. 15.

[3] For Yājñavalkya's doctrine of the unknowability of the Ātman, see chapter iv. For the Sāṅkhya doctrine see especially *Kārikā* 19. The similarity of view between Yājñavalkya and the Sāṅkhya is well brought out by Keith, *RPV*. p. 536 and *Sāṁkhya System*, pp. 76 ff.

of definite Sāṅkhya doctrines makes it extremely improbable that we have here any adjustment of monism to dualistic views brought in from without. In the later Upanishads it is possible to argue that Sāṅkhya doctrines were already current and that the Upanishads in their use of terms and ideas, which were at least later characteristic of the Sāṅkhya, were merely taking them over from a system already existing, and altering them to suit their own purposes. In our own opinion this argument can be successfully maintained only in the case of the *Maitri* since the passages which show similarity to Sāṅkhya views in the *Kaṭha*, *Śvetāśvatara*, *Muṇḍaka*, and *Praśna*, while they of course admit of explanation on the hypothesis that they are adaptations from a previously existing Sāṅkhya, can also be explained on the supposition that they form a natural development of Upanishadic views, and were later made use of by the Sāṅkhya.[1] Inasmuch as we have no definite proof of the existence of a Sāṅkhya system which denied the absolute until a period certainly later than these Upanishads, it appears that the hypothesis making fewest assumptions will be that which considers that the later Sāṅkhya

[1] It is maintained by Hume, *Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, pp. 8, 9, that the later Upanishads must have known the Sāṅkhya system, and that the *Śvetāśvatara* represents a definite attempt to harmonize Vedānta and Sāṅkhya views. But it cannot be said that a proof is fully made out from the evidence which he brings forward. In his quotations from the *Chāndogya*, *Kaṭha*, *Muṇḍaka*, and *Praśna*, he merely shows the similarity between these passages and the Sāṅkhya, without trying to show the latter's priority. There is most evidence in the case of the *Śvetāśvatara*, and if *svabhāva* at 6. 1 were really a Sāṅkhyan term, or demonstrably equivalent with prakṛiti, we would have good reason for believing that the system was here being opposed. But the doctrine which is combated appears rather to be Buddhist. cf. Keith, *RPV*. pp. 550, 551, Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 511. We have already seen other indications that the Upanishad is not remote from Buddhist tendencies (p. 195). The verse at *Śvet*. 4. 5 does have a very Sāṅkhyan appearance, but even if the two he-goats are interpreted as individual souls, this is not necessarily irreconcilable with the Vedāntic position. See Keith, *Sāṁkhya System*, p. 11; *RPV*. p. 540. In the latter place Keith gives his judgment that 'the view that the *Śvetāśvatara* Upanishad post-dates the Sāṅkhya system cannot be supported on any cogent ground'.

was influenced by these passages of the Upanishads, rather than that which assumes that there was a Sāṅkhya system (for which we have no other evidence) which antedated these Upanishads and influenced them to introduce its terms. We shall have to consider the origin of the Sāṅkhya more fully in our next chapter, but it seemed desirable to call attention here to the evidence which may be gathered from the connexion of the view of Yājñavalkya with the Sāṅkhya.

To return to the consideration of views and expressions in the Upanishads which might possibly be given a dualistic interpretation, we note that while the *Śvetāśvatara* normally maintains that there are three primary forms of reality, it sometimes makes statements which appear to limit these forms to two, although the additional member is in each case immediately supplied. Thus in *Śvet.* 1. 8 the contrast is made between the perishable and the imperishable, the manifest and the unmanifest,[1] but it immediately adds that both are supported by the Lord. In the following verse, the supreme and individual souls form a similarly contrasted pair, which are described as the knowing and the unknowing, the omnipotent and the impotent, but prakṛiti is again added to the group. We have already called attention to the contrast of enjoyer and enjoyed; and this appears to be implied in the illustrations of the he-goat and the she-goat,[2] and of the birds and the sweet fruit of the tree.[3] While the *Śvetāśvatara* does not mean to teach dualism, its three principles are thus frequently spoken of in such a way that it is very easy to find a single verse which appears to limit the number of principles to

[1] cf. *Kaṭha*, 3. 11, where the unmanifest (*avyakta*) is made a member of the series of evolution.

[2] *Śvet.* 4. 5. For the interpretation of this verse see chap. vi. p. 196; and cf. *Maitri*, 6. 19, § 3 of Hume's translation.

[3] *Śvet.* 4. 6, 7.

two; but this temporary dualism is quite as frequently one of the supreme and the individual soul as of the individual soul and matter.

The result of our study of the roots of dualism in the Upanishads is, then, that while we have found no passage which in its context appears intended to teach a dualistic view, we have discovered, especially in the teachings of Yājñavalkya, suggestions from which a dualistic doctrine might be developed, and we have found real points of similarity between his view of the Ātman and the Sāṅkhya view of purusha; the contrast between food and the eater of food, or between enjoyer and enjoyed furnishes similar ground for a distinction between subject and object; while the separation of reality into three categories in the *Śvetāśvatara* needs only to be made absolute in order to have a close approximation to the theistic Sāṅkhya of the epic, and, with the removal of the hypothesis of a creative God, to approach the atheistic classical system.

We turn next to one of the most characteristic features of the classical Sāṅkhya, namely, its evolutionary series by which the psychical apparatus and the external world are made to develop from prakṛiti. According to the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*,[1] the series is as follows; from prakṛiti, which is also called *avyakta*, the undiscriminated, arises the principle known as the Great One (*Mahat*) or Intellect (*Buddhi*); from this egoity (*ahaṅkāra*); from this there is a twofold development—on the one hand to the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*) which in turn produce the five gross elements (*bhūta*); and on the other hand to the mind (*manas*) and the ten functions or faculties (*indriya*), five of which are functions of sensation, while the remaining five are functions of action. There is much in this list which is in need of explanation, but in view of its difficulty, we postpone any attempt at interpretation

[1] *Kārikās* 22 ff.

until the following chapter. We merely add that it will be found that this series consists of twenty-four principles, which with the inclusion of purusha, (which is 'neither producing nor produced'[1] and hence stands outside the series), makes twenty-five principles in all. The Sāṅkhya is frequently described from this fact as a system of twenty-five principles, while its companion, the Yoga, which adds an Īśvara or creative god, is similarly indicated as a system of twenty-six principles.

We will now endeavour to see what approximations to this series of development are to be found in the Upanishads. By far the most important passage to be considered in this connexion is the twice-repeated series of the *Kaṭha*,[2] which we have already to some extent examined in a previous chapter.[3] The *Kaṭha* series is, however, simpler than that of the classical Sāṅkhya, and its most striking difference is that it carries the development upwards beyond the avyakta or prakṛiti to the purusha, so that the entire development is in the *Kaṭha* but a single line. In the Sāṅkhya, on the contrary, the purusha is separated from the series of development and instead of being regarded as a single absolute, is divided into an indefinite number of independent souls. In the remainder of the list there is a considerable degree of similarity, although there is confusion as to details. The relationship can perhaps best be seen from the table:

CLASSICAL SĀṄKHYA	KAṬHA, 3. 10–11	KAṬHA, 6. 7–8
Prakṛiti or Avyakta	Avyakta	Avyakta
Mahat or Buddhi	Mahā Ātman	Mahā Ātman
Ahaṅkāra	Buddhi	Sattva
Indriyas and Manas (fine and gross element)	Manas	Manas
	Objects of sense (*artha*)	Indriyas
	Indriyas	

[1] *Kārikā* 3. [2] *Kaṭha*, 3. 10–13, 6. 7–8. [3] Chap. vi, p. 190 f.

The similarity between the Sāṅkhya and the *Kaṭha* series is so great that the conclusion that there is some kind of historical connexion can hardly be avoided.

We have already pointed out the relation between the *Kaṭha* series and that of *Chānd.* 6. 8. 6. It remains to refer to a few instances of similar lists in the later Upanishads. In *Muṇḍ.* 1. 1. 8–9 we have a series of Brahma, food (= *avyākṛitam*, matter, according to Śaṅkara), breath, mind, and 'Truth, the worlds, immortality, too, in works' (cf. bhūtas of the Sāṅkhya). Again in *Muṇḍ.* 2. 1. 2–3 we have the series: Purusha (the Imperishable, *akshara*), breath, mind, sense, and elements. The *Praśna*[1] also has a list which includes the Sāṅkhyan principles, although it is somewhat more extensive. In it we have first the five elements, then the ten functions, the mind (*manas*), intellect (*buddhi*), egoity (*ahaṅkāra*), thought (*citta*), light (*tejas*), breath (*prāṇa*), and finally the supreme Ātman. We may perhaps find a hint of the Sāṅkhya categories in the list of *Śvet.* 1. 8. where we have conception (*saṅkalpa*), egoity (*ahaṅkāra*), intellect (*buddhi*) and Ātman.

As pointed out above, the number twenty-five is a characteristic number in connexion with the Sāṅkhya principles. It is not impossible that a fondness for the number twenty-five may have antedated the particular list of principles which was accommodated to it. This number, like some others, enters into many mystic ideas of the Brāhmaṇas, where Prajāpati, seed, and the human body are all said to be twenty-five fold. In particular, the human body is often said to consist of twenty-five parts, since it includes ten fingers, ten toes, four limbs, and a trunk (Ātman). The Ātman is thus said to be the twenty-fifth.[2] In the Upanishads in

[1] *Praśna*, 4. 8; cf. 6. 4.

[2] See *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 7. 3. 1. 43, 8. 4. 3, 17; cf. also 6. 2. 1. 23, 9. 1. 1. 44, 9. 3. 3. 19 and Keith, *Sāṁkhya System*, p. 48 f. There are also similar references in the *Sāṅkhāyana Brāhmaṇa*.

spite of much numerical allegorizing, especially on the number five,[1] the number twenty-five does not occur. But in *Bṛih.* 4. 4. 17 we have a verse which at least as early as the composition of the *Vedānta Sūtra*[2] was interpreted by some as referring to the twenty-five principles of the Sāṅkhya system. The verse says that the 'five five-peoples' (*pañca pañcajana*) are established in Brahma. According to Śaṅkara, the Sāṅkhyas interpreted the 'five five-peoples' as meaning twenty-five peoples or principles. He himself explains that the expression means no more than five peoples, and he interprets this in accordance with the Sūtra as meaning breath, the eye, the ear, food, and the mind. In the commentary on the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* which has come down under his name, the five peoples are otherwise explained as five classes of divine beings, or as the four castes with the outcastes. Whatever the detailed explanation may be, it is quite likely that Śaṅkara is correct in his contention that *pañca pañcajana* means only five peoples and not twenty-five,[3] but even granting this, it is easy to see how this obscure phrase would have suggested the number twenty-five as especially important.

We turn next to the Sāṅkhya doctrine that prakṛiti and its evolutes are possessed of three qualities or guṇas, which are called *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. The exact interpretation of these names is again puzzling, since the place of the guṇas in the Sāṅkhya doctrine seems to demand something which can be understood in a cosmic sense, while the guṇas are ordinarily given a psychological meaning. Deferring this question for fuller answer until our next chapter, we note that the first Upanishad in which they appear prominently is the *Śvetāśvatara*, while they are not given their usual names until the *Maitri*. One of the

[1] There are five elements, five functions of perception, five functions of action, the sacrifice is five-fold, etc. See especially *Śvet.* 1. 5.

[2] *V.S.* 1. 4. 11 ff.

[3] cf. the name of the tribe, Pañcāla.

most important passages is *Śvet.* 4. 5, which we have already had occasion to refer to as capable of a Sāṅkhyan interpetation. It will be recalled that this passage speaks of prakṛiti as a she-goat (or the Unborn female) which is red and white and black. These three colours were interpreted by the Sāṅkhyas as referring to the guṇas of their system.[1] 'The red is rajas (passion) because it naturally makes red (*rañjayati*, put into agitation); the white is sattva (essence, goodness) because it naturally makes light; the black is tamas (darkness) because it naturally darkens. On the other hand, it seems clear that there is a connexion between this verse and *Chānd.* 6. 4. In that passage it is taught that various things consist of three parts, namely of heat, water and food (earth). These are said to be respectively of a red, white and black colour. The similarity both of the colours themselves, and of the order in which they are mentioned seems too great to be accidental. In the *Chāndogya* it is said that reality 'is just the three forms (*rūpa*) so that from these three constituents all things can be made. It is clear that we have here a rudimentary doctrine of elements, since the later list accepted these three while they added the more subtle elements, air and space. Just what the significance of the guṇas is in the *Śvetāśvatara* is harder to determine. While the passage which we have just examined assigns the guṇas to prakṛiti, an earlier passage in the Upanishad[2] speaks of the guṇas of god, while another[3] assigns them to the individual soul. The guṇas are definitely stated to be three in number.[4] They appear to play a part in the creation and destruction of the world, since the absence of the guṇas appears to bring about the disappearance of the world.[5] The guṇas are said to conceal God or his self-power[6] and in this we may

[1] For the Sāṅkhya interpretation, see *V.S.* 1. 4. 8–10.
[2] *Śvet.* 1. 3.
[3] ibid. 5. 7.
[4] ibid. 5. 7. cf. also 4. 5, and perhaps 6. 3.
[5] ibid. 6. 4.
[6] ibid. 1. 4.

perhaps have an echo of *Bṛih.* 1. 6. 3 where the Ātman is said to be the Immortal veiled by the real. 'Prāṇa truly, is the Immortal. Name and form are the real. By them this prāṇa is veiled.'[1]

Beside the *Chāndogya* passage which has been discussed, an attempt to find the doctrine of the guṇas in the older literature has been made in connexion with *Atharvaveda*, 10. 8. 43. This is from one of the Skambha hymns, and is difficult to interpret. We give the verse in Whitney and Lanman's translation:[2] 'The lotus-flower of nine doors, covered with three strands (*guṇa*)—what soulful prodigy (*yaksha*) is in it, that the brahman-knowers know?' There is little question but that by the lotus-flower of nine doors the human body with its nine orifices is meant,[3] and although it is not certain that guṇa can have the meaning of quality in the older Vedic literature, Whitney is inclined to that opinion.[4] Lanman, however, appears to dissent from this judgment, and refers to Garbe, who understands the three guṇas of this passage to be the skin, nails and hair.[5] Whatever the original force of this passage may have been, it seems likely that this hymn was familiar to the seers of the Upanishads, and its phraseology may have had some influence upon the formation of the later doctrine.

In the *Maitri* the guṇas are expressly said to belong to nature but not the soul,[6] and their classical names are given, although not always in a very clear

[1] A further resemblance between this passage and the *Śvetāśvatara* may be noted in that the Atman is said to be a triad although it is also one. While no connexion can be traced between the particular members of the triad here and the three principles of the *Śvetāśvatara*, the numerical scheme may have been taken over.

[2] W. D. Whitney, *Atharva Veda, Translation and Notes*, p. 601.

[3] cf. the similar figure of the body as the nine-gated city in *Śvet.* 3.18.

[4] 'The three guṇas are probably the three temperaments familiar under that name later.'

[5] Whitney, *Atharva Veda*, p. 1045.

[6] *Maitri*, 3. 2, 6. 10, 7. 1.

way.[1] It is likely, however, that the *Maitri* is borrowing its views from the classical Sāṅkhya, and if this is true, the Upanishad does not have the interest of an original source of the doctrine.

Our final task in connexion with the investigation of the origins of the Sāṅkhya will be to trace certain particular physical or psychological conceptions which found a place in the classical system to their sources in the Upanishads. In other instances we have not undertaken to investigate these details, since the connexion of the other systems with the Upanishads is sufficiently clear. But since there is some possible question as to the origin of the Sāṅkhya, it seems best to investigate these matters also as far as possible.

We have already had something to say in regard to the history of prakṛiti in the Upanishads, and we have seen that although this word and the closely allied pradhāna do not appear before the *Śvetāśvatara* Upanishad, the conceptions for which they stand are already implied to some extent in the teachings of Yājñavalkya. It may be added that a verse of the *Kaṭha*[2] describing Aditi as arising together with life and entering into the secret place of the heart has been traditionally interpreted as referring to prakṛiti,[3] but it is difficult to see much connexion between the two conceptions beyond identity of gender.

In our investigation of the second member of the *Kaṭha* series of evolution which is known as Mahā or Buddhi, we ventured to refer to *Bṛih.* 4. 4. 22 as furnishing a possible key to interpretation. It is evident, however, that in other lists something with more of a cosmic significance is needed, and in the

[1] Thus in *Maitri*, 3. 5 tamas and rajas are described at length, but no mention is made of sattva. In 5. 2 all three are mentioned by name, and they are identified with the three members of the Hindu Trinity—Rudra with tamas, Brahma with rajas, and Vishṇu with sattva.

[2] *Kaṭha*, 4. 7.

[3] See Hume, *Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, p. 354.

Śvetāśvatara we hear of the Great Primeval Person,[1] and of a demiurge, Hiraṇyagarbha, the Golden Germ, who is the first born of creation.[2] In Hiraṇyagarbha we see a reference to *Ṛigveda*, 10. 121, where he is praised as the creator of the world and as identical with Prajāpati. In the *Śvetāśvatara* he seems to be thought of as the same as Brahma in 6. 18, and very possibly as identical with the red seer (*kapila*) in 5. 2. It is true that this latter verse has been interpreted to mean Kapila, the reputed founder of the Sāṅkhya system, but it is more likely that it was intended first as a mythological designation of the demiurge, and was later understood as referring to a human founder.[3] It is possible that an earlier reference in the Upanishads to this being is to be discovered in *Kaush.* 1. 7, where mention is made of a 'great seer', consisting of the sacred word, but the passage is too fragmentary for us to gather from it much significance.

In the *Kaṭha* series, the term buddhi or intellect appears as an alternative or supplemental step for the great. It is first introduced in the parable of the chariot in *Kaṭha*, 3. 3, and is there distinguished from manas or mind by representing intellect as the driver of the chariot, while mind is the reins, i.e. the organ by which the decision of the intellect is carried out. In 3. 12, buddhi is said to be the means by which seers are able to behold the Ātman. In the *Śvetāśvatara* there are repeated prayers for clear intellect, and this is thought to be within the gift of Hiraṇyagarbha, who, as we have seen, corresponds to the second step of the Sāṅkhya series.

The third step of the classical Sāṅkhya is ahaṅkāra, the I-principle, or egoity. This is not found in the *Kaṭha* series. The word appears in *Chānd.* 7. 25. 1, where it appears to be treated as identical with the

[1] *Śvet.* 3. 19. [2] 3. 4, 4. 12.

[3] We have already seen how the origin of doctrines in the Upanishads is frequently traced to divine sources, in particular to Prajāpati.

Ātman. In *Śvet.* 5. 8 it is mentioned as one of the qualities of the Self, but it, along with *saṅkalpa* or conception, is put on a lower level as compared with buddhi or intellect.

Manas or mind is a word of very frequent occurrence in the early Upanishads. It is sometimes regarded as on a level with the special senses, while sometimes it is placed above them. It is not only connected with perception but also with volition, and may be thought of as taking the impressions of the senses and forming from them ideas, while on the other hand it transforms the ideas into resolves.

Various lists of the indriyas or senses are given in the Upanishads. They include not merely the functions of perception, but also the functions of action. A list, substantially the same as that of the Sāṅkhya, is to be found already in *Bṛih.* 2. 4. 11, which merely adds the mind and heart to the later number. The term, indriya, is first used in *Kaush.* 2. 15. The precise list of the Sāṅkhya is first found in *Praśna*, 4. 2, 8.

The earliest mention of fine elements is in *Chānd.* 6. 5 where the elements, earth, water, and fire, which we have already noticed above are said each to consist of three parts, namely, coarse, medium, and fine. They are then said to constitute appropriate parts of the human body. A further development of this thought is to be seen in *Praśna*, 4. 8, which has the full list of five elements, including wind and space, but distinguishes between the substance itself and its elements (*mātra*). Thus we have earth and the elements of earth, water and the elements of water, etc. This is doubtless the origin of the term, *tan-mātra* (literally, having that as its element) which we find definitely given in *Maitri*, 3. 2, where the body is said to consist of the tan-mātras and the gross elements (*mahā-bhūtas*).

As to the development of the conception of the elements themselves, we have already had something

to say in an earlier chapter.[1] The five elements of the Sāṅkhya are already found in *Tait.* 2. 1, although other ideas are there added. An explicit list of five gross elements is given in *Ait.* 3. 3.

The twenty-fifth principle of the Sāṅkhya, purusha, has already been sufficiently discussed in connexion with the dualism of the system.

[1] Chap. iv, p. 121.

CHAPTER IX

THE PLURALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE *SĀṄKHYA KĀRIKĀ*

IN our treatment of the Sāṅkhya it appears desirable to make some change from the method which we have employed in the discussion of the other systems. There we have first presented our view of the factors which tend to explain the production of the system, so far as we have been able to grasp them, and only after examining in this way the historical significance of the system have we entered upon its detailed explanation. This method was made possible by the fact that in each case the preceding chapter had detailed the beginnings of the system in the Upanishads and we were thus enabled to give at least a preliminary view of the thought which was later elaborated with greater fulness. The same method hardly seems possible in the case of the Sāṅkhya, since, as we have seen, the main outlines of this system can scarcely be made out in the Upanishads, even though the greater part of its material can be clearly traced there. The questions as to the historical origin and significance of the Sāṅkhya are moreover particularly difficult. It appears necessary, then, that before we enter upon a discussion of these questions, we should have some idea of the main outlines of the system itself. We propose, therefore, to reverse our earlier procedure, and to give first our account of the teachings of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, and in the latter part of our chapter to take account of the questions which bear upon the origin and significance of this system.

We choose the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* instead of the

later commentaries as the basis of our account since the main lines of the system are laid down by the *Kārikā*, and since this work is in itself sufficiently intelligible for our purposes. The *Vedānta Sūtras*, as we have seen, were so obscure that several quite different philosophical systems could be based upon them. But the *Kārikā* is so definite and precise in its teaching that in spite of differences in small details, it cannot be said that the commentaries of Gauḍapāda or Vācaspatimiśra represent any very radical departure either from it or from each other. A greater degree of difference can be seen in the *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-sūtra* and its commentary, but these works are so late as to fall into quite another period than that with which we have been concerned. It appears then to be sufficient for our treatment of the Sāṅkhya system that we should explain the views of the *Kārikā*, adding where useful the explanations of it given by the two older commentaries.

The *Kārikā* itself is, in spite of the obscurities which the system itself presents, an admirably clear and logically arranged treatise. After an introductory section on the purpose and logical foundations of the system,[1] it enters into a discussion of its fundamental metaphysical categories, namely, primary matter, its evolutes, and spirits, together with proofs of their existence.[2] The next section deals with the process of the evolution of the world from prakṛiti, or matter, and this proves to be largely a discussion of questions of psychology.[3] This continues into an enumeration of the states or conditions (*bhāva*) which lead either to bondage or to release.[4] A brief discussion of cosmology follows,[5] and the final section of the original work gives the Sāṅkhya doctrine of release.[6] The brief appendix, which very possibly forms a later

[1] *Kārikās* 1–6.
[2] *Kārikās* 7–21.
[3] *Kārikās* 22–42.
[4] *Kārikās* 43–52.
[5] *Kārikās* 53–56.
[6] *Kārikās* 57–68.

addition to the text, gives some account of the literary tradition of the Sāṅkhya school.[1]

The text shows the fondness for certain definite numbers which we have already stated to be characteristic of the system. Not only is the number five a favourite one in the lists of the fundamental principles of the system,[2] but there are five proofs for the existence of prakṛiti, five for the existence of purushas, five kinds of animal and vegetable life. Other favoured numbers are three and eight, and we find three kinds of pain, three fundamental categories, three means of proof, eight conditions which make a thing imperceptible, three guṇas, three inner organs, eight conditions (*bhāvas*, also fifty), eight perfections (*siddhi*), eight classes of divine beings, etc. Doubtless by these numerical schemes the details of the system were more easily fixed in memory.

The purpose of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is to furnish a way of escape from suffering. This is clearly stated in the first verse, and it is fully borne out by the character of the whole treatise. As compared with the Upanishads, where we found pessimism but slightly developed,[3] the Sāṅkhya's pessimism is profound. Of the fifty states or conditions of life, forty-two are evil, while the remaining eight are of value merely because they are means to the attainment of release.[4] These baneful conditions cause the transmigration of the soul to a new body, while rebirth, in turn, brings with it the renewed development of the baneful conditions. Thus the wheel of transmigration goes on in its endless course, unless the soul is able to find its means of release.[5]

[1] *Kārikās* 69–72. The analysis which I have given follows that of Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. I, iii, p. 412.

[2] There are five organs of perception, five organs of action, five fine elements, five coarse elements.

[3] This statement must be altered in the case of the *Maitri*. But it is characteristic that it is the *Maitri* which in other ways shows most affinities with both the Sāṅkhya and Buddhism.

[4] *Kārikās* 43–51. [5] *Kārikā* 52.

Both empirical means for removing misery and the Vedic religion are inadequate to the task of releasing the soul. Empirical means are insufficient, first, because they give no promise of giving eternal freedom from suffering without the possibility of its return, and second, because they do not achieve precisely the result at which they aim, but in the very process of relieving misery pile up further consequences of their own. The Vedic ritual is equally ineffective. Its prescription of animal sacrifices involve the worshipper in impurity, the rewards which sacrificial works bring are not eternal, and it shares the fault of the empirical means of not securing precisely the result aimed at.[1]

The true remedy for this misery is to be found in the discrimination of the three fundamental categories of the Sāṅkhya, the fundamental substance, prakṛiti (also called avyakta, the unmanifest), its evolutes (also called vyakta the manifest), and the soul (purusha, also jña, the knower).[2] The effectiveness of this remedy lies not in any mere general value which the study of philosophy or the practice of contemplation may have, but in its specific effect in enabling the soul to become free of what is substantially a false opinion concerning its relationship with matter. Suffering in reality exists not in the soul but in matter, and the soul in its own nature is free from suffering. But matter would not be aware of its misery if it were not illuminated by the consciousness of the knowing soul. Hence the soul by knowing itself as totally distinct from matter becomes free from the delusion that it is suffering. In matter, moreover, the suffering which exists in it when it is joined with the soul now becomes unconscious. It is thus that we have the paradox that it is not the soul but matter which is 'saved'. We shall

[1] *Kārikās* 1, 2.

[2] cf. the *Śvetāśvatara* where release also consists as in the Sāṅkhya in the knowledge of three principles, although its three principles are somewhat different from those of the Sāṅkhya.

return to a consideration of the problems which are presented by this theory of release at a later point, but it seemed necessary to emphasize at the beginning this practical character of the whole philosophy.

The *Kārikā* distinguishes, as we have seen, three fundamental categories, the unmanifested (prakṛiti), the manifested evolutes from prakṛiti, and the purusha; but since the evolutes from prakṛiti are of the same substance with it, and share some of its qualities, we are justified in reducing the number of primary kinds in the system to two. Prakṛiti is but one, the souls indefinite in number, while as we have seen in our previous chapter, the system numbers twenty-three evolutes from prakṛiti, although it is clear that at least some of these evolutes are conceived of as existing separately for each soul. The *Kārikā* contains also another classification of its principles into that which evolves but is not evolved, viz. prakṛiti; those which are both evolving and evolved, viz. mahat, ahaṅkāra, and the five fine elements; those evolved but not evolving, viz. the ten indriyas with manas and the five gross elements; and that which neither evolves nor is evolved, viz. purusha. This division, however, is of no special importance in the system.[1]

Prakṛiti is the fundamental basis of the empirical world. It cannot be known directly, since it is of too fine a nature to be perceived, but it must be inferred from its effects. According to the Sāṅkhya theory of perception,[2] there are no less than eight conditions

[1] Deussen, *AGP.* vol. I, iii, p. 416, points out that this division is precisely parallel to that of Scotus Erigena in his work *De Divisione Naturæ*, where he distinguishes objects according as it may be said, *creant, non creantur; creantur et creant; creantur non creant; neque creant neque creantur.*

[2] *Kārikā* 7. The hindering conditions are: too great remoteness, too great nearness, destruction of the special sense concerned, inattention, fineness of the object, the interposition of other objects, the overpowering presence of other objects (as when the stars become invisible because they are overpowered by the light of the sun), and confusion with many other similar objects.

which prevent a thing from being perceived, so that the fact that prakṛiti is invisible is no reason for doubting its existence. On the other hand the existence of prakṛiti must be inferred from the existence of its evolutes.

This causal argument for this existence of prakṛiti demands that we should here take some account of the Sāṅkhya theory of causation, which, like that of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, is called the *sat-kārya-vāda*, or true effect theory. The fundamental tenet of this view is that the effect pre-exists in the cause, so that in some sense cause and effect are identical. But with this general understanding there is still considerable difference between the interpretations which the three schools put upon the doctrine. With Śaṅkara, cause and effect are so completely identified that all difference is declared illusory. With Rāmānuja there is a genuine development from cause to effect, so that the qualities of the cause and effect may differ, although the fundamental substance remains the same. In this respect the connexion between Rāmānuja and the Sāṅkhya doctrine is close, but in another there is considerable difference. For both schools of the Vedānta, Brahma is both a material and an efficient cause, and Brahma's action as an efficient cause is explained by the fact that it possesses the nature of intelligence. The place of Brahma in the Vedānta scheme is in part filled by prakṛiti in the Sāṅkhya, but prakṛiti is an unconscious principle,[1] and is conceived rather as a material than as an efficient cause. The relation of cause and effect is that between water and ice or steam, to use an illustration which is implied in the *Kārikā*,[2] or it may be explained by the relation between clay and the pot, or the thread and the cloth, to use the stock expressions of later times.[3] There is thus identity of substance between cause and effect.

[1] *Acetana, Kārikā* 11. [2] *Kārikā* 16.
[3] cf. *Kārikā* 67 for the figure of pottery.

although the Sāṅkhya does not maintain that their qualities are the same. The *Kārikā* devotes one stanza[1] to the proof of this doctrine, giving what purport to be five different arguments for this position. Its first argument is that what is non-existent can have no power of causation, since the non-existent cannot be the subject of any action whatsoever. The cause must therefore be found in what already exists. The second argument is that the product is nothing else than the material of which it is composed. The third argues from the fact that not all effects come from a given cause, but only such effects as pre-exist in the cause. The fourth argument puts the third in another way, and maintains that the cause has only such effects as it is in fact capable of producing. The fifth argument restates the second, and says that the product is present in the cause as its material. Although these proofs may have no great convincing force, they at least enable us to come to a clearer understanding of the Sāṅkhya view of the ultimate cause. Prakṛiti is the abiding entity which is capable of changes of appearance and quality, but which remains essentially unchanged.

Prakṛiti is repeatedly said to be the cause of the world, and the manifested world its effects.[2] That prakṛiti actually exists is shown by a series of arguments in *Kārikā* 15. The point made by all of these is that no individual object can be the cause which is sought for. Individual objects are limited, while prakṛiti must be unlimited. Individual objects are all analogous to each other, and hence no one of them can be put above the rest as a cause. Again, all individual things originate from a force (*śakti*), and they cannot themselves be that force. Finally, in spite of what was said above about the likeness between cause and effect, there must also be

[1] *Kārikā* 9. [2] *Kārikās* 8, 9, 14, 15, 16.

some difference between cause and effect, and since the whole empirical world is alike in being secondary, produced, effected, it cannot be the cause which is sought. For all these reasons a cause which will stand outside of the empirical world must be postulated. The obvious difficulty that such a reality is not known from experience is met, as we have seen, by pointing to the defects of the senses.

The attributes of prakṛiti are set forth with meticulous exactness by comparing it with its evolutes and with purusha. The evolved is said to be effected, not eternal, not all-pervasive, active, many, dependent, the sign (by which prakṛiti can be inferred), connected (with other evolutes), and secondary, while prakṛiti is on the contrary uncaused, eternal, all-pervasive, inactive, one, independent, that to which the logical sign points, unconnected with anything like itself, and primary.[1] Both prakṛiti and its evolutes are contrasted with purusha by assigning to them a further series of attributes. They possess the three guṇas, they are not discriminating (that is, they do not discriminate between themselves and purusha), they are objects not subjects, they are common in that they are the objects of many purushas and not merely of one, unconscious, and finally parts of the series of evolution.[2] While there is difficulty in the interpretation of individual members of these series of attributes, the main intention of the *Kārikā* is clear. Prakṛiti is the one substance, above the limitations of space and time, inactive, independent. The evolutes share in all the imperfections of the phenomenal world. Both are objects, in themselves unconscious, in contrast with the knowing subject, purusha.

One of the attributes assigned to both the unmanifest and the manifest is the possession of the three guṇas. Although this is taken by the *Kārikās* as a

[1] *Kārikā* 10. [2] *Kārikā* 11.

matter of course and in need of no special proof, it is one of the aspects of the system where it is least definite. A certain amount of definition of the guṇas is given by the *Kārikās*, but even so their significance is far from clear. The guṇas are, first, sattva (literally, being or goodness) second, rajas (literally, passion) and third, tamas (literally, darkness). It would seem that it is impossible to define the guṇas as they are in themselves, and that they can be known only through their effects upon man. It is said that the nature of sattva is pleasure, that of rajas is pain, and that of tamas is dullness or indifference. Again, their functions are said to be respectively illumination, activity, and restraint. Finally, sattva is the light (in weight) and the enlightening, rajas is the active and moving, and tamas is the heavy and restraining.[1] Considering that prakṛiti is something which is said to be unconscious, it would appear as if something more physical and less psychological were needed than is furnished by these definitions, and the notion of the *Chāndyoga*[2] which makes fire, water, and food the three constituents of the world appears a much more rational scheme than that provided by the *Kārikā*.[3] But it must be remembered that the presence of the guṇas in prakṛiti is a matter of inference and not of observation; in the second place, the evolutes of prakṛiti in the Sāṅkhya scheme are interpreted in the *Kārikā* predominantly in psychological terms, although here again something of a more cosmic status appears to be required; and finally, we note in the Sāṅkhya the same tendency to confuse the individual and the cosmic which we have already marked many times in the Upanishads. Some provision for physical qualities is perhaps intended in the description of sattva as light and tamas as heavy,

[1] *Kārikās* 12, 13. [2] *Chānd.* 6. 4.

[3] Hopkins, *Great Epic of India*, p. 113, n. 1, suggests that the guṇas be interpreted as conditional being, energy, and inertia. See Keith, *RPV.* pp. 534, 535.

but the tendency is strong toward a psychological interpretation.[1] The relation of the guṇas to each other is said by the *Kārikā* to be similar to that of the parts of a lamp. This is interpreted by the commentators to mean the flame, the oil, and the wick, but this analogy does not add materially to our understanding.

The theory of the guṇas furnishes an explanation of the means by which the evolution of the world from prakṛiti takes place. In the state of prakṛiti the three guṇas are in a state of equilibrium, so that although all three are present, no one of them is in evidence. Evolution from prakṛiti takes place through the disturbance of this equilibrium, so that in every evolved thing there is too great or too little a share of one of the guṇas or another. All the diversity of the world is to be explained as due only to the presence of a greater or lesser degree of each of the guṇas.

We come next to the Sāṅkhya theory of souls. As contrasted with prakṛiti and its evolutes which are always object, the purusha is always subject, and its function is that of a spectator (*sākshin*) before whom prakṛiti appears as a dramatic actor, or as a dancer.[2] It is said that the characteristics of the purusha are that it is absolute, i.e. distinct from prakṛiti; neutral (*madhyastha*) i.e. not belonging to this or that; it possesses the quality of seeing, and is inactive.[3] Its only positive function is to be a knower (*jña*). It thus furnishes the closest parallel to the Ātman of Yājñavalkya. But while the latter is considered to be a

[1] cf. the interpretation of tamas and rajas in the *Maitri Upanishad*, 3. 5: 'Now it has elsewhere been said, "The characteristics of the Dark Quality (tamas) are delusion, fear, despondency, sleepiness, weariness, heedlessness, old age, ignorance, jealousy, cruelty, stupidity, shamelessness, religious neglect, pride, unequableness.

'"The characteristics of the Passionate Quality (rajas) on the other hand, are inner thirst, affection, emotion, covetousness, maliciousness, lust, hatred, secretiveness, envy, insatiability, unsteadfastness, fickleness, distractedness, ambitiousness, acquisitiveness, favouritism towards friends, dependence upon surroundings, hatred in regard to unpleasant objects of sense, overfondness in regard to pleasant objects, sourness of utterance, gluttonousness."'

[2] *Kārikās* 42, 59. [3] *Kārikā* 19.

single reality, the purushas of the Sāṅkhya exist in indefinite numbers. Proofs both for the existence of the purusha and for its multiplicity are given. The proofs for the existence of souls are, first, that an assemblage of things, such as the manifest world is, must exist for the sake of another. That is to say, although prakṛiti is unintelligent, and hence can have no purpose in itself, yet it does carry out the purpose of another, though unconsciously. This is further illustrated in *Kārikā* 57 where it is said that the production of milk, which is quite unintelligent, yet provides for the growth of the calf. The second argument is that since both the unmanifest and the manifest share in certain qualities (mentioned in *Kārikā* 11), there must also exist that which would have the opposite of these qualities. The third argument is that there must be a superintending power. The fourth is that there must be an enjoyer.[1] Again, since the nature of the three guṇas is pleasure, pain, and dulness, there must be that by which these qualities can be felt. Finally, there must be that for which the evolution of prakṛiti takes place. According to the Sāṅkhya doctrine of release, the development of the world takes place in order that the purusha may recognize its difference from prakṛiti. If there were no purusha, there would be no reason for this evolution.

The proofs of the separateness of souls are such as might occur to common sense in objecting to the doctrine of the oneness of the Ātman. They are, first, that birth, death, and the bodily organs are individual matters. With the death of one man we cannot say that all have died, nor is the seeing which takes place in the bodily organism of one man the same as that which occurs in that of another. The second argument proceeds from the fact that

[1] *Bhoktṛi*; cf. *Kaṭha*, 3. 4.

when one of the functions of the body is active in one person, it does not follow that it is active in another. We are to infer, then, that the persons also are different. The third argument takes its ground on the opposition of the purusha to the world of prakṛiti and its evolutes. This was said in *Kārikā* 11 to be common, that is, to belong equally to different knowing subjects, and hence to be in some sense one. Since the purusha is in all respects opposite to prakṛiti, it follows that it must be many.

We have seen that the *Kārikā* makes meticulous use of proof for establishing all of its main ontological positions, giving arguments even for the existence of the purusha, which might not unreasonably be considered as beyond the reach of proof. Although no proof was offered for the guṇas, they may have been thought to be known from observation. In the next section of the *Kārikā* which traces the evolution of the various stages of the manifest world from prakṛiti, no proofs are given, although the nature of the evolution is such that it seems to be urgently in need of explanation.

The main idea of this series of evolution is that prakṛiti evolves itself in order to enable purusha to recognize its own difference from it. Since the souls are many, while prakṛiti is one, the leading idea of the system is that this evolution must take place with never-ending repetition for the sake of each individual soul. But when we descend into details, there is much obscurity in the conception. The development proceeds from prakṛiti to mahat or buddhi; from buddhi to ahaṅkāra; from ahaṅkāra to the ten senses and manas on the one hand, and the subtle elements on the other; from the subtle elements to the coarse elements and hence the external world. The prevailing idea in the *Kārikā* is as we have said individual and psychological. Yet there are sugges-

tions also that the process is a cosmic one.[1] Intellect appears in the series before individuation, so that it would seem natural to think of this as a cosmic principle. But while, as we have seen, this is a natural conception in the *Śvetāśvatara*, where the universe is thought to be intelligent, it is evident that there is difficulty in finding room in an unintelligent world for any such cosmic figure. Ahaṅkāra, again, might naturally be interpreted as the individualizing process by which a particular substrate is formed for each purusha. But here again the *Kārikā* is drawn to a more psychological interpretation. The primary meaning, then, which is given by the *Kārikās* to buddhi, ahaṅkāra, and manas is that they are all organs of the individual psychic apparatus and the notion that they are evolving processes from prakṛiti is largely lost sight of.[2]

The buddhi is the power of decision; the ahaṅkāra is the principle of self-consciousness which refers the material gained from the mind and the senses to the particular individual. The mind gathers the material furnished by the senses into ideas. It is also the agency through which resolves are carried into action. In the commentary of Vācaspatimiśra it is said that man uses first his external senses, then he considers with the manas, then he refers the various objects to his ego or ahaṅkāra, and lastly he decides with his buddhi what to do. A special place is given to buddhi,

[1] In the later Sāṅkhya the thought is that the process is in the first place cosmic, so that a cosmic buddhi, ahaṅkāra, manas, etc., are created, which are later divided up into individuals. See Keith, *Sāṅkhya System*, pp. 95, 96.

[2] This ambiguity of the Sāṅkhya system is clearly brought out by Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, pp. 275, 277: 'While this [psychological] analysis gives an explanation of the recognition of the different factors on the subject side, it does not help us towards understanding the precise functions of these factors when enlarged to a cosmic plane. The cosmic scheme is framed on the analogy of the human self, since man is a microcosm in which all the factors of reality are repeated, as it were on a reduced scale. . . . The obscurity of the Sāṅkhya theory is due to the fact that a psychological report is mixed up with a metaphysical statement. The order of psychological presentation need not be the order of real evolution unless the subject is the ultimate and supreme one.'

in that it stands in the most immediate connexion with the purusha. It is the channel through which the results of the other psychic functions are made known to the soul, and it is also the means by which the soul is finally able to discriminate between itself and matter.[1] The manas also is in need of special explanation. It is on the one hand on the same level with the special senses; on the other it stands in a superior relation to the functions of perception, in that it gathers in the results of all the senses, and to the functions of action, in that its action is carried out by their agency. While the ten outer functions each have their appropriate organ, the buddhi, ahaṅkāra, and manas are functions merely. Like all the other evolutes of prakṛiti, their nature is determined by the action of the three guṇas. When the intellect is dominated by sattva, it has the qualities of virtue, knowledge, freedom from passion, and power. These qualities are later said to lead upwards in the scale of saṁsāra, and to bring final release.[2] When the buddhi is filled with tamas, the opposite qualities prevail, and the soul is dragged downward. The products of the ahaṅkāra are, as we have seen, twofold, the mind and the special senses on the one hand, and the subtle elements on the other. The first of these productions comes from the sattva element, the second from the tamas. Both share in the quality of rajas.

We have no reason to delay over the special functions. The functions of perception are the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. The voice, the hands, the feet, and the organs of excretion and generation are the functions of action. Voice is said to have for its object only sound. The other active functions are said to be connected with all the objects of sense.[3]

When an object calls one of the senses into action.

[1] *Kārikās* 36, 37. [2] *Kārikās* 44, 45. [3] *Kārikā* 28.

all four of the mental functions, i.e. the sense, mind, ahaṅkāra, and intellect operate, either one after the other in ordinary cases, or instantaneously in great emergency.[1] Thus, as Vācaspatimiśra explains, if one sees a tiger, the sense impression is carried by the sense to the mind, the mind finds that it is a tiger, the ahaṅkāra refers the matter to the 'I', and the intellect decides on running away. But this process takes place so quickly that it is impossible to recognize the individual steps. In other cases the sequence of operations takes place in a more leisurely fashion.

The *Kārikās* have much more to offer of a psychological nature, but we must pass on to the remaining members of the evolutionary series, the subtle and the gross elements. The subtle elements are regarded as being the pure parts of the gross elements, since they are said to be without difference, while the gross elements have difference. This may be interpreted in the light of *Chānd.* 6. 4 where each of the elements appears to have not only a predominant degree of its own nature, but also a mixture of the natures of all the other elements. Thus the gross element, water, contains not only a larger proportion of its own nature, water, but also particles of the other elements as well. No list of the subtle elements is given by the *Kārikā*; in later commentaries they are said to be sound, tangibility, order, visibility, and taste. It is safer to consider them in the *Kārikā* as merely the potentialities from which the gross elements arise.

The gross elements are the familiar list, ether, air, earth, fire and water.[2] While there is no hint of a development of a theory of physical or chemical combinations between them, the *Kārikā's* theory of matter is not without further complications of its own. The gross elements consist each of three parts, a fine part, a part which in the human body is derived from father

[1] *Kārikā* 30. [2] *Kārikās* 38, 39.

and mother, and finally ordinary extended things. Further it is said that the subtle elements and the fine parts of the gross elements are included with buddhi, ahaṅkāra, manas, and the ten functions to form what is called the *liṅgam* or subtle body, which is the empirical individual person which transmigrates from one body to another.[1] It is clear that the Sāṅkhya theory of matter is not designed to help us understand the external inanimate world, but strives to give an explanation of the process of transmigration and re-embodiment. Something actually material seems to be needed as a substratum for the empirical soul as it goes from body to body, for it is said that the fine parts of the coarse elements are necessary to the subtle body just as a canvas is necessary to a picture, or as a pillar is necessary for a shadow.[2] This idea of a quasi-material transmigrating substance is, as we have seen, accepted by the Vedānta school as well, although it is not worked out with the same detail. The second part of the gross elements, the parts contributed by father and mother, are perhaps an attempt to explain the facts of heredity. Concerning the ordinary extended parts of the gross elements the *Kārikā* did not think it necessary to make any further statement.

This theory of the elements even apart from its total ignoring of what we usually think of in connexion with the physical world contains serious difficulties. We have seen that according to the purpose of the evolution of prakṛiti we should expect that all its evolved states would be developed separately for each purusha, and the main tendency of the system is to think of the external world as a product of the activity of each particular empirical individual. Thus in spite of its dualism, its main tendency is not distant from idealism. But when we come to the gross elements, it

[1] In regard to this subtle body see also chap. iii, p. 78. [2] *Kārikā* 41.

is obvious to common sense that they are not the separate products of each individual. In regard to them the system is forced to a more realistic view which comes into conflict with its main theory of evolution taking place for each separate person alone. The result, then, in its theory of matter is to introduce inextricable confusion.

In all the evolutes of prakṛiti the guṇas are active, and they produce in men through their admixture various states or dispositions (*bhāvas*).[1] Two lists of these are given, one of eight, and one of fifty members. The lists are only imperfectly intelligible in the *Kārikā*, and it appears likely that we have two different traditions which were never entirely reconciled. We do not mean to repeat these tedious lists, except to point out that in the first there is only one state[2] which brings release, and in the fifty, eight which tend toward it.

We have already given some account of the Sāṅkhya theory of release, but there are further details to be observed. Soul and matter are, and have been from all eternity, separate. But the soul is not aware of its separation, and from this proceeds all misery, which in reality is in the material principle, although the soul erroneously thinks it its own. Matter therefore begins the endeavour to save itself (although it must be remembered that it is unconscious) by evolving itself so that the soul may eventually see it and recognize it as different from itself. Thus it is stated that matter and soul co-operate in securing the former's release, and their union is said to be like the arrangement between a blind man and a lame man by which the lame man climbs on the blind man's shoulders. The one can only see, while the other can only walk, but together they are able to proceed to their desired destination.[3] But the analogy is inade-

[1] *Kārikās* 43–52. [2] *Kārikā* 63. [3] *Kārikās* 20, 21.

quate since it assumes that both are conscious and can enter into intelligent co-operation, while the system denies consciousness to prakṛiti and activity to the purusha. Better illustrations are those of the actor or the dancer,[1] but here also it is difficult to conceive of an unconscious and yet purposeful activity. Nature maintains her play until she has at last been seen and recognized by the soul. Then like a modest girl she disappears and the union between matter and soul is broken for ever.[2] The misery in nature which was known as misery merely because of the combination with a particular soul now becomes unconscious so far as that soul is concerned. It is true that for a little while the appearance of transmigration goes on, just as a potter's wheel continues to revolve for a little even though no force is applied to it.[3] But while the process is now complete for the particular soul, it goes on eternally for nature, since there is an infinite succession of individual souls, each of which must be brought to a knowledge of its separation from nature.

The means of release, then, as in the system of Śaṅkara, is in the end metaphysical knowledge. But while in the Vedānta it is the knowledge of union with the Ātman which saves, in the Sāṅkhya it is the knowledge of the distinction between the Self and matter. The supreme knowledge according to *Kārikā* 64 is found when one is able to say, 'I am not that; that is not mine; I am not.'

We have tried in the preceding paragraphs to give as objective an account as possible of the chief conceptions of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. The question still remains what the significance and probable origin of this system of dualism may be. In regard to the first question, it is clear that we do not have to do

[1] *Kārikās* 42, 59.
[2] *Kārikā* 61. 'Nothing is more modest than Nature; that is my judgment. Saying "I have been seen," she does not expose herself again to the view of the Soul.'
[3] *Kārikā* 67.

primarily with a scientific system. The interest of the *Kārikā* is not in understanding the world so much as in escaping it, and such understanding as the *Kārikā* secures is for the purpose of distinguishing the knowing Self more clearly from the world. Further, it is perfectly evident that the Sāṅkhya is not the result mainly of first-hand experience and reasoning upon the nature of the world. In spite of its meticulous care to give proofs of the existence of prakṛiti and the purushas, its main positions are only intelligible as an inheritance from previous thought. The three guṇas might conceivably be discovered by observation, but for the series of evolution no proof is offered, and no explanation is given for the series being as it is. Later Sāṅkhya writers were obliged to fall back on the authority of Scripture for its support, since it could not be rationally explained.[1] Although the system has much to say in regard to the psychical members of the series of evolution, it is almost completely silent regarding the material world apart from living beings. What little we can learn about the gross elements is intolerably confused, and is clearly the result of metaphysical ideas rather than of actual observation. The only department in which any progress can be discerned is in the matter of psychology and here we do indeed see more definiteness of outline than we have found in the Upanishads. But this is rather the result of the method of the Sāṅkhya in fixing upon definite numbers for everything than of any real advance in the power of explanation.

In other words, we have in the Sāṅkhya not a scientific system but another method for the attainment of release. It would not be necessary to insist upon this aspect of the Sāṅkhya, since it is held in common by all the systems which we have studied,

[1] 'For the series "From prakṛiti the great, from the great ahaṅkāra," Scripture alone is the authority,' writes Vijñānabhikshu. See Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 274.

were it not that the Sāṅkhya has sometimes been interpreted as the only 'rational' form of Indian philosophy, and as a system of 'natural' science. While the Sāṅkhya does, as we have seen, speak much of 'nature', prakṛiti is from first to last a purely metaphysical notion, and far removed from any scientific conceptions. The lack of interest in scientific matters in the *Kārikā* may be seen, if nowhere else, from the single fact that while it propounds the theory that the variety of the world is caused by the varying combinations of the guṇas, no attempt is made to work this out in more than the vaguest outline.

The further problem which we have before us is in regard to the origin of the Sāṅkhya. This is an intricate and difficult question and perhaps cannot be fully and finally answered in the light of existing knowledge. That the Sāṅkhya is dependent upon the conceptions of the Upanishads, and that it represents a later stage in the working out of their views, does, we believe, admit of satisfactory proof. But between the time of the Upanishads and the date of our earliest definite document of the Sāṅkhya system lies a gap where the growth of thought can be traced only with some degree of conjecture. While we do have certain source material in the documents of Buddhism and the philosophical sections of the *Mahābhārata*, these sources are in themselves difficult to evaluate, and the connexions which they give with the Sāṅkhya are of an uncertain and ambiguous character. Any attempted reconstruction in detail, therefore, of the origin of the Sāṅkhya system must be a matter of hypothesis; but this need not prevent us from grasping the main outlines of the process. We shall, then, first attempt to show the dependence of the Sāṅkhya upon the Upanishads for its main conceptions, while we indicate whatever evidence we may gain from elsewhere for the details of the development.

We have already indicated in our chapter on the Sāṅkhya in the Upanishads what we believe to be the chief instances of the growth of the conceptions which were taken over by the Sāṅkhya. In regard to much of this mass of detail, it is quite impossible to believe that the conceptions originated with the Sāṅkhya and were borrowed from it by the Upanishads. The lists of the senses and the elements are clearly in process of development in the Upanishads, since they are put forward tentatively at first, and then are modified and readjusted so that in the later Upanishads we have the Sāṅkhya lists as the product of an evolution of thought which is before our eyes in all its stages. Not only in this, but in the development of the Sāṅkhya series of evolution, it appears to be impossible to escape the conclusion that the Sāṅkhya represents a borrowing from the *Kaṭha* and not vice versa. No explanation is available in the Sāṅkhya for the order of evolution, while in the *Kaṭha* it is easily explicable as the development of conceptions previously held in the Upanishads. We have already pointed out in some detail the dependence of the Sāṅkhya idea of purusha upon Yājñavalkya's conception of the Ātman.

But it is when we come to the underlying conceptions of the Sāṅkhya that its dependence upon the Upanishads becomes most evident. The Sāṅkhya like the Vedānta accepts without question the theory of transmigration, and much of its psychological theory of the *liṅgam* and the fine elements is due to its attempts to make this theory intelligible. There can be surely little question that we are near the origin of this theory in the Upanishads, where in the earlier passages it is somewhat tentatively introduced. It is not plausible to suppose that the Sāṅkhya made this discovery again on its own account, and did not merely accept it from the Upanishads.

Another point in which the Sāṅkhya shows its derivative character is in its pessimism. The Vedic

literature and the greater part of the Upanishads are free from this characteristic feature of later Indian thought. But already in the teachings of Yājñavalkya we have the beginnings of a depreciation of ordinary life in comparison with the bliss of union with the Ātman, and one of his characteristic phrases is 'Aught else than this (i.e. union with the Ātman) is wretched'. With the progress of thought in the Upanishads, this is linked up with the doctrine of transmigration, so that already in the *Kaṭha* union with the absolute is thought of as bringing release from the round of saṁsāra, and the pessimism of the Sāṅkhya and of Buddhism represents a further stage in the same development.

Perhaps the clearest evidence of the dependence of the Sāṅkhya upon the thought of the Upanishads lies in its conceptions of release. Upon the Sāṅkhya's own hypothesis it is really inexplicable that release should ever become necessary. Matter and the soul are in reality separate from all eternity. Nothing ever really happens to the soul. No soul in reality is bound, or is liberated or migrates, as the *Kārikā* assures us.[1] Not only so, but matter is never really conscious so that it might be aware of its misery. We find only that the soul seems to be bound, that the evolutes of matter seem to be conscious.[2] The connexion of soul and body which alone makes misery possible is thus on the postulates of the *Kārikā* itself impossible. Nor do the illustrations which are given to explain this relationship assist us, since they are in fundamental contradiction to the absolute dualism which they are designed to illustrate. We can only understand the development of this contradiction as the result of historical conditions, viz. of the acceptance by the *Kārikā* without question of the conception of the purusha which brings this difficulty about. It is clear that the conception of a soul

[1] *Kārikā* 62. [2] See especially *Kārikā* 20.

from which all activity is taken away and which is thus pure subject is the legitimate successor of the Ātman in the teachings of Yājñavalkya. The difficulty into which the Sāṅkhya comes of finding any real relation between such a Self and the world is already implicit in that theory, but is not urgent there. The later Vedānta found its solution in the theory of illusion, but while this seems to be the necessary conclusion of the Sāṅkhya, the inference that the soul in thinking itself bound is misled by ignorance is never actually drawn. Further, the difficulties of the Sāṅkhya are increased by the multiplication of souls. Where the Ātman is conceived as one, the bisection of the universe into subject and object is comprehensible, in spite of its obvious difficulties. But when we have a plurality of knowing subjects, it appears no longer intelligible to limit the object merely to the material world. It would appear necessary to consider the other knowing selves also as in some sense object if they are to enter into the system at all.

Not only are the general conceptions which concern release intelligible only in the light of the development of the Upanishads, but the particular knowledge which brings release is related in the closest way to the similar knowledge of the Vedānta system. In surveying the conception of avidyā in Śaṅkara's system, we found that the typical wrong knowledge was that which confused the Self with things outside the Self, with the senses, or with the internal organ.[1] While knowledge for the Vedānta thus consists on its positive side in knowing that one is identical with the Ātman, it equally consists on the negative side in knowing one's difference from the world of appearance. If this resemblance were discoverable only with the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, it

[1] See chap. v, pp. 156–8.

might prove that the Vedānta had been influenced in this point by Sāṅkhya views and not vice versa. But we find the same conception of release also in the Upanishads. In the *Kaṭha*,[1] we find the thought of Yoga as a means for suppressing the external world and the lower senses in order to come to the Ātman alone, and in the Yoga system the negative ideal of discriminating between the Self and matter is emphasized as well as the positive attempt to come to the vision of the true Self.[2] While the Sāṅkhya idea of discrimination between the Self and matter appears then at first sight as opposed to the Vedānta principle of identification, it may be recognized on reflection as but the reverse side of the same conception.

In spite of these similarities between the Upanishads and the Sāṅkhya, with the points of dependence which they imply, it may yet not unreasonably be maintained that at one point, at least, the Sāṅkhya does introduce an idea which is entirely foreign to the Upanishads. The outstanding feature of the Sāṅkhya is that it contains no reality which combines the dissevered members of subject and object, and in this it must be acknowledged that the Upanishads furnish no parallel. A closely related point is the fact that the Sāṅkhya is an atheistic system, for while it recognizes the gods, and in fact eight classes of them, no one of them is essentially different from the human spirit, and no one has any special power to assist man in his search for release. To consider first this latter question, the Sāṅkhya, although it differs from the theistic Upanishads, is not far removed from the earlier doctrine of the Upanishads, since they, too, recognize only the subordinate place of the Vedic gods. In fact, atheism has never been the serious charge in Indian philosophy which it has been in the West, and even the most orthodox of the six schools, the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā,

[1] *Kaṭha*, 3. 13. [2] See Keith, *Sāṁkhya System*, p. 56.

is traditionally associated with atheism. Further, in regard to the first point, while it is true that the Sāṅkhya denied an absolute, it assigned to its prakṛiti and purusha between them, much the same functions as had belonged to the absolute alone. In the conception of Brahma as it develops in the Upanishads, we may distinguish two separate strands. It is in the first place the ultimate basis of the world, and in the second place it is the subject in consciousness. These two notions which are clearly brought together only in a fairly developed stage of thought, did not remain entirely at one. There was always a tendency to separate between the individual Self and the cause of the world, and this tendency in the *Śvetāśvatara* has gone so far as to create a new theological expression. Now it appears that in the Sāṅkhya the same uneasiness is working, although the solution which it arrives at is not the same as that of the *Śvetāśvatara*. The cosmic functions of Brahma are merely transferred to prakṛiti, and this henceforth takes the same place in the system as the final cause of the world which Brahma had had in the Vedānta. On the other hand, the conception of Brahma as knowing subject is transferred to the purusha, and as we have seen, the soul in the Sāṅkhya is Yājñavalkya's Ātman with its cosmic attributes removed. With this elimination of cosmic significance from the purusha, the chief reason for urging its uniqueness disappeared, and the way was opened for the Sāṅkhya's plurality of souls, although, as we have seen, not without introducing thereby confusion into the system in other respects.

As against the view which has here been outlined, that the Sāṅkhya is ultimately to be explained on the basis of the Upanishads, the most serious dissentient opinion is that of Garbe, whose extensive work on the Sāṅkhya system entitles him to special consideration. The essentials of his view are as follows: The Sāṅkhya did not arise from the views of the Upanishads, but as

a clear reaction against them.[1] Its animus against Brahmanism is exemplified by the antagonism shown by the *Kārikā* to the sacrifice.[2] The Sāṅkhya arose in eastern India, and was the product of the Kshatriyas.[3] It is clearly pre-Buddhistic.[4] The Sāṅkhya is, on the other hand, entirely unknown to the older Vedic literature and to the older Upanishads, but came into existence between the time of the older prose Upanishads and the *Kaṭha*.[5] References in the later Upanishads which contain Sāṅkhya expressions are therefore to be explained as the result of Sāṅkhya influence, and not vice versa. Finally, Garbe finds his theory of the Sāṅkhya confirmed by the recent discovery of Kauṭilya's *Artha Śāstra*, which mentions as systems of philosophy the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata (or materialism), but not the Vedānta.[6]

We will indicate briefly our own views on the points which Garbe has raised. In regard to the first point, that the Sāṅkhya represents a reaction against the philosophy of the Upanishads, this is in a certain sense true, in that any later view represents a certain degree of reaction against the older view on which it is based. But it appears to us that Garbe very seriously minimizes the actual dependence of the Sāṅkhya which we have endeavoured to make clear above. It is also perfectly true that the Sāṅkhya does represent a reaction against the sacrificial ritual; but this merely continues a tendency which is observable in the early Upanishads. We may see in the *Kārikā's* reference to the impurity of the Vedic sacrifices a reference to the doctrine of non-injury (*ahiṁsā*) of animals, which was not characteristic of the older Vedic religion, but which became widespread, especially in Jainism, and is prevalent in modern India. But this is surely not a mere reaction against Brahmanism,

[1] 'Sāṅkhya', in *ERE*. vol. XI, p. 189. [2] *Kārikā* 2.
[3] *Sāṅkhya Philosophie*, p. 13. [4] ibid. p. 15. [5] ibid. p. 32.
[6] ibid. p. 3.

but a natural corollary of the doctrine of transmigration, which we have seen growing up in the Upanishads. The view that the Sāṅkhya is due to Kshatriya rather than Brahman thought receives a certain support from the fact that the, in some ways, parallel movements of Buddhism and Jainism are known to have developed under Kshatriya leadership. The argument, however, cannot well be urged by Garbe, since he elsewhere maintains that the Upanishads are also due to the Kshatriyas, and he would thus have not merely a revolt against the Brahmans in the supposed Kshatriya authors of the Upanishads, but also a further reaction of one party of Kshatriyas against another in the growth of the Sāṅkhya. For our own part, we do not find evidence that the development of thought took place so rigidly on caste lines as some writers appear to imagine. The thought of transmigration and release took a powerful hold upon the minds of all, at least upon all members of the higher castes, and the Upanishads give us abundant evidence that caste lines in that age were not drawn so strictly as to make it impossible for a Brahman to teach a Kshatriya or even a Śūdra, or on the other hand for a Brahman to gain information from a Kshatriya. As for Garbe's view that the Sāṅkhya grew up in eastern India, it is not impossible that such may have been the case, since Yājñavalkya, if indeed we can attach any historic importance to this name, is said to have taught in Videha, and since we have seen some connexion between his views and those of the Sāṅkhya. On the other hand, the explanation of the name of Buddha's birthplace, Kapilavastu, as the town of Kapila, the reputed founder of the Sāṅkhya, cannot be taken as of very great weight. Whether or not the Sāṅkhya is pre-Buddhistic is a difficult question to which we shall give attention a little later. In our opinion the evidence is too uncertain to be of much weight for the interpretation

of the relations between the Upanishads and the Sāṅkhya. Garbe maintains that there are no references to the Sāṅkhya in the Upanishads before the *Kaṭha*. On the other hand, we have found there striking resemblances of thought. He also maintains that the references in the later Upanishads show their knowledge of the Sāṅkhya and represent the attempts of their authors to meet the Sāṅkhya view. But it appears to say the least remarkable that if before the time of the *Kaṭha* a system existed which denied some of the fundamental presuppositions of the Upanishads, and in fact was a general reaction against them, as Garbe's theory requires, there should have been no attack upon this theory in the Upanishads, but instead an eager attempt to harmonize their teachings with its views. The *Śvetāśvatara* is by no means free from polemics against opposing views, but we have seen reason to believe that the Sāṅkhya was not one of them. Logically, as we have said in our previous chapter, it is possible to make the hypothesis that there was a Sāṅkhya system from which the Upanishads borrowed. But in the absence of any evidence for such a system, beyond what may be gained from the Upanishads themselves, it seems to be an unnecessary assumption. As for the passage in the *Arthā Śāstra*, not only do interpretations differ, but the date and hence the value of the treatise as evidence are not free from doubt.[1]

There remains the question in regard to the evidence which can be gained from the early literature of Buddhism and from the philosophical portions of the *Mahābhārata* for the early history of the Sāṅkhya. These are matters of great difficulty, since it is by no means easy to determine what part of the Pāli canon represents the actual teaching of the Buddha himself, and what may be the result of later philosophical

[1] Keith, *Sāṅkhya System*, p. 58 gives references.

reflection. In the case of the epic, too, there is difficulty in dating the various philosophical sections, and some parts of them may be practically as late, or even later, than the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. Since these literary questions cannot be said to have reached as yet any satisfactory settlement, the use of the evidence of these sources for the understanding of the Sāṅkhya must be merely provisional.

That there should be some historical connexion between the Sāṅkhya and Buddhism appears at first sight to be probable in view of the denial of an Absolute which is made by both philosophies. The hypothesis is natural, then, that Buddhism works out in practical detail the metaphysical position of the Sāṅkhya. A closer comparison, however, shows that the fundamental metaphysical positions of the two systems are different, in that while both deny the existence of an absolute, Buddhism denies the existence of the soul as a metaphysical entity as well. It is clear that the two systems are related by reason of the fact that both depend for their fundamental conceptions upon the teachings of the Upanishads, but if the claim for any nearer connexion is made, convincing evidence is difficult to secure. The attempt has often been made to connect the Buddhist chain of twelve causes with the Sāṅkhya doctrine of evolution. There is resemblance in so far as both represent schemes of evolution, but in details the two are far from coinciding. Further possible resemblances are to be seen in the Buddhist doctrine of *saṁskāras*, or predispositions, since the word is to be found also in a similar sense in *Kārikā* 67. The general notions of release in the two systems also show some similarity. But in spite of the possibility that there is some historical relation between the two systems, the evidence is not conclusive that we have more than can be explained by the common dependence of the systems upon the Upanishads and the common milieu in which they

worked. In any case we gain no further light for the understanding of the development of the Sāṅkhya.[1]

The case is somewhat otherwise in the philosophical portions of the epic. There we have frequent mention of a Sāṅkhya system which evidently is at least in some instances conceived as agreeing with the classical Sāṅkhya in denying the existence of the absolute, although the writer of the epic endeavours as far as possible to emphasize its agreement with other systems of thought which acknowledge an Absolute. This Sāṅkhya differs, however, in some details from the classical Sāṅkhya,[2] although it agrees with it in being a system of twenty-five principles. It is closely associated with the theistic Yoga, which differs from it only in adding a creative God as its twenty-sixth principle. In endeavouring to trace the growth of the Sāṅkhya, however, it is difficult to make effective use of this epic evidence. The epic is evidently only a popular presentation of philosophy, and does not show any very great degree of philosophic acumen, so that it frequently places side by side opposing views without any apparent realization of their contradiction. Attempts have been made to find a consistent system in the epic, or to explain the contradictions by a complicated theory of different sources and reductions, but the most probable view is that the writers were merely unaware that the views which they expressed were not in harmony with each other. Thus Hopkins finds present in epic philosophy no less than six philosophic strands, namely, Vedic orthodoxy, the doctrine of Brahma without illusion, the doctrine of Brahma with illusion, the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, and the sectarian systems which taught the worship of Śiva and Vishṇu.

[1] See Keith, *Sāṁkhya System*, pp. 20–28, where the relations between the Sāṅkhya and Buddhism are thoroughly examined.

[2] The epic Sāṅkhya says nothing about the tanmātras. See Keith, *Sāṁkhya System*, p. 37.

and thought not only in the epic but in the later Viśishṭādvaita school makes it appear probable that there had been a time when the two schools had been fundamentally in harmony.[1]

If we should accept this hypothesis that the Sāṅkhya is to be explained as a development from the theistic Upanishads, especially the *Kaṭha* and the *Śvetāśvatara*, although not without the use of the absolutism of Yājñavalkya, we might reconstruct the origin of the Sāṅkhya as follows. We would find the historical origin of the Sāṅkhya in the *Kaṭha* evolutionary series, which derives all being from purusha through successive stages. We would then find that the tendency of Yājñavalkya's logic to make the Ātman more and more inactive would finally make the Purusha incapable of even producing a series of evolution from itself. It would then be relegated to the position which it holds in the Sāṅkhya system of being a mere seer, while the actual development of the world takes place from prakṛiti. On the other hand the three categories of the *Śvetāśvatara* were already providing the basis for a distinction between the individual self and the world, which with the distinction in Yājñavalkya's thought between subject and object could easily become complete. It is perhaps also possible to trace a connexion between the three principles of the *Śvetāśvatara* and the three categories of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Prakṛiti is present in both series, although its functions are not altogether the same. We have already pointed more than once to the resemblance between the supreme Self of the Upanishads and the purushas of the Sāṅkhya. The third member of the Sāṅkhya list, the

[1] One of the most noteworthy adaptations of Sāṅkhya material in the epic is the identification by the Bhāgavatas of their system of emanations (*vyūhas*) from Vishṇu with the Sāṅkhya principles. From Vāsudeva, the supreme reality, springs Saṅkarshana or prakṛiti, from Saṅkarshana, Pradyumna or manas; from Pradyumna, Aniruddha, or *ahaṅkāra*; from Aniruddha, Brahma or the elements. See Farquhar, *ORLI*. p. 98.

Manifested, at first sight appears to be the empirical world, but we found in our explanation of the *Kārikā*, at how many points it resisted that interpretation, and in how many ways it was comparable to the empirical individual. Even in its doctrine of the elements, the thought is almost completely of their relation to the individual life, and the status of the external inanimate world is left almost entirely unsettled. The opinion that there are two kinds of individual souls, a metaphysical and an empirical one (*bhūtātman*) is also contained in the *Maitri*. With the division of the Ātman into individual purushas (which as we have seen may have been aided by the transference of cosmical functions to prakṛiti), the need for any additional Absolute drops into the background, and while it continued among those who were theistically inclined as the twenty-sixth principle of the Yoga, it was ultimately dropped entirely by the Sāṅkhya. The tendency of the Sāṅkhya to rely upon reason rather than upon Scripture may have been either the result of a desire for the rational establishment of its principles for their own sake, such as may be found also in the history of western medieval theology, or of the need for a means of proving its principles to the Buddhists.[1]

It must be owned that such a reconstruction as we have here offered contains hypothetical elements, and

[1] This last is the opinion of Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 253: 'The Sāṅkhya did not become a well co-ordinated system until after the rise of Buddhism. When Buddhism offered a challenge to realism, the Sāṅkhya accepted the challenge and argued on strictly rational grounds for the reality of selves and objects.'

Keith does not believe that a system which does not deny an absolute can be properly called Sāṅkhya. He does, however, believe that it represents a growth from the Upanishads, although he has not attempted to describe the process with the definiteness with which I have tried to represent it above. Thus he says (*Sāṁkhya System*, p. 46): 'The system on close examination can be seen to be a somewhat illogical reduction of principles which are expressed in the Brahman philosophy of the Upanishads, and in opposition to the theory of a rapid development (as held by Garbe, who believes that the theory is the work of a single independent thinker) must be set the far more probable theory of slow growth, which can be traced through the later Upanishads, the *Kaṭha* and the *Śvetāśvatara*, which have clear traces of the doctrine of evolution of principles in the Sāṅkhya manner.'

that it cannot be fully proved with our present command of source material. On the other hand, our main proposition, that the Sāṅkhya is a derivative movement from the monism of the Upanishads admits of no such question, and this main fact rather than the detail of the method by which the development took place is the point of main interest for the history of Indian philosophy. The dualism of the Sāṅkhya was no original development of Indian thought, but contains in itself clear marks of its dependence upon an earlier monism. It is probable that the transition was made through a theistic view which distinguished more and more sharply between God, the individual soul, and the world. In any case, the Sāṅkhya itself was no attempt to gain a scientific view of the world, but was, like the other systems of Indian thought, a religious doctrine for the securing of release from transmigration.

CHAPTER X

CRITICISMS OF THE SYSTEMS UPON ONE ANOTHER

THE further one penetrates into the study of Indian philosophy the more one is impressed with the degree to which the understanding of any one system depends upon a knowledge of the systems which it was criticizing. While one may grasp the main points in the Vedānta or Sāṅkhya from the positive statements which these systems make, it is necessary for any complete understanding of the growth of these systems that we should remember that they did not develop *in vacuo*, but under the stress of criticism not merely from the schools which we have mentioned, but from other movements as well, some of which are but slightly known to us. In order to interpret properly the treatises of the philosophies which we have studied, it should first become possible to determine whether the critics who are so frequently introduced anonymously under the formula 'some one may object' (*iti cet*) are in each case actual rivals, or whether the objection is merely introduced in order to bring out the writer's own point of view; and further it should be possible in the former alternative to determine to what school the view referred to actually belonged. While this is possible in some cases, the Indian philosophic writers rarely referred to the names of their opponents, and often they did not even mention the school to which they belonged, so that our answer to these questions must be largely based upon conjecture.

An ideal presentation of the texts of these philosophies would, then, enable to see in detail the relations between the schools at every point. The present

chapter undertakes a much humbler task. While both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja refute many schools, in each case their principal attention is turned to only one opponent. In Śaṅkara this opponent is the Sāṅkhya while in Rāmānuja it is the Advaita school of Vedānta. As a completion of the accounts of their systems which we have already given, we here present a summary survey of these criticisms of other systems. This was not possible until we had gained some notion of the systems which were being criticized, but it is hoped that at this point it will throw light upon the systems of the critics and the criticized alike.

We begin with the criticism of the Sāṅkhya in Śaṅkara. It is clear that both the *Vedānta Sūtra* and Śaṅkara think of this as being their chief opponent, so that when the Sāṅkhya has been refuted the other erroneous schools are of little importance. Thus in *Sūtra*, 1. 4. 28 the statement is made 'Hereby all are explained, are explained,' which is interpreted by Śaṅkara to mean that with the refutation of the Sāṅkhya doctrine, all other erroneous views are at the same time refuted. 'Hence' says Śaṅkara, 'he (i.e. the writer of the *Sūtra*), like one who has overthrown the champion (of his opponents), extends his reasoning thus: "By this," i.e. by the combination of arguments refuting those who say that pradhāna (i.e. prakṛiti) is the cause, "all" i.e. those also who say that atoms, etc., are the cause, must be considered as "explained" by being refuted.'

It is important to realize that while Śaṅkara criticized the Sāṅkhya sharply, he did not entirely disapprove of the system. Some of its points he openly accepts, and since the doctrine is supported in some of the Smṛitis, it has a certain importance which he cannot entirely neglect. Further, there are some Vedānta texts which are capable of a Sāṅkhya interpretation. Thus in the commentary on the same Sūtra ,he says:' '(The doctrine of the pradhāna has

been so thoroughly refuted) because certain arguments in the Vedānta texts apparently support this opinion and at first sight might impose upon the dull-witted; moreover, because of its admission of the identity of cause and effect, it is nearly related to the Vedānta, and has been resorted to by some of the authors of Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, etc., in their books.'

In another passage he says that the Sāṅkhya has been refuted first 'because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda.'[1]

While Śaṅkara takes occasion to criticize the Sāṅkhya at frequent intervals throughout the comment on the Sūtras, his chief criticisms are gathered together in three sections, namely in the last section of the first book of the Sūtras and in the first two divisions of the second. The first of these three sections is principally concerned with showing that the interpretation of the passages from the Upanishads which had been used in a Sāṅkhya sense, was incorrect. The second deals with the refutation of the Sāṅkhya criticisms of the Vedānta, while the third gives the Vedānta criticisms of the Sāṅkhya. Although the first section contains specimens of acute Vedāntic exegesis, we confine our attention here chiefly to the third of these sections which is of most interest for our present purpose.

It is important to see just what aspect of the Sāṅkhya appeared to Śaṅkara as important, and for this purpose we quote the brief statement of the Sāṅkhya position which he places before his criticism.

'Then the Sāṅkhyas think as follows: "Just as in experience different objects—pots, dishes, etc.—consisting of clay, are seen to have as their presupposition the common character of clay, so it must be that all different things, external and psychic, consisting of

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 12.

pleasure, pain, and delusion have as their presupposition the common character of pleasure, pain, and delusion. This common character of pleasure, pain, and delusion, the pradhāna consisting of the three guṇas, although it is unconscious like clay, transforms itself of its own accord into different evolutes in order to accomplish the purpose of the conscious purusha." In that way one may prove (they believe) the existence of the pradhāna from other circumstances also, such as the limitation [of the evolutes]."[1]

It is clear that to Śaṅkara the chief point in the Sāṅkhya appeared to be its derivation of the world from a material principle through the mechanical operation of the guṇas. Against this position and in favour of a spiritual principle he uses the arguments from design and from the fact of motion to the unmoved mover which we have previously indicated.[2] He continues by attacking the difficult Sāṅkhya doctrine that the activity of the prakṛiti is unconscious and yet is directed toward a purpose. This was illustrated in the *Kārikā*, we remember, by the analogy of the milk which flows for the growth of the calf, although its production is unconscious.[3] A similar illustration which was known to Śaṅkara is that of water, which flows according to its own nature, but for the benefit of mankind. Śaṅkara's reply to the statement that these actions are unconscious is, first, to adduce the Scriptural statements that water flows because of Him 'who dwells within the water, who rules the water from within' and that it is 'by the command of that imperishable that some rivers flow to the East and some to the West'.[4] But arguments from reason may also be adduced. The cow is not an unintelligent being. Her flow of milk is the result of her love for her calf. The flowing of water takes place not at random, but in accordance with an intelligent principle,

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 1.
[2] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 1, 2. 2. 2.
[3] *Kārikā* 57.
[4] *Bṛih.* 3. 7. 4, 3. 8. 9.

namely that it seeks the lowest level.[1] Further, although the Sāṅkhyas posit the pradhāna as the material cause of the world, they assign no efficent cause, and it is difficult to see what in their system would ever start the world into motion. 'The three guṇas of the Sāṅkhyas when in a state of equipoise form the pradhāna. Beyond the pradhāna there exists no external principle which could either impel the pradhāna to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul (*purusha*) as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to—nor restrains from—action. As therefore the pradhāna stands in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself into the great principle (*mahat*) and sometimes not.'[2] Illustrations from the spontaneous modifying power of grass into milk are of no avail, since they take place under definite conditions, viz. the feeding of the grass to a cow, and in some cases as when a man deliberately feeds the grass in order to obtain milk, the efficent cause can be definitely fixed upon.[3] Again, the ascription of purpose to the pradhāna brings us into difficulties, both because contradictory purposes are ascribed to it, viz. the furnishing of enjoyment on the one hand, and release on the other, and because the idea of purpose is itself contradictory in the Sāṅkhya system. Purpose implies desire, and desire is impossible in the pradhāna because it is unconscious, and impossible in the purusha because it is inactive.[4] The Sāṅkhya illustration of the lame man and the blind one cannot be urged in proof, because this illustration itself contradicts the Sāṅkhya premises that the Self is entirely inactive and matter entirely unintelligent.[5] Since the two principles of the Sāṅkhya are independent of one another, relation between them can only be conceived

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 3.
[2] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 4.
[3] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 5.
[4] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 6.
[5] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 7.

with the aid of some third principle, and this the system denies. 'The pradhāna, then, being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle to connect them, there can be no connexion between the two.' If the Sāṅkhya in order to escape from these objections admits that the primal cause is after all intelligent, 'he would cease to be an antagonist, since the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world would be nothing else than the Vedāntic doctrine of Brahma'.[1]

Finally, the Sūtra says: 'And moreover [the Sāṅkhya doctrine] is objectionable on account of its contradictions.' Some of these are somewhat petty affairs. Thus Śaṅkara says: 'Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes eleven. In some places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed from the great principle, in other places again that they proceed from self-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs, sometimes of one only. That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts Śruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and Smṛiti, based on Śruti, is well known.—For these reasons also the Sāṅkhya system is objectionable.'[2]

One of the contradictions which Śaṅkara points out, however, is worthy of fuller mention. This is the central point of the system in regard to the misery for which it professes to give its remedy. Śaṅkara asks whether this misery is real or unreal. If the suffering is unreal, then either release from it is unnecessary, or the Sāṅkhya is compelled to accept the illusion doctrine of the Vedānta, since he would seek release not from a reality but from a false knowledge of reality. If on the other hand the misery is real, as the whole tendency of the Sāṅkhya indicates, then release from it cannot be achieved by mere knowledge, for it would

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 9. [2] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 10.

imply a real connexion between prakṛiti and purusha, which no knowledge could dissolve. Further, since the Sāṅkhya gives an eternal metaphysical place to prakṛiti, the bondage of the soul would likewise exist for ever.[1] The absolute dualism of the Sāṅkhya then, in Śaṅkara's opinion, is when seriously considered, self-contradictory.

This fundamental question of the ultimate basis of the world is the chief one raised by Śaṅkara in his criticism of the Sāṅkhya. Incidentally, however, we gain some idea of his views of the remainder of the system. He objects to the Sāṅkhya evolutionary series from prakṛiti as unproved by any evidence. At the same time, not all parts of it need to be rejected. 'The principles different from the pradhāna, but to be viewed as its modifications, which the [Sāṅkhya] Smṛiti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Smṛiti; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience—no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense—Smṛiti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown.'[2] With the treatment of the purusha in the Sāṅkhya, Śaṅkara finds himself in agreement, except for the statement that the souls are many. Thus he says: 'We willingly allow room for those portions of the two systems (i.e. the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga) which do not contradict the Veda. In their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities, the Sāṅkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 2. 11. [2] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 2.

person (*purusha*) is essentially pure.'[1] In view of the connexion which we discovered between the Yājñavalkya doctrine of the Ātman and the Sāṅkhyan purusha, this approval which Śaṅkara bestows on the system at this point is not without significance.

Although Rāmānuja in following the Sūtra gives a criticism of the Sāṅkhya, it is easy to see that the Sāṅkhya is not thought to be so dangerous an enemy as in the commentary of Śaṅkara, and in details one can even see that Rāmānuja accepts some of the Sāṅkhya positions. Thus, following the lead furnished by the *Śvetāśvatara Upanishad* and the *Bhagavadgītā* he brings the three guṇas into his own thought.[2] When it comes to the Advaita system, however, he admits of no compromise, and he believes that it is not only false but that it dangerously imperils men's prospects of salvation. The importance which he gives to it is shown by the fact that in the comment on the first Sūtra he introduces a prolonged account and refutation of the Advaita theory, which reaches such proportions that it practically forms a treatise in itself. While he returns to his criticism of this view again and again, this is the most important statement of his position, and we shall take it as the basis for our own exposition of his criticism.

We must remember that Rāmānuja lived nearly three centuries after Śaṅkara, and that in consequence the Advaita school had undergone some degree of transformation in the interval. The views which Rāmānuja criticizes are those of the Advaita teachers of his time, and it may be possible to detect certain shades of difference between the opinions refuted and those held by Śaṅkara.[3] It is noteworthy that Śaṅkara

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 2. 1. 3. [2] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 4. 23.

[3] It appears to us that the accounts of Śaṅkara's philosophy given by Dasgupta and especially by Radhakrishnan are more applicable to the views of the Advaita which we find in Rāmānuja, than to those which appear in Śaṅkara's own comment. This might be natural in view of the fact that neither of these writers attempts to distinguish sharply between the earlier

himself is not once mentioned by name in Rāmānuja's comment.

Rāmānuja first states the Advaita position with some fulness, giving in detail the arguments by which it might be supported, and refuting merely superficial objections to it. A test of the degree of fairness with which he accomplishes this task may be found in the fact that one may easily find this presentation of the Advaita more persuasive than Śaṅkara's own less systematic exposition. The fundamental position of the Advaita, as Rāmānuja conceives it, is as follows:

'Brahma, which is pure intelligence, and opposed to all difference constitutes the only reality; and everything else, i.e. the plurality of manifold knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, and acts of knowledge depending on those two, is only imagined on that Brahma, and is essentially false.'[1]

This primary statement is reinforced with ample quotations from the Upanishads, showing, first, that Brahma is the one substance, second, that the appearance of the world is only avidyā, and third, that avidyā is removed by true knowledge. If it is objected that perception is of greater force than Scripture, ample proofs of the authority of Scripture can be given, and apparent discrepancies in the testimony of Scripture can readily be explained. But it is not certain as the objector supposes, that perception does conflict with Scripture. On the other hand, an analysis of perception itself shows us that what it truly testifies to is substance without difference, while the appearance of difference is false. The very conception of difference is incapable of being logically defined, since it is

and later stages of the growth of the schools. It might also be accounted for from the fact that they do not limit their sources for Saṅkara as we have done to the *Sūtra-bhāshya*, but again, we are uncertain as to how much of the remainder of the supposed writings of Śaṅkara are not the product of a later time.

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 20.

neither the essential nature nor the quality of anything. It might be objected that at least we must admit a difference between consciousness and that which is the object of consciousness. But here again the Advaitin replies that it is just his position that being and consciousness are one. Consciousness is eternal and unchanging. Any fact which would seem to contradict this must be regarded merely as false. In particular the distinction between consciousness and the object of consciousness is the result of the introduction of the false idea of ahaṅkāra or self-consciousness. This illusion of individuality disappears in states of deep sleep and death. Rāmānuja concludes the statement as follows:

'As the outcome of all this, we (i.e. the Advaitins) sum up our view as follows: Eternal, absolutely nonchanging consciousness, whose nature is pure nondifferenced intelligence, free from all distinction whatever, owing to error illusorily manifests itself as broken up into manifold distinctions—knowing subjects, objects of knowing, acts of knowledge. And the purpose for which we enter on the consideration of the Vedānta texts is utterly to destroy what is the root of that error, i.e. Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm knowledge of the oneness of Brahma, whose nature is mere intelligence—free, pure, eternal.'[1]

Rāmānuja's own opinion of this view is then stated in language which makes clear his real abhorrence of the Advaita philosophy in spite of the apparent sympathy with which he had just expounded it. The severity of this statement might be put down to the controversial manners of the time except for the fact that Rāmānuja nowhere else even approaches the asperity of this passage:

'This entire theory,' he says, 'rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow and vicious arguments,

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, pp. 38, 39.

incapable of being stated in definite logical alternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are darkened by the impression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the nature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them, and into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge. This theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through texts, perception and the other means of knowledge—assisted by sound reasoning—have an insight into the true nature of things.'[1]

Rāmānuja first attacks the fundamental Advaita statement that there is one real substance without difference. Suppose that for the moment we grant this as an hypothesis. If it be true, how can any possible proof of its truth exist? Any proof demands that there should be distinction at least between the proof and the thing proved, and all the means of knowing operate only with regard to things which are affected with difference. If it is maintained that the one reality is in no need of proof, but is known intuitively, Rāmānuja replies that the report which he is able to bring from his own consciousness is that he is aware of difference and not of an un-differenced substance. Even the simplest act of perception involves the distinction between subject and object, if I only say 'I see'. Inference likewise implies difference, and if difference were removed from the knowledge gained, all judgments would become meaningless. 'If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, everything would be apprehended by one act of cognition; and from this it would follow that there are no

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 39.

persons either deaf or blind.'[1] What the eye sees is not mere being, rather it sees the qualities of colour, etc., which inhere in the thing. Plurality, then, is not unreal. So long as the objects which constitute our world do not contradict each other, they are entitled to a place in reality side by side. In a good deal of this consideration, Rāmānuja seems to be subject to the criticism from the side of the Advaita that it never maintained that the world in which the ordinary means of knowledge operate is a world without difference or plurality. But Rāmānuja still urges the point that no part of this conventional world should be used as a stepping-stone into the world of the undifferenced one. A person who uses the differences of this world to maintain that there is no reality except that which is without difference is no better than a man who asserts that his own mother never had any children. He contradicts himself without knowing what he does.[2]

Rāmānuja also objects to the statement that reality is to be equated with consciousness. The Advaitin speaks of consciousness as alone real, as if there could be a consciousness which was devoid of an object of consciousness. Since the consciousness itself can never be an object according to the Advaitin, there is no reason for thinking that such objectless consciousness is anything more than a mere fancy. Consciousness and knowledge, according to the testimony of grammarians and the universal usage of language, are relative terms and are meaningless apart from an object to which they relate. On the other hand, not only is the abstraction which considers it possible for consciousness to exist without an object false, but it is not even true that consciousness is never an object. It is possible for a person to judge of the consciousness of another, and to know something of it by

[1] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1.
[2] Comment on *V.S.* 1. 1. 1, *SBE.* vol. XLVIII, p. 43.

inference though not by immediate perception. Further, a man may make his own past mental states the objects of his present consciousness, as when he says, 'At one time I knew'. The conclusion which the Advaitins draw from this claim that consciousness is never an object, namely, that no attributes can be assigned to it, is thus seen to be ungrounded. Further, the theory is refuted by ample passages of Scripture. We will not examine this Scriptural evidence, except to call attention to the stress which Rāmānuja lays on passages which speak of attaining release by knowing Brahma. If Brahma were such that it could never become the object of consciousness, the knowledge of Brahma would be impossible, and release could never be secured.

The theory of avidyā also is subjected to criticism. The Advaita theory, in spite of its insistence that reality is nothing but pure undifferenced intelligence, yet maintains that avidyā exists. But if it exists, where does it exist? Is it in Brahma, or is it in individual souls? It cannot be in the latter, for the individual soul is itself the product of avidyā, and nothing real in itself. Nor can it be said that avidyā is to be found in Brahma, for Brahma is nothing but undifferenced intelligence, and is completely contradictory in character to all avidyā. Further, if avidyā has its basis in reality itself, all our efforts to attain release from it will be unavailing, and hence the practical aim of the system becomes utterly impossible. Not only is avidyā thus subjected to criticism, but the vidyā which removes it is equally incomprehensible. For if this knowledge is the knowledge that Brahma is pure knowledge, we already have a difference between the knowledge which constitutes the essence of Brahma, and the knowledge that it is so. However we take the theory it leads to endless contradictions, which Rāmānuja examines in detail, but which we will not attempt to repeat.

The sum of Rāmānuja's criticism of the Advaita is this, that all knowledge, instead of pointing, as the followers of Śaṅkara claimed, to a unity without duality, shows rather that difference is implicit in every act of knowledge. Even the texts which maintain the identity between the individual soul and Brahma, instead of proving this identity without difference, demonstrate diversity instead. The famous text, 'That thou art,' instead of meaning that there is but one substance, is in Rāmānuja's opinion the strongest evidence of diversity. For if 'thou' and 'that' were really absolutely identical, the judgment which connects them as subject and predicate would be tautological, and hence meaningless. It is possible to say that this merely proves that knowledge is not enough, and that reality can only be comprehended through some mystical experience. But Rāmānuja would add that the clearest reason which he had for objecting to the Advaita view of reality lay in religious experience, since this gave witness to the distinction between the individual and the supreme soul. Yet the distinction in Rāmānuja's mind is not absolute, and his theory of modes was designed to make possible a conception of the world as relative diversity and yet fundamental unity.

Neither the Sāṅkhya nor the Advaita were without reply to the criticisms which were levelled against them, and the subsequent development of Indian philosophy consists largely in the attempts of the adherents of each school to restate their case and to defend it against attack. It cannot be said that this debate has ever had any very definite conclusion, and in the nineteenth century the discussions of the schools were still being carried on. But with the passage of time, some of the fundamental presuppositions held by all the schools alike have ceased to be convincing, and if the conflict is to be further prolonged, it is evident that the questions must be expressed in other forms. It is not

necessary for us, then, to undertake to judge which of these philosophies has the most claim to final truth, and since little radically new was developed in Indian thought after this classical period, we may here bring our study to a close.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSIONS

WE have now come to the end of the task which we set before ourselves at the beginning of our work. We shall here merely gather together the main positions which we have maintained in previous chapters. We set them forth in summary form as follows:

1. The period of greatest significance for original thought in the history of Indian philosophy is that which begins not long before 500 B.C. and which closes about A.D. 1100.

2. Among the many so-called systems of Indian philosophy, we may distinguish three which are in their first intention metaphysical. These are the two chief forms of the Vedānta, and the Sāṅkhya.

3. The Upanishads cannot legitimately be treated as a single unified philosophical source. In addition to large quantities of non-philosophical material, they contain many divergent philosophical points of view. To speak therefore of 'the philosophy of the Upanishads' is likely to be misleading.

4. The contents of the Upanishads is determined partly by the fact that the word 'Upanishad' means 'a secret', and partly by the use of the Upanishads in education. After the period of the early Upanishads, the term 'Upanishad' comes to stand merely for a dogmatic theological treatise.

5. The literary form of the earlier sources of Indian philosophy is in large part to be explained by the fact that they were meant to be committed to memory rather than read.

6. Indian philosophical thought, both in its origin and through every step of its development is most closely connected with religion.

7. Although both the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya acknowledge the authority of the Vedic Scriptures in some sense, they were successful in working out exegetical distinctions which allowed their own thought to proceed largely unhampered by this doctrine.

8. The doctrine of transmigration is assumed without proof through the entire period with which we are concerned, and has an important influence in determining the aim of all thinking.

9. The institution of caste was less rigid in the time of the Upanishads than it later became. Its influence upon thought may be seen in the lack of contact between philosophy and technical knowledge, and in the failure of the philosophies to take serious account of ethical and political questions.

10. The motive for gaining knowledge in Indian thought is throughout practical. In the early Upanishads the motive is often the attainment of material ends. In the later systems it is to secure release from transmigration.

11. Indian thought is distinguished by its almost complete lack of contact with any conception of physical or mathematical science. It may therefore be compared more fairly with early Greek or with medieval philosophy than with modern western thought.

12. The thought of the Upanishads arises not from one or two interests, but from at least five which may be distinguished. These are, the interest in finding the secret correspondences or identifications of things, the interest in the origin or basis of the world, the interest in the human body and mind, the interest in the fate of the soul after death, and the interest in the nature of the ultimate reality.

13. A large number of conceptions of the ultimately real are to be found in the Upanishads. These may be classified into conceptions of the real as a substance, of the real as a force, and of the real as the

object of supreme value. It must be recognized, however, that no such clear distinctions are made by the Upanishads themselves, where we frequently have all these ideas more or less completely blended.

14. The conceptions of the ultimately real in the Upanishads can also be classified according to their source as derived from either the physical world, or from the religious ritual, or from the human body and mind, or from abstract ideas.

15. The lists of dependent entities which are frequent in the early Upanishads result in part from the attempt to reconcile various conceptions of the ultimate reality.

16. While the word 'pantheism' may be conventionally used for describing one of the principal tendencies of the Upanishads, the use of this word is in danger of causing misunderstanding. In the most typical of the so-called pantheistic passages, the conception of immanentism is also present.

17. In the view ascribed to Yājñavalkya, that the Ātman is the subject in knowledge, and hence not capable of positive description, we have a position of the utmost importance for the later development of thought.

18. The philosophy of Śaṅkara is the legitimate development of the teachings of Yājñavalkya. While it is probable that Śaṅkara was in some degree influenced by Buddhism, such influence was indirect and subordinate.

19. Śaṅkara's main significance is that he is a harmonizer and systematizer of the Hindu faith. His main interest is to provide an adequate dogmatic basis for his religion through his exegesis of the Upanishads and the *Vedānta Sūtras*.

20. While Śaṅkara's distinction between metaphysical and empirical knowledge (vidyā and avidyā) is of genuinely philosophical significance, an important use which he makes of it is in harmonizing apparently discordant Scriptural teachings.

21. Yājñavalkya's insistence upon the Ātman as subject and upon its unknowability is clearly seen to exercise influence upon the thought of the later Upanishads.

22. The theism of the *Kaṭha* and *Śvetāśvatara* Upanishads is an outgrowth of the old Vedic polytheism, which is, however, transformed through the influence of the pantheism and absolutism of the earlier Upanishads.

23. Tendencies in the direction of theism may be seen in the earlier Upanishads and even in the teachings of Yājñavalkya.

24. Theism receives its most definite expression in the Upanishads in the *Śvetāśvatara*, with its three categories of God, the soul, and prakṛiti. But even here there is some admixture of other views.

25. The fundamental basis of Rāmānuja's thought is to be found in the *Śvetāśvatara*.

26. Rāmānuja's primary significance is that he is the theologian of the Vaishṇava religious movement in south India.

27. Rāmānuja's chief philosophical contribution lies in his attempts to explain how it is possible that there should be diversity in unity. This he endeavours to accomplish by his theory of modes and by his conception that God is the soul of the world.

28. Definite dualistic teachings are not to be found in the Upanishads, nor is it certain that Sāṅkhyan dualism was known to any of the classical Upanishads with the exception of the *Maitri*.

29. Yet, the greater part of the detail of the Sāṅkhya system is to be found in the Upanishads.

30. The Sāṅkhya is certainly dependent upon the Upanishads for its origin. Dualism is thus in India the outgrowth of monistic tendencies.

31. Specifically, the Sāṅkhya may have grown out of the theistic tendecies of the *Kaṭha* and *Śvetāśvatara* Upanishads, and may have been in an early

stage 'a kind of realistic theism, approaching the Viśishṭādvaita view of the Upanishads'.

32. Śaṅkara criticizes the Sāṇkhya as self-contradictory when it holds on the one hand that prakṛiti and purusha are absolutely distinct, and on the other hand that they are always connected in the ordinary course of life.

33. Rāmānuja's chief criticism of the Advaita is that knowledge always implies difference, and hence no reality which can be known can be the ultimate reality demanded by the Advaita.

34. The debates between the philosophical systems in India have tended to disappear not because of the settlement of the questions at issue, but because of diminished confidence in their common underlying assumptions.

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POSTSCRIPT

The following misplacements of diacritical marks and other errata have been noticed in the text too late for alteration in this edition: P. 16, line 14 from top, read *karma-kāṇḍa* for *karma-kaṇḍa*; p. 16, line 16 from top, read *jñāna-kāṇḍa* for *jñāna-kaṇḍa*; p. 17, note 1, line 7, read fusion for fushion; p. 17, note 2, line 3, after *Taittirīya* insert *Aitareya*; p. 26, line 2 from foot, read *Brahmodyas* for *Brāhmodyas*; p. 26, last line, read Brahma for Brāhma; p. 27, note 1, read Brahmodyas for Brāhmodyas; p. 30, line 3 from foot, read Brahma for Brāhma; p. 30, note 1, line 2, read Brahmā for Brahma; p. 41, line 15 from foot, read it for him; p. 42, line 13 from foot, read Sūtras for Sūtras'; p. 46, note 3, lines 3 and 4, read (in Tamil *Vaduganambi*) for in Tamil (*Vaduganambi*); p. 47, line 18 from top, read *Śrībhāshya* for *Śrī-bhashya*; p. 80, note 1, read *Chānd.* 4.4. 1–2 for *Chānd.* 4.4, 44.12; p. 99, note 1, under references to *Bṛih.* delete 3.4–5; p. 102, note 1, read *Chānd.* 3.18 for *Chānd.* 39.18; p. 131, line 5 from top, read truth for trust; p. 138, line 3 from foot, read Madhva for Mādhava; p. 143, line 8 from foot, read Māyā for Maya; p. 167, note 1, line 18, read dvaita for advaita; p. 170, line 17 from foot, read dreams for dramas; p. 196, line 2 from top, read (*īśā*) for (*īsā*); p. 198, line 4 from foot, read *īśāna* for *īsāna*; p. 263, line 10 from foot, read odour for order.

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